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THE EVOLUTION OF HAITIAN PEASANT LAND
TENURE: A CASE STUDY IN AGRARIAN
ADAPTATION TO POPULATION GROWTH.
(VOLUMES I AND II)

Columbia University, Ph.D., 1977
Anthropology, cultural

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THE EVOLUTION OF HAITIAN PEASANT LAND TENURE:
A CASE STUDY IN AGRARIAN ADAPTATION
TO POPULATION GROWTH

Gerald Francis Murray

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in the Faculty of Political Science

Columbia University
1977
ABSTRACT

THE EVOLUTION OF HAITIAN PEASANT LAND TENURE:
A CASE STUDY IN AGRARIAN ADAPTATION
TO POPULATION GROWTH

GERALD FRANCIS MURRAY

This study, based on twenty-one months of fieldwork, documents the occurrence of "cultural evolution" in the form of a series of adaptive land-sharing strategies that have emerged in a Haitian peasant community, serving as a partial buffer against the deleterious impact of internal population growth. The recent anthropological literature on agricultural intensification emphasizes adaptive changes in technology as an agrarian response to population growth. Population growth in Haiti, however, has led to a transformation, not of technology, but of land tenure, in the form of ritually mediated resource-sharing patterns that permit the bulk of the population to remain on the land despite serious intergenerational decreases in average landholding size. Analyzing quantitative data on land tenure within an evolutionary paradigm, the study gives a step-by-step systems analysis of the mechanics of this demographically triggered transformation and exposes the still somewhat latent structure of the new adaptation that has been devised, giving particular attention to the unexpected but statistically impressive intervention of Haitian "voodoo" in the arena of land control.

The presentation is divided into three parts. Part One places the Haitian peasant in historical and structural perspective, dedicating two chapters to an anthropological reconstruction of the emergence of peasant lifeways in Haiti. A further chapter discusses the contemporary structures of civil and military control by which the peasant of today is tied into the larger society. Part Two then turns to the research community.
Life in the village of Kinanbwa is described, with particular emphasis being given to those peasant lifespheres most directly affected by the process of internal population growth.

Part Three zeroes in on the land tenure system itself. The occurrence of recent evolution manifests itself in the form of a puzzling discrepancy between the land tenure system reported to prevail in Haiti and the system which a plot-by-plot analysis actually reveals in Kinanbwa. What was expected was an inheritance system, in which most plots would have been under the control of owners who had received them from parents. What emerged instead was a system in which most plots were being sharecropped. Instead of the traditional life cycle, now the typical cultivator begins as a sharecropper, purchases land in his mid-thirties, and in turn shares this land out with other tenants in the community, nonetheless remaining a tenant on one or more plots himself. A complex web of intracommunity sharecropping emerges as the backbone of the contemporary land tenure system.

The task of accounting for this system is approached both diachronically and synchronically. Diachronically the system is shown to be the transformed "descendant" of what in fact was a more traditional inheritance system. A model is constructed simulating the step-by-step conversion, under demographic stress, of a traditional inheritance system into a system whose transformed descendant is one of reliance on stratum internal sharecropping. The model is tested and validated with quantitative data.

But in the final chapter a synchronic riddle is also solved. Analysis had shown that most of the peasants now purchase land and eventually become landlords themselves. But such a system has a built-in
design problem which must be solved. In a society such as Haiti where land is scarce and valued, who is doing all of this land selling? Land transaction data indicate that the vast majority of land sales are made by the peasants themselves to finance obligatory rituals of the ancestor cult. Thus rural Haitian voodoo emerges as a latent regulatory device sustaining a critical flow of land and functions thus as a mainspring mechanism in the resource-circulating strategies which this population has evolved under the impact of population pressure.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The fieldwork on which these pages are based was carried out from October of 1971 to August of 1973 in a rural community of some 250 households in the Cul-de-Sac Plain of Haiti. The name given to the community in this presentation—Kinanbwa—is a pseudonym, as is the name of the town to which it is administratively attached, Les Bayahondes. At every stage of the research—preparation, funding, fieldwork itself, preliminary processing of the data, and writing up of the results—I have received generous support from many individuals and institutions, support which I wish to acknowledge here.

Among the many things an anthropologist needs, there are three that appear particularly critical: a region in which to work, a method for collecting information, and a theory to give meaning to that information. For these basics I am indebted to Professors Lambros Comitas, Conrad Arensberg, and Marvin Harris. It has been my good fortune to have Professor Comitas as an advisor for the past seven years. Under his tutelage my "pre-anthropological" fascination with the Caribbean has been preserved, but transformed into a much more systematic intellectual involvement. But his support has extended into other areas as well and—perhaps to a greater degree than he realizes—what I have been able to learn from him goes far beyond the content of the anthropology which I have studied with him. My gratitude to Professor Arensberg is also deep. His encouraging reactions to different phases of this research have put wind in sails that were more than once in danger of growing slack. And his continuing insistence that there are, after all, peasants outside of the Caribbean with whose lifeways I should become familiar has given me
a more powerful comparative perspective on the peasants of Hispaniola. But most importantly the community study method, which he has pioneered and defended, has served as the basic blueprint for the research which I have carried out. And from Professor Harris I have learned a number of basic conceptual strategies, without which I would almost certainly have missed a number of important patterns in Kinanbwa which have come to constitute the axis of the analysis to be made here. I stand in profound personal and intellectual debt to these three anthropologists and am honored to have had them on my dissertation committee.

The research in Haiti itself would not have been possible were it not for Dr. Samuel M. Wishik, then Director of the Division of Social and Administrative Sciences of Columbia University's International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction. I am grateful to him for the extraordinary financial, logistical, and interdisciplinary support which he secured for me to carry out research in Haiti. It was Dr. Wishik who made fieldwork possible by his assistance in obtaining for me an A.I.D. funded Overseas Population Internship in the Department of Population Planning at the University of Michigan. But of even greater significance was the ongoing intellectual and moral support he provided throughout fieldwork in Kinanbwa, responding quickly and perceptively to preliminary field reports, arranging for other professionals of the Institute to visit Kinanbwa, financing a trip back to New York City for mid-project discussion, and eventually flying to Haiti to visit Kinanbwa himself. It is rare for a graduate student to find such intellectual and material support. I am deeply indebted to Dr. Wishik
and hope that I will one day be able to give to other students the
type of support that he has given to me. It was Susan Klein, formerly
a health professional of the Institute, who first put me in touch
with the Institute. Kwan-Hwa Chen, a demographer of the Institute,
spent several months with us in Kinanbwa. And Dr. Susan Scrimshaw,
a fellow anthropologist, visited the village briefly and provided a
comparative perspective from the work she had just completed in
Ecuador. To these colleagues I am grateful.

In Haiti itself the carrying out of fieldwork was greatly
facilitated by the support and assistance of Dr. Ary Bordes,
Director of the Centre d'Hygiène Familiale, and Head of the Division
d'Hygiène Familiale of the Département de la Santé Publique et de
la Population. Dr. Bordes was instrumental in obtaining the neces­
sary permissions to carry out fieldwork, introduced me to the
authorities of the town of Les Cayes, and throughout fieldwork
permitted me to use his office as a base of operations and point of
"refuge" on visits into Port-au-Prince. I am deeply grateful to
Dr. Bordes for these and other kindnesses which he and his wife
Lillian showed us throughout our stay in Haiti.

The research in Haiti benefitted from the assistance of other
individuals and institutions as well. Of particular importance at
the final stage of fieldwork was the valuable support of the
Instituto Interamericano de Ciencias Agrícolas (IICA) of the Organi­
zation of American States. For this support I am grateful to Dr. J.
Michel Montoya Maquín and Mr. Jerry LaGra. IICA was most generous
in providing transportation to and from Kinanbwa on several occasions,
not only during fieldwork, but also during follow up visits that I
made to Haiti. IICA also paid for the reproduction of several hundred questionnaires used in the Agricultural Survey carried out toward the end of fieldwork. I am also grateful to Mr. Stuart Baggaley, Mr. Uli Locher, Dr. Hannelore Adamson, and Eleanor Turnbull for various types of professional inputs, logistical support, and/or personal kindness during our stay in Haiti.

There is one special acknowledgment in Haiti that must be made: an acknowledgement to the Haitian ethnologist Michel Romain. Ethnologist, teacher, novelist, musician, and resident of Les Bayahones, "Met Michel" worked closely with me during much of fieldwork. It is a fortunate visitor who can count on the friendship and assistance of such a person. My debt to the villagers of Kinanbwa themselves is also great. They tolerated not only the continual questioning and probing with which anthropologists traditionally bombard "their" communities. In addition they tolerated more systematic intrusions into their lives in the form of numerous surveys. And some half dozen villagers further served during lengthy periods of time as interviewers within the village itself. I am deeply indebted to them for their assistance. Their active participation in the research made possible the unearthing of patterns which would have remained invisible to an outsider. Because they are residents of the village, I will not single them out by name in these pages, but will restrict my acknowledgment to an anonymous but sincere thank you.

On terminating fieldwork I was most fortunate in being invited to spend a year at Yale University under the auspices of the Antilles Research Program. For that year I am indebted to Professor Sidney W. Mintz, then director of the Program. Of particular importance for
these pages was the grant which Professor Mintz obtained for the use of the Yale computer. It was this funding which permitted me (with a great deal of trial and error) to learn basic programming and to do the simple quantitative analyses on which so much of the following presentation will be seen to rest. But my indebtedness to Professor Mintz goes far beyond this material support. His writings on the Caribbean, and on Haiti in particular, have profoundly influenced by own view of this world region. And his many kindnesses to me during the year in New Haven smoothed what would otherwise have been an abrupt and difficult transition from the role of fieldworker to that of neophyte teacher.

Had my timetable been adhered to, the dissertation would have been finished by the end of the year in New Haven. It was not, however. But the Department of Anthropology at the University of Massachusetts in Boston, whose faculty I subsequently joined, has been most generous in the arrangements they have permitted me to make to complete the work. Not only was I allowed to go on a half time teaching load during a semester, but I was also given a last minute leave of absence, with all the administrative inconveniences and search for replacements that that entails, to spend a year at Teachers College, Columbia University, where the work was finally completed. I am grateful to the UMass/Boston Department, as well as to the Institute for Urban and Minority Education at Teachers College, and in particular to Professor Charles Harrington, Assistant Director of IUME. It was under IUME's auspices that the final work preceding the defense was completed. In this regard, Professor Herbert Klein and Dr. Vera Rubin are also to be thanked for their
heroic reading of a lengthy document that was handed to them only
some three weeks before the defense.

I feel a very special type of gratitude to my wife, María
Alvarez. She has supported this work from the moment that we
entered Kinanbwa together as timid outsiders and newlyweds to boot
to the recent moment—some five years later—when the final paragraph
of these pages was typed. A psychologist by profession, an anthro­
pologist by avocation, and a perceptive human being by natural
endowment, she came to know Kinanbwa and its people and tolerates
no distortion. If her criticism is therefore keen, by that same
token her encouragement and confidence in the worth of this under­
taking have been sufficient cause to see it to its completion.
My gratitude to her is profound.
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PART ONE

THE HAITIAN PEASANT
CHAPTER ONE
THE PROBLEM

INTRODUCTION

In the closing years of the 18th century an economically vigorous and flourishing Caribbean plantation system was totally and irreparably destroyed by an internal uprising, turning into cataclysmic reality a fantasy which for decades had been disturbing the sleep of many European planters in this region of the colonial world. Though slave resistance and slave uprisings had occurred in the Antilles throughout colonial history, none had as yet succeeded in effecting the radical societal transformation finally achieved by the insurrection which transformed the French colony of Saint-Domingue into the Republic of Haiti. The chaos which appeared to reign during and immediately after the abolition of the old order quickly gave way as a new social order emerged, crystallized and spread. The disappearance of the Europeans and their plantation institutions confronted the newly liberated Haitians, the bulk of whom were African or of recent African descent, with new organizational potentialities—and new organizational imperatives. Though the earliest Haitian leaders, following the colonial models most familiar to them, attempted to reinstate an organizationally tight plantation-like economic and social order, their efforts failed. The newly liberated and protectively dispersed Haitian population resisted all attempts to reinstate even the semblance of the old order. The efforts of central planners—now the Haitian leaders themselves—came to naught. The system into which the people of Haiti were eventually to organize their economic and domestic life was one which would bear little resemblance either to what had
preceded or to what ruling groups had subsequently planned.

Government plans had called for a society of plantation gang laborers. What emerged instead was a society of peasant cultivators. The following pages have as their main objective the analysis of a profound transformation which has come over certain critical agrarian lifespheres during the century and a half that has elapsed since the emergence of this peasant society. This transformation, heretofore unreported in the literature on rural Haiti, has involved first and foremost an internal metamorphosis of the institutions of land tenure triggered off by the process of demographic growth. Under the surface veneer of a "stagnant" unchanging peasant economy, it will be argued that rural Haiti has in fact been the scene of a fundamental adaptive restructuring of several key components of the local economy. It will be the objective of these pages to expose, descriptively capture, and quantitatively analyze the details of this transformation, in the hope not only of increasing our knowledge of one society, but also of gaining anthropological insights of a more general nature into the various maneuvers which human social systems employ when confronted with population growth.

The ethnographic and quantitative data on which this analysis will rest were gathered during some twenty one months of anthropological fieldwork (from October of 1971 to August of 1973) in a rural community of the Cul-de-Sac Plain. This hamlet, which has here been given the pseudonym of Kinanbwa, is a residential cluster of some 220 dwellings and ancillary structures (most of them wattle daub) located a few kilometers' distance from a town of the Plain here given the name of Les Bayahondes. Though Kinanbwa, with its 1,200
inhabitants, is by no means a small community in Haitian context, it is nonetheless more appropriately termed a "hamlet" than a "village," since it lacks the specialized administrative offices, commercial establishments, and handicraft workshops that characterize perhaps most of the communities that anthropological researchers have called "villages." Kinanbwa is an occupationally homogeneous Creole speaking community virtually all of whose males live from cultivation of the land and most of whose adult females engage in cash-generating trading activities. It is in this community that the problem of agrarian adaptation to population growth was studied.

The use of the word "problem" is by no means unwarranted. Few people would deny to the ancestors of the present day Haitians the credit for having staged a uniquely successful revolt; but the success of the economic and social system which subsequently emerged has frequently been called into question. Throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries European and American writers tended to caricature Haitian leaders as pretentious buffoons and to dismiss the Haitian peasant as a superstitious and slothful savage. Though a corpus of more objective descriptions of life in Haiti has been growing since the mid-1930's, Haiti still has a uniquely poor press as New World societies go. Contemporary debunking, however, tends to be buttressed by a discouraging array of economic, medical, and educational statistics which have earned for Haiti a generalized image as the disaster area par excellence of the Western Hemisphere.

Nineteenth century racist assessments of Haiti's dilemma have yielded to more recent caricatures which tend to depict most of the country's problems in terms of macabre savagery attributed to the leaders. The image which the English speaking world has of Haiti today is pro-
bably largely dominated by books such as Greene's novel *The Comedians* or the journalistic horror story of Diederich and Burt (1970), whose front cover shows a black hand holding a burning skull impaled on a wooden stake, and whose subtitle reads "Atrocities in the Realm of a Madman." The image of madman rulers controlling a voodoo-infested hinterland has been exploited by various types of story tellers as entertainment for their predominantly middle class readers willing to pay for such titillating accounts of jungle savagery being perpetrated at their own front door. Haiti thus becomes grist for the entertainment industry's mill.

A more sophisticated contemporary caricature involves, not political savagery, but rather the image of impending Malthusian doomsday, as an island population is seen as over-reproducing itself. The end result will presumably be masses of starving peasants unable to produce their basic food supply from a depleted soil. The seriousness of this image should not be underrated. Popular views of Haiti held in its less crowded neighbor, the Spanish speaking Dominican Republic, for example, tend to invoke visions of an eventual uprising by hungry black hordes who will come pouring across the western frontera, machete in hand, in search of food. In this view, held in a less vivid form by many outsiders who are in general concerned with human demography, Haiti's major problem is not that of mad leaders, but of excessively fertile masses. Though the image of the hungry black hordes can be dismissed as a caricature, the problem of internal population growth is genuinely serious and will in fact be one of the major themes in this presentation.
Thus Haiti is typically viewed as a "problem," not only in the sense that any human society, rich or poor, presents analytic challenges for scientists wishing to understand the dynamics of human life. It is a "problem" in a more conventional sense of the term as well. Population is dense, agricultural production is low, nutrition is substandard, mortality is high. To live and work in a Haitian village without cognizance of these problems would border on the irresponsible. The solution of such problems is far beyond the scope of anthropology; their exploration and understanding are not. On the contrary a combination of concern for human welfare, desire for contemporary relevance, and pressure from sources of funding has led many anthropologists to address their research to precisely such problems.

Anthropological inputs into such matters can take several forms. On the one hand the first hand insights gleaned from anthropological fieldwork frequently permit the formulation of more realistic program tactics aimed at attacking these problems in a specific society. Such program recommendations for Haiti have come out of this research project and appear in other documents (Murray 1972; Murray and Alvarez 1973; Chen and Murray 1976).

But anthropology's role in helping administrators implement policies is probably less promising than its ability, through grass roots probing of human life carried out with the aid of anthropological theory, to generate scientifically more effective definitions of the problems themselves. It is in this realm of fundamental concepts and definitions, in its impact on the underlying idea systems within which social problems are attacked, that anthro-
pology's contributions can probably be greatest. The emphasis is still on "attacked." No retreat from action is implied. But if the concrete field data unearthed by anthropologists is to reach its maximum scientific potential, it will not be in terms of the "helpful hints" it provides to administrators in carrying out the policies and objectives which they have already set, but in terms of the fundamental shifts which anthropological knowledge may bring about in the very definition of policy objectives. And such contributions can be made only if unique anthropological field data is harnessed to one or more of the powerful theoretical perspectives which the discipline has developed.

The specific problem which has been singled out for treatment in these pages is the impact of population growth on the economic life of an agrarian community in rural Haiti. The analytic attack which has been made on the problem has been "anthropological" in both of the senses--method as well as theory--alluded to above. On the one hand the data have been gathered in the context of a somewhat "modernized" version of the traditional anthropological approach called "community study method" (Arensberg 1954). The defining features of this approach will be discussed below. If there is something unusual about the particular variant of the community study method that was used in this research, it is the inclusion of an exceptionally heavy component of quantitative data gathering. As will be argued in more detail, the immersion techniques of traditional ethnography should not be contrasted to quantitative research. On the contrary this immersion makes possible the collection of critical, penetrating quantitative data which would simply not be
captured by "hit and run" survey researchers. In this sense the research to be described here has capitalized on what continues to be an underexploited potential that has always been latent in the community study method of traditional anthropology.

But the utilization of the community study method is a general strategy for gathering data. It does not in itself commit the researcher to focus on any particular lifesphere; nor does it aid him in the subsequent analysis of the data which have been gathered. To guide data collection, and to inform analysis, the researcher needs a theoretical perspective. If the data-gathering techniques employed in this research drew from the repertoire of traditional anthropological method, the conceptual framework in which the data are given meaning is heavily informed by anthropological theory.

There are two particular theoretical perspectives which have proved particularly useful in exposing what has happened and what is happening in rural Haiti in terms of the underlying economic and demographic trends affecting the basic well-being of the population. To understand the origin of present day patterns, and the forces which keep them in existence, the viewpoint of evolutionary theory is particularly apropos. The variant of this theory which will be applied in these pages to economic and reproductive behavior in Haiti, however, is an actor oriented variant which views individual human beings as actively maneuvering their way through life in terms of a variety of behavioral alternatives, selectively chosen or discarded in terms of the opportunities and constraints which confront the actor at any given moment.
But these alternatives are not as a rule independently invented by the individual. They are usually pre-existing given, which the individual incorporates into his own repertoire through learning from his social environment. But there are generally several alternatives for any given situation. In terms of evolutionary principles, there is a fund of behavioral variety, and a particular alternative will be selected to the degree that a larger number of individuals come to use this alternative instead of the others. Behavioral evolution then can be said to occur when the aggregate frequency of one of the alternatives increases in the behavior of a group until it gradually supplants the competing behavioral alternatives as the statistically dominant form. But this change in the selection of one alternative as opposed to another, especially if the change occurs in a vital lifesphere, tends to come as a result of changes in the external structure of opportunities and constraints in terms of which behavioral decisions are made.

It is in understanding the effect of this external structure that yet a further theoretical perspective will be of great use, a perspective which falls under the rubric of cultural materialism. The most precise recent articulations of this point of view have been made by Marvin Harris, with whose name the perspective has come to be most closely associated (cf. Harris 1968:217-249, esp. 240-241). Harris generally refrains from calling this point of view a "theory." It is rather a general research perspective and research strategy. Guided by this perspective, the researcher probing for the determinants of a particular behavioral pattern will begin by taking a careful look at the techno-economic and techno-environmental conditions which prevail at a given moment. Of particular
importance in shaping basic adaptive patterns among the Haitian peasants, for example, have been factors such as mountainous topography, a comparatively low man/land ratio in the decades when a new peasant adaptation was being forged, a labor intensive technology in which not even animal drawn plows are employed but all labor is rather done by human beings, an international environment that imposed economic isolation on Haiti during the critical decades of its formation as a new society, and the like. When searching for the factors which have produced and temporarily sustained certain types of economic and reproductive behavior, it is to such features that analysis will turn. And when searching for the causes of evolutionary change in economic and reproductive behavior, high priority analytic attention will be given to the possible causal impact of simultaneous changes in these above-mentioned parameters. The cultural materialistic strategy makes no a-priori assumptions about unilateral causality. It merely suggests to the researcher a number of areas whose exploration shows analytic promise.

The evolutionary perspective in reality goes hand in hand with the cultural materialistic perspective. The former attempts to conceptualize the rise and fall of different lifeways in terms of the differential selection by actors among a set of pre-existing behavioral alternatives for any given situation. The latter, the cultural materialistic perspective, provides general guidelines as to the possible determining causes underlying these behavioral changes. In their combined use they provide a powerful conceptual tool for exposing the underpinnings of much of what is happening today in rural Haiti.
This research strategy had never been applied specifically to a Haitian peasant community. Its utilization has produced a series of startling patterns which are "findings" in a literal sense of the word. They were not anticipated; they surfaced, unexpected, during research. On the one hand what has emerged is the clear outline of a genuine microevolutionary sequence in which a land tenure system has been transformed under the impact of population pressure. The quantified variant of the community study method used in the village has had the good fortune of unearthing data which capture the details of the sequence in an unusual step-by-step fashion, and which furthermore expose the intervening mechanisms that appear to have actually triggered the entire process off.

In this sense some interesting insights have been gleaned into how "population pressure" actually works. It has long been known that Malthusian resolutions are the exception, that under normal circumstances populations swing into regulatory action long before hunger turns them into machete-wielding hordes pouring into neighboring lands. But exactly when and how systems adapt is a matter of debate. The microevolutionary sequence whose occurrence has been captured in a Haitian village is precisely such an adaptation. And what is interesting is that adaptive maneuvering had clearly begun long before any pressure on the local food supply had occurred. The unexpected manner in which population pressure actually "intruded" into the system at a quite early stage will be documented in some detail.
But even more surprising was the manner in which the rituals of the Haitian folk religion ("voodoo") were to emerge statistically as the mainspring and dynamo of the transformed resource control system. Voodoo has for the most part been handled by researchers in a somewhat descriptive fashion. The ceremonies tend to be described in great detail, down to the actual direction of the dancers' pirouettes and the design of the cornmeal figures drawn on the ground by the voodoo priest (houngan). Where analysis has been attempted, it has frequently been in terms of the African provenience of this or that trait or, occasionally, the psychological "release" which spirit possession provides for the devotees.

While the present research does not contradict such analyses, it does suggest that the ritual system is actually wired much more deeply into the system than conventional treatments of voodoo would indicate, that the rituals in fact penetrate down into the very internal machinery of local agrarian economics. The unexpected emergence of this pattern casts Haitian folk ritual in a somewhat new light, and suggests that perhaps the most powerful dynamic underlying the continuing (and perhaps increasing) strength of voodoo in rural Haiti might stem from its heretofore unsuspected function in this lifesphere.
It would not be inaccurate to suggest that both Haiti and its predecessor, the French colony of Saint-Domingue, have always had a "population problem." But paradoxically it is only in recent decades that the problem has been perceived as overpopulation. During the colonial period and the century following Haitian independence demographic concern tended to center around the question of underpopulation and subfecundity, and whatever public policy existed on the matter was consciously oriented toward increasing, rather than maintaining or reducing, the local population.

During the colonial period the maintenance of a large labor force was the primary concern of the slaveowners. The very strategy of populating the colony with vast numbers of African slaves was a direct response to this need for plantation labor. But there is clear historical evidence that the population was replenished and increased less through the process of normal demographic increment than through the mechanism of the slave trade. The plantation system of Saint-Domingue in effect imposed a number of artificial controls on slave mating which were not only humanly represive, but demographically devastating as well.

It was not that the fertility of their female slaves was a matter of indifference to the planters. On the contrary it was a matter of great satisfaction when slave women produced more human property. But the need to secure a maximum agricultural output tended to take precedence over the need to ensure local reproduction of the population. Stated simply the availability of fresh manpower through a continuing slave trade made it more profitable in the eyes of
many planters to have a short lived, subfecund, but highly productive slave group, than a group which enjoyed better living and working conditions and which was able to replenish itself through local reproduction. Exact information on this matter is hard to come by; but the reliable data that do exist are quite revealing. A French planter named Maulévrier had done some close calculations and had arrived at the conclusion that "...the childhood years of a slave on the plantation turned out to be more expensive for (the master) than the purchase of a twenty year old African (Debien 1956:107)." On this same plantation Debien was able to calculate the mortality and fertility trends. With respect to the former, there was an annual death rate among the slaves of 8%—a demographically astronomical eighty per thousand. "The colonists counted on an average of 15 years of work per slave. Profit considerations obliged them to work them hard (Debien 1956:106)." The harsh labor regime led not only to high mortality, but also to low female fertility. The reproductive career of most females appeared to end before they were thirty. A 35 year old female who gave birth to a child was considered unusual. And one 38 year old female slave who gave birth to a child was considered to have pulled off a miracle (Debien 1956:108-11). It is this situation which placed the bulk of demographic increment on the shoulders of an active slave trade.

With the final expulsion of the French in the first decade of the 19th century, and the consequent disappearance of that system of domination which had imposed its own regulatory controls over mating and reproduction among the slaves, the way was paved for the emergence of a new reproductive system among the ex-slaves. A somewhat detailed reconstruction of the emergence of a true peasantry in Haiti will be
given in the two following chapters. It can here be briefly pointed out that one aspect of the new social system which emerged was the emergence and crystallization of a stable mating system in which replenishment of the population was to occur through the reproductive behavior of individuals within the society rather than through the artificial mechanism of forced overseas importation.

The particular mating system which emerged to regulate the reproductive behavior of Haiti's population was a variant of a mating system that has been found to be widespread throughout the Caribbean. The major distinguishing feature of this Caribbean (or "West Indian") mating system is the existence of a number of socially distinct conjugal alternatives within which the husband/wife relationship may be expressed. The principal alternatives throughout the Caribbean are legal marriage, consensual cohabitation, and an extraresidential variant labeled "visiting." The rural Haitian variant of this system which was found to prevail in Kinanbwa includes legal marriage and consensual cohabitation (referred to in Haiti as plase ay), the latter

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1. The literature on Caribbean family systems is quite abundant, particularly for the British and French Caribbean. For critical summaries of this literature, see M.G. Smith (1966) and R.T. Smith (1971, 1973). For case studies and the analysis of more specific problems see Blake (1955, 1961); E. Clarke (1957, 1971); Comber (1961); Davenport (1961); Goode (1960); Greenfield (1961); Henriques (1973); Herskovits (1973); Herskovits and Herskovits (1947); Horowitz (1967, 1971); Jayawardena (1960); Kerr (1951); Klass (1961); Matthews (1953); Otterbein (1963, 1964, 1965, 1966); Roberts (1962); Rodman (1971); Simey (1946); Solen (1971); M.G. Smith (1962a, 1962b, 1965); R.T. Smith (1955, 1959, 1963); R.T. Smith and C. Jayardena (1955, 1959). Though the focus is more descriptive and less statistical, some case studies of local family systems in a Hispanic society can be found in the studies by Manners, Mintz, Padilla, Scheele, and Wolf found in Steward (1956). With respect to the Haitian family, the major first-hand sources are Bastien (1957, 1961); Cohnsire-Sylvain (1958, 1961); Herskovits (1971); Klein (1971); Simpson (1942). Though not based on intensive fieldwork, summary statements of Haitian family organization can also be found in Leyburn (1966:177-208) and Moral (1961:172-8).
accounting for some seven out of ten of the conjugal couples in the community. The monogamous visiting relationship, though prevalent elsewhere in the Caribbean, was found to be a statistical rarity in Kinanbwa. The third major alternative was rather a variety of polygyny in which a male openly assumes responsibility for two (or more) households. In short, the postrevolutionary decades in Haiti witnessed the emergence of a social order in which the demographically non-viable reproductive conditions of the slave period were replaced by a regularized mating system that functioned in conjunction with a peasant economic subsistence base.

Though it is now known that demographic increment is not an inevitable feature of agrarian mating systems (cf. Mag 1968, Polgar 1972), nonetheless the population of Haiti did not stabilize at a low density, but rather increased rapidly. Though nothing conclusive can be stated here, it seems plausible that the roots of this pattern are most likely to be found in certain aspects of the economic legacy.

2. To some degree it might be more appropriate to refer to "plural mating" than to polygyny. If a polygynous society is one in which a man may have two legal wives, then Haiti is not a polygynous society. Monogamy is mandated by law. Nonetheless the widespread pattern whereby a large percentage of males at some point in their conjugal careers simultaneously maintain more than one household with the widespread approbation of their peers means that there is de-facto polygyny. Thus the term will be used throughout this work, keeping in mind the monogamous nature of the formally codified laws.

It should also be pointed out that occasionally the term plasaj is erroneously used by outsiders as a synonym for polygyny, the assumption being that a married man will in addition "place" an extra wife or two on this or that plot of land. This is a pseudo-etymological use of the word plasaj which does not correspond to the rural Haitian usage. In rural Haiti a man is said to be plasé if his spouse is not his legal wife. Most plasaj unions are in fact monogamous. In Kinanbwa there was no simple term which corresponded to the word "polygyny." The most commonly used phrase was "to have two wives" (gè dè madèm). A man "with two wives" may be legally married to one of them, but this was the exception in Kinanbwa. More often than not the man would be in a plasaj union with both of his wives.
of the colonial period. Though the matter will be given more detailed treatment in a later chapter, it can here be briefly pointed out that a central component of the emerging economic system of rural Haiti in the nineteenth century was a strong market orientation on the part of the cultivators—a market orientation that was little affected by the demise of the plantation and the virtual cessation of the planting of sugar cane for export. Despite the damage done to this export market, there persisted patterns of society-internal trade. This means that land has always been used by Haitian peasants as a source of cash as well as food. But it must further be recalled that in the early postrevolutionary decades land was abundant. This in turn meant that the more land one could exploit the greater would be one's cash income, because of the availability of an internal market. Economically this meant that a great premium was placed on the availability of a labor pool. Such a situation is conducive to the emergence of high fertility aspirations and behavior, and it is in this context that the fact of steady demographic increment in 19th century Haiti is perhaps best understood.

The demographic dénouement to this process has indeed been dramatic. From a postrevolutionary density of some 40 people per square mile, the Haiti of 1975 now contains more than 500 people per square mile, a figure that is one of the highest in the Caribbean, about double that of the Dominican Republic, the Spanish speaking country with which Haiti shares the island of Hispaniola. And if one calculates the density per unit of arable land, the figure triples and perhaps quadruples.
TABLE 1-1

HAITI: POPULATION AND DENSITY, 1920 - 1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>POPULATION</th>
<th>DENSITY (per square mile)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>2,124,000</td>
<td>198.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1925</td>
<td>2,260,000</td>
<td>210.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1930</td>
<td>2,422,000</td>
<td>226.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>2,610,000</td>
<td>243.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>2,825,000</td>
<td>263.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>3,085,000</td>
<td>237.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>3,380,000</td>
<td>315.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>3,727,000</td>
<td>347.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>4,130,000</td>
<td>385.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>4,867,000</td>
<td>454.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>5,969,000</td>
<td>463.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>5,070,000</td>
<td>473.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>5,173,000</td>
<td>482.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>5,273,000</td>
<td>492.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>5,382,000</td>
<td>502.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At this point it would be very easy to slip into a fallacious analysis which attributes Haiti's present dilemma to untrammelled reproductive behavior on the part of its inhabitants. It must be stated emphatically here that there is no evidence that in the long run the fecundity of the Haitian peasant has been any greater than the fecundity of members of other agrarian societies. Though the mechanisms involved may still be a matter of academic debate, the relationship between the basic economic organization of a society and the average fertility output of the households in that society is now generally accepted. Agrarian

3. The data here were taken from Beckles (1975) and came originally from a bulletin of the American Statistical Institute. Most of the yearly figures are, of course, interpolated estimations.

groups tend to have more offspring than occupationally industrialized groups. The people of Haiti are no exception in that regard; but neither do they appear to be an exception in the other direction. Early in the course of fieldwork in Kinanbwa, it became clear that, not only the reproductive aspirations, but also the actual aggregate reproductive output of the community, bore a close relationship to the agrarian and marketing demands of local subsistence endeavours (Murray 1972). Though the actual dynamics and resulting rates of local fertility regulation will not be the main topic of this presentation, it is clear that there is widespread concern among Haitian peasants against excessively large families and that there have also been more or less effective regulatory mechanisms operating to keep local reproduction, if not under complete control, at least within the range of output characteristic of other agrarian societies. If the demographic problem seems more acute in Haiti than in most other New World settings, the cause is not likely to be found in any excessive fecundity on the part of Haitian couples, but rather in the fact that some cross-culturally common demographic escape valves have, for historical reasons, been somewhat less available to the populace of rural Haiti than to many other societies confronted with the same impending day of demographic reckoning.

Emigration to foreign lands has been one historically important device which has relieved local population pressure in many societies. Though there has always been some emigration from Haiti, however, this

5. Detailed reproductive data were gathered in collaboration with Kwan-Hwa Chen of the Division of Social and Economic Studies of the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction at Columbia University. The analysis of this data will appear in subsequent publications.
process has always been numerically modest in comparison to most of the
neighboring islands. The two major outlets--Cuba and the Dominican
Republic--were both abruptly closed off in 1937, when Batista expelled
thousands of Haitians from Cuba and Trujillo simply ordered the slaughter
of Haitians on Dominican soil, triggering off a bloodbath in which as many
as 20,000 Haitians lost their lives (Leyburn 1966:271). Some migra-
tion has since resumed to the Dominican Republic. Each year some 50
or 60 individuals--most of them single males--leave Kinanbwa to go
nâ payol, to carry out the cane cutting which the Dominican government
is unable to induce its own citizens to do at the going wages. But the
vast majority of these migrants will return and will eventually esta-
blish households in Kinanbwa. Thus their short-term emigration pro-
vides no long term response to the question of demographic pressure.
It is true that in recent years Haitian emigration to both the U.S.
and Canada--both legal and clandestine--has been stronger than before.
But recent moves made by both of these governments indicate that
this tide may also be partially turned back--literally.

At any rate the net effect of emigration from Haiti has always
been minor in comparison to the demographic importance of this stra-
tegy in other Caribbean societies. There was a period in the history
of the British West Indies where emigration was so intensive that it
actually led to a decline in the growth rates of the region (Roberts
1966:67). The case of Puerto Rico is even more dramatic. The 1970
U.S. census indicated that there were 1.8 million persons of Puerto
Rican descent in the continental U.S. If these individuals are grouped
with the 2.7 million Puerto Ricans living on the island, it means that
40% of the population of Puerto Rico are not living on the island. Even eliminating from this count second generation Puerto Ricans on the mainland, it is clear that emigration has been a crucial feature of the overall demographic strategy of Puerto Rican society.

Never in her history have Haiti's emigration patterns come close to achieving these demographic effects that have been cited above for the British West Indies and Puerto Rico. Though the policies of the Haitian governments may have had some hand in creating this situation, nonetheless the reason seems to reside principally in the 150-year-old status of Haiti as a sovereign nation, without the direct ties to external metropoles which have made possible such extensive emigration from other islands. Whatever the final explanation is, however, it is clear that Haiti has not been able to depend on the emigration strategy as a serious palliative to the dilemma of its own internal growth.

A variant of the emigration strategy involves, not departure from the society, but rather geographical transfers of large numbers of people from rural regions to urban centers within the same society. This urbanization process has also occurred in Haiti—but to a much lesser degree than in most other societies. Haiti is at the very bottom of the New World scale in terms both of the percentage of occupationally active adults engaged in non-agricultural pursuits and the percentage of the population residing in urban areas. More than any other New World society, Haiti is occupationally agrarian and residually rural. Comparing her to her Caribbean neighbors, it is once again Haiti's exceptional degree of political and economic isolation which seems to lie at the root of this low level of urbanization and industrialization. The indus-
trial pursuits which absorb labor in some Caribbean islands are generally supported by capital from without and frequently administered by non-local personnel. Complaints about American "penetration" of the Haitian economy notwithstanding (e.g. Castor 1971), the fact is that the occupational structure of Haiti has been less affected by foreign (or overseas "metropolitan") capital than that of any other (inhabited) island of the Caribbean.

In short, Haiti is an agrarian society whose members have not had access to certain escape valves that have, in other settings, alleviated rural land pressure and rural poverty—or more precisely, have had somewhat reduced access to these escape valves. Haiti's multi-faceted and occasionally tragic uniqueness in New World context stems in the long run from such macro-factors, rather than from the frequently touted escapades of Haitian politicians or excessive reproductive output on the part of Haitian peasants. It is this demystified, desensationalized guiding vision of Haiti which permits the posing of questions that deal with the contemporary crisis in Haiti in the framework of deeper structural processes, and permit the formulation of tentative solutions that derive from a scientific understanding of these processes.
POPULATION GROWTH AND AGRARIAN ECOLOGY

The basic perception of Haiti as an agrarian society with normal demographic processes, but with less-than-average access to common escape valves which mollify the effects of these processes, gives rise to a new type of question, one that is currently on the frontier of anthropological analysis. The two traditionally analyzed processes of fertility limitation and emigration as responses to population pressure have been briefly alluded to above. But in recent years a fundamentally different type of conceptualization of the entire problem has been emerging, an analytic view which is not incompatible with the above-mentioned approaches to the question of population growth, but which attacks them from a heretofore unattended angle and in effect posits yet a third major strategy which agrarian societies have hit upon—or been forced into—under the impact of demographic pressure.

This third strategy does not involve a direct attack on the fertility rates of the society as such, or a physical siphoning off of excess members from the local setting itself. The process that has recently been discovered and analyzed entails rather a modification of the subsistence base by which a population is supported. There is a growing corpus of provocative ecological analyses in the recent anthropological literature which documents the existence of functional linkages between population parameters and certain strategic features of the subsistence activities by which the population supports itself, the former being seen to exert an impact on the latter.

For some time anthropologists have been positing functional links between population and subsistence variables; what has changed
in recent years has been the general direction in which the causal arrow is seen to point. In an earlier theory such as White's (1959), for example, the subsistence variable of technology is treated as the independent variable, which operated through the intervening variable of food supply to produce a causal impact on the density of the population, which was seen as the dependent variable. Specifically, improvements in technology were seen as producing an increase in the food supply, and this in turn has led, according to the theory, to a population increase (White 1959:289). In terms of the analytic dichotomy of "causes" and "consequences," the population density is seen to be to some degree a consequence of the nature of the subsistence system.

In recent years the emphasis has been shifting. Without denying that in macro-evolutionary perspective the powerful variable of advancing technology impacts on the size and density of populations, the literature of the past decade and a half has been characterized by a stimulating abundance of descriptive and theoretical works which have found (or posited) smaller, short-range feedback loops in which population growth now emerges as the independent variable, exercising various types of causal impacts on the subsistence realm. The general thrust of many of these analyses is that, when confronted with increasing demographic pressure, a society will modify its subsistence pursuits in such a fashion that the "carrying capacity" of these activities will increase, thus permitting the denser population to be supported on substantially the same quantity of land. The causal arrow is thus reversed for the time being; it is the subsistence realm which is now seen as falling under the partial sway of popu-
The now abundant literature—primarily, but not exclusively, anthropological—which deals with population growth in this manner has been recently summed up in a comprehensive and conceptually lucid review by Netting (1974). He points out quite correctly the impetus given to these issues, and the healthy scientific debate which has been provoked, by the general statement on these matters given by the economist Boserup (1965). It was Boserup who was perhaps most systematic and forward in reversing the order of the two variables, treating population pressure as the exogenous factor which tended to result in an intensification of agricultural pursuits via the intervening variable of increasingly shortened fallow period and the concomitant landscape change which this process brings about (Boserup 1965:28-42).

In positing this process there is no simplistic assumption being made that every agrarian society will react in identical fashion. Indeed there have been local economic adaptations to increasing population pressure and land scarcity which in themselves do not affect the productivity of the major subsistence pursuit. The above mentioned search for non-agricultural employment in cities is frequently seen as an economic response to population pressure (cf. Netting 1974:40), but is an economic strategy which in itself entails no direct modification of the primary subsistence techniques of local agriculture.

But such occupational transfers are unable to absorb much of the impact of population growth in preindustrial agrarian societies. Boserup's contention that different aspects of the local agricultural system itself will begin to change under the impact of population growth had, when her book appeared, already been given some ethno-
graphic support and in the intervening years, as fieldworkers began looking at their communities in new ways, the body of evidence has grown greatly. Population pressure has been seen by different analysts to have resulted in widespread and profound transformations in the very nature of the cultivation: from shifting cultivation to permanent agriculture, frequently passing through a variety of way-stages, such as have been documented in New Guinea (W.C. Clarke 1966) and Thailand (Hanks 1972). The advent of local irrigation, another profound technological transformation, has also been attributed to population growth (e.g. Carneiro 1961). Increase in local man/land ratios may lead to the use of terracing and manuring, to more frequent cropping of each plot, to more judicious allocation of plot space to different crops, and to the use of more intricate, time-consuming labor inputs which will draw more produce out of each unit of land. Such processes of technological change have been noted in many culture areas. Ethnographic examples have been gleaned in Asia (Geertz 1963; Hanks 1972; cf. also Buck 1956), in Africa (Cleave and White 1969; Netting 1968), in Melanesia (W.C. Clarke 1966; Brookfield and Hart 1971), in Central America (Dumond 1961) and in South America (Carneiro 1961).

Among the more intellectually stimulating and articulate of these analyses is the one that Geertz has presented for wet rice growing in Indonesia. He suggests that certain characteristics of the crop itself make it capable of highly flexible adaptation to the impinging reality of increased population density; that by a certain process of intensification, whose particularities have led him to coin the term "involution," the potentially harmful effects of an increasingly
unfavorable man/land ratio are absorbed and temporarily neutralized, as the local population modifies various aspects of the technology of production to produce more rice per unit of land than was formerly produced. This absorption occurs not only through the complexification of the local irrigation system, but also through the development of more refined cultivation techniques—transplanting, more exact spacing, better weeding, the use of drainage, refining of the techniques of ploughing, levelling, and raking the soil in preparation for the actual planting, and other technical innovations. All of these features of the local subsistence system are thus in effect analyzed as being to some degree at least consequences of population pressure, as consequences of the need to support a larger number of people on a fixed quantity of land (Geertz 1963:32-5).

The processes which Geertz posited for Indonesia have their analogies and counterparts in other continents and cultures, and constitute a major class of adjustment triggered off by the phenomenon of population growth.

It is in light of these theoretically analyzed and empirically 6

6, The word "analyzed" is used intentionally. The data necessary for a conclusive or even convincing demonstration of the posited functional linkages are lacking in Geertz's monograph, and the entire work must, by any halfway rigorous epistemological criteria, be seen as a tantalizing hypothesis, and nothing more. The empirical data which could validate this hypothesis are not to be found in any part of this publication. The key feature of the model—the notion that there are "before" and "after" states—implies the existence of comparative data, which Geertz did not collect (or at least provide). It is stated furthermore that intensive lowland rice growing techniques are more productive per unit of land than less intensive highland techniques. But nowhere are actual field data to be found in the monograph confirming or even justifying this assertion. It is further stated that these intensive lowland techniques arose, or were adopted, as a result of population growth. This is a crucial feature of the entire analysis—yet it also lacks any empirical support in the
defensible processes that we may now turn back to the Haitian peasant. For the theoretical stance which posits such law-governed functional linkages in specific settings would also incline to the guiding nomothetic hypothesis that some such adaptive response within the institutions of subsistence could be— not predicted with certainty— but at least expected with some likelihood in any setting where an agrarian population finds itself increasingly confronted with the challenge of a growing population. These are not haphazard, whimsical coincidences, if the theory is correct; they are rather law-bound processes. And though the bewildering complexity of the conditioning factors should prevent simplistic hopes of being able to predict specific directions a given society will take, nonetheless we may expect some adaptive response to take place. And at any rate we now have a guiding hypothesis through which to examine empirically, and to analyze theoretically, the data which are collected in other agrarian settings. Haiti, we have seen, is just such a setting.

monograph, and the readers are in effect asked to take the author's word that the functional linkages between the phenomena do indeed exist. In short this pioneering monograph is more noteworthy for its articulate ideational brilliance than for its concern for epistemological or empirical credibility. The work must be assessed in terms of the standards applying at the time it was published—standards which still largely prevail in the discipline. But if anthropology moves toward scientific maturity, a hypothesis such as the one under discussion will be used to begin serious fieldwork, and not be presented as a supposed conclusion to long fieldwork. And though valuable hypothetical analyses such as the one in question will continue to be generated, they will be clearly presented as hypothetical, and not presented in an idiom which could lead less-than-careful readers to accept them as conclusive findings or established facts.
Yet Haiti, and many other contemporary Third World agrarian societies, simply fail to fall into this mold of "intensifying" societies. Though population pressure might be argued to have led to advances on the part of some food-producing systems, in others it has quite clearly not. Quite the opposite. In many such "non-intensifying" agrarian societies, evidence points rather to increasing environmental degradation, on the one hand, and to decreasing per-hectare crop yields on the other, with concomitant decreases in per-capita caloric intake and general living standards. Haiti appears to constitute a prototype of this latter type of society. Even in the absence of reliable diachronic statistics, the testimony of villagers and observers indicates that even within the last few decades, Haiti has experienced marked declines in soil fertility, in per-hectare food yields, in nutritional standards, and--by most conventional yardsticks--in general human welfare.

The problem then is to grapple with this fact. Some systems intensify their productive activities and produce new technology. Other societies, though confronted with the same problems, simply do not—or have not in the period of time in which they have been observed. They appear, rather, to remain technologically "stagnant." Can this pattern be accounted for?
THE THESIS

The peasants of Haiti constitute a rural agrarian populace confronted by problems not totally dissimilar—and in some cases quite similar—to the dilemmas confronted by other agrarian societies. The maintenance of an agrarian base in the face of population growth has been seen to have produced various sorts of adaptive adjustments in other societies. How has the Haitian peasantry responded to this reality? What, if any, provisions have emerged which will absorb and neutralize, at least temporarily and to some degree, the detrimental impact of an increasingly stressful population density? Has he made adaptations at all analogous to those which his counterparts in China, Indonesia, Central America, and other settings have been seen to have made?

It is this question which provides the guiding framework for this presentation, and it is in the context of this formulation of the problem that several otherwise baffling patterns which surfaced during fieldwork in Kinantwa will be described, analyzed, and theoretically interpreted.

The thesis which will be presented and argued in the following pages is that there has indeed emerged and crystallized in rural Haiti a powerful complex of behavioral and attitudinal patterns, one of whose major effects is to deflect and soften the economically deleterious impact of the century and a half of population growth which has occurred since the founding of the new society. The existence of this pattern will be documented with both descriptive and quantitative
data gleaned during fieldwork. A combination of ethnographic and quantitative techniques has brought to light the existence of an initially puzzling complex of land control patterns, a complex which can be reduced to order, however, when the hypothesis of adaptation to population growth is introduced and the appropriate internal breakdowns of the data are made.

A crucial distinction must be introduced at this point. The nature of the adaptive response of the Haitian peasant will be more clearly grasped if a preliminary conceptual clarification of the phrase "institutions of subsistence" is made. Within this broader complex, a heuristic distinction must be made between the institutions of production and what here will be called the institutions of access.

This distinction must be kept in mind. The economically adaptive subsistence adjustments made by agrarian societies to the phenomenon of population growth may involve technological change. But they also involve adaptations in other spheres of the community's economic behavior, in addition to the realm of agrarian technology itself. The high visibility of modified technology—which is what most relevant studies have documented—might tend to obscure the presence of less immediately visible but equally crucial (and empirically identifiable) strategic adaptations at other nodes in the chain of subsistence behavior engaged in by the members of an agrarian community.

More specifically, the institutions of production—the inventory of tools and repertoire of behavioral techniques which physically provide the energy inputs leading to a harvest of food—must be distinguished from the equally strategic institutions of access, alluded to above. These latter comprise all of those regulatory
arrangements, including not only the formally codified institutions of legal ownership, but also the folk customs of de facto usufruct, by which individuals initially acquire and subsequently maintain access to plots of land. Though less visible than the actual tools and behavior sequences used in the fields themselves, the absolute centrality of these latter institutions of access to any particular local ecosystem must be formally recognized. For these institutions determine which actors will make the energy inputs, and the circumstances under which these inputs will be made, and will furthermore determine in its basic outline the manner in which the biotic output will be distributed. Furthermore it is probably the case that the question of access to land is a much more burning daily issue in peasant communities than the question of actual productive techniques. But at any rate the complex of circumstances and sequence of events by which a cultivator acquires access to a plot of ground are logically and empirically as much a part of the institutions of subsistence as the actual tools and behaviors which physically produce the harvests.

The utilization of this distinction permits a theoretically more comprehensive and powerful analysis of the process of agrarian responses to increasing demographic pressure. For the process of agricultural intensification—the local emergence or adoption of more effective technological inputs—involves primarily the institutions of production. But modifications in this particular sector of the ecosystem will be found to occur only under certain (yet-to-be-fully-determined) conditions. When these conditions are lacking, economic adjustments may be displaced to other spheres within the
institutions of subsistence. Under certain conditions, it will be the institutions of access which come to bear the brunt of the demographically imposed imperative to change; and the major adaptive maneuvers will thus occur in the form, not of technological innovations, but of pressure reducing innovative arrangements in the manner of allocating cropping ground within the society.

This, it will be argued, is precisely what happened in Haiti. Technological intensification in the form of transformed technology has emphatically not occurred. But the dynamics of sociocultural causality have not thereby ceased their operation. The ineluctable reality of steady demographic increment has merely shifted the locus of its institutional impact. Not the institutions of production, but rather the institutions of access have, in rural Haiti, borne the brunt of this impact. It is in this latter sphere of the local ecosystem that the most visible and impressive adjustments to the demographic bind have come to be made.

The nature of these resource-allocating adaptive arrangements will be documented and analyzed in some detail. Field data will be presented indicating that there has crystallized in rural Haiti a statistically and normatively powerful land transactional pattern—at first glance somewhat enigmatic and economically "irrational"—resulting in a series of socially generated land transfers. The major effect of this transactional complex is to "spread out" and "circulate" access to land within the community at large. By virtue of this locally evolved transactional complex, a major aspect of the immediate short-range impact of local population growth—i.e. increasing land shortage—is deflected, generalized, and thus
partially and temporarily absorbed by the group as a whole.

One result of this analysis will hopefully be an increase in our understanding of the underpinnings of life in what continues to be one of the more misunderstood societies in the New World. In particular the analysis will attempt to approach the topic of Haitian voodoo from a yet unexplored route. The folk ritual complex of rural Haiti will be found to play a latent but statistically central role as a mainspring mechanism in the local system of land allocation. The analysis of this unexpected function will hopefully provide a long overdue blueprint of the deep systemic linkages between the folk ritual system of rural Haiti and the local peasant economic system.

But in carrying out this analysis, I will be intent on addressing issues that transcend the specific lifeways and problems of Haiti alone. A major area of concern will be the critical issue of population growth. The analysis presented here will attempt to tease out new insights into alternative adaptations which agrarian systems can and do make to the stresses produced by internal population growth.

THE STRUCTURE OF THE PRESENTATION

The presentation to follow will have three parts. In the remainder of Part One I will discuss the framework of contemporary peasant life, beginning first with the historical background of the Haitian peasantry and then discussing a number of contemporary community external structures that play a determining role in the lives of the peasants of Kinambwa. With respect to the historical
section, two chapters will be dedicated to discussing the evolutionary emergence of the Haitian peasant economic adaptation. Because the central hypothesis of the entire presentation relies on an evolutionary and cultural materialistic frame of reference, it will be useful to analyze the very origins of peasant life in Haiti from this perspective as well. The microevolutionary transformation which surfaced in the research community started from the "baseline" of the nineteenth century peasant adaptation. But this state of "classic" peasant adaptation was itself the product of earlier evolutionary developments. To expose the evolutionary nature of these processes, I have had to reinterpret a large segment of Haitian history from a cultural materialistic standpoint, emphasizing the systematic selection of preexisting alternatives under the impact of various types of exogenous forces. The following two chapters will be dedicated exclusively to this historical task.

Part One will conclude with a chapter discussing the external structures—civilian and military—which today impinge on the lives of the contemporary villagers, making of them true "peasants" integrated into structures which transcend village boundaries. In discussing these structures, reference was of necessity made to the role which the nearby town of Les Bayahondes plays in the lives of the villagers of the hinterland.

Having given this background information, Part Two will contain four chapters that delve directly into critical ethnographic spheres of contemporary life in the village. In selecting topics for inclusion I have been guided by the general agrarian hypothesis underlying the entire presentation. This has resulted in an emphasis on basic
features of social organization within the village and on patterns of cropping, technology, and land tenure.

In Part Three the major task of the thesis will be undertaken. A detailed analysis will be given of a microevolutionary transformation that has occurred in the institutions of land tenure as a result of a century and a half of population growth. My use of the term "evolutionary" is less metaphorical and somewhat more literal than is often the case in such discussions. That is I will show that what has occurred in Kinanbwa is an agrarian transformation which:

1. has been made possible by virtue of a "polymorphic" state of preexisting behavioral variety in the life-sphere where the change has occurred, the realm of resource control;
2. has involved systematic selection of one of these alternatives over the others, producing diachronic shifts in the statistical preponderance of each of these options within the population; and
3. has had the long range effect of preserving the viability of certain basic features of a structure of economic life that had been threatened by "environmental stress"—in this case a drastically altered condition of resource availability.

In short I will not only use the labels of evolutionary theory, but will operationalize the data in terms of several of the theory's key constructs.

As a final task, having given an analysis of the operation of this evolutionary process through time, I will present and empirically document a "synchronic" blueprint of how the system functions today. To do this I will view the "system" as an abstraction from
ongoing human careers and will describe the changes that have come over the life cycle of the Kinanbwa cultivator as a result of population growth. A series of subtle but critical differences distinguish the "typical career" of today's peasant from that of his predecessors. But because the stages of the transformed life cycle have not yet been incorporated into rites de passage or folk explanations, they in effect constitute a "hidden career." To expose the operation of this hidden career I have relied on pattern discovery procedures which incorporate a type of quantification that go beyond the descriptive probings of conventional ethnography.

Using this quantified data, the analysis will be concluded by exposing the unsuspected manner in which the rituals of a local ancestor cult (voodoo) have been latently functioning as the main-spring of the transformed agrarian resource control system. If voodoo has maintained its strength in rural Haiti, data will be presented showing that its continuing prevalence may be largely due to the camouflaged role it has been playing in the overall adaptation which the Haitian peasant has made to the dilemma of population growth. The precise nature of voodoo's surprising function in this sphere will be analyzed.
CHAPTER TWO

COLONIAL ORIGINS AND REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION

EVOLUTIONARY FRAMEWORK

Examined through the lens of evolution, even the most deep lying and apparently stable components of a human social system are revealed to be in a state of ultimate flux. The permanency of the synchronic "now" is unmasked as an illusion. Contemporary patterns are exposed as fragile compromises with a past which, buckling under pressure, has "given in" to a transient present, a present which will in turn quickly cede place to an impinging future.

But analysis needs the stability of before and after states. Though perpetual flux may be the rule, it is analytically convenient to momentarily freeze the process, utilizing one past state as the baseline from which evolution has taken off and viewing the present as the end result of this process. The baseline itself may have been a fragile and transient end result of some earlier process, and the present end result may quickly cede to some newer configuration. But if the process is to be studied closely, it is convenient to choose a historical baseline and to trace the metamorphosis of this vanished past and its step-by-step transformation into a compromise present.

The baseline for the evolutionary analysis to be carried out in these pages will be a certain type of peasant adaptation which emerged, crystallized, and spread throughout the mountains and plains of 19th century Haiti. Despite regional variation, this "golden age"
lifeway manifested certain root features in common in every locale where firsthand research has been carried out. Interviews with elder informants indicate that the past of Kinanbwa was a local variant of this broadly generalized peasant system, characterized (as will be discussed in more detail) by certain types of land allocation and labor mobilization strategies. But though it will be utilized as the baseline from which were made the microevolutionary steps into a transformed present, this "classic" peasant adaptation was itself the produce of earlier evolution, is therefore itself an explicandum. It is the emergence of this peasant "baseline" in 19th century Haiti which will be the subject of the historical discussion to follow here.

But there is a guiding framework underlying the entire analysis, the framework of evolutionary theory. History may not be bunk, but it is certainly pliable. The same facts can be interpreted in the context of competing theoretical frameworks, and the end result will be fundamentally different versions of history. The primary sources from which the history of rural Haiti must be constructed were, of course, not written in an evolutionary framework. But neither were the abundant secondary sources which are now available, the dozens upon dozens of historical analyses which have been carried out on Haitian society. It is rare for an analyst to inject evolutionary concepts into his discussion. There are a number of problematic disparities between the analytic approaches taken in many of these historical sources and the evolutionary approach which will be adhered to in these pages.
In the first place many analyses of Haitian history adopt what is in effect a great man theory of history, by focusing on the personalities and behavior of the famous figures of early Haitian history, notably Toussaint, Dessalines, and Henri Christophe. This stands in contrast to the systemic conceptualization being increasingly utilized in anthropology, as more conducive to understanding the dynamics underlying local microevolutionary sequences. In this systems approach, analytic focus is given rather to the statistically dominant and occasionally latent patterns which characterize the behavior of masses of people, as opposed to the behavior of the leaders. No a-priori stance is taken to the effect that the behavior of the leaders is irrelevant. What is assumed rather is that their behaviors are themselves product of a context. To the degree that leaders do in fact yield to the inevitable and follow their followers, then an understanding of history entails a careful analysis of this latter group. In Haiti especially, as will be shown, the course followed by "recalcitrant" peasant masses played a determining role in the course of local history. But historians of Haiti have not always looked carefully at this peasant sector. In the determined effort to document and analyze the behavior of the masses, the discussion presented here will differ from the analyses of most conventional historiography.

But there are other disparities as well. As will be seen, conventional history, when discussing the critical transition period at the turn of the 19th century, falls into a poorly conceived chaos model, positing a marauding, footloose rebel slave population who apparently subsisted for years on pillage and destruction. This is a historically untenable distortion which must be rectified. What
has been ignored in this approach is the powerful underlying chain of agrarian adaptations worked out by the population during the crucial transitional years between the insurrection of 1891 and the establishment of the Republic of Haiti in 1804. The attention of most analysts of the revolutionary period appears to have been captured by the burning canefields and the "marauding hordes" whose vividly described deviltries were at the time used as warnings against the slacking of control over Caribbean slaves. The approach taken in these pages will rather be to look at the agrarian underpinnings, insofar as they can be determined, which supported the population during those critical years. Thus, whereas conventional history tends to see hordes of riotous slaves, the analysis presented here will be more intent on focusing on a changing agrarian base.

There exists one other disparity in the two approaches, a disparity which concerns the nature of the changes which led to the triumph of a peasant way of life in Haiti. The theory to be presented here implies an evolutionary approach to technological and organizational change. With respect to Haitian society, such an approach gives careful attention to the preexisting alternatives found within colonial society which provided the raw material from which selective processes could lead to the emergence of a transformed society. The emphasis is on the continuities with pre-existing states, and the historical task is construed as that of dispelling the illusion of discontinuity.

But such discontinuity is precisely the main argument of much conventional historiography. Several analyses of Haiti posit in effect a type of storybook series of three abrupt, cataclysmically
discontinuous stages—colonial, revolutionary, postrevolutionary—which Haitian society is assumed to have traversed in the brief span of a few decades. The focus of the following pages will be somewhat different. In the model to be presented here the insurrections, battles, and pronunciamentos which fill the pages of history books will be seen as ancillary facilitators of what was in effect the evolutionary emergence of a way of life whose seeds had been sown long before the insurrection of 1791.

The model to be presented here makes no claims to being even a moderately definitive version of Haitian history; the archival and documentary research that professional historiography entails was not carried out. The model is rather an anthropological reinterpretation of Haitian history made on the basis of consultation of some three dozen published primary and secondary sources, and a reading of these sources within the conceptual framework of an evolutionary perspective.

THE RISE OF A PLANTATION ECONOMY

PRECOLONIAL ORIGINS

The analysis of the evolution of Haitian peasant lifeways must begin much earlier than the now famous slave uprising of 1791, but for practical purposes need not antedate the arrival of Europeans on the island of Hispaniola. By the end of the 16th century the predominant aboriginal groups on the island had been physically destroyed or genetically and culturally absorbed by Spanish colonists. Though certain features of aboriginal conuco technology clearly survived, aboriginal patterns of social organization, land allocation, and land control appear to have made no significant input into the French colonial
institutions which were eventually to dominate on Western Hispaniola.

Though the Spaniards were the first Europeans to occupy the island, their eventual wealth acquisition strategies differed profoundly from the plantation system which the French were later to institute on the western end of the island. After the early 16th century gold fever had proved to be a chimera, the Spaniards that remained on the island dedicated themselves principally to the raising of livestock and the export of lumber. The land tenure institutions which subsequently emerged on Spanish Hispaniola, revolving as they did around a ranching economy, took the form of non-individualized, communal patterns of land tenure referred to as terrenos comuneros (cf. Albuquerque 1961; Maya Pons 1972).

The French, who eventually occupied the western third of the island, were to have a fundamentally different strategy of wealth extraction, one based on the production of tropical export crops. In line with this orientation, the land on their side of the island came under the sway of an individualized, private property land tenure system. Though the earliest French settlers—referred to as boucaniers—appeared to depend primarily on the capture of wild livestock and did not take much interest in the agricultural potential of the island, they were soon replaced by other groups who did. By the mid seventeenth century the hill dwelling boucanier had come to be challenged by the French yeoman settler.

On several Caribbean islands the early course of European agricultural implantation involved a two step sequence. Though the first agrarian wave consisted of smallholding yeomen who dedicated themselves primarily to the cultivation of tobacco, this group was
eventually supplanted by more heavily capitalized sugar planters. Williams documents the occurrence of this sequence in the British West Indies (1966; 1970). He is quite explicit in using the historical occurrence of a white yeoman tobacco growing stage as a refutation of arguments to the effect that the importation of African labor was somehow a result of an inability of whites to withstand the heat of the tropics. With the exception of various sorts of adventurers who constituted the vanguard of the British presence in the Caribbean, the first wave of British colonizers consisted principally of smallholding yeomen whose principal livelihood was the growing of tobacco. A similar sequence was discussed by Ortiz (1971) on the island of Cuba. There is increasing evidence that the French colony of Saint-Domingue passed through this smallholding phase of colonial evolution. Lepelletier's (1846:69) reference to petun ("tobacco") as the first colonial crop has recently been confirmed by Saxe (1975:8-9) in her research into colonial families. This yeoman tobacco phase began before the mid-1600's and was to last for half a century.

But this phase was to pass, as it had passed elsewhere. Already by 1690 the tobacco growers in several regions of the colony had been replaced by a different type of colonial figure (cf. Saxe 1975:9). Letters and documents emanating from the colony in 1689 still refer to tobacco as the major export. But by 1716 references made in correspondence now assume the economic supremacy of sugar (Vaissière 1904:33), and to some degree of other high capital crops such as indigo. This shift in local economic reality was accompanied by a shift in official attitude—an important factor in a mercantilist
colonial system. Whereas official policy had at first frowned on the planting of sugar cane (Lepelletier 1846:15-16), an about-face had been made by the early part of the seventeenth century, as restrictions were now placed on the growing of tobacco (Vaissière 1909:34-5). And highly important, the switch in the island's economy to large scale plantations was further accompanied by a legalization of French presence in Saint-Domingue, as the Spaniards in 1697 formally ceded the western part of Hispaniola to the French. That is, whereas the small scale tobacco economy had been carried on under de-facto French occupation, the larger investments which sugar entailed were embedded in the institutionally more secure context of unquestioned French hegemony.

With the passage of tobacco and the arrival of sugar (and other crops of similarly high investment demands), other important adjustments were made. As has been mentioned, the small proprietor with little capital was unable to compete, or even survive, in the sugar economy. He succumbed to the heavily capitalized grand blanc who could afford the machinery and the slaves required by the sugar economy. A concomitant and overwhelming shift came in the racial composition of the colony as well. Whereas the yeoman economy of the mid and late 1600's, manned by small proprietors who did much of the field labor themselves, maintained a numerical superiority of free over slave (cf. Saxe 1975:9), the arrival of sugar plantations set in motion the process which was to culminate, by the end of the 1700's, in a demographic situation in which a handful of whites found themselves surrounded by half a million slaves. This led in turn to exceptionally repressive behavior on the part of slaveowners, a pattern which at least some authors feel was largely responsible for the violent nature of the uprising.
when it finally did occur.

LAND OWNERSHIP BY WHITES AND MULATTOES

For a while the French government attempted to run the colony through a private company, La Compagnie des Indes Occidentales. When this attempt proved unsuccessful, the French Crown turned to direct rule (1674), establishing arrangements which were analogous to those already institutionalized on other French Caribbean colonies. The colony of Saint-Domingue was divided up into three Departments (the North, the West, and the South), and authority was shared between a Gouverneur-Lieutenant général and a Commissaire-Ordonnateur.

The principle of eminent domain was invoked, all land being declared property of the Crown. Colonists gained access to land principally through the vehicle of the concession. The Crown's representatives granted specific plots of land, placing certain conditions and restrictions on the grantee.

As might be expected, many colonists dealt with these formal regulations less as models to follow than as obstacles to get around. But as the wealth of the colony began increasing, and as land became more desirable and less readily available, an earlier flexibility on the part of officials was replaced by stricter control. By the closing quarter of the 18th century the general wealth and massive individual fortunes which the Saint-Domingue economy was creating had endowed the land with inestimable value. But the deaths of original owners, the increasing absenteeism of metropolitan heirs, the constant arrival of eager newcomers anxious to imitate the fortune-building exploits...
of earlier generations, and the increasing scarcity of the productive land which would make such feats possible—all these factors worked in combination to augment and effectively institutionalize energetic patterns of land transaction. The concept of eminent domain survived in the form of codified laws; in their actual behavior the colonists came more and more to treat land as a fully alienable commodity, as an impersonal resource that could be freely bought, sold, or otherwise transferred, according to the immediate needs and vicissitudes of one's own personal economic career. This orientation toward the land, this treatment of the land as an alienable commodity, continues to this day as one of the root principles of the peasant economy of Haiti.

But there was another aspect of the colonial land control patterns which were to pave the way for the eventual downfall of this prosperous colony. For reasons that will not be discussed here, no restrictions had been placed on the acquisition of land by mulatto freedmen in Saint-Domingue, though such restrictions were the rule in several other colonies. As a result of this loophole, the gens de couleur had succeeded in gaining control of as much as a third of the colony's soil (Renaud 1934:67-77; Leyburn 1966:18). It was not until the latter part of the eighteenth century that the whites began public attempts to curtail the power and privileges of these slave-owning mulattoes; but by then it was too late. And the irreconcilable antagonisms and racial hatreds which were generated by this now open conflict provided the basis for a temporary alliance between the mulatto group and the slave group, creating thus a powerful
eonfluence of interests which was to bring the Saint-Domingue slave rebellion of 1791 to a culmination that had never been reached by more easily quenchable slave insurrections on other islands. In short, land acquisition was a concern of both mulattoes and whites. The competition that arose was to play a role in shaping the future of the island.

**PROVISION PLOTS FOR THE SLAVES**

But what of the land tenure status of the most numerous group on the island, the black slaves? If the market-oriented land transaction patterns among whites and mulattoes were to provide the seeds for the destruction of the old society, there was yet another incipient pattern which was to provide the model for the creation of the new. Had the earlier colonists adhered to and enforced a rigid circumscription of the economic role of slaves to plantation and domestic labor, they might possibly have saved their descendants many headaches. But circumstances moved them to a deviation from these strict patterns and to the toleration and eventual encouragement of a fundamentally different type of economic activity among slaves, in addition to their required field or house labor.

The pattern was set in motion by the very practical problem which the owners had with respect to the feeding of their slaves. As might be expected, colonial law placed the responsibility for feeding and clothing the slaves in the hands of the owners, stipulating that a specific amount of land per slave had to be set aside and cultivated. Though the law envisioned that this ground would be cultivated in common, as part of normal plantation labor, many colonists adopted an
alternative arrangement by which they would presumably kill several birds with one stone: they would feed their slaves, avoid having to take time away from plantation tasks for the cultivation of this slave food, and at the same time give the slaves a slight economic stake in the plantation, a stake that might discourage the flight and absenteeism (marronage) which constituted a constant headache to planters (cf. Mintz and Hall 1970). All of these objectives would be met if, instead of having slaves grow food in common, the were instead each allocated a private plot of land on which each would grow his own food, and they were encouraged in this activity by permitting them to sell any surplus, or any small animals or poultry they might raise, and pocket the proceeds themselves. Case studies, especially by Debien (e.g. 1956:76, 116), indicate that this is precisely the arrangement that existed on certain plantations.

But such interclass schemes founded on "psychological" manipulation tend to backfire easily; it comes as no surprise to learn that this arrangement produced unexpected results that had little to do with the objectives listed above. In the first place these provision plots never sufficed to provide all of the food for the slaves. The planters were still obliged to import foodstuffs such as codfish, or to resort in the end to communal gardens worked on plantation time (Debien 1953:31; 1956:49-50, 55-6, 114-116, 165-6; Wimpffen 1817:233; cf. also Mintz and Hall 1970). The immediate importance, and ultimate historical significance, of these private provision plots was less in terms of the actual food they provided for the slaves, than in terms of the unanticipated types of economic behavior which it permitted to them. In response to these opportunities, a vigorous internal market system
supplying all classes with locally produced crops and animals was to arise and entrench itself as a fundamental part of the local economy.

The response of the slaves to this economic leeway was dramatic. If reluctant in plantation tasks, their enthusiasm for engaging in these individual pursuits on many instances had to be actively dampened (cf. Debien 1956:116). But the white planters had stumbled into an arrangement from which there was no easy retreat. Many colonists were to find themselves quite dependent on these "supplementary" products grown and raised by the slaves (Debien 1956:76). But even more paradoxically, by turning the slaves into quasi-proprietors, the plantation owners had unwittingly created an embryonic peasantry, thus giving birth to the very class that would eventually supplant them. In this manner an incipient peasant economic configuration had emerged as a somewhat unplanned-for adjunct to the march of the dominant plantation activities, as an "economy within an economy." The following pages will document the manner in which this configuration was selected in the course of postcolonial evolution as the adaptive form destined to emerge as the basic guideline for economic life in rural Haiti.

**THE REVOLUTIONARY TRANSITION**

There is a critical thirteen year period in Haitian history where the economic current which emerged in the days of slavery was freed from the restraining context of overseas plantation control and emerged as the dominant economic form on the island. In August of 1791 a period of long-standing internal tension and conflict within the colony between white property owners and mulatto property owners (gens de couleur or affranchis) came to a violent climax in the form of a long-feared insurrection among the slaves in the northern
part of the island. Though the French government was to take many steps toward the restoration of internal order and the reestablishment of the threatened colonial economy, this uprising was in effect the beginning of the end for the planters of Saint-Domingue, dealing the colonial economy a blow from which it was never to recover. The end was to come slowly, however. A violent, turmoil-filled period of thirteen years was to pass between the insurrection of the slaves and the final establishment of the independent Republic of Haiti.

The revolutionary abruptness and irrevocableness of the overthrow of the colonial political structure and the total destruction of the export sector of the colonial economy has succeeded in obscuring the evolutionary nature of many aspects of the emergence and crystallization of a new Haitian economy. To talk about the evolution of a new economic system in the Haiti of the early 1800's could be seen as a type of heresy in the light of more conventional assessments of what is perceived to be the total destruction of an entire economy and its substitution by something radically and fundamentally different. But an examination of certain pieces of historical evidence brings to light several inconsistencies in the cataclysmic approach to the emergence of Haitian society, and leads to a model of Haitian economic history in which the truly revolutionary military and political events simply cleared the way and provided the context for the emergence of a local subsistence base which was a logical and predictable evolutionary sequel to certain patterns which had taken root during slavery days.

The first major black leader to emerge in the 1790's was Toussaint Louverture. Having trained a small but effective fighting force, this educated ex-slave was wooed by various European powers intent on capitalizing on the uprising on French Saint-Domingue.
Having spent some time in the service of Spain, Toussaint and his army eventually went back to the side of France. Recognizing that the reimposition of slavery was now practically impossible, the French declared the slaves free and designed an alternative colonial system that in effect was a compromise restitution of the plantation economy. Under this scheme, devised by the specially appointed French envoys Sonthonax and Polvorel, large plantations would still ideally continue to function under their original owners, but the "slaves" would be transformed into a new class of "cultivateurs portionnaires," sharecropping freedmen who would receive part of what they produced. This plan in effect preserved intact most of the features of the plantation system. Its major innovation was a politically and militarily opportunistic abolition of slavery and its substitution by a condition of collectivized neo-serfdom which, under a different label, bore remarkable similarities to the condition which it was supposed to supplant.

This plan was published as the Agrarian Law of 1793-1794. But it is one thing to write a law, quite another matter to enforce it, especially in the Saint-Domingue of the 1790's. The French lacked a military force capable of bringing the ex-slaves to plantation labor. The colonial militia and the newly arrived French troops were simply incapable of achieving and maintaining such a feat. The French envoys thus turned to the black and mulatto military leaders and in effect coopted them into collaboration with the restitution of the plantation system on the backs of "sharecropping freedmen." The French authorities found in Toussaint a willing collaborator. Switching his allegiance back to the French, he became the major instrument for the restitution of
French authority to the island. And more importantly he and his military apparatus played a decisive role in restoring and maintaining some semblance of a neo-colonial plantation economy in the central part of the island (Moral 1961:15). Unable to achieve the feat militarily, the French were thus able, by political concessions and promises of privileges within the new regime, to coopt this black military apparatus into providing the social legitimation and military muscle for the restoration of the old order under a slightly new name.

In their calculations, the French civil and military authorities had been effectively brilliant—and at the same time terribly naive. For in recruiting into their service and rewarding the black military apparatus, the French indeed created a local force that stood a good chance of restoring much or most of the devastated plantation economy. But in their expectation that the black commanders and troops would content themselves with the role of remunerated enforcers, the French committed a devastating error.

Many of the French and Creole planters had been killed. Most of the survivors had hastily left the island. This meant that hundreds of plantations were abandoned. Under the Sonthonax-Polvorel formula, these plantations were to be rented out to temporary owners, pending the return of the original owner or the final sale of the plantation to a new owner. There was soon a land rush, and from the outset Toussaint and his officers consistently contested the claims of the "anciens libres," the mulatto claimants to ownership of land. A fever for the acquisition of control of the abandoned or contested estates came over the land, and officers of the black military apparatus were eventually to play a critical role, attempting wherever
possible to occupy local positions of economic control throughout the
country, left vacant by the political and military turmoil of the
years of insurrection. They did not attempt to fundamentally alter the
compromise economy designed by the French Commissioners; they aimed
rather to secure for themselves a commanding position therein.

THE MASSES: BIRTH OF A PEASANTRY

The military campaigns and the subsequent economic policies of these
black leaders have received abundant historical documentation,
and indeed more than just one historical analysis tends toward
giving much detailed treatment and heavy analytic importance to
discussions of the varying personality characteristics of these
key individuals. Yet the highly visible military events, the colorful
series of personality anecdotes, and the camouflaging power of the
official pronouncements and memoirs which provide much of our historical
knowledge of these years, have combined to obscure the operation of
an economic dynamic which, when a more detailed reinterpretation of
Haitian economic history than is possible there is finally achieved,
may well turn out to be the major underlying determinant of the course
which Haitian society eventually took. When certain features of the
subsistence base of colonial and revolutionary Saint-Domingue are
given analytic priority, the chaotic military and political realignments begin to fall into conceptual order, and the military heroes are
suddenly seen in a perspective quite different from that of conventional
historical accounts. It is within this readjusted framework that the
revolutionary transition will be succinctly analyzed (cf. Moral
The underlying process is intimately linked to the de facto subsistence base which had emerged in colonial Saint-Domingue. Discussions of the "colonial economy" tend to focus on the land tenure arrangements, technological inputs, and organization of labor which produced cash crops for an export economy. Yet I have already indicated that a "subterranean," or at any rate less flamboyant, second component arose and grafted itself into the more visible export component. The production of foodstuffs by slaves on plots allocated to them, and the raising of minor livestock, though initially intended to provide a supplement to their own diets, eventually became a much relied on source of various types of food throughout the colony. From the point of view of the colonial system, it comes across as a useful, but economically marginal, component. But from the point of view of the slaves themselves, it takes on a completely new light.

Briefly stated, what was secondary to the planter class was primary to the slaves. I have indicated that for many slaves these "extracurricular" economic pursuits came to be an important source of income and, consequently, an important focus of interest and affect. A duality had arisen in the economy; two radically different opportunity structures for economic advance had emerged. And the desires for freedom which must have been felt by the majority of the slaves were not desires for freedom in the abstract, but for freedom to dedicate all of their labor to their own economic pursuits. Whatever triggered the initial uprising, whatever subjective motivations pushed on the early bands of marauding brigands whose destructive activities have been so luridly portrayed in history books, the ultimate destruction of the old order came about as the result of the
victory of this "internal economy" over the export sector. The battle was between two types of economic organization.

The Myth of Universal Armed Insurgence

Much confusion is caused simply because of a historically untenable assumption that is frequently made concerning the activities of the ex-slave masses during the 13 year period between the revolt of 1791 and the eventual declaration of Haitian independence in the early 1800's. The historically indisputable thoroughness of the destruction which was wreaked in many parts of the colony has led many authors to use language which directly states, or seems to imply, that the vast majority of the slaves were involved in sustained, hostile destruction of life and property. Leyburn's reference to "half a million riotous blacks (1966:23)" perhaps provided Rodman (1954:9) with his own assertion that "the 500,000 Negro slaves revolted." These authors merely state directly what had been implied in Renaud's claim that the slaves "se soulevèrent en masse (1934:39)" and in Franklin's (1970:97-8) and Balch's (1927:3) statements to the same effect. A very early statement can also be found by Baskett (1970:112), who claimed that "most of the Negroes" took direct part in the hostilities.

As to Leyburn's and Rodman's statements concerning the "half a million blacks," we are simply dealing with sloppy language. Leyburn himself quotes the most reliable figures on the slave population at the time of the insurrection (1966:18), figures which indicate that there were 452,000 slaves, who constituted 87% of the colonial population. It is unlikely that Leyburn was seriously stating
that every single slave, including the women and children who were counted among the half million, became a "riotous" armed insurgent. When dealing with black hordes, even serious authors apparently get swept into poetic licence.

The figures that are generally given concerning the size of the various armies of this period cast into doubt the validity of any assumption concerning universal involvement—even universal adult male involvement—in sustained hostilities. Eventually the insurgent "hordes" crystallized into more highly organized fighting forces under leaders who assumed (or were given) military titles—i.e. they became armies. What percentage of the potential militants were actually part of these armies? The colonial slave population was seen to have been 452,000, of which a disproportionately large number were known to be adult males, in comparison to the age and sex ratios holding in more conventional populations. Thus we may plausibly entertain the notion that there were between 150,000 and 175,000 males of fighting age who could potentially belong to one or another of the armies. The fact is that the most important black army of the early 1790's, that of Toussaint, for several years numbered between 5,000 and 6,000 soldiers (James 1963:145-7), and even after it had been augmented by the addition of lesser chiefs and their troops during the 1790's, it never went beyond 18,000 men (James 1963:305). When adding to the number of combatants the smaller armies in other parts of the colony and the various maroon bands—some of whom sided with the colonial authorities against the rebel armies (James 1963:309)—it is unlikely that at any point in the revolutionary decade more than three out of ten adult males of
flying age ever formed part of an organized fighting force—and
that is a generous estimate.

Status of Agricultural Activities During the Years of the Revolt.

If the ex-slaves were not all rioting, what then were they doing?
The conventional notion of universal participation in the uprising
implies furthermore that the bloodthirsty hordes no longer had either
the time or the inclination to continue growing crops. The notion that
the slaves, in picking up weapons, simultaneously dropped their hoes,
fnds rather frequent direct expression in the literature. Baskett
(1970:118) assures us that "the Negroes were, because of slavery,
averse to agricultural labor," which was only slightly more moderate
than Brown's plaint (1970:108) that "...the mass of the insurgents had
no distinct object in view, farther than to gain a freedom from
labor, and to gratify their desire for a life of plunder and drunkenness,"
sentiments shared for the most part by Franklin as well (1970:119).
A more modern historian talks in the same basic chaos idiom when
he tells us that the blacks suffered from an "intoxication of liberty,"
and that "all habits of steady industry had been lost (Leyburn
1966:26, 33)." A concomitant to this myth is the companion myth that
the major problem confronting early Haitian leaders was to get their
subjects back onto the land. When Toussaint came to power, says one
author, "fields were no longer cultivated (Rodman 1954:11)." Toussaint
achieved great economic feats "...faisant rentre les (noires) sur
les propriités rurales (Lepelletier 1846:110)." Again, Leyburn accepts
as a fact that "the vast majority of the people" had to be "forced
willy-nilly into agriculture (1966:34)." Brown perhaps states the
myth most clearly when he says that "the influence of the black chiefs was put in requisition to restore the negroes to the plantations, and make the labors of agriculture serve them for employment instead of the disorders of war" (1971:108). In short, the chaos model would have us believe that it was largely due to the moral influence of a charismatic leader that the blacks' repugnance to field labor was temporarily overcome.

Evidence cited above has called into question the notion of universal uprising. But if the historical records are to be set right, analysis must go beyond a simple challenging of the chaos model, to the construction and documentation of an alternative, more credible theory concerning the activities of hundreds of thousands of adults during these critical years. Fortunately the same historical documents which impugn the validity of the chaos model also give us very clear leads into the nature of the activities which the former slaves were in fact pursuing during these critical years.

The outbreak of the slave insurrection in the north, and its spread to other regions of the country, had universal repercussions throughout the colony, even on those plantations where immediate physical devastation did not occur. Two of these repercussions are of particular interest for us. In the first place the insecurities stemming from the armed hostilities and the concomitant rise in prices for most goods caused widespread local strains on the food supply, which had traditionally included a large component of foodstuffs imported from abroad. More and more the colonial population came to depend on the crops and small livestock raised and marketed by the slaves who had not revolted. An earlier section discussed the manner
in which produce from the provision plots of the slaves had gradually become an essential component of the colonial diet, and how this dependence manifested itself in the form of a growing internal market system in which the slaves took active advantage of this opportunity to earn an otherwise hard-to-come-by income. But if this dependence on slave-raised and slave-marketed food had already become noteworthy before the insurrection, it became critical afterwards (Débiens 1956:130). This had immediate and deep reaching repercussions on the life chances of those large sectors of the slave population that appear to have remained on the plantations.

But the very forces which created this increased dependence on the slaves simultaneously constrained and channeled the response of the freemen and owners to their new situation. Their general response was not to exact more labor and produce from the slaves that had not revolted. On the contrary: the behavior of many owners and overseers became suddenly, dramatically, and understandably conciliatory toward the slaves, a sensible strategy on their part to minimize the danger of their slaves joining the ranks of the insurgents.

An historically critical passage appears in a letter in which a local foreman writes to the absentee owner of a plantation concerning measures which he had taken to forestall the possibilities of a revolt:

Vos negres...traavillent comme de coutume. Pour les encourager a continuer... je leur donne tous les dimanches une livre de morue à chacun et deux rechanges par an... Je les oblige à faire chacun un jardin capable de les nourrir, leur donnant à cet effet deux heures à midi franches, leurs dimanches et fêtes... De temps à autre je leur donne une journée pour travailler dans leur jardin, soit pour y sarcler, planter ou récolter des vivres. Cette façon de les conduire les rend plus satisfaits (Débiens 1956:124).
The whites, in short, found themselves making gifts. But of much greater significance than gifts of clothes and increased rations were the economic concessions that were made, especially those of more cropping land and more time to work the land. The fact that many slaves remained attached to their plantations suggests at least partial success for these maneuvers. De bien (1962) emphasizes the tranquility that appeared to have prevailed during the hectic years of 1791-1797, in the very region of the colony where the insurrection first broke out:

Au milieu d'une des périodes les plus agitées de l'histoire de Saint-Domingue, (les esclaves de Foache) forment un atelier compact, que les insurrections, les influences de la Révolution ont des années durant fort peu touché. Jusqu'en 1798 l'ordre intérieur persiste. Le gérant peut demeurer sur place sans sérieuse inquiétude. Le travail survit, en somme assez régulier (Debien 1962:170).

Equally clear documentation comes from a coffee plantation in a mountain region of the Artibonite area. A French "gérant" (overseer) writes thus to the absent owner of the plantation in August of 1792, exactly a year after the initial insurrection:

Les louanges que J'ai a faire de vos nègres son au-dessus de toute expression, n'ayant eu aucun sujet de mécontentement d'eux dans l'instant de la plus grande insurrection et dans le moment où ils étaient entourés de sujets révoltés et de particuliers intéressés au désordre (quoted in Debien 1962:170).

By no means can it be assumed that such plantations were the exception. Although cautioning against unwarranted generalizations, Debien points out that on plantations with a certain type of authority structure, a relatively high percentage of "creole" (i.e. locally born rather than African born) slaves, and/or a highland location which created some isolation—three factors very common throughout the colony—the slaves frequently continued working their land even during the insurrection (Debien 1972:170-1).

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What is analytically critical is the observation that their continued dedication to agricultural pursuits was sustained in the context of the cash cropping activities that had been permitted to them in the days of slavery, buttressed by the new freedoms and concessions which the masters were forced to make in the face of the insurrection.

It would be impossible to overestimate the evolutionary impact of this situation on the future of Haitian economy and society. Debien phrases the matter beautifully:

En face des blancs que ne font plus que passer et qui se remplacent en courant comme sur un fond miné, les noirs, libres ou esclaves encore, enfonce doucement leurs talons dans cette terre nourricière que chaque jour et chaque récolte font lentement un peu plus leur (1958:131).

If evidence has earlier been presented justifying the suspicion that most of the slaves refrained from extended active participation in the hostilities, it is passages such as the above, gleaned directly from eyewitness accounts of the period, which give us a clear picture of what these slaves were doing: making more secure their possession of the plots on which they had been accustomed to grow provisions, simultaneously expanding their cash-cropping and animal raising activities to respond energetically to a social situation in which they had more economic leeway and to a market which had drastically altered in their favor.

In light of this the notion that Toussaint somehow had to struggle to get his black followers back to the land becomes nonsensical. His headaches were of a completely different nature. The blacks were already firmly and determinedly entrenched on the land— but on their own plots. Toussaint's legislation must thus be translated judiciously.
He is constantly praised for his attempts to reinstate "agriculture." But in his lexicon, and the lexicon of the colonial rulers with whom he collaborated, the term "agriculture" referred strictly to the gang labor economy of reinstated plantations. Similarly his imprecations against "vagabonds" were less directed against urban idlers than against incipient peasants hard at work on their own plots, small holding cultivators who refused to leave their plots and attach themselves to neo-colonial work gangs laboring under the supervision of black commanders and soldiers.

The evidence for this is quite clear. Toussaint's plans to reorganize the economy encountered resistance, in the form of a revolt in the North. A verbatim quote from one of the "vagabonds" concerning the reason for the revolt is highly revealing:

Par ici...l'on nous vexé trop, l'on ne nous paie pas bien ce que nous revient des denrees que nous faisons; l'on nous force de donner pour rien nos poules, nos cochons, quand nous allons à la ville... (Moral 1961:16)

This very significant passage attests to

1. the presence of a large number of blacks who were on their own raising crops and animals during the so-called turbulent decade of the 1890's;
2. the degree to which the whites had become fundamentally dependent on these crops and animals;
3. the degree to which the blacks were assiduously committed to this type of pursuit.
4. the degree to which at least some of the armed conflicts occurring in the colony at this time were directly and overtly fought over the issue of freedom for the blacks to grow food on small plots and raise animals, as a source of cash income.
An equally clear passage is gleaned from a visitor to the rural areas in 1799, who wrote:

Nous remarquâmes qu'ils (les cultivateurs) avaient tous disposé d'une étendue plus ou moins considérable de terrain pour leur jardinage, auquel ils donnaient tout leur temps, malgré les défenses faites à ce sujet par les règlements du général en chef Toussaint Louverture. (Moral 1961:19)

This means clearly that the conflict in which Toussaint found himself embroiled was not one of industry versus laziness, but of individualized private holdings versus plantation gang labor.

In the same vein another verbatim quote from a black prisoner casts some new light on the "intoxication" with wanton destruction allegedly manifested by the blacks. In a very revealing quote, James gives us a possibly new slant on the dynamics of said destruction. The blacks who burned fields were in at least some cases burning fields which they themselves, on their own initiative, had planted. When the French interrogated a captive as to why he had done such a thing, he retorted: "We have a right to burn what we cultivate because a man has a right to dispose of his own labor" (James 1966:361).

A quote such as that sets the chaos model directly on its head. The traditional model states that the blacks were burning instead of planting. But this passage indicates that in at least some cases they were burning because they had planted, and were unwilling to see their fields appropriated by others. In short the oft-touted cessation of economic activities during the Haitian revolution must be treated as one more component of the master myth. What ceased was not economic activity, but plantation gang labor. This was replaced in some cases by pillage and destruction, but in other—perhaps more numerous—cases by a switch to the full time pursuit of the market oriented
cash cropping and livestock raising that had begun to emerge during the colonial period. The fact that the early Haitian leaders—and most writers on this period—did not recognize this as "agriculture" attests more to their own biases than to a genuine withdrawal from land and crops on the part of the black masses.

To sum up: the notion that the decade of revolutionary transition in Saint-Domingue was characterized by universal and exclusive dedication to destruction and pillage by "half a million riotous blacks" must be challenged as a myth. Full time historians must eventually supply the definitive documentation on this matter, if indeed such documentation can be unearthed. But the evidence already presented here suggests that perhaps a not-insubstantial part of the black population dedicated a not-insubstantial part of their energies and attention to securing control over plots of land, growing crops and raising animals, and marketing these commodities for purposes of securing a cash income. In the light of such evidence the marauding hordes who fill the pages of historical accounts of the Saint-Domingue revolt have been suddenly transformed. They now appear curiously similar to a historical type currently being given much anthropological attention—the freeholding peasant.

Conventional history, which focuses on the behavior of certain salient groups and couches its analysis in the idiom of imputed ideals and motives, generates the type of historical legend with which I have dealt here. An alternative analysis has been presented, which has attempted to outline at least the general contours of the deep structural processes that were unfolding on French Hispaniola during this critical period. A master-myth tells us that the blacks
were running wild, killing, looting, destroying, until a charismatic leader coaxed and forced them back onto the land. The reality, as I have indicated, was quite different. Many of the blacks had stayed on the land and were quite determined and assiduous in their production of crops and livestocks, now that the profits would belong to them. The master-myth further speaks of the role of the military as enforcers of new discipline and work-morality, as the only path to restoring economic prosperity. But if the analysis presented here is correct, the leaders appeared to be less occupied in the task of society building than in that of plantation restoration and in the coercive exacting of labor whose fruits would fall largely to themselves. But their "true motives" are somewhat tangential to the discussion. What is of central interest is the structural implication of their behavior. Conventional interpretations of the Haitian revolution in terms of racial, national, social or political terms fall short of convincingly accounting for what occurred.

I have argued rather that the conflict was, on a very deep level, between those small-scale cultivators who wanted to plant and market their own crops, and those ruling groups who had other designs on the labor of these "proto-peasants." The rulers changed skin color and political allegiance in the course of the conflict. But the underlying battle lines always remained the same. And if one is not unduly enthralled by "fires, gunshots, and "marauding hordes," the cataclysmic Haitian revolution begins to take on at least some of the appearance of a more gentle evolution, bringing to dominance a type of peasant livelihood that the French colonists had unwittingly permitted to take root under their very noses.
CHAPTER THREE

THE PEASANTIZATION OF HAITIAN SOCIETY

If the seeds of peasant economics had been sown in the colony and had surfaced in the period of revolutionary transition, it was only in the postrevolutionary decades that the plant was to emerge full blown to engulf the entire western part of Hispaniola, as the dominant adaptive strategy governing the economic lives of the vast majority of the population. In the preceding chapter I discussed the manner in which the colonial period had witnessed the seminal implantation of embryonic peasant behaviors, which the revolutionary period subsequently freed from the confining strictures of a plantation regime. In this chapter I will discuss the step-by-step transformation which finally made of Haiti a peasant society.

Emphasis is placed on the word society. The cultivation of small plots and the utilization of market outlets for the crops so produced do not in themselves signal the presence of peasants. A society is a peasant society only to the degree that there are groups exercising revenue generating control over these smallholding cultivators. Until ruling groups in Haiti had gained some degree of de facto control over the rural hinterland, Haiti remained in a taxonomic limbo. But this state of affairs endured but a short period of time. The history of postrevolutionary Haiti was the story of the rather rapid emergence of an institutional apparatus capable of controlling, at least to some degree, a mass which by now had become highly peasantized in its behaviors.
STRUCTURAL WEAKNESSES IN THE POSITION OF HAITIAN RULERS

A superficial view of Haitian history places emphasis on the victory of the ex-slaves against the French. The model presented in these pages gives emphasis, rather, to the victory of freeholders over representatives of a gang-labor economy. The emergence of Haitian society is best seen as the result of a diachronic compromise. The ruling groups abandoned serious efforts to reimpose plantation economy (though the rhetoric was to persist for a few decades) and began confronting the Haitian peasant on his own ground—that of an independent cultivator. It is only after this de facto capitulation was made that rulers were able to exercise some revenue-generating control over the hinterland, converting Haiti into a peasant society. This capitulation was rendered necessary by the existence of certain structural weaknesses in their position of control.

WEAKNESSES IN THE SUPERSTRUCTURE

With regard to the governmental superstructure, we may expect effective control only under conditions of at least moderate integration and internal coordination within the chain of governing command. This coordination and integration were, for very concrete and recent historical reasons, absent in postrevolutionary Haiti. The degree to which military leaders in the colony and the new republic had quickly switched allegiance must have been constantly before the eyes of any president or commanding officer. The much discussed side-switching of Toussaint, the greatest of the early black leaders, is an excellent example of the point in question. And Toussaint himself was to be plagued by pusillanimity and outright desertion on the part of his own subordinate officers. In the North, the reign of Christophe—
who himself had been among those to desert Toussaint, was to be brought to an abrupt end by a revolt from within his own military ranks. The emperor would have been assassinated had he not beat his soldiers to the punch by committing dignified suicide a few moments before the arrival of the insurgents. Dessalines himself had several years earlier met his end in a similar fashion, ambushed by a clique of rebelling subordinates.

In short it is clear that, despite the adoption of the external titles, ranks, uniforms, and drill patterns of the former European rulers, the very conditions under which Haitian military leadership emerged militated against the coalescence of a truly unified and effective chain of command. Despite the legendary ferocity of the early black leaders, a ferocity that is often given detailed (but misleading) anecdotal treatment in conventional histories, their hold on the reins of power was very tenuous, and their ability to control the masses was effectively undermined by their inability to assure long range compliance even on the part of their own subordinates. There was, in short, no genuinely effective apparatus of control in the higher levels of society.

INDEPENDENCE OF THE BASE

But these weaknesses from above were aggravated by a complex of control-resisting conditions prevailing within the lower levels of society. At least three of these must have entered the equation as factors frustrating any effective application of centralized control.
Lack of Physical Infrastructure

On the one hand the very topology of western Hispaniola was one which militated against easy control of the interior. The large percentage of the country's land surface which is made up of poorly accessible mountains and valleys would cause headaches to any would-be rulers. The further lack of physical infrastructure in the form of good roads created a situation that was much more conducive to local autonomy than to centralized control.

The problem of physical separation between rulers and ruled on the island of Hispaniola had proved so bothersome to the Spaniards in an earlier century that they had physically depopulated the mountainous western end of the island and forcibly concentrated the population on the flatter and more easily governable eastern end. Thus Haitian rulers inherited the "wrong end" of the island, from the point of view of easy control of the population. Their new subjects were protectively dispersed over mountains and valleys that had been the traditional refuge of Arawak Indians and African maroons.

One can sympathize with the comical pathos of the situation of the early president who, busily engaged in his tasks of governing, was blissfully unaware that his northern province had for weeks been openly preparing for an armed uprising (Franklin 1970:10-11). In short the physical makeup of western Hispaniola strongly militated against the imposition of effective central control.
Ideology of Liberty

The colonial rulers, however, had also to contend with mountainous topography and deficient roads. Even given these it was possible to impose at least local patterns of control. But there were other factors in postrevolutionary Haiti which impeded the imposition of even local control. One of these factors was a militant, anti-slavery, egalitarian ideology generated by recent historical events. The revolution had been fought under the slogans of liberty for all. Even Dessalines found himself compelled to pay at least public lip service to the ideal of liberté (Leyburn 1966:32). The writings of early observers such as Franklin (1970) and Mackenzie (1971) are filled with (disapproving) comments on the insolent recalcitrance which they perceived among many Haitians with whom they came in contact in their journeys through the island. During the colonial period there was, of course, no widespread analogy to this open ideology of liberty. It was a newly forged control-resisting factor with which only the early Haitian rulers had to contend in such an open fashion.

Independent Resource Base

But much more important than either the mountainous topography or the ideology of liberty was the independent resource base which the Haitian masses had already begun to control before the crowning of the first Haitian emperor, Dessalines. Indications of the definitive spread and inculcation of this crucial pattern during the transitional years have already been given. It is along this dimension that the masses of early Haiti differed most dramatically from the slaves.
of the late colony. Though the latter had access to their provision plots, such access was had at the sufferance of coresident masters or their ubiquitous managers and overseers.

In postrevolutionary Haiti there was neither master nor, in most places, effective overseer. With their disappearance in preceding decades, the masses had begun to pursue in a full time, energetic fashion the independent economic activities which in earlier days had been relegated to scarce free-time. By the time Haitian leaders assumed formal control, the masses were well entrenched in their new way of life, with effective control over their own plots of land and the concomitant autonomy which such control implies. It was this quasi-advanced stage of peasantization that already prevailed throughout the island which was probably the major factor in thwarting all efforts on the part of rulers toward centralized control. Whereas the colonial masters had to deal with disenfranchised slaves, the Haitian rulers were confronted with masses of independent, economically entrenched peasants. It was no wonder that their schemes were to come to naught.

CONSOLIDATION OF POWER

The capitulation to a peasant reality was not to be made by the representatives of the black military aristocracy. To the end these former slaves maintained their vision of a Haiti in which they and their favorites were the commanders of a collectivized labor force producing a steady stream of exportable agricultural produce which would restore national wealth to the levels it had attained during the colony's heyday as the jewel in the French empire. Dessalines had
not abandoned this plan, when he was assassinated in 1806. After his death a political division was to arise in the country, with a former black general, Henri Christophe, establishing a kingdom in the north. By dint of Christophe's powerful rule, this section of the country did in fact pass through more than a decade of a collectivized economy, at least in the areas contiguous to the capital city (today called Cap Haitien). But in 1820 this economic edifice came crumbling to the ground with a revolt and the subsequent death of Christophe; with its collapse all seriously enforced dreams of a collectivized Haiti passed forever from the scene.

The capitulation to a peasant reality was to be made rather during the incumbencies of the mulatto successors of Dessalines and Christophe. The first mulatto ruler was Pétion, who governed the South for over ten years from 1807 to 1818, during the time that Christophe was in control of the North. Pétion's successor was another mulatto, Boyer, at the beginning of whose long rule (1818-1843) the North and the South were again reunited after the death of Christophe. It was during the presidencies of these two leaders that the forces of peasantization finally triumphed.

One of the main achievements of these presidents was their success at the consolidation of governmental power, without which effective rule was impossible. There were three major groups to be reckoned with: the masses, the mulatto gentry, and the military establishment. With respect to the masses, both Pétion and Boyer continued to give lip service to the ideals of collectivized agriculture, the most impressive document being Boyer's Code Rural. But such lip service appears to have been done out of deference to
the interests of the mulatto gentry (cf. Franklin 1970:337). In their behavior, both presidents were conciliatory toward the masses. The laissez-faire leniency of Pétion induced many blacks from Christophe's kingdom in the North to defect to the South. His successor Boyer was quite concerned publicly to disassociate himself from the tyranny of Dessalines and went so far as to punish military commanders who behaved harshly toward the people in efforts to enforce collective labor (Mackenzie 1971, 1:60).

If the masses were conciliated with a basic hands-off policy, the mulatto gentry were wooed through a series of favorable legislative moves made during the reign of Pétion. Of particular importance was his restoration to the gentry of much of the land that had been expropriated during the reign of Dessalines and his facilitating of the legalization of land titles.

But of even more weighty implications for the consolidation of governmental power and the future of Haitian history were the moves that Pétion and Boyer were forced to make to consolidate their power vis-à-vis the military. The government budget, presupposing as it did the production of a steady stream of export crops, was in a sad state. The statistics of the period, especially statistics on exportation, give dramatic testimony to the extent of the failure. The nation was receding further than it ever had from the wealth of the colonial period. At the height of its prosperity, Saint-Domingue could boast of some 140 sugar estates, almost all of them embracing over a thousand acres of land, of which a fourth would be
planted in sugar cane, and the remainder in pasture and other crops. But none of the handful of sugar estates which were established by military and governmental functionaries in the post-revolutionary decades had more than 40 acres planted in cane. Per acre productivity also declined. The colonial average was reported to be almost 3,000 pounds of sugar per acre. But in the Cul-de-Sac plain under Boyer, one acre would not produce 1,000 pounds of sugar (Franklin 1970:349-50). The extent of the decline in the plantation economy can be grasped if it is remembered that in the year preceding the slave insurrection more than 163 million pounds of sugar were exported. But in the year 1825, under Boyer, Haiti exported only 2,000 pounds of sugar (Leyburn 1966:320). As the ultimate symbol of decline, sugar was now being imported from the neighboring island of Cuba (Mackenzie 1971:77). In short, in the eyes of foreign observers the Haitian economy had ceased to exist. It was not sick; it was a corpse.

Part of the problem of course was in the eye of the observer. The eagerness with which foreigners declared the Haitian economy as dead was based on an anthropologically untenable exclusion of yeoman cultivation from the rubric of "economy." As will be shown, the country's economy, if measured by another yardstick, was flourishing. But it was true that the elite groups of Haiti had failed dismally in their stated intentions to organize what was by international standards a wealthy Republic.

The failure of the plantation economy to revive placed the government in a financially difficult situation. No money was coming in, yet there was an army demanding its pay. Pétion and Boyer were forced
into a number of oblique revenue-raising schemes. All of these oblique schemes avoided the peasant reality; some of them were almost ludicrous; and none of them ultimately worked. Aside from the predictable strategy of simply printing more money, Pétion brought various types of local foodstuffs cheaply and attempted to sell them for a profit in the still flourishing plantation island of nearby Jamaica. When Boyer came to power, he also printed money and attempted mining schemes of various sort. But the unpaid army remained.

The immediate danger was probably less in terms of uprising than of desertion. Pétion was particularly interested in maintaining a respectable standing army. Under Dessalines there had been constant fear of an overseas invasion from the French and a reimposition of slavery. Under Pétion there was a much more immediate danger: an invasion from the kingdom of Henri Christophe in the North. In this kingdom the black ruler had in fact reimposed a quasi-collectivized economic order in which the masses—at least those in the vicinity of the emperor’s capital—were marshalled into onerous corvée labor and the soldiers did in fact enjoy a relatively privileged position as enforcers of this labor. Thus Pétion was confronted with a disciplined and regularly remunerated northern army whose very existence posed a threat to the sovereignty of his Republic in the South. His lack of funds with which to maintain the size and morale of his own army became a high priority focus of attention early in his reign.

He had not been in office for two years before the nature of the solution became clear. Pétion may have had little cash, but he had a critically important substitute. He had eminent domain over virtually a nationful of land of which only a fraction was legally deeded to
private owners. In a move that was unique in the annals of Caribbean history, he took advantage of this resource to maintain the size and morale of his army, guaranteeing that every single member of the military, from the highest echelons to the rank and file troops, would one day become a landowner.

His first steps into this path were tentative and modest. The 1809 decree which first launched the nation into this direction applied principally to retired soldiers. Those who had been rank and file troops were to receive a don national of some 15 acres of land; and of course officers were to receive substantially more, according to their rank. The response of the beneficiaries—the concessionaires—was overwhelmingly positive, so much so that two years later an even more magnanimous step was taken when many categories of officers currently serving in the military were also given land. It was no longer necessary to wait for retirement. Since much of the land given to the military was land on which coffee trees had been planted in the colonial period (Renaud 1939:85), it was not necessary to dedicate one's full time attention to the plantation to enjoy it as a source of income. And though at least some of the land given to retired lower echelon military was of poorer quality (Franklin 1970:316), the response of the entire military establishment to this policy of Pétion was overwhelmingly positive. So effective was this strategy in securing a loyal army even in the absence of funds that Pétion decided a few years later to strengthen his civil administration using the same tactic. In 1814 he promulgated a decree granting land to various categories of civilian functionaries (Bastien 1951:113). In short, within seven years
of his ascent to power, Pétion succeeded in unifying the entire institutional apparatus, civilian as well as military, under his now magnanimous command. And he did it by taking the unprecedented step of parcelling out the land of the Republic. Historians have debated at length the wisdom of this policy on the part of Pétion. But in terms of Pétion's short run goals, the move had been indisputably effective. With one stone he had succeeded in killing several enormous birds. He had not only removed the threat of invasion from the North, but had also circumvented the problem of empty public coffers.

This view differs from that of writers such as Thoby (1888) and Renaud (1934), who adopt a "wise man" model of history when discussing Pétion's land policy. In this view, it was the egalitarian ideology of the French Revolution combined with economic insight which induced Pétion, in his wisdom, to dismantle the plantations and "create a peasantry." Leyburn also attributes the emergence of a peasantry to Pétion's policies, but blames rather than praises the mulatto president (1966:86-8). The model presented here differs from both of the above models in suggesting that the freeholders were proliferating without Pétion's help and that his land policy must be understood first and foremost in the context, not of egalitarian ideals, but of an unpaid army.

In short, the presidents were in effect merely flowing along with a current of peasantization which they had had no fundamental part in initiating, riding the crest of a wave over whose direction they had virtually no control. They were truly "riding the crest." Though they could not stop the tide, their positions did permit them to manipulate the process of fragmentation and turn it to their own advantage. By "turning loose" the military onto the land, they were
merely unleashing a process which was bound to occur anyway, but doing it in such a way that their own popularity and positions of power were strengthened. Unlike their black predecessors, they were practising the politics of least resistance.

To say that the presidents were following a tide is not to say that their policies were devoid of significant impact. On the contrary the structural implications of the policy of land grants were profound. Up until now there had been a severe chasm between the institutional superstructure and the proto-peasant base, whose smallholding economic pursuits had enjoyed an evolutionary florescence in the post-colonial years but had not yet even been recognized as true "culture de la terre." By plugging in to this current, Pétion narrowed the gap between the rulers and the ruled.

To the degree that terminological shifts indicate changes in orientation, the sudden appearance in official government documents of references to "la petite culture" (smallholding cultivation) as a legitimate contrast to "la grande culture" of plantation agriculture was laden with structural implications. This official "legitimization" of peasant cultivation probably had little effect on the behavior of the myriads of Haitians who had taken it up without governmental approval. But the significance of the legislation lies in the fact that it signalled a new type of behavior on the part of the rulers. The fiction of a plantation economy was rapidly disappearing, the rulers were opening their eyes to the fact that their followers were not gang laborers but independent yeomen, and that governmental control strategies must so adapt.
In structural terms Pétion's policy placed this spontaneous proliferation of smallholders within reach of the law. The government had proved incapable of pulling the people off of their plots onto plantations. But it would certainly be able to make them toe at least certain lines within the smallholding context. Above all, now that land was being passed out en masse to specific military and governmental figures, the squatter no longer stood in defiance of a distant and somewhat impersonally indifferent governmental superstructure whose military enforcers had neither the personal stake nor the long range persistence to keep him tied to a plantation. Now the illegally established freeholder would in many cases be in defiance of a specific military or governmental official who did have an interest in that specific plot of ground and who might find it more to his advantage to eject one occupant to substitute another. That is, Pétion's policy of distributing relatively small plots to military and governmental figures put an end to anomaly as the only basis for smallholding pursuits. Now there were numerous landowners permanently and legally established with titles to their plots, and the illegally established freeholder was becoming somewhat more conspicuous.

It was not an entirely new ballgame for the smallholder, but at least some of the rules had been suddenly changed. If he wanted to continue pursuing his own course as a cultivator of his own gardens, well and good. But neither he nor his children could count on a secure future unless he first toed certain lines. His rulers had woken up to reality. They were now no longer an internally divided mishmash of
warring factions concocting unenforceable schemes for reconstructing the plantations. They were now a fairly unified superstructure of government officials, soldiers, and landowners who had taken a sudden interest in the plots he was cropping and in the smallholding activities which earlier rulers had not even deigned worthy of recognition. The smallholder continued in his way of life—but now he had an extremely interested "outside world" starting to take a closer look at him. As a coalition of power took shape in the upper institutional structures, the autonomous hilldweller was being drawn closer and closer to the status of a centrally controlled peasant.

THE ACQUISITION OF REVENUE

The coalescence of a unified power structure is but one element in the peasantization of a society. The presence of non-food-producing groups in an agrarian society creates the structural demand for revenue generating mechanisms as well. The preceding section has dwelled on the modus vivendi established among the various power groups in post-Dessalinian Haiti, their abandonment of a plantation scheme, their sudden interest in "la petite culture." But these processes are in a sense but the anteroom of peasantization. To perceive the nature of a rural populace is not necessarily to be able to rule them. The task still remained of "integrating" these rural freeholders into a national unit, an integration whose sine qua non was the establishment of some sort of liens on at least part of their economic activities. After some false starts, the ruling groups were eventually to hit on a solution.
THE IMPOSITION OF TAXES

One of the most direct forms of securing revenue employed by rulers is the imposition of direct taxes. But there are a great variety of taxes. The particular form of taxation employed in a society will frequently be a good indicator of deeper economic dynamics governing the society. During colonial times, for example, the French authorities eschewed the alternative of imposing simple land taxes, choosing rather to tax individuals according to the number of slaves they possessed. Land was frequently left idle, and an individual's landholding was not necessarily an indicator of his wealth. Slaves were not left idle; the size of a planter's slave contingent was a good indicator of that individual's taxability. The choice of taxation by slaves rather than by simple landholdings signalled a recognition by French authorities of the nature of the society with which they were dealing.

The Haitian rulers, when they began dealing with the economy as it was rather than with the economy as they had hoped it would be, were no less astute in their perceptions than their French predecessors. Foreign observers of the period lamented the Haitian peasant's lack of involvement in a cash market. The lamentation was unneeded because the perception was false. Though the Haitian peasant had little direct involvement with an export market, already in the nineteenth century he was heavily involved nonetheless in the production of cash crops for an internal market system.

The existence of a money orientation was clear. Mackenzie somewhat sarcastically comments that this was the only common denominator
which bound all classes together:

Some have attempted to show that the coloured population form an aristocracy, while the whole of the labour is entailed on the negro. This, I suspect, is generalizing too extensively... There is one circumstance which appears to me very essentially to contribute to (a) spirit of equality. Almost every man, whatever his official rank may be, is either directly or indirectly engaged in commerce, the acquisition of money being held in as great repute as it ever was (in Europe). (Mackenzie 1971:29)

Though done sarcastically, he has identified an important pattern in Haitian society, one which has not been gainsaid by any evidence gathered in the century and a half since he made that comment.

This same author elsewhere gives evidence that local markets were already flourishing, markets supplied with products grown for that purpose by rural cultivators. Though his comments were directed at Europeans and were concerned with the local availability of foods that would interest members of the small foreign colony in Port-au-Prince, an important vignette emerges:

The principal market day is Saturday; but there are daily markets throughout the week for certain articles. The supply of beef, mutton, and fowls, is very tolerable; that of fish uncertain; and what is singular enough, although turtle abound in the bay, they are rarely met with for sale. There is also a respectable supply not only of tropical vegetables and fruit, but of some European kinds, which are raised by some natives... (Mackenzie 1971:13)

The surprisingly (to Mackenzie) weak orientation toward fish as an element in the diet is a pattern that continues today. But what is important in that passage is the glimpse it gives of the basic outline of a market system which still continues today. Already by the 1820's a market system had arisen in Port-au-Prince in which foodstuffs could be purchased every day, but in which Saturday was an especially active day. And already members of the rural population
were dedicating at least part of their energies to supplying this market with meat, vegetables, and fruits.

But it is not only the existence of these antecedents of contemporary markets which is impressive. The similarities in certain aspects of the systems' details are equally remarkable. One of the most salient characteristics of the Haitian internal market system of the 1970's is the preponderant role which females play. But this was exactly the situation which had come to prevail by the 1820's (Mackenzie 1971:42). Furthermore, during fieldwork in Kinanbwa, it became clear that many of the more important female traders (the larger madam sara) in effect used their capital to surreptitiously "employ" other individuals, principally in the acquisition of stock (Murray and Alvarez 1975). A somewhat analogous pattern, different in details but similar in its fundamental thrust, was also reported by Mackenzie:

The native retailers...are chiefly women, styled "marchandes;" these employ hucksters, also women, who traverse the country, attend the markets, and give an account of their transactions to their employers... (Mackenzie 1971:42).

In short the fleeting observations of this British consul general indicate that several basic design principles of today's market system were already present in the Haitian economy of the 1820's.

As I have indicated, Mackenzie's comments focus on the supplying of produce of interest to Europeans. But there is other evidence that this process was occurring throughout Haiti. Franklin, in discussing the value of land in different parts of the country, comments:

With respect to lands on the coast they are generally in waste, unless they happen to be immediately in the vicinity of a town, when some of them are occupied as small settlements for vegetables and for raising poultry for the markets... (Franklin 1970:315).
From this brief passage we see on the one hand that the population preferred the more secluded interior and on the other hand that the raising of vegetables and poultry for market had become a normal activity.

In another section of his work, Franklin confirms these impressions. Commenting on what he felt to be the evil effects of the government's policy of making gifts of land under the don national policy, he complained that such a policy merely extended and perpetuated the "evil and pernicious habits" of the people:

When a negro obtains a grant of a small tract of land, he cares little about the cultivation of it beyond the production of enough for his own immediate wants, and those wants are trifling. Two or three hours labour in each week will suffice to answer all the purposes of the culture required to produce food enough for himself; the rest of his time is then allowed to dwindle away... (Franklin 1970:344).

On the following page he then stumbles into a blatant contradiction which is obvious even without contemporary knowledge of peasant economic systems:

Hayti abounds with these small proprietors; their patches of land, with their huts upon them, are generally situate... in the mountains... They are therefore lost for the purposes of agriculture; their cultivation does not extend beyond vegetables for the markets in their vicinity, added to which they furnish an occasional supply of pork, poultry, and wild pigeons (Franklin 1970:345, emphasis mine).

A few pages earlier he had complained that all the negro did was grow food for himself; now he says that he only grows for local markets. What is important for us is the presence of such markets as the apparent stimulus for much of the cultivation that was occurring. In short, Franklin's racist comments about the slothful self-sufficiency of indolent negro cultivators were contradicted by evidence which he
himself had seen concerning the presence of local markets throughout
the Republic, supplied by produce from the gardens of these small-
holders.

In a similar vein, in discussing the need for education in the
country, Franklin comments on the obstacles to this schooling which
lack of money creates.

The cultivators in the country have neither (schools
nor money); money in particular they never have, except
just as much as the sale of their vegetables on a Sunday
brings them, but which is generally disposed of in payment
for the salt provisions, and the supply of taffia (local
alcohol) required for their weekly consumption (Franklin

The Haitians cannot seem to win in Franklin's eyes. If they are seen
lounging, they are proving the innate slothfulness of the negro.
If they are found busily selling produce in market, then of course
it is merely to earn money to satisfy another vice, that of drinking.
It is doubtful that Franklin took the care to see exactly what was
done with this money, and his comments on the drinking habits of the
Haitians can be dismissed as the uninformed prejudices of an ignorant
intruder. But in spite of himself, his references to the markets
throughout the country attest to a thoroughly ingrained cash orientation
on the part of even the earliest Haitian cultivators.

But there is other evidence from the same general period. Less
than two decades later (1840), another foreign visitor was to travel
throughout Haiti. As with Franklin, this later visitor, John Candler,
also had an axe to grind, but one of a fundamentally different sort.
Candler was a missionary and abolitionist, and as such was as exube-
rent in his praise of certain aspects of Haitian life as Franklin
had been vitriocially critical. But as with Franklin, Candler's
eyewitness account gives us a number of glimpses of the existence
of a vigorous internal market system within Haiti. The morning after
he arrived in Haiti, in the port of Cap Haitien in the North, Candler set out in the pre-dawn hours to visit parts of the nearby hills. He had scarcely left the city limits when he ran directly into his first encounter with the internal market system.

About three miles from the city, we met a curious group of country people in carts, and with horses and asses loaded with yams, plantains, and sweet potatoes, and some with bundles of guinea grass for sale at the morning market: they were bivouacking by fire-light, sipping coffee, and waiting for the hour when the city gate should be thrown open (Candler 1842:26).

What is of interest here is not only the presence of these marketbound people, but also the nature of the produce they were carrying: local cultivates that would be of interest only to local consumers. Export crops are notably absent from their stock.

What is lacking from the above description is the sex of the people involved, and the source of their produce. If the past was similar to the present, then most members of the "curious group" that Candler ran into were probably females. And (though Candler could not have found this out) it should not be assumed that they were bringing the produce from their husbands' gardens. Assuming again that the past was similar to the present, there is a good chance that these pre-dawn merchants had purchased part of the stock and were to that degree specialists in trade. Such assertions must remain completely speculative, as the historical documents do not go into enough detail.

Shortly after Candler ran into the above-mentioned group, he embarked on a longer overland journey south to the coastal town of Gonaives. He approached the town in the afternoon and once again was quite struck by the large number of hill dwellers who were involved in trade in the local market. Since it was later afternoon, he saw the people returning from the market, rather than waiting for it
to open as had been the case with the first group he had seen:

It was market day at Gonaïves: hundreds of people had passed us within the last two hours; wending their way homeward to the high mountains: the sight surprised us, and seeing other groups in the distance, we began to count the people. Before entering the town itself, we had passed in all four hundred and sixty-five persons, with nearly as many horses, mules, and asses, drawing light carriages, or loaded with commodities, which the peasantry were carrying back in return for the small parcels of cotton and coffee which they had carried to market (Candler 1842:56).

Many aspects of that passage are revealing. Once again we get a clear glimpse of the apparently large numbers of people involved in the local market system. But what is perhaps more interesting are the assumptions which Candler made, which to some degree contradicted the evidence which he had seen firsthand just shortly before on leaving the city of Cap Haitien in the North. There, it will be remembered, he saw people entering the market with the produce which they were going to sell. They were carrying local foodstuffs—yams, plantains, sweet potatoes. But at Gonaïves, since people were returning from market, he did not see what they had taken to sell and had to infer what they had brought with them to market. It is interesting that he inferred they had taken export crops—"small parcels of cotton and coffee." Why should he have made this assumption, when shortly before he had seen rural folk taking local foodstuffs—not export crops—to a town market? If Candler’s comments are correct, then it means that these export crops were sold in the local markets, which is fundamentally different from the case today, where the bulk of coffee and cotton are handled by speculatores who deal directly with the producers on their farms. If he is not correct—which must be accepted as a possibility—then his assumption that peasants sold only export crops, an assumption that contradicted what he himself had
seen at Cap Haitien, must be seen as part of a very general bias of the time that viewed agricultural potential exclusively in terms of export crops.

These biases against a clear perception of the independent empirical and logical status of production for a local market persist today. A twentieth century scholar such as Leyburn falls into the same puzzling pattern, filtering out evidence which he himself was to give. In one passage Leyburn says

During (Boyer's) twenty-five-year presidency the mass of Haitians became so indifferent to pecuniary inducements that little work could be got from them beyond that required to produce necessary food (Leyburn 1966:65).

But just six pages later he informs us that

...sentries at the gates of Port-au-Prince were authorized to confiscate plantains, yams, or fruit brought by any worker who, in contravention of the Code (Rural) had strayed to market on a forbidden day (Leyburn 1966: 71).

If Leyburn had information indicating that the army had to be used to prevent rural cultivators from marketing fruits and vegetables grown for this purpose, his statements concerning indifference to cash on the part of these cultivators is simply unfathomable. Though it involves some reading between the lines, the careful scrutiny of such comments made by first hand observers and subsequent historians attests to the presence even in the early nineteenth century of a very prominent market orientation among the populace of rural Haiti, a market orientation that largely expressed itself in the raising of crops and animals for local sale. Why this pattern has been systematically filtered out, ignored, or even directly denied by outside observers is matter for discussion elsewhere. What is important here is the fact that the pattern did exist in the early nineteenth century, as it had existed in the days of slavery, and as it continues to exist in the closing quarter of the twentieth century.
In view of this market orientation, the Haitian government was ultimately to adopt as its principal internal revenue collecting strategy the taxation of transactions in the public marketplaces. Whatever official pronouncements were, official behavior indicated awareness that the rural cultivators were not in fact locked into self-contained subsistence, but were in fact heavily oriented toward the production of crops for sale in the many public marketplaces that were appearing throughout the land. In view of their potential as an important source of revenue, these marketplaces were placed under official jurisdiction, laws were passed restricting most sales of produce to these locales, and sellers entering with produce were to be charged according to the volume and type of merchandise they were bearing.

With the imposition of these taxes the rural populace came at last under some degree of effective control by the authorities. Their livelihood, involving to such a large degree the production of produce for local sale, depended on the existence of locales where buyers and sellers would meet en masse. The government had been unable to coerce them into sustained residence and labor on plantations. But it was able, rather easily, to legalize and then tax entry into these locales. It began doing this in the nineteenth century, and it had continued doing this unabated, as its main source of internal revenue, even into the 1970's.¹

In this sense the government was utilizing the cash-cropping orientation of the rural population as a major handle on part of their

¹. In late 1974, after fieldwork had terminated, the government took a historic step when it decreed the eventual abolition of market taxes. What the steps leading up to this economically critical decision were, and what its impact has been (if indeed it has been implemented) are unknown at present writing.
revenue. In certain other peasant settings, local involvement with markets may be partially analyzed as a result of government taxation, and the need to acquire the cash which the payment of these taxes presupposes. In Haiti it was somewhat the opposite. The market orientation was more in the nature of a pre-existing given with which Haitian rulers had to deal. Rather than create this orientation, the public sector used it rather as a handle on at least part of the economic activities of the rural population. Without the government's assistance, without its assent, a market-bound train had begun rolling, a train whose motion the government could not stop, whose direction it could not change. As a last resort, the leaders themselves simply jumped onto the train, reminded the passengers of their presence, and started collecting fares.

THE COLLECTION OF RENT

The solution of market taxes answered the revenue needs of only one of the major power groups, the government. But it left unaffected the needs of the other two groups, the military and the gentry. In view of the fact that both of these groups had been given legalized titles to abundant land, one might have thought that their economic problems were ipso facto solved.

But such was not the case. Land does not produce wealth by itself; labor must be applied. The new recipients of land, however, in many cases had no intention of working that land themselves. They had inherited from their colonial predecessors a societal model in which they would occupy command positions in an economy supported by the labor of subordinate others. But these recalcitrant others refused
to be subordinate along prescribed channels. The government, it was true, was securing at least some revenue from market taxes. But this revenue was of precious little use to the military, and of no use to the gentry. These two groups were still confronted with the problem of establishing their own sorts of liens on the rural population.

They were not interested in becoming cultivators themselves, but neither could they impose taxes as the government had done. And both groups, military as well as gentry, had lacked the power to coerce any but a fractional percentage of the rural population onto their plantations. They were thus forced to resort to a different strategy. If they could not marshall the masses into gangs of reconstituted plantation workers, they might nonetheless control them as peasants. Where the government had resorted to the imposition of taxes, then, these other ruling groups were to briefly try their hand at the collection of rent.

When the earliest neo-plantation economic schemes proved impractical, the ruling groups experimented with several modified variants of the same theme. Pétion, for example, had legalized a compromise arrangement in which laborers would in fact have access to individual plots, in addition to working in the fields of the plantation. But even under such modified arrangements, the basic structural role of the landowners continued to be that of organizers of labor and payers of wages. But they were unable to enforce even these modified arrangements. Eventually they had to settle for the still dominant but less advantageous role of being collectors of rent from stubbornly autonomous freeholding cultivators.
Thus the landowners were eventually, in many cases, to turn over plots of grounds to individual cultivators, to crop when and as they wished, with the stipulation that part of the produce would go to the landowner at harvest time. With the gradual spread of this latter arrangement an important structural metamorphosis had occurred in the bosom of Haitian society, as the *cultivateur portionnaire* became a peasant, and the landowner became a simple collector of rent. Within a brief period of time landowners, unable and probably unwilling to put any large plots of land under cultivation with their own labor and that of their families, had thus found themselves forced to assume a new economic role. The masses had become independent cultivators. The landowner who wanted his land to be worked by others had to enter an arrangement in which the cropping and timing decisions were left up to the cultivator, and in which the landlord’s stake was a form of rent in kind.

The offshoot of such arrangements has in some societies been the crystallization of a social structure in which non-peasant landowners live off the rent they collect from peasant tenants. Had this particular type of interclass sharecropping arrangement stabilized as a normal pattern in Haiti, the result would have been a society based on a *latifundio* type of social structure similar to the one that prevails in many parts of Latin America. But this was not to be. Unlike many other cultural settings, the efforts of non-yeoman landowners to collect rent in this particular fashion from yeoman tenants was an ephemeral exercise in futility, a maneuver which, despite its success in other societies, was with few exceptions destined to evaporate and largely disappear from the Haitian scene.
If Haitian landowners had failed dismally at the task of organizing labor, they were hardly more successful in their efforts to collect rent.

Why? When the historical sources have been more thoroughly analyzed, perhaps a more definitive answer can be found than the tentative one which will be suggested here. But already enough information exists to show the general shape of a plausible answer. As formulated above, the question was phrased in terms of unsuccessful rent collection on the part of Haitian landlords. The question might just as well have been phrased in terms of successful resistance on the part of Haitian peasants. The secret of their success would be of great interest to many tenant masses in other New World rural settings, where such resistance has not been successfully offered and where the onerous asymmetric linkages of the latifundia still prevail.

Simply stated, the nineteenth century Haitian cultivator standing before a potential landlord was able to set conditions and call shots in a manner that few of his counterparts in other settings could (or can) do. Perhaps the most important pre-conditioning factor was the exceptionally low man/land ratio which prevailed in the Haiti of the 1820's--at tops some 25 inhabitants per square kilometer, and probably somewhat less (cf. Franklin 1970:404). This land abundant (and labor scarce) situation created a definite "sellers market" with respect to sharecropping. Landowners desperately needed labor to convert their governmentally deeded holdings from idle scenery to productive farmlands.
As a result of this situation, the informal "rules of the game" that emerged to govern rural Haitian sharecropping appear to place the tenant in a somewhat stronger position than his counterparts in other settings generally enjoy. On the one hand, contemporary evidence in Kinanbwa indicates that the cropping decisions—not only as to the timing of the process, but even as to the specific products which will be planted—was largely the prerogative of the tenant. In contemporary Kinanbwa the landlord can exercise some pressure, but the final say is with the tenant.

Insistence on the part of tenants as to the prerogative of planting what they wanted undoubtedly undermined from the start many of the advantages which "sharing out" their land might have brought landowners. The entire orientation of landowners of the period was the production of crops for export, above all the production of the sugar cane which had underwritten so many colonial fortunes. But the tenants were for the most part totally uninterested in sugar cane. It is true that they were interested in cash, as was the landowner. But the nature of the cash-generating opportunity structure in which the tenants were functioning was fundamentally different. Their cash earning opportunities had come rather to be linked to a market system that was geared to internal distribution rather than to export. Not only was the collective labor necessary to produce sugar cane now not available. But even if yeoman cultivation could have produced other crops for export, the fact was that the government had erected formidable barriers between the local population and outside commercial interests (cf. Mackenzie 1971:77). The precarious military situation
in which Haiti found itself in the early 1800's was conducive to a political and commercial isolation that rendered traffic with the outside on the part of the rural populace very cumbersome and impractical. The two export crops that were still produced--simply because the trees were already there--were coffee and cotton. Quite significantly these crops, especially coffee, have traditionally been marketed, not in the internal market system, but via a different sort of trajectory in which speculators deal directly with the producers.

Thus the obstacles erected by the government, and the obligation to enter into disadvantageous and perhaps perilous contact with governmentally licenced traders, made production for the export market a less attractive alternative than production for the local internal market system. In this latter system, the intermediaries were for the most part females of their own social and economic class, and even of their own domestic group. The attractiveness of this outlet, as opposed to the obstacles that stood in the way of easy traffic with the outside, would generally lead producers to allocate land to the production of crops which could be marketed in these local channels. But of course this entailed the planting, not of sugar cane, but rather of manioc, plantains, yams and other crops that were purchased and consumed locally. There was thus a fundamental disagreement between landlords and tenants as to which crops should be planted. Owners of coffee plantations could still share their land out and reap the produce they desired. The trees were already there, and the role of the tenant was largely that of a coffee picker, since little care was given to the trees in the post-colonial period. But except
for such coffee land, cultivators would generally dedicate their energies to the planting of locally marketable foodstuffs, of little interest to the landowners. The strong bargaining position in which nineteenth century tenants found themselves resulted in their preferences coming to the fore.

But in yet a second sphere, that of the physical harvesting of the crops, an examination of contemporary sharecropping patterns appears to indicate that nineteenth century Haitian landlords were forced into an arrangement which their rent-collecting counterparts in other settings might find astonishingly conciliatory on their part. The Kinambwa tenant to this day refuses to harvest the landlord's portion of the crop for him. This service is not part of the "deal," not a feature of the sharecropping model which they have inherited from their nineteenth century predecessors. The arrangement is rather for the landowner to harvest his own portion. Though landlords claim to prefer this arrangement, since they will be cheated less, in many other cultural settings it is the tenant who will harvest the entire plot and who will, perhaps under supervision, divide the harvest and physically transport the landowner's share to the latter's storehouse. In two years of fieldwork no Haitian tenant was ever seen to undertake this service for the landowner. What is done, rather, is a division of the plot before harvest, one half being designated as that of the tenant, the other as that of the landlord. The latter must then harvest his own section. It goes without saying, then, that in yet a third area that of marketing the crop, the Haitian landlord cannot count on the services of the tenant, but must rather do it himself.
The offshoot of these arrangements is a serious undermining of the position of the landlord. Except for the owners of coffee plantations (cf. Candler 1842:144), the nineteenth century Haitian landlord was in the almost ludicrous position of having fields cultivated in crops which did not really interest him, and of having furthermore to harvest those peasant crops himself. As a last straw he was also obliged, if he was to make any money on the arrangement, to himself arrange for the marketing of that produce within the arena of a popular market system dominated by energetic female peasants. If the image of a self-respecting member of the gentry digging up his own sweet potatoes is humorous, the image of his genteel, French-speaking wife lugging them to a local market to sell them in noisy competition with skillful peasant machâd is absurd. Had the Haitian peasant been oriented toward the production of export crops marketed in well-regulated channels, absentee landlordism might have had more of a chance in Haiti. But not only were there barriers erected between the peasants and the outside world. The peasants were furthermore becoming more deeply involved in this internal market system calling for crops of a different nature. The land abundant situation which permitted the peasant to orient his economic behavior in this direction was thus to undercut from the start many of the hopes of rent-needy landlords.

This does not mean that sharecropping is not present in Haiti. On the contrary I will present statistical data showing that sharecropping is in fact one of the economic cornerstones of contemporary Kinanbwa. What the above discussion means is that interclass sharecropping has not been feasible, that the sharecropping that has arisen is an arrangement between members of the same peasant class, rather than
an arrangement between subordinate, landless peasants and an occupa-
tionally distinct stratum of absentee landlords. This latter group
has never really "gotten off the ground" in the Haitian context.
History—or rather demography and topography—has treated them
somewhat harshly. It is no wonder that so many of them simply left
their nineteenth century holdings, turned them over to peasant
pérants (administrators) to earn for them at least some minimal
benefits out of the land, and tried their hand at commercial and
other pursuits in the towns or capital city (cf. Moral 1961). As ru-
ral rent collectors, they had flopped.

THE SELLING OF LAND

Had such constraints not existed, had alternative land not been
available to the population of post-revolutionary Haiti, then the new-
ly created "neophyte" landowning classes might very well have succeeded
in creating a latifundio type of structure such as those seen in many
parts of Latin America, a society characterized by tenant masses
paying rent to occupationally distinct absentee landlords. But such
is not the case. The fact is that Haiti has not turned into that type
of a society. It is rather a society of freeholders, in which the
majority of the population owns at least part of the land on which
they crop. How did the reach this status? How did they move from
the status of extralegal occupant to legal occupant of at least part
of their holdings? The dynamic bringing about this change was critical
to the formation of Haitian society as it now exists.

With respect to this matter, there are several somewhat different
interpretations that one finds, different versions of the paths which
the population took toward its current ownership status. And though
the versions are by no means mutually exclusive—all routes could
have been taken by different individuals in different places—only
one of them appear valid for explaining the historical emergence of
the peasantry of Kinabwa.

There are various types of "squatter models" which appear to
account for at least some contemporary Haitian "proprieters." It is
quite probable that many of the earliest freeholders would have
fallen into the category of "squatter," cultivating land whose owner
was unaware of, or opposed to, its utilization by the individual in
question. Débien has presented documentary evidence (1956, 1961)
indicating that many ex-slaves simply remained cultivating the plots
they had been allocated as provision ground during slavery. Moral
points out that much squatting occurred on abandoned plantations or
on the uncultivated pockets within reconstituted plantations during
the reign of Dessalines (Moral 1961:27-8). And though his evidence
is admittedly slim, Leyburn states that as many as a third of the
Haitian cultivators during the reigns of Pétion and Boyer were
squatters (Leyburn 1966:76-8).

There is another type of more subtle extralegal occupancy that has
also been reported to occur, a strategy closely linked to the pat-
terns of sharecropping described briefly above. I have indicated
the circumstances which induced the gentry to abandon efforts to try
to organize labor and to become instead less active collectors of rent.
But they were apparently even ineffective at this activity as well.
"More and more the landowners, having subdivided their fields, grew
lax in overseeing them (Leyburn 1966:78)." The result of this laxity
is the development of a type of de-facto squatting by individuals who might have originally been placed on a piece of land by an owner, but who eventually stops--or whose children stop--paying any rent.

To the extent that such processes were generalized--and some authors believe them to be the norm--then the contemporary Haitian "landowner" lives on a fiction, is in actuality the descendant of a squatter, and the entire land tenure system will be permeated with a high degree of extralegality. Leyburn states the matter strongly:

legally it might be argued that only a small fraction of the population has an indisputable right to the land on which it lives. By strict interpretation most of the peasants are still squatters whom the government might dispossess. The American Occupation...met with the stubborn refusal of the peasants to state their claims or take any interest in legalizing their rights (Leyburn 1966:96).

Many aspects of that passage are literally incredible, and it must be challenged.

During research in Kinanbwa, it became clear that a squatter's model of Haitian land tenure was totally inapplicable to that community, and would provide a false story of the manner in which this community of freeholders was in fact historically created. There is other evidence in the literature as well pointing in the same direction. The impact of such evidence is to suggest strongly that the peasantization of Haiti did not, at least in some regions, occur via the intervening variable of unchallenged squatting.

On the contrary, the very constraints which characterized the situation of the rulers forced them into one final revenue-generating maneuver--one that appears to have had an element of desperation--which was to entrench and \textit{legalize} the yeoman condition of many of the
masses, to remove them from the status of squatter to that of bona fide landowner. Emphasis has been given thus far to the obstacles which have stood in the way of the rulers--the "constraint" side of the opportunity/constraint coin. But the coin had another side as well. In addition to their handicaps, the Haitian ruling groups had some unusual "opportunities" which permitted them to pull off a somewhat unusual revenue generating maneuver not as readily available to rulers of more firmly "solidified" peasant societies.

To understand this maneuver, it should be recalled that Haiti was in a state of fluid microevolutionary movement. The smallholding behavior of the rural population--their cultivation of plots of ground and their raising of livestock for local sale--was a continuation of behavior patterns that had been present among the slaves in the colonial period. But the tenure arrangements under which this land was cultivated were somewhat ambiguous. Legal ownership was very important, both objectively and subjectively. Dessalines had expropriated mulatto gentry ostensibly because their deeds were not in order; and the major service which Pétion was to render to this landowning group and to the military establishment was to make them legal owners of land, with governmentally validated deeds. Most of the peasants were operating without the benefit of such deeds. This was a fundamental structural weakness in their own position, a weakness on which the ruling groups were to capitalize.

The disappearance of all of the French colonists meant that a great deal--perhaps most--of the land in the Republic was not covered by any legal deed. Under the principle of eminent domain, the Haitian government found itself with at least theoretical access to virtually a nationful of land. If its power to make the rural populace toe
certain lines was less than that of most other nearby governments, it enjoyed at least de jure sovereignty over a much larger proportion of the national territory than was true elsewhere. Relatively little of the land was controlled by legally recognized owners. The land was there for the rulers to do with as they would (or rather could).

We have seen the manner in which this eminent domain was invoked to secure, via land grants, the continued services of the military establishment and, eventually, the civil government as well.

In a final revenue-generating strategy which must perhaps go down as one of the most unusual governmental maneuvers in the history of peasant society, the ruling groups of Haiti, unable to effectively regulate the economic activities of the rural populace, unable to impose any but market taxes, and virtually unable to collect any sort of usable rent, ended up selling off most of their land to that very peasant sector which was so recalcitrantly refusing to be ruled in a conventional fashion. The rulers needed revenue. And they had finally hit on a one-shot maneuver by which their land would produce at least some cash for them. Did the peasants want land? Very well. But let them pay for it in cash.

It is not clear which ruling group first resorted to this strategy. Evidence from Kinanbwa indicates that in that region it was probably the military who first began selling off the land which they had received under the policy of don national. But whoever may have started it, before many years had passed all three ruling groups were busily engaged in the pursuit of putting up land for sale. No foreigners were involved in the purchase. Not only was no local labor available to work the land; but recent laws had
been passed anyway forbidding foreigners to own land in Haiti. Nor were any of the ruling groups among the purchasers. On the contrary; they had more land than they knew what to do with, were in fact busily trying to sell it. The purchasers were in their virtual totality members of the newly emerging Haitian peasantry.

It is the documentary research of Moral (1961) which has most clearly brought to light the importance of this pattern of land purchasing as a major pillar on which the Haitian peasantry came to rest. In a terse but penetrating discussion of his research into the National Archives of Haiti and into the newspapers of the 1820's, Moral identifies land purchasing as the first element in what he terms "l'offensive des petits exploitants." Already in the time of Pétion, recipients of governmental land concessions had begun to put their property up for sale.

Le débitage des concessions s'organise dès la présidence de Pétion. On voit un concessionnaire de 25 carreaux de terre en vendre une première fois 15, une seconde fois 8; le premier acheteur négocie immédiatement une partie de son acquisition en trois lots de 5, 3, et 2 carreaux. Un autre concessionnaire de 10 carreaux les détaille sur-le-champ en parcelles de 1 à 3 carreaux (Moral 1961:34-5).

The newspapers of the time contained frequent advertisements of land available for purchase. Some of the announcements dealt with entire plantations (habitations). But many offered for sale plots of ground containing only five or ten carreaux of land (Moral 1961:35).

Such advertisements referred to land which belonged to private owners. But the government was very early to turn to this same tactic as a means for generating revenue. As early as 1812 a law was passed allowing the government to sell of a number of plantations, which were still part of the national domain. These sales were
undertaken with the quite explicit purpose of "establishing a national currency." The move apparently met with some immediate success. Just two years later a follow-up law, passed "in view of the positive effect produced by sale of part of the national domain," in effect put virtually the entire country up for plot-by-plot sale.

Our knowledge of these maneuvers is scanty, dependent for the most part on the brief notices which appeared in the archives and newspapers of the period and the rationale which the rulers gave for taking these steps. But these rationales should not be permitted to dominate and distort our vision of what was occurring. Land grants and land sales were publicly explained as an effort of the rulers to foster a love for the land among the rural populace. That a government which had been trying to get the people away from their plots of land should suddenly depict itself as a champion of peasant cultivation, borders on the ludicrous. Unable to generate revenue in any other abundant fashion, the rulers capitulated. Land was to be used as a dual type of pawn. It was given away to some, and sold to others. Though some peasants were reported to have received land for free in the presidency of Pétion, the vast majority of recipients of free land were members of the military or civil establishment. The vast majority of peasants who acquired land during this period had on the contrary to purchase it.

And purchase it they did. Already by 1820 the newspapers were commenting on the large number of small proprietors that had availed themselves of these opportunities, investing their savings in the purchase of land (Moral 1961:35-6). There is little mystery as to why the ex-slaves should have responded so energetically to the opportu-
nities now available for the purchase of land, be it from the gentry, the government, or from the governmentally-endowed military and civil establishment. The Haitian revolution has been depicted here as consisting, at deep level, of a struggle between the forces of the plantation and the forces of a smallholding peasantry. That the representatives of this latter group should avail themselves of the opportunity to entrench themselves in their desired way of life via the legal acquisition of plots of ground should come as no surprise. The ruling groups had tried various revenue raising schemes, all of them which had to one degree or another run into obstacles. But in latching on to this final--and somewhat unusual--revenue generating scheme of putting a large portion of their island up for plot-by-plot sale to the peasants, the landowning groups were to be overwhelmed by a surge of willing buyers eager to spend their money for this particular commodity.

In behaving this way the Haitian cultivator was merely following a pattern which his counterparts in other Caribbean islands were to follow as well. The enthusiastic purchase of land by former slaves has been documented for Jamaica (cf. Mintz and Hall 1974:23), Guyana (R.T. Smith 1956:13), Grenada (M.G. Smith 1965:11), St. Vincent (Williams 1970:338), and other islands. In those settings where former slaves have attempted to openly undertake cultivation in territory under the effective control of central governments, the modality of purchase has generally been the preferred land acquisition strategy, whereas that of squatting has generally been an interim strategy, quickly to pass as soon as opportunities to legalize tenure have been made available. Even today a large percentage of the land purchases made by cultivators
of Xinanbwa involve plots on which the purchaser had already been working as a sharecropper. In like manner, though many of the plots purchased in the early 1800's may have been "new" to the buyers, we may suspect that perhaps just as many were already under the effective control of the purchasers, who merely leapt at the opportunity to secure ownership for themselves and their heirs. Thus in a paradoxical twist, the ruling class recipients of free land-grants by the government were eventually able to convert their holdings into cash—not by themselves cultivating them, but by selling them off to individuals who were interested in cultivating them. What was a revenue generating strategy for one class was a source of land to another.

If the why of this peasant land purchasing is fairly patent, the how is likewise quite unenigmatic. In the first place land prices of the period were extremely low. It was clearly a buyer's market. Observers of the period were astounded at the nose dive land prices had taken from their high level at the height of the colonial period just three or four decades earlier.

The finest land in the republic would not sell for more than sixty dollars per acre, although contiguous to a port for shipping, and of a quality so strong and nutritive, as to be capable of growing any of the tropical productions. The mountain lands, and the lighter descriptions in the plains, suitable for cocoa and cotton, can be obtained for a price varying between twenty and thirty dollars in any quantity from ten to five hundred acres (Franklin 1970: 314; cf. also Mackenzie 1971:100).

If lowland real estate was selling for these reduced prices, mountain land (except perhaps that on which coffee groves were still standing) must have been even cheaper.
In fact, in a circular feedback process, once the process of land selling had started, the cheapness of land was to furthermore undermine the feasibility of the plantation system even more. It was the impossibility of reinstituting this system which had originally led to land sales. Once these sales had begun, once land was available, the coup de grace was given to the plantations. Candler was surprised at the good treatment which plantation workers in the North received from their employers in the year 1840. His assessment as to the reason was right on target:

Good land may be had of the government in every part of the island at a low price; and any man not satisfied with his condition as a private labourer, may easily buy it, and become a freeholder in his own right (Candler 1842: 38). In short it did not require a great deal of cash to acquire a plot of ground in the Haiti of Boyer.

And where did the peasants get this cash? Had they truly been locked into the self-sufficient moneyless subsistence economy that some have written about, or had spent all their money on local liquor as others have said, then the purchase of so many plots of land would indeed constitute an enigma. But the inaccuracy of these versions has already been suggested. The cash was available because they were involved in the production of crops and animals for a market. Since land could be had only for cash by the majority of the people, the feverish dynamic which has traditionally characterized these marketplaces now becomes more understandable. At any rate the involvement of the rural population in an internal market system was clearly their principal access route to cash. If their stubborn clinging to small plots forced the rulers into eventually selling
off their land, then it was their involvement in this internal market system which gave them the wherewithal to take up the offer.

In short the Haitian smallholder had won. The embryonic peasant behavior that had been marginally implanted as an adjunct to a plantation system had emerged fullblown as the evolutionary victor, the dominant productive form of a transformed western Hispaniola. The Haitian cultivator was, it is true, firmly integrated into structures that went far beyond the confines of his local community. But he was integrated, so to speak, on his own terms. He was a peasant freeholder, and if the rulers wished to live off revenue produced by his energies, they would have to adapt their ruling strategies to his smallholding, cash-cropping way of life. By institutionalizing the collection of taxes in the marketplace, the rulers legitimized this structure as a cornerstone of local economic organization. By attempting to control the cultivator as a "tenant," landowners had recognized the impossibility of returning him to the plantations. And by finally tossing their hands in the air and selling him their land, they institutionally entrenched him in a way of life which his predecessors in slavery would have looked upon as ultimate freedom.

But the history presented here has been only tangentially the history of freedom. In a more direct sense it has been the chronicle of cultural evolution, of a diachronic journey of which the emergence of a land-abundant peasant society was to be a brief waystage. With the regularization of mating that came as a concomitant to the regularization of peasant livelihood, population was to grow, and the land-abundance of the base was to simultaneously erode. Thus if the proliferation of land sales as a ruling class revenue maneuver was to bring to a culmination one leg of the evolutionary journey, another
leg was soon to start.

If I have gone into detail in exposing the dynamics of this process, it has been done through conviction of the uniformitarian forces governing the development of human society, and of the need for explicitly exposing these processes, frequently ignored or poorly interpreted by conventional historiography (or unimaginative ethno­graphy). As the following chapters will document, fieldwork in Kinanbwa has uncovered the progress of a localized microevolutionary sequence in which a critical sphere of human behavior has been systematically evolving under the impact of an archaic force. The sphere of behavior is agrarian land control; the force is population growth; and the nuts and bolts details of their functionally linked interaction will be the subject of the chapters to come. But to carry out this analysis, the analytic construct of a "baseline state" will be used, a starting point from which the forces of demographic increment will be viewed as having "entered the system" and exercised their transforming impact. This "baseline" is the "classic" peasant adaptation whose emergence in nineteenth century Haiti I have just traced.

But this very starting point was itself produced by the selfsame forces which were to transform it. For the same elements—land availability and man/land ratios—which will account for the ethno­graphically documented transformation of a system were also the major forces underlying its nineteenth century birth. The nature of the causality, it is true, has undergone a paradoxical about-face. The origins of the Haitian peasantry are to be found in a context of population scarcity and land abundance. Its subsequent transformation was to occur under the contrary impact of population density and
concomitant land shortage. But land, population, and their interaction continue to be the engine of change. The anthropologically guided reinterpretation of Haitian history that has been undertaken here has hopefully exposed the uniformitarian nature of the economic and demographic forces underwriting the entire evolutionary journey.
CHAPTER FOUR

CONTEMPORARY STRUCTURES OF CIVILIAN AND MILITARY CONTROL

The historical chapters provide a diachronic framework within which to view contemporary life in rural Haiti. But peasant life is framed not only by history; of equal analytic importance is a powerful "synchronic" structure of institutions, authorities, and community-external agents whose sphere of influence in one manner or another impinges on and guides the life course of the inhabitants of the rural hinterlands. But this general involvement of peasants with the outside world frequently takes as one of its most important concrete manifestations a series of political and economic linkages with a nearby town. For this reason the village of Kinanbwa cannot be understood apart from the history of the town that has dominated it for a century and a half.

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF LES BAYAHONDES

THE FOUNDING OF THE TOWN

Neither the village of Kinanbwa, nor the town of Les Bayahondes, existed during the colonial period. Even in the postrevolutionary period, references to the region are hard to come by in published historical sources. But during fieldwork I had the good fortune of coming into possession of a very unusual type of historical document which has facilitated reconstruction of the founding of the town and even to some degree of the village of Kinanbwa.

This document became available thanks to the presence in Les Bayahondes of Michel Romain, a Haitian ethnologist whose ancestor, Colonel Jean Romain, was the earliest postrevolutionary recipient of
a land grant which included the land on which Les Bahayondes and Kinanbwa now stand. His descendant Michel Romain has access to the records not only of the original grant, but also of the subsequent sales and partitions, one of which led to the founding of Kinanbwa. In response to some inquiries of mine, Romain sat down at a typewriter which I had lent him and produced an 80 page manuscript (as yet unpublished) detailing the history of the town of Les Bayahondes as well as many aspects of the contemporary institutions and customs. This highly reliable account of the origins of the town places in context the legends still preserved in the village of Kinanbwa, and even includes documentary evidence mentioning by name one of the founders who enters the folk-tradition.

In compiling the historical section of his manuscript, Romain not only talked to several elders in the community. Most importantly he also examined the landholding records of his own family, whose residence in Les Bayahondes extends back to the presidency of Dessalines' successor Pétion. The following passage comes from the manuscript:

The nucleus of the Commune is the town of Les Bayahondes located on the (former site of the) _______ Plantation. During the colony the plantation belonged to a colonist of that name. But after independence it was given to Colonel Jean Romain under the title of don national... Colonel Jean Romain became the owner of the Plantation _______ by virtue of a concession made under the title of Don National granted to him by President Pétion on August 28, 1812 (Romain 1973:1, translation mine).

Thus it appears that the town of Les Bayahondes is located on a small section of a larger tract of land which was once a plantation during the colonial period. This land came into the legal control of a private owner via the presidential land grant policy described.
in the preceding chapter. It is fully consistent with the history of
the period that the recipient of this land should have been a colonel
in the Haitian army. The origins of Les Bayahondes are thus to be
found in the historical process whereby the earliest mulatto presidents,
in an effort to consolidate power, began passing out land in lieu
of the cash which they simply lacked. The town thus has its roots
in a process that was central to the formation of Haiti as a whole.

But the bouk—the town center itself—was not founded until
several years later. Though Pétion had granted Romain the land,
Pétion's successor Boyer convinced Romain to give a small part of
it back. In the mid-1820's Romain donated to the Haitian state
nine carreaux of land for the foundation of a bourg and an extra
carreau to boot for the location of the town cemetery. Thus some
15 years after Romain had come into possession of this large
tract of land, the first steps were taken in the formation of the
town from which the peasants living in that region were one day to
be governed.

From this point the town passes into more than a half century of
obscurity and virtually total documentary anonymity. Little is
known about Les Bayahondes through most of the nineteenth century,
extcept that it was an obscure wattle-daub town which had not yet
been elevated to political standing as a regional center of any sort.
It was only toward the end of the century that the town was to begin
taking on importance; and it was in the context of military conflict
that the change was to come. During one of the many revolts which
dominated Haitian politics in the latter half of the nineteenth
century, the country briefly split into two. The region of Les
Bayahondes sided with the rebel government based in Saint Marc. Perhaps as a reward the bouk was elevated in 1899 to the rank of a Commune. Though the administration was theoretically to be composed of civilians, the context in which the change took place resulted in the first Magistrat Communal being an important local general. When the conflict was resolved, the bouk retained its newly granted status.

**ECONOMIC GROWTH OF THE TOWN**

But the political process was merely the prelude to a more deep reaching economic process which was to begin about a decade later. As always, the presidents and the generals needed revenue; as always, they looked to the land to produce this wealth; and as always, they had no intention of working that land themselves. In the closing years of the nineteenth century they began enthusiastically—almost frantically—looking to the outside world, inviting others to come and produce the export crops—above all sugar cane—which their peasants were simply not interested in producing. American blacks were brought in by one president. They soon left. Another president seriously considered the possibility of inviting in Italian immigrants. Such schemes, of course, were never destined to work. But the outside world did begin taking an interested look at the island.

Among the earliest to approach were various French and Belgian companies, whose representatives saw possibilities in the underexploited land. But nothing could be accomplished until the virtually total absence of adequate physical infrastructure had been dealt with. The road system that had existed in the colony was primitive enough. But this system had since deteriorated. No records exist of efforts
on the part of any nineteenth century government to seriously reconstruct or improve the roads. The solution envisioned by the foreign companies was not, however, the construction of highways. What occurred at the turn of the twentieth century, rather, was an outbreak of railroad building (Moral 1961:62). There were problems in all such schemes, as the property rights of foreigners were still seriously restricted by Haitian law. But Haitian military figures were quite willing to serve as remunerated fronts for foreign capital; and the revenue-needy governments liberally gave 50 year exclusive charters to willing investors (cf. Romain 1973:38). Thus within a few years railroad tracks began connecting Port-au-Prince with various towns.

For the most part the railroad tracks were restricted to the flatter coastline, as the mountainous topography of Haiti presented formidable barriers to all such endeavours. But though Les Bayahondes was quite a distance inland, it was, to its great fortune, on a lowland plain with no physical barriers between itself and the capital. This favored location was to cause it to be the recipient of one of these early railroads. Thus the locally famous "PCS" (Plaine du Cul-de-Sac) was built to make an arc across the plain all the way from Port-au-Prince to just a few miles inland beyond Les Bayahondes, passing directly through the town on its way (and passing close to the now growing hamlet of Kinanbwa). Because there were no large communities beyond it, Les Bayahondes became in effect the "last stop" of the line. And because the mountains which began just behind the town prevented any extension of the tracks to the higher coffee regions beyond, the rapid access Les Bayahondes now enjoyed to the capital was to convert it into a magnet for the crops, especially coffee,
grown throughout the nearby hills. Thus, because of its lowland topography, the town was to become an early beneficiary of the externally financed physical infrastructure that started appearing at the turn of the twentieth century.

This new state of affairs was to have a profound impact on the economy of the region, producing an era of local prosperity that is still the topic of nostalgic idealization on the part of older town residents. Les Bayahondes was converted into the major processing and bulking center for the vast coffee regions in the mountains beyond. Unprecedented amounts of capital were pumped into the local economy, most of it to be used in commerce. Numerous "speculateurs"—some ten or twelve of whom were to become local legendary giants—set up base in the town, constructing large warehouses, and drawing a steady stream of produce-bearing peasants down from the hills. To a degree unprecedented in its history, Les Bayahondes became a major regional meeting point for buyers and sellers of a wide variety of goods.

As the population of the town skyrocketed, its physical appearance underwent substantial change. For the first two decades of the railroad's presence—up until 1920—the town remained basically a wattle-daub community of thatched cottages. But the combination of a growing economy and a catastrophic fire which destroyed most of the buildings in 1921 motivated the construction of large concrete buildings—commercial as well as residential—topped by the corrugated tin roofs which still are the hallmark of the person who is "moving up" economically.

But these physical signs of prosperity were less important than the vigorous flow of goods and cash which produced this external
transformation. The coffee-buying speculators, though they pocketed a substantial part of the profits from this trade, were by no means the only group whose economic lives were affected by the railroad. The peasants who now directed themselves toward Les Bayahondes were interested not only in selling their produce; they were interested in acquiring other goods which the money from this produce could now purchase. Thus the town of Les Bayahondes, in addition to its function as a center for the processing, bulking, and transporting of coffee, was to become an important regional trade center as well, the meeting place for masses of peasants and townsmen interested in exchanging a wide variety of goods.

Thus the town was to be the site for the operation of those two parallel but semi-autonomous trade circuits which have characterized Haiti from its earliest days. On the one hand there was the warehouse and store based trade in export crops and in many types of imported goods. The peasants who descended from the mountains with coffee did not direct themselves to the local marketplace. They went first to the homes and stores of the speculators, who competed with each other for the coffee of the mountaineers. The bulk of this trade thus bypassed the local marketplace, as did the trade in many types of consumer goods which were supplied to the peasants and townsmen by a growing number of well stocked local stores.

But at the same time the internal market system itself flourished, serving as the channel principally for various types of foodstuffs, and for many other types of items as well. Though the bulk of the participants--buyers as well as sellers--in this internal market were from the peasant sector, they inhabited microenvironmental
niches whose climatic, topographic, and edaphic features would differ drastically from that of other nearby peasants. The very crop inventories would differ from one zone to another; and when two localities did happen to grow the same crop, the growing season would often differ from one of the localities to the other. Les Bayahondes, located on the Plain but close to the mountains, thus became an important regional center where inhabitants of these different ecological zones would meet to exchange produce. The town market would thus swell to the rhythm of biweekly influxes of sellers and buyers, whose sheer numbers made them flood into the sidestreets.

But if the railroad served to enhance the regional importance of the town of Les Bayahondes, it was no less effective in bringing local peasants into more direct contact with the capital. Port-au-Prince had formerly been a tedious day's journey away on foot or animal. It was now accessible via a brief two hour trip on train. The low fares for passengers and freight were governmentally controlled. The railroad served thus not only to draw people to Les Bayahondes, but facilitated and made more normal the movement of people and goods between the interior and Port-au-Prince. In doing this it served as a spur to the increasing involvement of all parties concerned in trade networks which, though always present, had now been intensified. For peasant as well as townsman, then, the railroad was to marshall in an era, if not of absolute prosperity for all, at least of increased economic well-being for the majority.
FOREIGN OCCUPATION AND ECONOMIC DECLINE

But the decline was to come rapidly. The prosperity had taken several years to "build up" after the initial construction of the railroad at the beginning of the century. By the 1920's it was in full swing. But by the 1940's it had long since peaked and was on the way down. Documents are few, the precise sequence of events is hard to reconstruct; local opinion is varied; but the general causes of the decline nonetheless seem clear.

The United States has militarily occupied a number of countries in the Caribbean and Central America. Assessments of the impact of these occupations vary, depending largely on the political stance of the assessor. A not uncommon conceptual compromise is to lament the political effects of this foreign occupation while pointing out certain economic benefits which at least some of the occupied countries managed to squeeze out of the occupation. An examination of the Les Bayahondes region, however, must reverse the direction of finger-wagging. The older peasants who still remember those years seemed relieved at the political consequences of foreign occupation—the cessation of what they themselves term uncontrolled banditry on the part of the caco bands. It was the economic thrust of the occupation which, under close analysis, will be seen to have had a highly deleterious impact on the prosperity which local geography had conspired to bring to this region of the country.

The Marines landed in 1915. The ostensible (and to some degree quite real) motive was the political chaos which had overtaken the country, destroyed its external finances, and threatened to lead to occupation by European powers whose renewed presence in the Caribbean
would constitute a potential military threat to the U.S. But if political and military considerations gave the ultimate spur to intervene, concerns of an economic nature were never far away. There were two major economic features of the occupation which were to spell eventual (though certainly not immediate) disaster for the prosperity of the town of Les Bayahondes.

**Competing Road Systems**

If the investors of a few decades earlier had gone haywire building railroads, the occupation forces were no less outstanding in their enthusiasm for the building of roads. Of the some two dozen categories of expenditures under the rubric of "Public Works," by far the largest was the category of "roads, trails, and bridges" (Balch 1927:110-111). Roads were being built in places where even many Haitians felt none was needed. The corvée labor which was forcibly marshalled to build these roads was, in fact, one of the major ostensible causes for much of the armed resistance to the occupation that occurred in the interior of the country. But the occupation eventually prevailed, and a network of roads—some paved, and others (like the road to Les Bayahondes) unpaved—was finally built, making numerous towns of the interior accessible by motor vehicle to and from Port-au-Prince. And when the roads appeared, the trucks and buses were not long in arriving.

It was this factor which in the long run was to marshall in economic doomsday to the economy of Les Bayahondes. The town has coffee-growing mountains behind it. But the town is located on the arid leeward side of these mountains, where few crops grow. It is furthermore located in an out-of-the-way direction with respect to
Port-au-Prince. If the population of the villages and towns of the windward coffee-growing slopes of the mountains went to Les Bayahondes, it was merely because the town was the closest point of rapid access, by virtue of the railroad, to Port-au-Prince, and it was there that buyers consequently based their operations. The other alternative for the producers would have been to carry their produce on animal to Port-au-Prince. Most preferred to make the detour, climbing up over the ridge and descending down the leeward side to Les Bayahondes to contact the numerous buyers there.

But the new road system changed that. Now a number of important towns on the windward side of the chain were directly connected by road to Port-au-Prince. It was now as easy for the speculatoreurs to set up shop in these towns; and it was substantially easier for the peasants simply to descend to these nearby towns with their produce than to make the arduous trip up over and back down the ridge into the obliquely located town of Les Bayahondes. Since the bulk of the produce which had been brought to Les Bayahondes came precisely from these windward slopes, the cessation of the traffic was to slit the jugular vein of the local economy. Thus the American passion for road building, though it was to enhance the economy of much of the country, was to cripple those regions such as Les Bayahondes whose prosperity was predicated on the absence of roads in the mountainous interior.

But the Americans not only gave roads to the town's competitors. To add insult to injury, they ended up taking away the town's railroad as well. This was a different group of Americans, however, a group involved in a quite different type of local pursuit.
The Arrival of the Sugar Company

The Marines had landed in 1915. Within three years a new constitution had been written, from which the age old prohibition against foreigners owning land in Haiti had been conveniently deleted. Within ten years a large number of American companies had set up shop, most of them intent on securing some sort of wealth from the unexploited agricultural potential of the lowland and coastal regions. These firms were not the Goliaths whose capital had come to dominate the islands of Cuba and Puerto Rico, however. Haiti appeared rather to attract small-fry, fly-by-night mavericks (Moral 1961). Most of the firms had a short life in Haiti, their schemes proving unprofitable. But at least one of the firms, after several years of floundering, did get off the ground and is today one of the major local economic forces in the region of Les Bayahondes. It was the first firm to come into the country, arriving in the same year that the Marines did; it will undoubtedly be the last to go if there is ever an exodus. And of critical importance for the people of Les Bayahondes and Kinanbwa, this "Haytian American Sugar Corporation" (HASCO) was to make the Cul-de-Sac Plain its principal sphere of operation.

There were a number of problems facing foreign companies in Haiti. The major one, of course, was that of getting access to land. But most land was effectively occupied by smallholding cultivators. And because of the widespread nineteenth century patterns of governmentally instituted land grants and land sales, much of this occupation was in fact quite legal (despite earlier quoted opinions as to the so-called "squatter" base of the Haitian peasant). The eviction of outright squatters is one matter; the expropriation of peasants with
pieces of paper of one sort or another is a different matter. Even had the Haitian government or the U.S. Marines wanted to carry out such expropriations (and there is no evidence that either group did), it is very unlikely that the military clout existed to pull off such a move. At any rate, to a much greater degree than in other Caribbean islands, foreign companies in Haiti have had difficulties in acquiring those large, consolidated blocs of land that are generally viewed as the sine qua non of effective industrialized agriculture.

By focusing its operations on the Cul-de-Sac Plain, however, HASCO was in a slightly better situation than most companies. Because of the proximity of the Plain to the center of political and military power in Port-au-Prince, consolidated holdings had survived to a greater degree in parts of the Plain (cf. Moral 1961) than in most other regions of rural Haiti. Thus HASCO has been able to rent great blocs of land to cultivate the cane itself, or has been able to make contracts with landowners who themselves would plant their extensive holdings in cane and subsequently sell the cane to HASCO. Finally, with the availability of a new type of market for cane, many small-holding peasants of the Plain (including those of Kinanbwa) have come to regularly dedicate at least part of their land to the growth of this crop for which they know there will subsequently be a virtually guaranteed market. Under these three arrangements—and different variants thereof—HASCO has thus been able to put the sugar industry back on its feet, at least to a modest degree, in this one region of Haiti.

But a critical problem for any sugar company is that of rapid transporting of the cut cane from the field to the mill. HASCO's mill is on the northern outskirts of Port-au-Prince. The problem was
to transport huge quantities of cane from distant regions of the Plain
to that mill. Other sugar companies on other islands have turned to
railroad building. But at least for this particular region of Haiti,
and for this region of the Plain, the railroad was there, just waiting
to be bought. Available documents are scarce, and the sequence of
events is not entirely clear. But the owners of the ill-fated
PCS railroad, who must have cursed the American road builders for
undermining the prosperity of their game in Les Bayahondes, must
also have leapt at the offer of the American financed sugar millers,
in need of a speedy means of transport, to purchase the railroad.
The result was predictable. Several decades ago the owners sold out
and the PCS ceased to exist. The brightly painted orange colored
engines that now course up and down the tracks during much of the
year have the words HASCO painted on them. And no longer do the wagons
carry passengers and freight. The railroad, now owned by the company,
has been converted to the virtually exclusive use of transporting
sugar cane from the Plain to the mill.

And what of the town of Les Bayahondes? Thanks to the occupation,
the town of course did get one of the ubiquitous roads. But by a
paradoxical twist, the road was not even paved. Perhaps because the
town still had its railroad connection to Port-au-Prince, its road was
treated by the authorities as a lower priority "penetration road,"
and was not considered one of the central arteries that had to be paved.

And so the decline has pushed on. The town that was once the terminal
for a major railroad and the focal point for numerous towns and hundreds
of hamlets in the surrounding hills has now become a neglected economic
backwater serviced by a handful of trucks which must inch slowly along
a now deteriorated dirt road. And there is a mixture of comedy and historical pathos in the sight of these cumbersome, overloaded vehicles, tortuously bouncing foot by foot over virtually impassable ruts, struggling to reach the safety of the swift paved road now servicing the town's former satellites.

THE CONTEMPORARY TOWN

First-time visitors to the Les Bayahondes of today—including Haitian visitors—will unanimously comment on the dreariness of the arid surroundings and on the physical unattractiveness of this now declining town. The trip itself is generally an experience for an outside visitor. The physical jolt which he receives from the road is frequently accompanied by a mental jolt at the scenery along the way. The tourist-guide brochures which promise dense Caribbean jungles and lush tropical vegetation appear to have been written for a different island. For much of the trip the visitor sees instead a barren plain to his right, graced only with cactus, bayahonde, and other desert flora. The hills to his left offer him little consolation. They are as dry as the flatland and, if possible, even more devoid of vegetation. Nor do the evidences of human habitation offer more promise. On the contrary. The first man-made structure, reached several kilometers after leaving the paved highway, is the foreboding skeleton of a twentieth century sugar mill, abandoned by its would-be owner midway in construction, and left to stand as a rusted, half-finished warning against facile hopes of pulling wealth from these barren flats.
A few kilometers on, people begin making their appearance, and with them the greenery which evidences the presence of their cultivation. Stands of millet and corn to the left will eventually be fronted on the right by fields of sweet potatoes and rice, as the road passes a tiny pond, relic of the Pleistocene inundation. The arid plain subtly transforms itself to marshland during this leg of the journey. But the attention of the first-time visitor tends to be captured less by the cultivation than by the dwellings of the cultivators. Though houses on the road will frequently have concrete walls and corrugated tin roofs, the more numerous houses further back are the same two-room, wattle-daub thatched roof cottages which were described by early nineteenth century visitors to rural Haiti. Though impressions are superficial, the physical austerity of the landscape appears to be mirrored by an equally austere tone in the quality of local human life.

After passing through several such wattle-daub communities along a road that appears to be steadily worsening as Les Bayahondes approaches, more than one unprepared visitor has been astonished—and relieved—by the sudden appearance of what must surely be the sign of prosperous town life not too far away. To the left of the road the town cemetery suddenly leaps out, striking the eye with the colorful sight of dozens of elaborate, well constructed, brightly painted tombs. Such edifices must surely be the resting place of the wealthy, and the reasonably large number of such monuments appears to give promise of at least some degree of semi-urban prosperity. The sudden appearance of railroad tracks entering at right angles to the road only serves to confirm this impression of urban promise. The tracks appear at a
point where concrete houses have become, if not much more elegant, at least more numerous. These tracks must obviously be an extension of the tracks which can be seen in downtown Port-au-Prince; and this modern means of direct communication with the capital, though it does not make any less unpleasant the deterioration of the dirt road, might at least explain why such deterioration has been permitted to occur.

Such reactions were forthcoming from visitors during fieldwork. And of course they are wrong on both counts. As for the cemetery, the fact is that only a minority of the occupants of those elaborate tombs were town dwellers in their lives. A much larger percentage of them lived and died in the very type of wattle-daub hamlet that was passed along the road. Visitors have shaken their heads at the logic—or illogic—of laying an individual to rest in a tomb that is in some cases sturdier than the house in which he lived during his life. Only an understanding of the local ancestor cult will expose the rationale. But by no means is the elegance of the town's cemetery to be taken as a measure of the town's prosperity. And as for the railroad tracks, their history and current economic meaning have been dealt with above. Though they were once a spur to the town's rise, they are now a symbol of its decline.

The buildings of the town itself, erected for the most part during the town's economic heyday, still give some evidence of wealth superior to that of the surrounding wattle-daub hamlets. The Catholic church, built in the first decade of the century, is the physically most imposing structure in the community. Following somewhat far behind in elegance is the military outpost (Fr: caserne; Kò: kazèn) standing kitty-corner to the church across an open space much too neglected to
to be called a town square. Though the streets have elaborate names (known only to a few of the more educated residents), none of them is paved; they are in fact generally more rutted, if possible, than the road. Water must be pulled either from wells or from streams flowing from the nearby mountains. Except for the church and its rectory, lit by a private generator, electricity is totally lacking.

There is one telephone in the community, that which connects the military outpost to district headquarters nearer the capital. There are no automobiles permanently based in the community. During the dry season a car owner willing to drive slowly and risk damage can make it to Les Bayahonds. But the only vehicles permanently based in the community are the three large trucks which shuttle people and their goods back and forth between the town and Port-au-Prince.

**INSTITUTIONS OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY**

But despite the air of decline which pervades the contemporary community, even a brief walk through the streets will clearly indicate the somewhat special economic and political characteristics which set the town apart from (and above) the surrounding villages, even those which rival the town in size. The residences which line the streets are interspersed with a number of businesses and services not as readily available—or not at all available—in the surrounding hamlets: an ironworker's forge, carpenter and cabinet-maker workshops, tailors, shoemakers, a mill where rice and corn are ground, the warehouses of town-based purchasers of coffee and other export crops, bakeries, various boutiques and grocery stores, a pastry shop, a lottery ticket office, a cockpit.
But of even greater diagnostic importance for the special nature of the town's function are a number of buildings whose signs clearly indicate the presence of central government: a school, a public dispensary, a "city hall" (Hotel de Ville), a post office, a civil registry, a courtroom, lawyer's offices, and--of great importance--an irrigation control bureau. However lethargic the economic spirit of the community seems to be, the presence of these institutions and their representatives signals the town as an important center of administration and governmental control.

**ADMINISTRATIVE OVERVIEW AND LOCAL POPULATION**

To understand the nature of this administration it is useful to bear in mind that the Republic of Haiti is characterized by a somewhat unconventional administrative duality. On the one hand there is a civilian system which divides the country into five departments. Each of these departments in turn is divided into several prefectures (arrondissements); and it is at the prefecture level that the prefects, the highest civilian functionaries under the President, operate. There are a total of 27 prefectures in the national territory. Each of the prefectures is in turn subdivided into a number of municipalities (communes), the highest civilian functionary at this level being the magistrat communal, whose role is somewhat analogous to that of a mayor in the U.S. The magistrat is assisted by an administrative council. Each municipality has as its administrative center a bourg (HC:bouk). Many of these units would be called "villages" under conventional English usage, but in these pages they will be referred to as "towns," since they are the capitals of the various
municipalities.

Excluding the small geographical area on which the town is located, the territory of each municipality is divided into a number of rural sections. The most recent Rural Code, that of François Duvalier, provides for a civilian council to rule each section. But no such body had been formed in the research area, nor have these civilian committees been established in many other parts of Haiti, perhaps in no part of the country (cf. Lahav 1975). Thus the government of the rural sections is out of the hands of the civilian administration, and falls strictly under the jurisdiction of the military.

The military authorities have their own subdivision of the National Territory into smaller units. At the highest level the military subdivisions correspond to the civilian departments. But at the next two descending levels--that of the military district and the military subdistrict--the military breakdown of the country does not correspond to the boundaries of civilian arrondissement and commune. At the lowest level, however, that of the section rural, the two systems once again merge territorially. In both the civilian and military systems, the rural section emerges as the basic unit of local government controlling virtually the entire nation except for the capital and towns.

The rural section thus constitutes perhaps the most critical administrative unit, since more than eight out of ten Haitians live in such rural sections. However there is a paradoxical lack of fit between the administratively recognized basic units and the actual communities in which people live. The rural section is
emphatically not a community or village in any sense of the word. It is rather a somewhat arbitrary administrative lumping of many communities for purposes of governance. But because the rural section is the lowest administrative unit, the actual communities in which the majority of the population lives have no official juridical existence.

The social entity which is truly the basic unit of Haitian social organization, beneath the level of the administratively created section, but above the level of the household and extended family, is the unit that is being referred to in these pages as the "village" or--for smaller units--the "hamlet." But this is strictly for purposes of prose and does not correspond to the terms used by the villagers. The French words communauté (community), village, and hameau (hamlet) are very rarely heard in daily conversation. The villagers tend to refer to their communities as "plantations" (bitasyo, from the French word habitation), but without any semantic elements of collectivized labor, rigid hierarchies, or other concepts involved in the English use of the word plantation. This use of the word bitasyo is restricted to somewhat formal situations. In daily conversation a local resident will refer to the village simply as a lakou. In its more frequent meaning a lakou is a compound, consisting of a small cluster of houses generally inhabited by adult siblings and, if still alive, by their parents. But in local conversational usage the term is frequently used to refer to a community which strictly speaking contains many lakous (e.g. "lakou Kinanbwa") and in this usage is best translated as village rather than compound. But whether the rural community is called a bitasyo or a lakou, and
in spite of the lack of official, juridical recognition of these rural communities, they constitute an anthropologically critical social unit in whose context people live out their daily lives throughout rural Haiti.

It is not known exactly how many people there are leading out these lives. The only complete census available for recent times is the one that was done in 1950. This census indicated that Haiti had over three and a third million people. A more recent census done in 1971 has not yet been completely tabulated. One recent estimate (Organization of American States 1972:635-56) placed the population slightly below the five million mark. The estimate that appears in the A.I.D. report by Beckles (1975) projects it closer to five and a half million for the year 1976.

The vast majority of this population lives in the rural areas. If one accepts an administrative definition of "urbanity"—residence in a ville or bourg at the time of the census—then 23% of the population must be classified as urban (Organization of American States 1972:635-56). But this is greatly inflated if a realistic definition of urbanity is used. Port-au-Prince is probably the only unit which would be classified as urban by most standards, and at any given time only between 10% and 15% of the population of Haiti will be found there. Since an undetermined but probably impressive percentage of those sleeping in Port-au-Prince are itinerant female traders who also have "rural addresses," the true rurality of Haiti is probably much closer to the 90% mark than to the 80% mark.

Being on the Cul-de-Sac Plain, the town of Les Bayahondes is administratively part of the Department of the West. Since the capital
city of Port-au-Prince is also located here, this department is the largest in terms of the number of inhabitants, containing at least a third of the population of the Republic. The Department of the West is divided into six prefectures (arrondissements) which contain a total of 27 communes. In terms of the number of inhabitants, the commune of Les Bayahondes, including the town as well as the rural sections, falls about midway in a ranking of the department's communes along the dimension of size.

The commune has over 50,000 inhabitants; and all but a handful of these (at most 1,500 town residents) live in one or another of the rural sections. The population of the town has declined over the years in absolute terms; many of its houses have been left somewhat empty and underused. Though the town once appeared to be a demographic giant standing in the midst of tiny hamlets, the population of the rural communities has been steadily growing, while that of the town itself has declined. Thus paradoxically Les Bayahondes has only two or three hundred people more than the 1,200 individuals who were censused during fieldwork in the village of Kinanbwa. And if a number of small hamlet-like appendages to the town are excluded from the population count, Les Bayahondes has fewer people now than many of the communities under its administrative control.

**THE GOVERNMENT OF LES BAYAHONDES**

Its size notwithstanding, however, the control exercised by the town extends into many spheres of the lives of the 50,000 villagers inhabiting the surrounding hinterland. The administrative apparatus and finances of the town are modest in scope. None of the officials
are currently elected. The most important civil position, that of magistrat communal, is generally filled by a local person, but the appointment is made from the capital. The magistrat works in collaboration with a municipal council (Conseil Communal) which in Les Bayahondes consists of three members: a president and two advisors. These positions also are filled by appointment, generally by the magistrat.

To meet its financial needs the commune must depend largely on the revenue which it is able to generate itself. Most of the revenue, of course, comes from the numerically superior sector of the population--the rural abitā. And the major occasions for exacting this revenue are occasions on which transactions in foodstuffs and animals occurs. Probably the major single source of municipal revenue are the market taxes. Every seller entering the marketplace with produce of any sort must pay a tax according to the type and quantity of the merchandise. But buyers entering merely to purchase are also generally charged a small entry fee at the gateway to the market.

But the commune has other sources of revenue as well. Of great importance is the revenue which comes from municipal intervention into various sorts of transactions with livestock. Taxes are charged for the sale of major livestock. Taxes are also charged when a large animal is slaughtered, be it for commercial reasons or ritual reasons. Many stray animals are also captured; if these are sold, the money belongs to the commune. If the owner reclains them, he must pay the commune a fine. The importance of animals in the local peasant economy is thus converted into a source of revenue for the municipality.
But there are yet other sources as well. Of particular interest is a tax which is charged when a peasant's sugar cane is weighed for sale. There is also a cemetery tax charged to households who bury one of their members in the public cemetery, or to individuals who, in preparation for their death, erect a tomb in that locale. There are taxes charged for various kinds of licenses, particularly the licenses required to engage in any but the smallest scale trade. Town dwellers are charged a small annual property tax, not on their land, but on their house. And there is even an "entertainment tax" (taxe sur les spectacles). The only public "spectacles" which fell under this rubric during fieldwork were the weekly cock fights. In short the municipality relies heavily on the vehicle of taxation as a means of meeting its own financial needs.

Although exact figures are, for several reasons, difficult to come by, it is estimated that the commune's annual budget is perhaps some $6,000 per year (30,000 Haitian gourdes). About 25% of this is remitted back to Port-au-Prince as the commune's annual contribution to the central government. The remainder is deposited in a special account in the Banque National de la République d'Haiti and used for the commune's purposes. Virtually all of the money is used in the payment of the salaries of the various municipal functionaries and employees.

There are perhaps some two dozen individuals whose salaries

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1. For specific information on the administration and finances of the town, I am relying heavily on information provided by Romain (1973), whose inside "track" into many of the town's affairs gave him a vantage point which few outsiders could achieve.
come from this fund. Aside from the magistrat communal, the highest paid employee of the commune is the president of the Municipal Council ($100 per month) followed by his two advisors, who earn half that salary. In addition there is a wide variety of lesser employees, including a municipal treasurer, a secretary/typist, town school directors, three managers (one for the marketplace, one for the slaughterhouse, one for the cemetery), inspectors, tax collectors, and even four street sweepers. The magistrat is generally appointed, as was indicated earlier. It is, in turn, his prerogative to then appoint most of the above mentioned town employees. It is no secret that kinship ties and political loyalties generally determine the allocation of these positions. The amount one earns is small. Even the modest salaries are not paid in full. The higher paid employees may have to relinquish between 15% and 20% of their salaries for various types of contributions (including an enigmatic "pension plan"). Most lesser employees pay back a smaller percentage of their earnings. There is furthermore no guarantee that the commune will be solvent every month; on the contrary it is taken for granted that during some months the salaries will be less, or even totally suspended. But despite this, the communal jobs are highly sought after.
CENTERS OF INTERACTION BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY

Though the revenue for the above mentioned activities comes principally from the peasants, the activities themselves tend to be confined to the town. But a clearer notion of the structural position of the bouk vis-à-vis the rural hinterland emerges if we make a brief inventory of the specific locales in the town where peasants interact with representatives of the various institutions and indicate the nature of the interaction which occurs.

Bureau d'Etat Civil

Of particular importance are the occasions in which the peasants are obliged to go to the Bureau of Civil Registry. The basic function of this office is to register all the births, marriages, and deaths which occur in the entire municipality, countryside as well as town. The office is in the hands of a special Officer, the seriousness of whose duties are indicated by the fact that he is sworn in. Records are kept in duplicate in two separate books. Monthly reports are sent to the capital indicating the number of vital events that occurred. Officials who have made mistakes in recording these matters have been known to have been brought before a tribunal and punished for their carelessness.

If the records were in fact completely accurate, they could be nationally compiled and some important demographic indices could be derived. But in actuality the system has some flaws from the point of view of completeness. Births are recorded only when the child is brought in to be baptized, an event which does not generally occur until several months after the actual delivery. The many neonatal
deaths which occur mean that many children are never baptized, and
their births are hence not recorded. By the same token, of course,
their deaths pass unrecorded as well. Furthermore a record of the
marriages which occur is virtually useless as an indicator of the
frequency of new conjugal unions in the population. The vast
majority of unions are of the extralegal plasaj type, and hence are
never entered into the civil registry, unless (as frequently
occurs) the union is subsequently legalized.

The importance of the Bureau of Civil Registry, then, must be
viewed less in terms of the completeness of the books which are handed
over to the government than in terms of the various pieces of paper
which are delivered to the peasant households. The birth certifi-
cate (called a batistè, since the occasion of its writing up is the
baptism of the child) is a very important document. In those
majority of unions which are extralegal, the child will have inher-
itance rights in the land of his father only if his father "gives
him his batistè," that is, recognizes him at the time of his baptism.
The vast majority of children do in fact receive their batistè, and
hence their recognition, from their fathers on this occasion.

Thus illegitimacy most certainly exists in rural Haiti,
despite its alleged unimportance in other Caribbean settings. The
occasional child who has not been given his batistè by his father
not only bears a local social stigma; he is also deprived of any
property rights he might otherwise have had in the land of his
father. The certificate of legal marriage is also a locally important
document, which is produced on different critical occasions
(generally by mothers) when the special status of a fully legitimate
child must be demonstrated in contrast to the status of another woman's child who has merely been "recognized." In short the papers which the peasant takes out in the Bureau of Civil Registry are treated by him as matters of great consequence, and the institution provides one of the major linkages between the peasantry and the central government.

Etudes de Notaires

Likewise of critical importance are the offices of the various notaries who serve in the town. During the period of research, there were two resident notaries in the town of Les Bayahondes, both having been duly commissioned by the commune to discharge their functions in an official capacity. The most delicate aspect of their work is in the drawing up of new land deeds. If the process is followed according to the letter of the law, when a person purchases a plot of land, or when inheritors formally divide land, a surveyor will officially demarcate the plot and a notary will draw up the deed indicating the new boundaries.

In actuality this process is rarely carried out. As will be indicated, there are a variety of factors which lead virtually all sibling groups to subdivide their land informally without taking out new and separate deeds for each of the subdivided plots. Furthermore when land is purchased, the transactants generally will merely record the transaction in a notary's office, without actually taking out a new deed. Nonetheless this formalizing of a bill of sale on the part of the notary is considered an essential part of any transaction. The notary's fee depends on the cost of the plot of land; the cost
reported may thus be substantially less than what the buyer actually paid the seller for the land. But though the sale price which appears on the notary's receipt must be taken with a grain of salt, the receipt will always be sought. Failure of the purchaser to acquire this piece of paper can result (and has resulted) in eventual loss of the plot, as heirs of the seller press their claim that their parent had not sold, but only rented, the land to the individual in question. The offices of the official town notaries, then, are yet other critical locales where important pieces of paper are prepared for inhabitants of the rural hinterland.

**Bureau d'Arpenteur**

In times past, at least, the surveyor's office was also an important locale where peasants interacted with the authorities of the central government. The large land sales of the nineteenth century, and the post-mortem subdivision of large landholdings by sibling groups, appeared to be generally carried out with the aid of official land surveys. The payment for services rendered was frequently made, not in cash, but in land. For example the surveyor who demarcated the boundaries of the individual plots inherited by Colonel Romain, the original recipient of the land from Pétion, was paid 40 carreaux of land for his services.

But in this century the surveyors are rarely used by the peasants. (The matter will be discussed at more length). There had been three official surveyors residing in the **bouk**. Two of them long since departed for Port-au-Prince. And as of several years ago the last remaining surveyor packed his bag and emigrated to the U.S.
As business is not exactly booming, no volunteer has come to the town to replace him.

**Bureau d'Irrigation**

The Irrigation Bureau on the contrary is a locale of active, critical importance for virtually every peasant household in the municipality. Though many of the lands cropped by the peasants are not irrigated (either because they are naturally moist marshland or because they are out of the reach of the groundwater sources which provide the irrigation for the region), a substantial percentage of the plots on the Plain are cropped with the aid of irrigation. In addition to a small number of minor springs, whose waters are not closely controlled by the authorities, there are three major sources of groundwater whose use is governmentally regulated. A system of open canals and sluices crisscrosses the Plain to channel the water from these sources.

A rather intricate organizational structure is maintained to administer the services of this physical irrigation structure. At the head is the **Contrôleur d'Irrigation**, who appoints three assistants (called **syndics**). Each of these syndics in turn is delegated the responsibility for allocating the water from one of the main sources. The syndics in turn each appoint a number of assistant "canal bosses" (**chefs de canaux**) in the various communities around the Plain. And these local bosses will in turn periodically organize the cultivators of the community for obligatory service in maintaining and cleaning the canals and trenches which service that particular region of the Plain.
But the peasants pay for their water not only by providing labor to facilitate its flow. There are levies exacted of every cultivator whose gardens are irrigated from these canals— a type of substitute for the land taxes which have never been imposed in Haiti. The amount paid depends on the amount of land the cultivator irrigates. It is no secret locally that many types of supplementary oblique payments are made to the local authorities as well. The groundwater rarely suffices to water the entire plain, especially in the dry months when lack of rain in the mountains has depleted the quantity of water flowing down to the plain. On such occasions extra payments appear to enhance the likelihood that one's garden will get water. Many times payment will not be in cash. One stratagem, for example, is to allocate a small section of one's garden to the authority in charge, cultivating it for him and guaranteeing him the fruits of that small section. This of course enhances the probability that that particular garden will not be one of the ones passed by when scarce water is being allocated.

In short the irrigation system which waters the Plain is an important focus for the local organization of collective labor, and an important lever with which to wield local power. Thus the Irrigation Bureau located in the town is perhaps one of the most important areas of contact between the peasant and the government. Though exact figures are not available, it appears that the post of Contrôleur d'Irrigation is the most highly paid post in the entire commune, surpassing even that of the magistrat. If such be the case it is a fitting recognition of the power that the incumbents of this position wield over the economic lives of the commune's inhabitants.
Tribunal de Paix

Of less universal use, but of great importance to the peasants, is the town courthouse. Land disputes are commonly reported in the literature to be the most frequent occasion of resort to the courts in rural Haiti. The impression was that in Les Bayahondes other types of disputes—intrafamilial violence, defaulted lonas, theft—in their combined totality accounted for more of the activity in the local courtroom. The Tribunal in Les Bayahondes is manned by four individuals. The head is a governmentally appointed (though locally born) titular judge (justice of the peace); he is aided by an assistant judge, a clerk, and a lower level assistant.

The other institutions mentioned earlier are ones which in general the peasants actively seek out. The courtroom is a locale which the peasants—even victims of one sort or another—try their best to avoid. To drag someone to court (méné moun devè lajistis) is seen as a last-straw act of desperation; to be called to court is a frightening misfortune. Though most peasants never see the inside of the courtroom, the tribunal de paix is one more town-based institutions which deeply affects the fortunes of those peasants who do enter.

L'Ecole

The town schoolhouse is yet another locale where an increasing percentage of peasant households are entering into a new type of relationship with the outside world. In this case, of course, it is the children of these households, rather than their parents, who are the individuals most directly involved in this contact. As is the
case with the administration of government, the administration of education within the territory of the Republic is based on an institutional duality which appears to have few analogs in other Caribbean societies. The schools of the nation are administered by two separate cabinet level ministries. Schools in the capital city and in larger municipal capitals are administered by the Département de l’Éducation nationale under the direction of the Ministère de l'Éducation, and are called écoles urbaines. But schools in the rural areas, and in smaller towns such as Les Bayahondes, fall under the bureaucratic domain of the Département de l'Agriculture, and are called écoles rurales. At the primary level, which in both systems comprises seven years of schooling, the curriculum of rural schools, though theoretically containing a slightly greater emphasis on agriculture, does not appear to differ greatly in practice from that of urban schools, though the level of preparation of the personnel in the latter is substantially more advanced. In both systems the students are awarded a Certificat d'Études Primaires at the end of the seventh year.

The one public school which is functioning in Les Bayahondes provides education only at the primary level. Furthermore the majority of peasant children who begin their studies (at the level called enfantine) will have dropped out long before reaching the Certificate level. Unlike incumbents of positions in the civil administration, the school director and the teachers are generally outsiders. Their assignment to this out-of-the-way town is quite openly looked upon by some of them as a form of unpleasant and hopefully temporary exile. The salaries of rural teachers are low. It was learned during
fieldwork that at least some of the town schoolteachers augment their salary by giving "extra attention" to a child—including, apparently, some actual instruction after school—if parents pay a small sum each month to the teacher. It is not known what percentage of the parents actually pay for this special attention; but it was commented on that the high rate of failure and obligatory grade repetition occurred principally among the children of those parents who did not see fit to purchase this special attention for their child.

Though the situation was different several decades ago, when the government had to fine parents who did not send their children to school, there is nowadays a genuine enthusiasm in the rural areas for the schooling of one's children. The expenses incurred are seen as being heavy. Uniforms and books must be purchased; the children must be given shoes; and at least a small amount of daily lunch money must be given as well. This notwithstanding rural families in this region who nowadays do not send their children—males and females—to at least two years of schooling are the exceptions in the communities.

The quality of the education received is rightfully questioned. The low level of academic preparation on the part of most rural schoolteachers, and the authoritarian, rote-memory, oral recitation techniques commonly employed would themselves militate against effective learning. But a major impediment is the fact that the books are written in a language that is totally foreign to the children: French. Though Creole is erroneously dismissed by uninformed commentators as "poorly spoken French," it is in fact a separate language which differs from French in many critical sectors of its syntax. And though the lexicon has a predominantly French base, Creole...
nonetheless contains many words not intelligible to a French
speaker. The two languages are mutually unintelligible, despite the
claims of many Francophone visitors to Haiti that they can understand
Creole. Thus the Haitian child has to learn to read and write in
what is essentially a foreign language; and very many village children
were seen who had spent several years in school and could still not
read and write. Not only the books, but instruction as well, is
supposed to be in French. Most instruction is, however, in fact
delivered in Creole. But the functional literacy of children remains
substantially low, principally because all written materials are
in a language which nine out of ten of them will never master.

But such questions—the level of training of the teachers, the
desirability of Creole instruction as opposed to French—were
not part of the generally expressed concerns of parents in the
villages. Though individual teachers would be the subject of critical
comments, the system itself was generally accepted as the possible
gateway through which their children—especially their male children—
might eventually find some sort of non-agrarian employment. And an
increasing number of parents are thus sending their children to the
school in Les Bayahondes.

But so strong is the demand for schooling that many types
of private instruction are springing up as well. A very practical
type of private instruction given to females are the now widespread
sewing lessons. Though young girls are now generally sent to school,
many will drop out to take these sewing lessons (al na koui), many
parents seeing this as a more promising source of future income for
the young girls. But private instruction will be given in the
three R's as well. There are two church-related schools in the bouk (one associated with a Conservative Baptist church, the other with an Adventist church) and a Catholic school is currently under con-
struction. Neither the curriculum of these schools, nor even the
sequence of grades which they incorporate, need necessarily coincide
with those of the governmental schools. Neither of the above-
mentioned Protestant sects had adherents in Kinanbwa, and thus none
of the villagers utilized these schools.

But in addition to such formalized centers of private instruction,
the town streets and villages are experiencing a surge of private
individuals who, for two or three gourdes a month, give daily
lessons (bay lésō) to very young children, a type of pre-school
preparation. Two such individuals were functioning in Kinanbwa
during the course of fieldwork. Their status is totally unofficial;
their teaching methods would generally be characterized as antiquated
and ineffective by a critic. But their services are eagerly sought
after by a growing number of parents who hope to prepare their
children—"teach them how to sit still," accustom them to wearing
shoes—for eventual entry into the town school. Most "graduates"
of these pre-school centers appear to start at the bottom rung in the
official school system. But at least one individual in Les Bayahondes
(Michel Romain, the author of the manuscript quoted earlier) gives
private tutoring to children who subsequently move directly into
higher levels of schooling in the capital.

In short patterns of formal education are becoming an increa-
singly prevalent source of involvement with the outside world on
the part of the peasants of the commune. Though one may be skeptical
about the eventual occupational payoffs of such endeavours in view of
the basically unaltered structure of life-chances with which most
students will eventually be confronted, nonetheless the increasing
stream of children who are attending educational institutions of one
sort or another is a pattern which is truly impressive (cf. Lahav
1975). Its economic meaning for the individuals concerned is per­
haps a matter of uncertain outcome. But in terms of the central topic
of this discussion—the various types of involvement with town-based
institutions on the part of outlying villagers—the government-run
school is becoming an increasingly important locus for such contact.

Le Dispensaire

Another town based institution whose importance to the peasantry
increased substantially during the period of fieldwork was a govern­
mentally built and staffed health center. The center was merely one
of a number that were built in the late forties when François
Duvalier was Director of Public Health under the government of
Estimé. When it first started functioning in the early fifties, the
center was regularly visited by a physician. But by the time
fieldwork began in the early seventies, no doctor had been there
for some time. The center was staffed only by a village woman who,
for a fee, would bandage wounds, give injections of various sorts
(hay piki), and dispense a wide variety of pills, salves, and
potions. The center was, needless to say, never very crowded.

In the 1970's however new life was injected into the dispensary
with the onset of a rural public health program directed and admin­
istered by the Division of Family Hygiene in the Ministry of Public
Health and Population. A young physician, recently graduated from
the school of medicine in the university, was sent to live and work full time in Les Bayhondes in fulfillment of a commitment to perform such services now required of medical graduates. In addition a number of nurses and paramedical personnel were also sent to reside in the town. And finally members of many surrounding rural communities were selected, trained, and paid as community agents to serve as liaisons between the health center and the community.

Falling under the auspices of the Division d'Hygiène Familiale, the program has come to focus on preventive medicine, maternal and child health care, and family planning services. Of particular importance is the prenatal care given to pregnant women, and the apparent depressing effect this is having on the occurrence of neonatal tetanus. Likewise of potentially great impact is the dissemination of family planning information and services now being carried out—and apparently being sought after by a growing number of women who are less fearful now of the harmful physical consequences that were originally thought to be a guaranteed result of using contraceptive devices. Thus the town's public dispensary is becoming an increasingly frequent locus of contact between the peasant hinterland and the outside world.

With respect to this domain of modern medicine, however, the town has no monopoly. In some areas it does. The peasant who wishes to recognize a child, for example, must do this in the Les Bayhondes Bureau d'Etat Civil. But a peasant who wishes modern medical services is free to seek them in the capital—and many do. People with minor health problems will go to the town dispensary. But people with major health problems, which persist despite the folk-rituals to which
such a large percentage of the population resorts, will frequently go to the capital to visit the office of a gro dokte javil (a "famous city doctor"). The young physicians who are sent to Les Bayahondes tend not to be considered dokte definitif ("real doctors") but are seen as assistants of some unspecified sort. Furthermore, though most deliveries are made right at home with the aid of a rural midwife, a growing number of younger women now go to the public maternity ward in Port-au-Prince to deliver their children. But whether the contact with modern medicine occurs in the town or in the capital, there seems little question that the involvement of the peasantry in such interactions is on the increase.

L'Église

Though not part of the governmental complex, the Catholic church located in the town of Les Bayahondes is one final locus of critical contact between the peasantry and the world beyond the community. The position of the Catholic Church vis-à-vis the Haitian government and the Haitian people is by no means identical with the general position of the Church in Latin America. But there are many similarities. Following the revolution, the Church in effect abandoned Haiti in view of a number of policies of the early Haitian leaders. For decades Rome would not formally recognize the Haitian government, and clergy were forbidden (by the Vatican) to enter the country. The priests who were present in Haiti during this period were frequently defrocked renegades or outright impostors. It was only in 1860 that the schism was healed, as a Concordat was signed, an Archbishop and a number of priests, nuns, and brothers were sent, and the country
was divided up into parishes.

Except for Port-au-Prince, where several parishes coexist within the same political unit, parochial boundaries correspond in general to municipality (commune) boundaries. Thus, some fifteen years after it was made a commune, Les Bayahondes was (in 1903) made a parish as well. Immediate steps were taken to replace the thatched cottage, which had up till then served as a chapel, with a church. The resulting stone edifice is by far the most impressive construction still standing in Les Bayahondes. None of the subsequent buildings which were built during the economic heyday of the town came near it in size. The rectory beside the church is a very elaborate wooden house, complete with tower, clock, and bell, and was in fact a private residence constructed before the actual church, but subsequently donated by its owner as a residence for the priest. Though there are now more Haitian priests in the country than before, the priest who was stationed in Les Bayahondes during fieldwork was a Frenchman.

Involvement with the church on the part of most peasants is circumscribed, but very real. In the village of Kinanbwa fewer than two out of ten adults (16%) described themselves as belonging to one of the various Protestant sects that have been evangelizing in the region with increasing energy over the past decades. The remaining 84% of the peasants describe themselves as katolik. Of these Catholics, fewer than one out of four described themselves as "pure Catholics" (*katolik fra*)—i.e. not mixing their religion with any devotions to spirits of the local ancestor cult. The remaining three out of four Catholics, however, described themselves as openly adhering to the
rites of the folk-cult which in these pages will be referred to as voodoo. This cult is publicly condemned by the Church as diabolic superstition, and devotees of the cult are excoriated for trying to mix the service of God with the service of Satan. But the incompatibility of the two lines, so clear to the priest trained in Catholic theology, is not at all obvious to the sèvité whose theology has other sources.

Far from being incompatible with his service to his ancestral spirits, certain types of involvement with the Church are part and parcel of the religious behavior of the practitioner of voodoo. He cannot take the Church or leave it. There are certain times in his life—few in number perhaps—when the peasant will have to become involved with the Church whether he serves the ancestral lwa (spirits) or not.

Of prime importance are the rites of baptism. Some three or four months after their birth, children in Kinanbwa are taken to be baptized. In a certain sense it is this rite which many see as giving the child a nam ("soul"), of making it a full human being. The child that dies unbaptized is unceremoniously buried in the bushes. He will then turn into a loutè, those harmless but annoying spirits who pézé moun na dòmi ("press people in their sleep"), creating those dreams where a person who wants to run is paralyzed. It is baptism that, even in the folk theology of practitioners of voodoo, turns the child into a person.

But if the theological consequences of baptism are important, its juridical consequences for the individual are even more so. For it is on the occasion of the child's baptism that his civil birth certificate
is issued; and this is the occasion on which those majority of children whose parents are not legally married come to recognition on the part of their fathers, receiving the batistè with the father's name on it. Finally the social consequences of baptism are also important. This is the occasion on which ritual kin are acquired by parents, and on which children acquire a godmother and godfather, individuals to whom they will turn to at different points of their lives. I was told by foreign health workers that in other parts of Haiti some people "don't even bother baptizing their children." I find this hard to believe. Such behavior would at any rate be unheard of in Kinanbwa. In this sense even the most ardent devotee of voodoo turns to the Church for this particular ceremony--becomes involved with this external institution, with its representative in the town of Les Bayahondes.

But there are other rites as well. Of increasing importance in recent years is the act of preparing one's children to kominyè, to receive first communion. Children may be 12, 13, or even older before their parents decide to undertake the expenses involved in purchasing the proper clothes and--very importantly--preparing the subsequent reception for the neighbors. Not all parents can afford this. In fact only 60 of the roughly 450 Catholic children of proper age in the village have actually been sent through this rite. For this very reason--its expense--the act of doing this to one's child is a public assertion that one is not doing so badly from an economic point of view.

But even more important in this regard is the ceremony of legal marriage. Most couples do not get married; those who do, as will be explained below, are taking an important step "up" in
the world—a step that is possible only via the portals of the church. And finally burial from the church is also seen as an essential finale to life, even if the deceased was a priest or priestess of the voodoo cult. No case occurred during fieldwork of any individual being turned away from the church at this moment. In short the large stone church in Les Bayahondes is one final locus—a special locus, it is true—of critical interaction between the peasant and representatives of the outside world.

To sum up: the population of the village of Kinanbwa are members of a peasant social sector. They are peasants not only because of the nature of their economic pursuits. They are peasants also because their lives are linked to forces whose loci are outside of the community in which they live. This abstract concept of social linkage to a large degree takes the concrete form of periodic interactions between the peasants and the personnel of various institutions based in the nearby town of Les Bayahondes. The economic power of Les Bayahondes over the outlying hinterland has drastically declined in past decades. Though people still visit the marketplace, many of the vital economic connections between the peasants and the outside now bypass Les Bayahondes, as the villagers hook up directly with the capital, going to Les Bayahondes merely to catch the truck.

But the town is still a center of political and administrative power in the lives of these people who are now economically less dependent on the town. The varied institutions from which this power is exercised have been briefly described. Each of these institutions—the Bureau of Civil Registry, the court, the school, the
Irrigation Bureau, the church—could be the subject of a separate monograph, in which the nature of the interaction between peasant and institution would be described, and the impact of that interaction on the peasants' lives assessed. But the purpose here has been merely that of inventorizing these institutions and to specify briefly the nature of the interaction between the personnel therein and the peasants of the outlying rural communities of the Plain.

INSTITUTIONS OF MILITARY CONTROL

But the institutions described above fall for the most part under the rubric of civil apparatus. There are other types of control structures in peasant societies which involve the exercise of a somewhat more coercive type of power. Probably in most stratified societies the exercise of coercive control has come to fall under the sway of two separate hierarchies. Problems of internal control will generally fall under the authority of a police force of some sort. Matters of external defense on the other hand will be turned over to the charge of some sort of military apparatus.

This functional differentiation has in fact emerged in Haiti as well. What has not appeared is a neat institutional division between a military apparatus charged strictly with external defense and an autonomous police force charged strictly with internal order. Though there is a police force in Port-au-Prince, the rural hinterland is in fact governed by members of the military apparatus. This means on the one hand that the military has a constitutional mandate to intervene in internal affairs in addition to their duties as agents
of external defense. On the other hand, from the point of view of the peasant, it means that at the highest institutional levels of society he is constitutionally subordinate to members of an apparatus which in many other societies need a specially defined crisis of "martial law" to exercise such direct authority over the civilian population.

But the demands of internal policing differ in so many aspects from the problems of external defense that a clear differentiation between the execution of the two functions in Haiti has occurred, despite their institutional unification at the highest levels. This differentiation manifests itself not only in the existence of a separate group of agents (with the formal title of "rural police") within the military hierarchy to carry out these internal functions; but also in quite clear distinctions which the peasants themselves make between regular members of the army and those local members of the military hierarchy who directly intervene to police peasant affairs.

CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEDENTS

Throughout Haitian history the constitutional focus of this internal policing has been at the level of the rural section. I have indicated the purely administrative character of this unit. The rural section is not a community, but a group of contiguous communities which have been administratively lumped under the authority of a chef de section. The inclusion of a particular community into this or that rural section is more a function of geographical propinquity rather than of genuine communal links to the other communities in the section. Likewise an entire section may be admini-
stratively switched from the jurisdiction of one commune to that of another, as in fact happened to one of the sections that is today under the jurisdiction of Les Bayahondes. But despite the flexibility of specific administrative placements, the section itself as an administrative unit goes back at least to the Code Rural of 1826, quite probably goes back to the colonial period, and may possibly even have roots in certain pre-colonial institutions (Lahav 1975:52-5).

The most recent constitutional definition of the status of the section is to be found in the Code Rural Dr. François Duvalier. One of the major differences between this document, written in 1962, and its most important predecessors (the Code Rural of 1826 and the Code Rural of 1864) is the provision it makes for a civilian component to the governance of rural sections. Previous codes envisioned the governing of the rural areas principally by military authorities. The Code Duvalier, on the other hand, while continuing the functions of these military authorities, nonetheless also provides for the creation in each rural section of a popularly elected civilian Conseil d'Administration. Such a plan ignores the artificial character of the section, implying that there is some of community involved. But at any rate the introduction of civilian authorities into the countryside has yet to be carried out in practice. The rural sections of Les Bayahondes are still governed by basically the same types of military figures as the ones which governed the sections from the earliest days of the Republic. 2

2. A civilian militia was formed under Duvalier (the tọtọ makout) but was not functioning in Les Bayahondes during fieldwork.
THE TOWN KAZÈN

The military status of these authority figures would be somewhat difficult for the outsider to detect by simple visual inspection. The only figures in Les Bayahondes who are immediately identifiable as soldiers or officers are those uniformed members of the regular army who are stationed in the town of Les Bayahondes. One of the most noticeable edifices in the community is the caserne (HC: kazèn). Though visually imposing in the context of its surroundings, the kazèn is actually a lower level military outpost (avant-poste) commanded by a corporal (kaporal) who is assisted by one (or at most two) common soldiers (gad). These individuals constitute the most highly visible authorities for visitors to the community. They blow the whistle when an occasional outside vehicle comes into the town, taking down license plates, names, and the like. But the scope of their formal authority is limited for the most part to the town itself. They only rarely ventured outside of the town limits, and even then usually not on a police mission. And though more important residents of the hinterland would bring their problems directly to the kazèn, most of the peasants in fact rarely came into contact with these soldiers, and referred to them quite openly as moun sa yo ("those people"), outsiders who do not really know what is happening locally.

The soldiers are in fact outsiders to the region. The ones that were stationed there during fieldwork were not born in the region, but had merely been stationed there, at least some of them considering the assignment somewhat in the nature of a hardship post. They rarely lasted for a long period of time. Replacements and reassign-
ments were frequent, though there seemed to be cycles whereby the same individuals would, after long absences, be restationed again in Les Bayahondes. At any rate the roots which these individuals had in the town appeared to be shallow, and they had virtually no functional contact with events in the rural areas.

THE RURAL POLICE

Not so with another group of individuals who, though for the most part wearing no uniforms, were nonetheless the true wielders of significant local authority beyond the town limits. The most important figure in this local hierarchy was its commander, a military figure called the chef de section (Ré: chef sëksyè-á). Though rarely wearing military clothes the chef was easily identifiable by the light blue denim shirts and pants he wore, the badge that was usually pinned onto his shirt, and the revolver that frequently hung from his hip. Both when referred to and when addressed directly, he was occasionally called ofisyé ("officer") by the people around him. But probably with greater frequency he was simply called by his nickname (nô twët). He had been ruling in the section for several years before fieldwork had begun. And though the military personnel of the kazên would come and go, the chef was still there long after fieldwork terminated—was still there when the community was briefly visited several years afterwards. If the town's soldiers were outsiders, the chef was born locally. And if the kaporal was generally to be found sitting (or napping) in the kazên, the chef would in contrast be out making his rounds somewhere in the countryside.
But in the governing of the rural section, the chef does not operate alone. On the contrary he is the head of an impressively large non-uniformed police force that extends down into virtually every one of the smaller hamlets of which the section is an administrative composite. By no means will every community have its own chef de section. Kinanbwa, for example, is a member of a rural section which has twelve other bitasyô as well. There is only one chef in charge of all these communities. But he does not have an office in each of the communities. Nor does he have any sort of central headquarters in the town of Les Bayahondes. He runs the section, rather, from his own home, located in the particular bitasyô where he and his family happen to reside. His control over the other communities is maintained on the one hand by the making of periodic rounds. But of much greater significance in the governing of the section was the appointment by the chef, in virtually every one of the constituent villages, of a special assistant who was regarded as the eyes, ears, limbs, and voice of the chef in that particular community. In this manner a hierarchy of rural police power is formed which effectively penetrates every hamlet in the section, even though on an administrative level these hamlets have no juridical status, are in that sense "beneath" the level of the law. But what legislators miss, their local agents supply. Even the smallest hamlet is brought under effective police control through this hierarchy created and commanded by the chef de section.

The local terminology appears to differ from region to region, but the organizational reality appears to be fairly uniform throughout rural Haiti. The local assistants appointed by the chef were called
mariéchal (marshall) in the region of Les Bayahondes. And each mariéchal further had another local assistant called notab. Comhaire (1955) found a similar usage in the region of Kenscoff, in which a group of community representatives called mariéchal met with the chef every week to discuss the affairs of the section. Though his reference to them as "community elders" is misleading in its implications, the organizational structure which Comhaire found appeared identical to that which functioned in the Plain. Lahav (1975:60) reports the existence of a more complex hierarchy in Verretes. There a layer of adjoints interposes themselves between the chef and the village-level police, who are apparently called in that region ajès (a term virtually never heard from villagers in Kinanbwa). But despite such differences in all cases the chefs de section create local penetration structures which bring the arm of the law down into the villages whose existence to this day has not yet been juridically recognized by the framers of Haitian constitutions. The law provides only for the appointment of assistants to the chef. But the particular form the structure of police control will take in a particular region will be largely governed by local tradition and by adaptive adjustment to local social reality on the part of law enforcement officials who are themselves intimately familiar with that reality.

In times past the power of the chef de section was apparently even greater than it is today. A well known anecdote concerns a past president of Haiti who was visiting the rural areas. Desiring to converse with the local people, he addressed himself to an old peasant, and explained who he was and what he was trying to do for Haiti. After the conversation the peasant wished the President well.
and exhorted him to continue in his efforts, that with perseverance and God's help, the president might one day even aspire to become a chef de section. Though the anecdote is occasionally told to illustrate the stupidity of the peasants, it is probably more a reflection of the power and prestige which these local authority figures used to have.

Even in modern times there are regions where the chef de section is hailed by the peasants as the "father" of the section and has come to enjoy a number of perquisites and prestations on the part of the cultivators of the section. In such regions he can not only expect regular offerings at harvest time, but can also count as a matter of course on unremunerated labor in his gardens by other cultivators (cf. Comhaire 1955:620). Though these patterns were somewhat on the wane in the lowland section of Les Bayahondés, they had not entirely disappeared when fieldwork was being carried out.

Because of the influence which these chiefs wield locally, a government which wishes to control the peasants must be able to place "its own men" in these critical ruling niches. More than one administration has in fact attempted to influence the course of local life by intervening in the assignment of individuals to the role of chef de section. During the American occupation the central authorities tried to place a different "type" of individual in the seat of local power. Efforts were made where possible to remove many of the semi-literate or illiterate peasant "patriarchs" who up till then had commanded the rural areas, and to replace them with individuals more to the taste of the occupying forces. They needed individuals more able to do the type of bookkeeping deemed
administratively desirable, who would lead monogamous marital lives purged of extralegal *plasaj* and polygyny so rampant in the countryside, and, above all, who would have no part in the potentially subversive voodoo rituals which the occupying forces were trying to stamp out. Thus the tendency was to appoint individuals who were not only somewhat more educated than the traditional chefs de section, but who were also converts to Protestantism (cf. Comhaire 1955).

If any gains had been made in this direction by the occupying forces, they had long been wiped out by the time fieldwork in Kinanbwa began. The chef who ruled the section was, as far as could be ascertained, basically literate. But in his marital life he fit the mold of the traditional chefs of times gone by. He had several wives in the section, one of them who lived in Kinanbwa. And though the chef himself gave no evidence of being an òugâ (voodoo shaman), he was a known sympathizer with and patronizer of ceremonies; and his wife in Kinanbwa frequently functioned as an òusi (female assistant to an òugâ) during voodoo dances.

There were two individuals who, at different times filled the role of maréchal in the village during fieldwork. Both of these individuals were also actively involved in voodoo rituals, being publicly possessed by spirits on several occasions. The older of the two was also a polygynist. In short the efforts of certain groups to create a different type of rural authority have come to naught. The reins of local power are back in the hands of individuals who fully accept, and themselves practice, certain behavior patterns which have come to symbolize folk life in the peasant hinterland.
More recent governments have been less concerned with the educational, religious, or marital characteristics of the chefs than with their political allegiance. As a result of certain steps taken by the government of François Duvalier, for example, there has recently been a tendency for the central government to play a more direct role in appointing, or at least approving the appointments of, individuals to the position of chef de section (cf. Lahav 1975). Even today in Les Bayahondes and Kinanbwa one is impressed by the frequency with which individuals aspiring to power will let fall references to their connections in the palê (the National Palace), or to their intimacy with individuals who have a direct pipeline to said palace. To the degree that the valued connections have come to lie in this direction, rather than in the direction of the military commandant in district headquarters, the civilian authorities in Port-au-Prince have succeeded in making themselves more of a force to be reckoned with than appeared to be true in the past.

But the influence of the central government is nonetheless relative. The current incumbent of the position of chef in the section where Kinanbwa is located has survived a change of national government, and has been left completely untouched by the rise and fall of different political fortunes in the town of Les Bayahondes. Though there are many lines he must toe, and though he must chart a careful course through oceans of administrative rigmarole, violations of which would give ammunition to potential rivals for his job, the chef is for all practical purposes in virtually unchallenged control of his section.
The effectiveness of his rule in the section stems largely from the knowledge his maréchal have of matters in their respective communities. So much a part of the local scene are these maréchal that it is difficult for an outsider to ascertain exactly who they are. The chef himself may be identifiable by his badge, his gun, and by the authoritative bearing which frequently accompany these trappings. The village level maréchal and notab are, at least in the commune of Les Bayahondes, not so identifiable. They wear no uniform or badge. The only indirect sign of authority they commonly carry about, if any, is a type of cane (generally purchased in Port-au-Prince) with alternating brown and black stripes, in imitation of the now scarce kokomastak clubs. But since other pretenders to local prestige—including ritual specialists—will also carry such batô, only inquiry will permit an outsider to determine who the local authority is in any particular village (cf. Lahav 1975).

This quality of inconspicuousness on the part of village level law enforcers is by no means the product of some sort of intentional secret-police camouflage. If they look and sound like ordinary peasants, it is because the vast majority of them are ordinary peasants. The income which village-level maréchal and notab earn in their official capacity is not to be sniffed at; but neither would it support full-time exclusive dedication to this type of activity. Their economic mainstay is still cultivation of the land. The only member of the rural police force who can count on a monthly check from the government is the chef himself—and even his salary may fail to materialize several months a year. The financial underpinnings of local police work are thus fundamentally different from
what they are in most contemporary Western settings. Though law enforcers in most settings appear to be able to generate some extra income from their positions if they are so inclined, the general assumption in most settings is that the government pays police personnel from taxes imposed on the population. It is considered inappropriate or illegal for law enforcers to generate income themselves in the course of their activities. This, however, is not the manner in which the rural Haitian system functions. In this setting the law enforcers are expected to generate most of their own income. Once this principle is realized, many other patterns begin to fall into place, and in a manner which removes many of the sinister implications which could otherwise be attributed to local police behavior.

One offshoot of this in Kinanbwa is that the person who has a complaint and who requires the services of the local maréchal should take it for granted that the maréchal may request a few gourdes to "pay for his meals" while working on the plaintiff's case. On one occasion during fieldwork, before I had grasped this aspect of the system, I had occasion to require the services of the local maréchal, and, when asked to contribute a few gourdes for his time and energy, refused to comply with such blatantly corrupt demands. As a result of my refusal, simply no action was taken on what was locally recognized to be a legitimate complaint. This aspect of the local system now appears to be taken for granted, an expected step in the normal procedure for calling in the law. This can, of course, be labelled "corruption" (e.g. Lahav 1975:61). But if so, the corruption has a systemic base. In the absence of
a regular salary from the government, this type of payment emerges as one local systemic "substitute" for financing essential law enforcement activities.

But by no means are these somewhat minor payments the only--or even the principal--source of income for local law enforcement agents. The bulk of the revenue which the local police system generates comes rather from a complex structure of fines and fees regulated by law, and imposed in the course of normal police work. An inventory of the major sources of income has been made by Lahav (1975). To understand this income, it is useful to have a general overview of the type of issue in which the chef and his assistants typically intervene.

There are some fundamental differences between the original function of the rural police and their current function. And even now there are gaps between what they are statutorily mandated to do and what they actually occupy themselves with in the course of their daily activities. The first appearance of rural police in Haiti dates back actually to before the founding of the Republic. In their original function, their main role was to be that of enforcing labor on the plantations, punishing any malingering or absenteeism on the part of the recently liberated slaves. With the total disappearance of the plantation society, of course, this particular role became meaningless and was simply dropped--even "from the books." They came to be assigned, rather, functions which make more sense in the context of a peasant society.

But even within this peasant context, chefs de section have been reported to have functions which were simply not observed to be the
case in Kinanbwa. Some of the chef's alleged functions come from sources whose reliability is extremely low. In one journalistic account of the Duvalier regime, for example, it is written:

The most important man is the Chef de Section, who represents the government in all its functions, from tax collector to policeman. He has to be consulted on all matters. It is not uncommon for him to require the paying of tribute... His word is final. The man literally has the power of life and death (Diederich and Burt 1970:32).

This is an inaccurate caricature of the Haitian chef de section, a caricature which is highly consistent with the overall sensationalistic and gruesome tone of the book from which it was quoted. The chef de section does not spend his days collecting tribute and dispensing death.

But even highly credible works have referred to activities on the part of local chefs which the chef in the research area was not observed to carry out, indicating regional diversity. For example a traditional role of the chef has been the registration of births and deaths in the section. Up until the 1960's he was statutorily chargeé with this task; and even after it was placed in the hands of other individuals by the Code François Duvalier of 1962, the chef continued to carry it out in practice in at least some parts (Lahav 1975:76). In Kinanbwa this was not observed to be the case. Births and deaths were reported directly by parties concerned to authorities in the town. Another occasional function of the chef has reportedly been that of advising the cultivators with respect to the proper care of their gardens. At no point was the chef or his maréchal observed to intervene or even advise in these matters in Kinanbwa, and most cultivators would probably have been startled if they had received unsolicited advice from this quarter.
In the community of Kinanbwa by far the most frequent issue provoking the intervention of the maréchal were problems associated with livestock. In times past the gardens of the plain used to be fenced in. For decades this has no longer been the case. Boundaries between fields are generally marked only by small irrigation ditches. The absence of fence boundaries brings no disputes between owners concerning land rights—but it offers free rein to animals. Cows and horses are generally tethered in fields with ropes (kôd) tied to stakes (pikêt). At least once, and usually several times, a day the owner or his children will come to change the position of the stake (châjê bêt) or to lead the animal to water. Very frequently, however, the animal will either break the rope (kase kôd) or pull up the stake (rachê pikêt). Animals who break free in this manner inevitably seem to find the grass (or the crops) greener in the field of a neighbor. It is furthermore known that certain individuals are not at all unlikely to sink the stake into soft ground or to tie their animal with a frayed rope, enhancing its chance of breaking loose and fattening itself on nearby forage which may be better than that which he, the owner, can provide at the moment.

The case of pigs and goats is, if anything, even more troublesome. These animals are generally not tied up in the fields, but are rather left to wander around the village. In many instances, however, they will wander beyond the village confines into the adjacent gardens. Pigs in particular have been known to destroy large areas of gardens planted in root crops. In nearby villages where some plots are still fenced in, owners will fasten sticks in the form of triangular collars around the necks of pigs and goats, in hopes of making their passage
through neighbors' fences less easy. But since most of the gardens around Kinanbwa lack fences, pigs and goats with a wanderlust create problems for cultivators.

The damage thus done by livestock--large or small--to crops is perhaps the major source of intracommunity conflict and is the major issue requiring the intervention of the authorities. If the owner of the garden captures a neighbor's pig or goat in his garden, he may simply kill it. What is generally done is for the garden owner to sing out, in a tone used especially for such occasions, announcing he has captured such and such an animal (described in terms of its earmarks). If the owner, or a member of his family, hears the announcement, he will go running to the field and will try to bargain with the garden owner for the life of the animal, offering to pay for the damages. If the owner of the animal does not come, or even if he does, the garden owner will frequently kill it, cutting off the head and distributing the carcass in certain traditional ways.

With cows and horses the procedure is fundamentally different. Garden owners may not dispatch these animals, but must rather capture them and bring them to the house of the chef or the village maréchal. He will tie them to a specially designated pole or tree (mété-l nē poto). He will then inspect the garden to assess the amount of damage done. The owner must then pay these damages plus a number of other fines, or the animal will be publicly auctioned. The chef or the maréchal charges several fees in the course of this procedure, including a fee for the assessing of damages (kōstatasyō). This chain of events appears by far to be the most frequently occurring
context for interaction between the peasant and the local police, and appears to constitute the greatest source of income for the latter.\(^3\)

But there are other sources of intravillage friction in which the authorities will regularly intervene. Paradoxically the cause of the most violent verbal scuffles between neighbors is a domain in which the local police have no real say: irrigation. During the dry months when water is scarce frequent altercations can be heard between neighbors competing for this scarce resource. Either there is a dispute between garden neighbors as to the timing of the distribution—for which reason watches have become genuinely needed commodities and not mere status symbols—or a cultivator farther upstream will surreptitiously siphon off (usually at night) part of the water from a canal destined to a cultivator farther downstream. But such disputes are more properly the domain of the irrigation authorities and his canal bosses in the villages. The rural police will intervene only if the disagreement erupts into physical violence, which virtually never occurs.

The infrequency of open physical violence in the community was truly remarkable. The occasions on which the heaviest drinking occur—various types of ritual events, especially voodoo dances—will be peppered with antagonistic verbal behavior. It was only somewhat later in fieldwork that I realized that these screaming bouts and insults, which seemed like an almost certain prelude to fistcuffs,  

\(^3\) Lahav (1975) reports this as well, but seems to imply that all stray livestock, even pigs and goats, will be impounded. This seems unlikely.
were in actuality somewhat ritualized and "part of the show." There was little question that genuine steam was being let off, much of it negative. But these outbursts were subtly incorporated into quasi-ritualized sequences whose finale was the pacifying intervention of bystanders and, frequently, a smiling embrace between individuals who moments before appeared ready to kill each other. This incorporation of aggressive sequences into ritual events was perhaps one of the factors suppressing outbreaks of violence. The severity with which such outbreaks are punished when they do occur, of course, must be seen as an even deeper conditioning factor which might itself partially account for the appearance of this above mentioned ritualization of violence. But whatever the cause, it was rare for the chef or the maréchal to become involved in violent attacks between neighbors, simply because such physical outbreaks were rare in the village.

When physical violence did occur, it was generally between members of the same household and consequently not seen as a matter of intervention by the authorities. The most frequent form of intrafamilial violence took the form of child beating. Children of both sexes are liberally clouted by parents of both sexes with straps and switches. Parents rarely hit children directly with their hands, and were never seen to slap them in the face, the slap (soufflet) being considered an extreme interpersonal insult. Such child beating was not defined as violence, of course, and the authorities never intervened. Neighbors would frequently intervene and indeed appeared expected to do so, thus making it safe for enraged parents to vent their anger knowing that they would be stopped if their behavior became extreme. As for child beating, the literature on Haiti reports that even adult
sons with wives and children of their own will be publicly whipped by their fathers (cf. Herskovits 1971:128). Though older men felt this was proper, in fact such beatings never occur in the village, child beating being virtually restricted to smaller children, tapering off drastically as the child passed through adolescence.

Another form of intrafamilial violence took the form of clashes between husbands and wives, and on at least some occasions the maréchal was called on to intervene. This was especially true in those cases where the beating was done by the wife on the husband, rather than vice versa. Though most references in the literature to physical violence between spouses concern wife-beating, and though this did occur in Kinanbwa, the converse occurred more frequently, or at least received more public notice. In carrying out this, women would not use switches or straps, but would hurl large pieces of firewood or even rocks. It was such cases which motivated the intervention of the maréchal, rather than the culturally more "acceptable" pattern of wife-beating by the husband.

If physical violence was not a major source of intracommunity conflict, there were other matters between households in which the authorities did occasionally have to intervene. One type of event involved defaulting on loans. Many small loans will be made between neighbors, frequently without interest, for short periods of time. There were a few loan sharks in the region who did charge 10% per month; but loans between villagers appeared to be made for the most part without interest, especially if the borrower had run into some sort of emergency (te ge you ka). In cases of default, the authorities would occasionally be called in. The
borrower would be arrested in the town kazèn and kept there until his kin came up with the money. Most cases are solved by the village authorities before events take the extreme turn of involving the town military.

It was very rare for borrowers to deny they had borrowed, even though they had signed their name on no piece of paper. The reason given: *si ou fe se, ya tchiyé-on*. If you do that the lender will kill you. There are frequent references to people "killing" other people, but reference is almost always being made to sorcery, never to physical killing. Sorcery is feared, and there were individuals in the village who had the reputation of resorting to sorcery on many occasions. And persons who suffered economic disaster would frequently attribute it to precisely this cause. If a person was caught, he was punished. The only case of this that occurred during fieldwork was the case of a woman who lifted her skirt in a certain way to a young child playing on the ground and the child reported seeing a certain type of charm tied to the body of the woman. The parents of the child had the women arrested in Les Bayahondes, but she was freed soon thereafter. Though sorcery, if caught, is punished, and though sorcery is a frequent theme in village conversation, it was rare for it to be caught and was thus not a matter with which the authorities had much involvement.

The problem of thievery was also rare in Kinanbwa during the two years of fieldwork. Rumor had it that in a number of bitasyô to the north of Kinanbwa thieves had broken into the unoccupied houses of several families all of whose members had moved to Port-au-Prince.
but who had left many of their possessions in the house. When thieves
are apprehended, the treatment may be an immediate clubbing by the
maréchal or chef who apprehends him if any resistance is put up and
almost certainly subsequent clubbings by the kaporal in the town
kazèn. Thievery is considered a serious crime, and news of it causes
angry reactions, especially among the old, who view its increase as
a sign of the turn for the worse which local life has taken.

But problems of thievery and violence are simply not the normal
fare of the rural police. Their activities more heavily center--
and their income more heavily depends--on various problems which
arise in the realms of crops and livestock, particularly with respect
to the damage which the latter does to the former. That is, the
nature of rural police activities are heavily informed by the nature
of the peasant economic pursuits which support the communities
policed by these individuals.

This chapter has briefly discussed the various institutions in whose
case the linkage between peasant and outside world takes concrete
form. On the one hand there are a number of civilian institutions whose
representatives are located in the nearby town of Les Bayahondes.
Because of the critical structural role which the town plays in the
lives of the peasants, its history was discussed, and the contemporary
town-based centers of administrative and social power were briefly
described. But in addition to these civilian authorities there
is a local military and police structure whose field of operation is in
the villages themselves and whose principal agents are the chef de section and the maréchal whom he appoints to be his representatives in individual villages. The basic functions of these individuals were briefly described.

By no means are the linkages described in this chapter the only conduit in which the peasant interacts with agents of the outside world. The village women who market produce in the capital interact not only with urban consumers, but also with truck drivers, market tax collectors, and others. Even at village level there are occasionally somewhat more direct contacts between the peasant and his central government. Of particular interest in recent years was the participation of very many Kinanbwa males in the civilian militia formed under François Duvalier, officially called Volunteers of National Security, popularly known as tétotè makout. Of more contemporary curiosity are the occasional trips the villagers make to the capital to participate in one or another mass rally before the National Palace. But the local branch of the militia has long since been disbanded; and the rallies in the capital are infrequent.

The major significant linkages which the peasant has to the outside world are thus lodged in the institutions and agents described in this chapter. But though important, these outside hookups play themselves out, so to speak, on the periphery of daily life. The are external forces with which the village interacts; but it has an internal life as well. The outside has shaped its history; but an internal dynamic has guided its evolution as well. The historical antecedents and external linkages of Haitian peasant life have now been examined. It is time to turn to the village itself.
PART TWO

KINANEWA: THE CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITY
CHAPTER FIVE

THE VILLAGE, LAND, AND CROPS

The town of Les Bayahondes is surrounded by a number of smaller communities, of which the town itself is the administrative center. Kinanbwa, the community in which most of the fieldwork presented here was carried out, is located a few kilometers to the south of Les Bayahondes in a section of the Plain that, though appearing level to the untrained eye, is in fact located in a slight depression a few meters below sea level.

The choice of a community of the Cul-de-Sac Plain as a research site was to result in the identification of several significant ethnographic patterns that suggest the existence of genuine subcultural differences between lowland Haiti and highland Haiti, differences that appear to be related more to ecology than to simple regional variation. But up until now the anthropological literature on rural Haiti has leaned somewhat heavily toward the study of highland life. Weaknesses in the census of 1950 (Organization of American

1. The factors which led to the selection of Kinanbwa as a research site, and the methodology used in the study are all discussed in some detail in Appendix A and Appendix B respectively.

2. Herskovits (1971) worked in Mirebalais, Simpson (1940; 1941) in Plaisance; Bastien (1951) and Métraux et al. (1951) in Marbial; Underwood (1964; 1970) on the Beaumont Plateau; Comhaire-Sylvain (1961) in the mountain town of Kenscoff; and Mintz (1959; 1960a; 1960b; 1961a; 1961b; 1964) in market places in different parts of Haiti, including Port-au-Prince. Moral (1961), whose massive work is generally regarded as the major source of information on the Haitian peasant in general, visited most regions of Haiti, including the plains. But the visits were brief and no extended, systematic fieldwork among any specific group of peasants is reported or evidenced in his work; and for many ethnographic statements he depends on Bastien's earlier work. The work of the economist de Young (1958) offers a provocative interpre-
States 1972: 633-5) make it difficult to say what percentage of the peasantry lives on the plains; but it is known that settlement is in general denser in the plains and valleys than in the mountains, and that consequently the model of the highland Haitian peasant which has appeared in some detail represents merely one of the ecological variants present in Haiti.

...
THE PHYSICAL SETTING

Because Kinanbwa is an agrarian community, the quality of life there is intimately linked to the quality of the physical surroundings within which agrarian activities unfold. The surroundings in this case are somewhat austere, belying Haiti's occasional public relations image as a beckoning island of lush Caribbean jungles. In reality there is no characterization that would apply to the country as a whole. Haiti is rather characterized by internal microenvironmental variety, Kinanbwa occupying only one specific type of niche. In terms of its overall physical structure, Haiti is for the most part an alternating series of mountain chains and valleys. The physical origins of the island are to be found in a series of orogenic events which occurred during the Pliocene, events which resulted in the emergence of an island with thirteen distinguishable physiographic units. To a much greater degree than its neighbor, the Dominican Republic, Haiti is mountainous. Almost four fifths of the nation's surface is mountainous; only 17% of its surface could be categorized as plains.

In a very obvious fashion the mountainous physical structure of the Republic exerts major influences on the agricultural activities of the population in at least three manners. In the first place the existence of regions of high altitude (several over 2,000 meters) in close juxtaposition to regions of low altitude creates quite remarkable patterns of micro-climatic variation even within a given part of the country. This means that communities physically close to each other but at different levels of altitude may have quite different cropping patterns in terms of the timing of agricultural activities, or even
in terms of the crops which are planted. Secondly the fact that much of the small-holding cultivation is carried out on extremely sloping land places obvious constraints on cropping technology and creates a special danger of rapid erosion to which much of the country's hilly land has already fallen victim. But thirdly, and most importantly, from the point of view of Kinanbwa, the existence of regularly arising mountain barriers creates drastic differences in rainfall from one region to another. The mountain chains, which are set in a general southeast/northwest direction, constitute a direct barrier to the prevailing northeast winds and create an alternating succession of rain shadows and areas of much rainfall. Thus many of the plains in Haiti take on a semi-arid character because they fall in the rain shadow of mountains to the north or northeast. Kinanbwa, located on the Cul-de-Sac Plain, is in precisely such a location.

In several ways the Cul-de-Sac Plain is perhaps the most unusual of the major physiographic units in Haiti, and its geological idiosyncracies have not been without repercussions on the lifeways of the various human groups which have made the Plain their home at one historic epoch or another. Though the referent of the term "Cul-de-Sac Plain" has changed throughout Haitian and French colonial history, the name as used here refers to the flat lowland region stretching eastward from the capital city of Port-au-Prince. The northern boundaries of this plain are the southern slopes of the mountains of Trou d'Eau; on the south the Plain is bordered by the Massif de la Selle, a chain of mountains containing the highest peak in Haiti. The western limit of the Cul-de-Sac is the bay of Port-au-Prince; its eastern limit is the boundary with the Dominican Republic. With respect
to this latter boundary, the physical characteristics of the Cul-de-Sac remain unchanged on the other side of the border, though the name of the plain now changes to El Valle de Neiba.

Though the Cul-de-Sac presents an image of flatness to the casual observer, the plain is in fact a geological syncline sloping gently from both the north and the south to a low point in the center. This plain, which was formed in the Pliocene, was flooded during the Pleistocene, as is evidenced by numerous marine deposits. In effect the southern peninsula of Haiti was once separated from the rest of the island, and what is today the Cul-de-Sac Plain was the inundated watershed between the two sections. Probably one of the results of this marine invasion was the brackish body of water, one hundred and eleven square kilometers in surface, called L'Etang Saumâtre, located in the northeast quadrant of the Plain.

Though neither a current inhabitant, nor a casual observer of the Plain would be aware of the former deluge, the present inhospitable saline physical condition of much of the Plain is fully consistent with--a lingering reminder of--this ancient oceanic inundation. The central part of the Plain, within which the research community is located, has about 40,000 hectares of land, of which some 10,000 hectares are highly saline. In general the soils of the Plain have been formed by the process of alluvion; the principal rivers descend from the mountains to the south bringing with them a concentration of calcium carbonate, giving much of the soil a grayish cast. In many of the poorly drained semi-arid sectors of the Plain, the soil has become permanently saline and pale. Though the mountain rivers descending to the Plain are used for irrigation, the lack of adequate drainage has
resulted in an intensification of the salinity as a consequence of the steady employment of irrigation.

Throughout much of the Plain the annual precipitation averages out to about 800 mm., creating a semi-arid situation in which various types of cacti, bayahonde, and other xerophytic plants are the predominant types of natural vegetation. The heaviest rains tend to fall in May (about 150 mm.); a second peak is reached in October. But even in these rainy months the downpours tend to be of short duration.

The meaning of the arid and forbidding appearance of much of the region goes far beyond the unpleasant surprise it may cause to unprepared visitors. The paradoxical combination of surface aridity with subsoil drainage problems—i.e. the alternating danger to crops from too little water or too much water—places obvious constraints on the agricultural activities of a small cultivator in such a region. And the general tone of daily life is constantly influenced by the alternating scourges of mud and mosquitoes in the rainy months and almost unremitting dust storms raised by a prevailing easterly wind during certain dry months. The inhabitants themselves comment on the uncom-fortableness of life in their region. There is furthermore the annually recurring fear of hurricanes. The Cul-de-Sac Plain has been a frequent corridor for tropical storms, and on more than one occasion the inhabitants of the Plain have had to abandon their houses and seek higher ground closer to the mountains.

When the specifics of local agriculture are discussed, it will become clear that not all is as bleak as the preceding paragraphs might imply, that there are in fact local pockets of excellent soil with
abundant irrigation. But the fact still remains that these zones are oases in what from many points of view borders on being a type of desert. It is the above-mentioned sterile and generally inhospitable ambience which comes to the fore in any realistic overall characterization of the region.

**THE FOUNDING OF KINANBWA: FOLK HISTORY**

It was in this region that the ancestors of the current inhabitants cast roots. During fieldwork I made efforts to determine what were the specific antecedents of Kinanbwa, suspecting perhaps that the current inhabitants might have been descendants of the slaves who had worked on the plantations in this region. Peasants of the area still refer to individual communities as "plantation" (bitasyô). Fuel was added to this suspicion when I was told early in fieldwork that Kinanbwa had been founded by a blâ (French:blanc). The villagers claimed that many of them were actually descendants of this blâ, however. This version was somewhat inconsistent with a simple plantation theory of the origins of the community. But nonetheless widespread references to a blâ as the founding patriarch appeared to bring the origins of the community back to the pre-revolutionary colonial period.

This theory was eventually to prove false, however. Subsequent evidence, both ethnohistorical and documentary, was to reveal a fundamentally different genesis of this community. Kinanbwa was to prove, not a lineal descendant of a colonial plantation, but rather the offspring of the society-building processes which occurred in Haiti some time after the revolution and founding of an independent republic.
Though the founding of the community was still a matter of vivid local tradition, the colonial and revolutionary period had in fact largely vanished from the traditions handed down by word of mouth across the generations.  

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3. The attempt to reconstruct the history of Kinanbwa raised methodological questions. The community was, of course, not mentioned in any of the documents of the colonial and immediate post-colonial period—it did not yet exist. Nor was Kinanbwa—or any other of the local hamlets—ever mentioned by any of the visitors to this region in the 18th or 19th centuries, nor does any mention of Kinanbwa appear in any of the few official documents surviving from this period of Haitian history. But early in fieldwork it became clear that what was lacking in written documentation might be compensated for in oral history. From the beginning villagers had manifested an interest in and tendency to discuss their past. The reasons for this interest seem fairly clear. Because of the importance of landholdings to community members, and the large role which the inheritance process plays in the creation of such holdings, people are able to trace their descent back several generations. But of equal importance in preserving verbal records of genealogical lines are the periodic public rituals of the local ancestor cult. In these rituals the founding ancestors and their now defunct descendants are publicly invoked by name.

It is now widely recognized in anthropology that oral histories of a community may contain a great deal of functional mythology in addition to historical fact. There may be local "reinterpretations" of the local past which provide a rationale and justification for certain features of the present. In this sense the legends concerning the founding of Kinanbwa undoubtedly have evolved under the pressure of selective retention of some information and filtering out of others, and perhaps some actual distortion.

But there are safeguards. There are reliable analyses available of early Haitian history; some of these have already been discussed. The manuscript of Romain (1973) has furthermore provided insights into the founding of the community of Les Bayahondes. When the folk legends concerning the founding of Kinanbwa do in fact dovetail with the materials presented in such sources, we can assume that we are dealing with substantially factual tradition and can give at least some credence to the version of the founding days which emerges on this basis. It is in a critical comparison of tradition with documented history that I have reconstructed the process which led to the founding of Kinanbwa.

In addition to the stories that were heard informally from the earliest days of fieldwork, the history of the community's founding was formally elicited from several informants in tape recorded interviews. Many long sessions were also spent in constructing the genealogies of all the adults who had been born in Kinanbwa.
WHAT HAS BEEN FORGOTTEN

The results of my historical probes were highly revealing. Though the community's sense of history became evident, it became immediately clear that the historical priorities of the villagers were quite different from mine. They retained certain things that seemed puzzlingly trivial to me. They had "filtered out" and collectively forgotten other things that seemed crucial to me. The historical focus of the villagers differed from the focus which I had extracted from my own reading of Haitian history.

African Ancestry

In the first place there were no commonly shared traditions concerning an African ancestry. With one possible exception (that of a man who recalls his grandmother telling him that some of her ancestors had supposedly come from a distant land called Giné) the majority of old people questioned on this issue were puzzled by my references to a foreign origin for the present day Haitians. The folk legends of origin began in Haiti; there were some vague notions that a people called edyé--"Indians"--had been here, but people felt that they somehow coexisted with the Haitians, who, it was generally assumed, had always been here. Africa had in one sense disappeared from the community.

In another sense, of course, Africa had by no means disappeared from the community. Not only are there a number of behavioral practices which can arguably be traced back to the pre-slavery African origins of the ancestors of the contemporary villagers. But there are abundant terminological survivals as well. Reference is frequently made to lafrik and giné as the abode of the spirits. And the realm of
lafrik gîné (French: L'Afrique Guinée) is furthermore associated with a journey over (or under) the water. The phrases nî lamè (French: "dans la mer;" English:"in the ocean") and abâ dlo (French: "en bas de l'eau;" English "under the water") are frequent accompaniments to references to lafrik and gîné in ritual chants.

Nonetheless what is important about these references is that lafrik and gîné are seen as being the abode of spirits. Several informants did not know, for example, that lafrik was also the name of a contemporary world region, analogous to lamerik, where ordinary human beings live. And the notion that their own ancestors had physically crossed the sea seemed quite alien to the version that villagers gave of their own history. The only adult villagers who had some idea of an African past were those handful of individuals who had learned of these historical events in school. Though I had expected otherwise, the African origins of the population were not, in short, a salient element in the local folk traditions, and were in fact completely unknown to at least some of the villagers.

Slave Period

But equally surprising was the finding that memory of the slavery period was also not a major component of local folk history. People did not allude to any notion of bondage to others as one element in the lives of their distant ancestors. As in the case of the African past, there were a number of local traditions which can perhaps be seen as oblique survivals of notions of slavery. Of particular interest is the tradition of the zôbi (English "zombie"), the person magically killed and clandestinely resurrected who is used as an unremunerated worker on the gardens of the individual who has ar-
ranged for such sorcery. Frequent references to this theme, and the precautions that are taken to prevent such a misfortune from happening to one's kin, can perhaps be seen as a local allusion to the slave period. But the allusion is at best oblique, and the connection is at any rate questionable. The slave period of Haitian history was not, in short, part of the oral tradition in which their community's history has been handed down to the contemporary villagers.

The Haitian Revolution

But yet a third major objective element in the population's history—that of the Haitian revolution—has likewise faded out of local tradition. A few informants had knowledge, it is true, that in the past there was a great war in which the Haitians fought and expelled the whites. But the notion seemed to be that the whites had invaded Haiti to occupy the valuable land, and that the Haitians—who had always been there—successfully repelled them. But even this tradition did not appear very strong or clear. Some people felt that the only armed conflict between whites and Haitians was that between the American marines who occupied the country earlier this century and the caco's, bands of armed Haitians ("bandits" or "revolutionary guerrillas," depending on one's point of view) who resisted them. These historical events were part of local history, since many of the older villagers had actually lived through them. But the revolution of the 1790's, which outsiders tend to view as the fountainhead of the Republic of Haiti, has not in fact been incorporated as a major contributing element in the version of local history preserved by the villagers.

In short three features of Haitian history which I had expected
would turn up as cornerstones of local tradition—the African past, the slave period, and the revolution—were in fact unimportant or even non-existent in the version of local history which villagers learn from their parents and pass on to their children. Despite the widespread interest in the village’s past and the spontaneous manner in which the historical events were discussed, the content of the traditions had little to do with the content of Haitian history as found in conventional textbooks.

WHAT HAS BEEN REMEMBERED

The vision that the villagers of Kinanbwa have concerning the origins of their community tend to focus on a number of specific events whose significance becomes meaningful in the context of certain local patterns of economic and social organization. Local history begins when a man named Pierre Mislette came to settle in Kinanbwa. It was this man who was to come to be regarded as the foun-

4 Why this should have been so is matter for discussion elsewhere. It certainly is not the case in at least some other Caribbean contexts, where knowledge of these elements is an important cornerstone of local tradition. But it was emphatically not the case in the probing which I made into the history of Kinanbwa with various villagers of all ages. The few references to these matters heard in the village came almost exclusively from people who had learned them in school. This may not be the case all over Haiti. With respect to the African past, Herskovits, for example, says that one element of the "underlying philosophy" of the Haitian is that his ancestors brought certain deities with him from Africa (1971:142), which seems to imply that his informants specifically referred to this aspect of their past. And with respect to the Revolution, Bastien (1951) also refers to a local tradition in Marbial where whites fleeing from Dessalines buried treasure in different parts of the mountains. Such traditions simply did not surface in Kinanbwa. The strong sense of the past manifested by the villagers focused on elements that differed from the major emphases that are given when outsiders discuss Haitian history.

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ding ancestor of a major section of the community, as the met
bitasyo whose name would take first place in the rituals that sub-
sequent generations would hold for the community's founders. It is
not known in what year Pierre Mislette came, merely that it was
lôta, long long ago. Nor is it known from where he came. He is
reported to have other relatives today in Saint Marc, a seacoast
town in the Artibonite, but his origins are obscure.

Some things are known about him, however. I was first told
that he was a blâ—a "white"—"just like yourself" (blâ tâk' ou mëm).
But this statement was later qualified. Most assert that he was
rather the child of a white. Physically Pierre Mislette is described
as having been rouj, literally "red." This term, however, was the
same one that was generally used to apply to my wife and me in
describing us physically. This Pierre Mislette was the light skinned
child of a blâ. This was the first bit of information that I learned

5. Though in English we would be called "white," in the village
people would generally refer to us as "red" when specifically refer-
ing to the color of our skins. Though the term blâ is etymologically
related to the French word for "white" (blanc), the referent of the
word has somewhat shifted in common Creole parlance. To describe
a person as blâ is to say that he is not a Haitian, not to say that
his skin is necessarily white. Thus an American black who visited
us during fieldwork was referred to as a blâ nwa by our neighbors
(literally a "black white") with no apparent sense of linguistic
paradox. Thus the term blâ would in many instances be more appropri-
ately translated as "foreigner," rather than "white." In terms of
color distinctions, the villagers adhered in their conversations to
what was basically a bipartite division between people who were
light skinned (rouj) and people who were dark skinned (nwa). In
this sense, though we were the only blâ ("foreigners") in the
village, we were often described as having the same color
(gè mëm koulè) as many other villagers who were also lighter
skinned (rouj). Finer distinctions, of course, exist in each of
these categories, and under formal elicitation other terms also
emerge. But what most struck us was the fundamentally bipartite
division that occurred in spontaneous conversation, and the fact that
we were phenotypically classed with individuals who in our own cultures'
color schemes (American and Dominican) would have been classed differently.
about this founder. The salience of his "redness" in the folk history which was given to me may have been partially a function of my own redness. But it was an element that was brought up whenever the founder was mentioned.

Another essential element in the history of Pierre Mislette was that he married a local woman. This would indicate that there were already people living here before he came. But the villagers were unclear about this; some were in fact taken by surprise when I pointed this out, as they had simply never given much thought to the origins of Pierre Mislette's local wife. The community's history concerns him, and he was an outsider who came in. This element of the history may in part be accounted for by the matri-local residence patterns which strongly prevail (both normatively and statistically) in this region of the Plain. It is assumed that Pierre Mislette followed this pattern as well.

But the most important element of the folk history of the community is the record that Pierre Mislette purchased land from an individual named Cadette Laplanche. It is this element which is the cornerstone of the community's history of itself, the notion that the founding ancestor had purchased the land on which so many of his descendants were still working. An immediate anthropological reaction is to question (not overtly to the villagers, of course) the historicity of this village tradition, to determine to what degree this was a legend justifying the present day landholdings of the villagers, rather than strict historical fact. But fact or fiction, it was clear from the outset that the purchase of land by the "mété bitasyà" was the major theme in the village's history of itself. The villagers did not refer to Africa; they were unaware of
the previous slave status of their ancestors; they never heard of Toussaint, Dessalines, or other giants of the Haitian revolu

tionary period. What they did know, and pass on to their children, was that the mét hitasy had come from elsewhere, had married a local woman, and--above all--had purchased land. It was here that local history began.

To what degree can this version be accepted as history? No record of the transaction appears in any notary's office in Les Bayahondes; the transaction would have occurred long before the few records which now exist had been begun. And the deed which Pierre Mislette must have received has long since been destroyed. Despite this lack, however, there is rather convincing evidence that the legend is historically true. On the one hand we have already seen the importance which land purchases played in solidifying the holdings of many early 19th century peasants. The legend is thus eminently consistent with what is known of Haitian history in the period when this purchase would have been made.

But there is more direct evidence as well. Romain's records (1973) indicated not only that his ancestor, Colonel Jean Romain, had received a presidential land grant. The records furthermore detailed what the Colonel did with that land. Most of the more than 600 carreaux contained in the plantation were left to his descendant. But Romain disposed of 147 carreaux (some 450 acres) in other ways. Eighty six of these carreaux were willed out to various individuals. But there is a record also of sales of 61 carreaux to various individuals. One individual straddled both groups. He was willed some land by the Colonel, and he
purchased some as well, acquiring thus a total holding of 15 carreaux. This man's name was Cadet Laplanche (Romain 1973:4). But the Kinanbwa tradition, it will be recalled, had stated that Pierre Mislette had purchased land from an individual with precisely that name. Thus the manuscript by Romain, who has records of a land transaction between an individual with that name and Colonel Romain, has imbued the Kinanbwa tradition with a high degree of plausibility.

The plausibility is enhanced by the fact that 10 of the 15 carreaux which Cadet Laplanche had acquired were located precisely in the location of present day Kinanbwa. This land was purchased by Laplanche principally as a place to graze animals. The other five carreaux had been purchased with the same objective in mind, but they were on higher ground in another section of the Plain, since the land on which Kinanbwa today stands was (and still is) frequently inundated during the rainy season.

In short it now seems beyond question that the traditions of the community's founding handed down across the generations in Kinanbwa are not mere legends which were concocted to validate present day landholding claims, but are probably historical fact. The founder of Kinanbwa was neither a slave who simply stayed on his plantation, nor an immigrant squatter who settled on land which nobody else was interested in. On the contrary: a powerful military figure had been given the land, and was generating revenue from that land by selling part of it off. There is a record that the specific site where Kinanbwa today stands was purchased by an individual whose name appears in the villagers' traditions, and the met bitasyo of the community was subsequently to purchase land from this individual.
Thus the combined utilization of documents and folk traditions has given us a glimpse of the manner in which the birth of Kinanbwa was linked to larger processes which were shaping the formation of Haitian society in the first half of the nineteenth century. The community was born under the impetus of a dual dynamic consisting on the one hand of several revenue generating strategies on the part of ruling groups and on the other hand of resource acquisition maneuvers on the part of smallholding yeomen. Faced with the demands of consolidating their power, Haitian presidents were to give away large tracts of land to military figures who would subsequently generate revenue therefrom by selling part of them off plot by plot.

As with other ex-slave groups on other Caribbean islands, the ancestors of the present day villagers of Kinanbwa actively availed themselves of these opportunities. But this initiative in the acquisition of land, this willingness to raise and subsequently invest the necessary cash in the building of an independent, privately owned landholding, was not to vanish with the founding generation. This pattern on the contrary continues to give shape to the economic careers of the villagers of today. As discussion turns now to an analysis of the underpinnings of contemporary peasant life, the structural continuities between the past and the present should become evident.
LOWLAND SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

In its overall shape and appearance, the village is virtually indistinguishable from most of the other villages which dot the Plain, creating somewhat dense clusters of human habitations surrounded by huge expanses of only partially cultivated land. This pattern of nucleated settlement is only partially a choice of the inhabitants of the region. For the very ecology of the lowland region itself has come to exercise a profound impact on the morphology of human settlement. The Plain is frequently inundated; the villagers will have to abandon their houses and seek high ground about once a decade. And even in normal years there is frequent flooding of the gardens. Thus houses in the region have come to be constructed on stretches of ground which are not only less suitable for cultivation, but are also at least slightly higher than the surrounding fields.

In view of this threat the practice of nucleated residential clustering has emerged as the normal settlement pattern in this region of Haiti. The peasants of the Plain tend to build their houses in rather close proximity to one another. From these nucleated resi-

6. If the inhabitants had their way, their settlement of the Plain would be characterized by a somewhat greater degree of residential independence. The ideal of many cultivators is eventually to purchase a plot of ground on which to build a house, to move off the communally inherited residence ground on which most of them still live, and on which any unfriendly co-inheritor can stride by your front door and give you a piece of his mind (jouré-ou, măké-ou déga) and you are powerless to send him scooting (kwapé-1). Only if you have purchased your own house site (plasă kay) are you truly master of your own front yard. There are regions in Haiti, especially in the mountains, where a larger number of peasants appear to achieve such residential independence. Either the houses are constructed out near the fields which the cultivator works; or the cultivator purchases a plot of residential land within a community and fences it off from the land of his nearest neighbor, forming an enclosure that has the air of a true compound (cf. Simpson 1942; Bastien 1951).
dential clusters cultivators disperse each day to work gardens which may be quite a distance from their homes.

But the same dynamic which has encouraged the adoption of nucleated settlement has simultaneously militated against the emergence of fence building between houses—i.e. against the forming of visually discreet mini-compounds within the larger residential cluster. This creates a marked duality in local patterns of owning land. There exist on the one hand patterns of strong individualism with respect to land ownership, but they apply only in the domain of cropping ground. Their strength in this domain cannot be overemphasized. Even when cultivators do not take out individual deeds to plots—as, for example, when siblings informally divide the land left by parents—the plots are henceforth treated as the private property of the individuals to whom they have been allocated by mutual agreement. The new proprietors behave as genuine owners of the land, and in many cases will even sell it if the need arises.

With residential land, however, the case is quite different. A large section of the original holding purchased in the 19th century was not placed under cultivation by the founder, but was set aside as residential land. Generation after generation, descendants who have remained in the region have continued to build their houses on this land. The original cropping ground has been split up into literally hundreds of privately owned plots, many of which have been alienated to outsiders. This special plot of residential land, however, designated as the grā lakou ("big compound"), continues to be treated as an undivided unit. An individual who can claim descent from the earliest founders may build his house on this lakou.
To some degree this land is then "his." While his house is standing there nobody can evict him. And there is a small, undefined space in front of the house which is referred to as the dévā-pōt ("in front of the door") and which is considered as the individual's territory on which no other inheritor should build a house.

But the land is not "his" in the same sense that cropping ground is considered his. He can sell cropping ground. He cannot, however, sell the land on which his house is built. If he sells the house, it must be to another inheritor who also has residential rights in the general lakou. Otherwise the purchaser would have to dismantle and relocate the house. It is in this principle that the duality in local land tenure is most clearly manifest. Cropping land may be sold. It is informally divided among siblings, each inheritor then having rights to dispose of it as he wishes. Residential land is allocated, but it is not divided. It cannot be sold, but rather continues to be part of an undivided compound which belongs to all of the descendants (erye-a-vo). In short, as part and parcel of the nucleated settlement patterns, by virtue of which houses are built at a distance from the fields, there are also two coexisting land control modes, a private property mode and a communal usufruct mode. The former applies to cropping ground, the latter being in contrast more prevalent in the realm of residential land.

The result of this residential clustering over the generations has been the gradual growth of an impressively large cluster of some 350 man-made structures, most of them thatched and wattle daub. There is no linear ordering of the houses. Though most of the
structures are built along a general east/west axis, their placement with respect to one another follows no easily visible pattern and indeed strikes the first-time visitor as somewhat haphazard, if not erratic.

There is, of course, little erratic about the physical organization of the village. There is an impressive internal ordering of the population, an ordering which becomes clear only when the kinship connections linking the residents of contiguous houses have been unravelled. There are in fact functional micro-clusters of residences within the larger macro-cluster; siblings (especially sisters, as will be discussed below) tend to build their houses in close proximity to one another. Matrilaterally related first cousins will thus tend to be closer to each other than to more distant relatives. Nonetheless there are virtually no physical indications of where one social group ends and the next begins. There is no large fence or boundary surrounding the entire grand lakou. Nor are there many fences separating the smaller lakous from one another within the larger tract of land.

We are thus dealing with a settlement morphology which differs greatly from that generally reported in the literature on the Haitian peasant. Because most observations of Haitian peasant life have been carried out in mountain or at least upland settings, descriptions of Haitian peasant settlement tend to emphasize the scattering of small, fenced-in, physically discrete compounds built in purposeful proximity to the gardens of their inhabitants. The nucleated settlement patterns of the Plain, partially a product of lowland ecology, present a striking physical contrast and an important subcultural variant whose internal dynamics will here be explored.
EXTERNAL MORPHOLOGY OF THE LOWLAND HOLDING

But differences between mountain life and life on the Plain are not restricted to the physical deployment of the population. Of much greater impact are important differences in the morphology of the landholdings on which that population lives. As in the case of physical settlement, a number of critical features of local landholding morphology are offshoots of certain pre-existing physical givens characterizing the lowland environment.

UNCULTIVATED STRETCHES OF LAND

A critical question for the population of any agrarian society concerns the amount of land that is actually available for cultivation. Popular images to the contrary, most of the land of Haiti is not under cultivation, probably never has been, and almost certainly never will be. The former reasons, however, differ profoundly from current causes of uncultivated expanses. Before the arrival of the Europeans, most of the island was covered with primary forest growth set in a fertile if thin layer of tropical topsoil. By the end of the French colonial period, however, much (though probably not most) of this soil had been cultivated with a market-oriented, get-rich-quick plantation technology from which systematic strategies of soil conservation or soil-restoration were generally excluded.

Nor is there evidence that the cropping technologies used by the slaves on their own plots included specific conservation techniques. In the land abundant situation of the colony, and in the absence of incentives for more careful land use, any preservation techniques brought from Africa would have been rendered meaningless and would certainly have disappeared. In short, neither in the collective labor
channelled into the plantation crops, nor in the domestic labor allocated to provision plots did soil conservation strategies appear found as part of the local technological repertoire.

In the light of such plantation-based technological antecedents, the contemporary ecological denouement is not in the least surprising. The passenger on an airplane traveling between the Dominican Republic and Haiti needs no announcement from the cockpit that the Haitian border has been crossed. When vegetation that still characterizes much of the less populated Dominican side of the border becomes suddenly and noticeably sparser, the traveler is probably flying over Haitian soil. The process of ecological degeneration in Haiti has been more serious in the mountains. But already in the colonial period the fertility of many lowland regions, including the Cul-de-Sac Plain, had been damaged by human cultivation. Moral cautiously estimates that perhaps only 7,000 square kilometers are in fact now under cultivation in Haiti (1961:121). This would mean that some three quarters of the nation's soil is not cultivated. It would also mean that the simple man/land ratio of some 500 persons per square mile would have to be raised to perhaps 2,000 persons per square cultivable mile.

This somewhat changes the image of the island. Rather than being a territory in which "every square foot of land" is under some sort of cultivation, Haiti rather emerges as an island on which cultivation occurs as an exception to a more general pattern of unused, unusable tracts of land. This is precisely the image which strikes a visitor to the Kinanbwa region. The fields of cane and sweet potato which dominate one portion of the Plain clearly appear...
to be oases in what is basically an uncultivated steppe. And the comments of older informants indicate that in times past, even less of the local land was under cultivation. The increase in the number of people has resulted in the utilization for cultivation of quasi-saline plots of ground on which the patriarchs of old would not have deigned to waste their energy.

Though more land in the region has been brought under cultivation in recent decades, the fertility of the land has plummeted. Even allowing for the exaggeration that can be expected in reminiscences of the good old days, the yields of rice and sweet potato which used to come from a ka tê in the olden days were substantially greater than current yields. Some older informants attribute this decline to the hand of God. (Quite interestingly, the African lwa are not seen as being frequent interveners in such agricultural matters. Though garden magic does occur, the sphere of activity of the lwa tends rather to restrict itself to human heads and bodies). Other informants refer to the hurricanes which have inundated the Plain in recent decades, increasing the salinity of the soil.

The presence in an agrarian society of much land that is not under cultivation is in itself not symptomatic of a system in trouble. It may in fact be a sign that the system is functioning well. There are horticultural and agricultural systems that rely on the periodic and systematic fallowing of land. In many such systems, especially swidden horticultural systems, it is part of the normal state of affairs for a greater quantity of land to be fallow than under actual cultivation. Is it perhaps possible to interpret the situation of Kinanbwa in this light? Is the presence of so much uncultivated land
merely the sign of systematic fallowing techniques?

This does not unfortunately appear to be the case. Regular fallowing is simply not part and parcel of the local cropping cycles. Fields will be worked until they are exhausted (bouké). Only then will they be left to rest (pozé). To validly assess the extent of systematic fallowing in Kinantwa, a distinction has to be made between truly uncultivable land which has never been planted, and other plots which were once under cultivation but which were not planted at the time of research. It is on such plots that intentional fallowing, if it occurs, should be found. There are some 350 plots in the villagers' holdings that were currently described as "fallow" (a tê). If these plots are included in the plot inventory of the community, then perhaps 20% of the community's land is being left fallow. But the reason for leaving each of the plots fallow was also ascertained from the plot's owner. These reasons are given in Table 5-1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Plot too salty</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot too wet</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot too dry</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plot resting</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between crops</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pasture use</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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This table gives evidence of the absence of genuine systemic fallowing. Not only are the 350 plots themselves a small percentage of the entire plot inventory of the community (about 1,500 plots). But the vast majority of these plots are being left uncropped for reasons beyond the control of the cultivator. Most are too salty; others are too marshy; yet others lack sufficient access to groundwater irrigation. If we liberally assign the other reasons—"resting," "pasture," "between crops,"—to the category of genuine fallow practices, then at most 85 plots out of a total crop inventory of over 1,500 plots are being left fallow. Obviously we are dealing with a system in which land restoration via fallowing is not standard practice—is in fact somewhat rare. In this light neither the hand of God nor Hurricane Flora are necessary constructs in accounting for the region's decline in soil fertility.

There is virtually no source of effective soil revitalization available to the local cultivators. Old timers talk about the "brush" which used to cover this part of the Plain before it was all cleared for gardens. Unfortunately the brush never comes back. When fields are left uncropped they are systematically grazed with cows and horses. The vegetation that reappears is more in the nature of xerophytic stubble than the nourishing secondary growth of classical swidden systems. As a result the preparation of land for planting does not involve the felling, desiccation, and subsequent burning of underbrush that is reported in the mountains (Bastien 1951:147). Despite the jeremiads of agronomists this device does provide some nutrients to the soil for at least one cycle. But it is not practiced by the cultivators of the Plain. Their only source of soil replenishment,
then, is the rotting of the post-harvest stubble purposefully left on
the fields after a cropping cycle, or the droppings of cattle and
horses which are frequently sent to graze on fields not currently under
cultivation. Such techniques are simply unable to restore fertility
to overworked land.

In short a prominent external feature of the local landscape is
the presence of large tracts of land that are unworked. These
tracts of land are being left uncultivated, however, not as part of
a systematic fallowing strategy, but simply because they are uncul-
tivable. Though much (perhaps most) of the uncultivable land in
this particular region of Haiti has never been under cultivation for
reasons of inherent unsuitability, much of the land in Haiti, and
at least some of the local land, has been rendered uncultivable by
a fallowless cropping technology with historical roots in the colonial
period.

MICROENVIRONMENTAL VARIETY

As was seen in Table 8-1, there was substantial variety in the
reasons for leaving plots uncultivated—a variety which stems from
the variety of the land itself. Even within the general ecological
region of the Cul-de-Sac Plain there is a great deal of microenviron-
mental variety with respect to land productivity. The major relevant
dimensions are soil type, salinity, natural moisture, and availability
of groundwater irrigation. Throughout Haiti there appears to be a
widespread folk distinction made by peasants between "hot land" (tè cho)
and "cold land" (tè frêt), the latter being higher up and generally
more productive. This folk-distinction was also encountered in
Kinanbwa but revolved less around the altitude of the plot than its natural moisture.

This dimension of natural moisture proved to be the major differentiating criterion used by the peasants in categorizing plots of land. Because the Cul-de-Sac Plain is on a syncline, because the village of Kinanbwa is located in a fairly low part of that Plain, and because there are two bodies of water in the vicinity of this community, much of the land is of a marshy quality. Though this marshiness frequently causes drainage problems resulting in crop loss, nonetheless the scarcity of irrigation water to plots not enjoying this natural moisture is an even greater disadvantage. It will be recalled that this region of the Plain has low annual rainfall, and that the major irrigation sources are on the other side of the Plain. Water shortage is a constant headache for owners of such plots. Thus the possession of a marshy plot of land is seen as being a much greater good than the possession of an equivalent amount of dry land. This is especially true if the dry land has access to no water, but is generally true even if the plot is served by an irrigation canal.

At any rate the major taxonomic division in the local folk-categorization scheme for classifying land is made along this dimension. Plots whose natural subsoil moisture frees them from the need for regular irrigation are referred to as tè frêchê and occasionally as tè maykay (Fr. marécage). Plots which need irrigation (whether they actually receive it or not) are referred to as tè rouzay. This division between tè frêchê and tè rouzay, because of the critical local importance of this marshiness, has "dethroned" the hot/cold distinction which appears to dominate the folk taxonomy of land in other parts of
Haiti. Hot/cold distinctions can still be found in Kinenbwa, but I usually had to purposefully elicit them. The most functional distinction which emerges in spontaneous conversation is the one between "fresh" land and "irrigation" land.

The relative frequency of the two types of land is given in Table 5-2. But though marshy land accounts for 35% of the plots in the community, it accounts for much less of the cultivated land surface. Perhaps because it is more valuable, tè fréchë has been the object of more serious fragmentation than dry land. The mean size of the universe of fréchë plots is less than half that of the rouzay plots, indicating that valuable marshland probably accounts for less than 20% of the locally cultivated land surface.

But though it accounts for little of the land surface, it accounts for a much greater proportion of local income. For it is on such plots of land that rice, the major cash crop of the region in terms of the income it produces, is grown. Paradoxically, however, the same factor which imbues their land with such value—natural moisture—also makes it extremely vulnerable to the loss of harvests.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>tè fréchë</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>423</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tè rouzay</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>798</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Very frequently the water is too abundant and will simply not drain off. Rice usually survives at least to some degree. But this water wreaks havoc on the crop which rotates with rice in the local annual cropping cycle: sweet potato. The cultivators, when questioned individually, reported having lost several hundred harvests in the past on one or another of their plots. I ascertained which crops had been lost in each case. The answers are tabulated in Table 5-3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vulnerability of Different Crops</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of plots on which each crop has been destroyed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potato</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table is anthropologically surprising. As will be seen below, sweet potato accounts for only a fifth of the local cropping cycles, yet it accounts for two thirds of the harvest losses. In cross-cultural perspective this is an extremely unusual state of affairs. Root crops such as sweet potato are generally the sturdiest of the cultivates in the crop inventory of an agrarian community in the tropics. They resist the droughts, illnesses, and winds which wreak
havoc on frailer grains and fruits. But the ecological conditions of much of the Cul-de-Sac Plain turn the tables on these crops. Though they resist other plagues, they are particularly vulnerable to the subsurface marshiness which characterizes much of the land in this region. The specific destroyer of sweet potato is a parasite called locally the ti-ladég. But it is under conditions of excessive moisture that this plague is most likely to occur.

The preceding may be summed up. There is a great deal of variety in local land. From the point of view of human utility, the most salient dimension is that of natural moisture. This objective importance of moisture is reflected in the local taxonomic system, in which the principal dividing line between the major folk taxa—tè fréché and tè rouzay—is precisely this dimension. And though its unfailing ability to produce rice renders tè fréché more valuable than tè rouzay, it is simultaneously vulnerable to dangers from that very subsoil moisture which imbues it with its superior value.

MODAL SIZE OF HOLDINGS

If the type of land a cultivator has largely determines his cropping possibilities, of even greater importance is the size of his holding. In terms of the overall size of contemporary holdings, the unanimous opinion of villagers is that they are on the whole smaller than the holdings of their grandparents. There are still individuals who through land purchase manage to acquire holdings that excel those of their parents. Furthermore much more of the land is now under cultivation than was true in the land-abundant days of yore. But on the
whole, in the presence of population growth and low permanent emigration rates, holdings today are substantially smaller than they were in times past. The size of currently cropped holdings was computed in the following manner. A plot by plot elicitation was made of the holdings of each of the 228 cultivators in the village, using the village interviewers, remuneration devices, and verification strategies discussed in the Appendix on methodology. One of the variables elicited was the approximate size of the plot. All plots which the cultivator was cropping, whether they were purchased, inherited, rented, sharecropped, or cropped for his wife, were counted as parts of his "holding." The size of the holding then was the combined sizes of the individual plots. Under this breakdown no cultivator was landless, in the sense of having access to no cropping ground at all. And fewer than two dozen cultivators were sharecropping all of their land. That is, the image of the Haitian peasant as a "proprietor" of at least part of his holding was verified. The average holding contained slightly less than two hectares (one and a third carreaux). The distribution of holding sizes is presented in Figure 5-1. 7

7. These figures, computed from a plot by plot count, fell within the range of what many informants had impressionistically estimated "between a carreau and a carreau and a half" as the average local holding. Nonetheless it is somewhat higher than most other published estimates of Haitian peasant holdings. The lowest estimates come from Bastien (1951) and Schaedel (1962). Bastien said that it was his impression that 50% of the households in his community in southern Haiti "...are owners of gardens whose surface varied between a quarter and a half of a hectare." This is extremely small. Schaedel, in reporting the average size "farm" in a community not far from Les Bayahondes, gave the figure of two thirds of a hectare as the community average. These are virtually non-viable holdings, and the credibility of both Bastien's and Schaedel's figures is low. Working
From this figure it becomes clear that there are intracommunity differentials with regard to holding size. Data will be presented later indicating that these differentials are more a function of age than of economic stratification. Furthermore though the mean holding is about two hectares, only some two out of ten individuals have holdings of more than three hectares. The upper limit of cropped

in the exact same region as Bastien at the same time, but collecting quantitative data plot by plot, Comhaire-Sylvain found that the average holding was about 5 acres (1952:182), which is four or five times what Bastien impressionistically reported. Similarly, working at about the same time in the North, Simpson estimated that the average holding was between three and six acres (1940:500), which is close to what was found in Kinanbwa and to what Comhaire-Sylvain had found. It is interesting that non-anthropological survey takers systematically come up with lower figures for the typical holding. The Census of 1950 came up with only 1.2 hectares as the typical holding for this region of Haiti, and a survey cited by the Organization of American States found a modal holding size of 1.5 hectares, as compared with the modal holding of 2 hectares in Kinanbwa. Either the peasants are concealing from survey takers or exaggerating to the ethnographers. Since peasants generally conceal wealth, the former seems more likely.
holdings in the community is about seven hectares, and holdings of this size are rare indeed. 8

DISPERSAL OF HOLDINGS

As in the mountains—or, paradoxically, perhaps even more than in the mountains, the peasant of the Plain must walk a great deal to reach his gardens. The literature on mountain peasants portrays a typical holding characterized by internal functional duality. "House gardens" with subsistence crops are planted near the home. Farther away will be planted larger gardens on which other crops, frequently cash crops (especially coffee) will be grown (Moral 1961:187; Herskovits 1971:67; cf. also Underwood 1964; Bastien 1961).

The Kinanbwa cultivator, in contrast, has no gardens near his home.

8. An argument could be made for a different breakdown of holdings. To identify differentials a person's holding might be computed as the sum of plots he owns plus the plots he gives out on a sharecropping basis, rather than those which he himself sharecrops. If this breakdown were made (and it would create problems more serious than the problems in the breakdown I have chosen), the curve would have skewed a bit more to the right. There are a small number of individuals who give out several plots on a sharecropping basis. But individuals who give out more than four plots on a sharecropping basis—the local gro abita—nonetheless control less than 10% of the land cropped by the community. There are numerous land circulating mechanisms operating to depress the incidence of permanent, intergenerationally perpetuated landholding differentials. These mechanisms will be discussed as central components of the adaptive adjustments made in the local land tenure system. The task here has been merely to establish within reasonably accurate limits what the size of local landholdings is. If the holdings of Kinanbwa (and those of Marbial reported by Comhaire-Sylvain 1952) are somewhat larger than those reported by conventional survey or census takers, it is because systematic attention was paid to the phenomenon of sharecropping, and the holdings were elicited on a plot-by-plot basis, rather than asking a respondent for a global estimate of his holding size. What is crucial is that intracommunity sharecropping is a structurally important feature of local land tenure. The effective size of holdings will be seriously underestimated unless the sharecropped plots are carefully enumerated.
Though pigs, goats, and chickens are turned loose to forage within the village itself, no form of gardening takes place within the community confines. On the contrary the fields are on the whole quite some distance from the community. The cultivators do not "live on their plots" and the time spent in walking from house to field and back adds up to a significant amount of time in the course of a cropping cycle.

This is especially true since the land immediately surrounding Kinanbwa in three directions is highly saline and many of the better gardens are some distance away. Table 5-4 gives an idea of the magnitude of this pattern. One of the variables I elicited on each of the gardens cropped by the villagers was its location.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Traveling Time Between Home and Garden</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than a 30 min. walk</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 min. to an hour</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>590</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over an hour</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From there it was possible to compute the approximate walking time from the village to the particular field. As the table indicates some six out of every ten fields are at least a half hour—generally somewhat more—away from the village. Thus where the independent hill peasant looks out his front door and gazes on his fields, his counterpart on the Plain looks out and sees his neighbor's children and chickens. To survey the work of his hand, he has to hike a bit.
SYSTEMATIC FRAGMENTATION OF HOLDINGS

If the entire holding of the cultivator were contained in one or two plots, the traveling time would still be a factor to reckon with. But holdings are generally much more fragmented. The total aggregate walking time of the entire community is not thus increased or diminished, since it is rare to visit more than one garden in a day. But the probability that an individual cultivator will have a distant garden is thereby increased. The degree of actual fragmentation goes far beyond what has been indicated in the literature, which still occasionally refers to the Haitian peasant cropping "his plot of ground," or the living which a husband and wife eke from "their garden." Such statements harbor monoplot assumptions that are at odds with the contemporary reality. The only precise studies found on this matter were both quoted in a documentation of the Organization of American States. One study quoted found that the average holding had 2.3 plots; the other study showed only 1.8 plots per holding. Both of these figures are incredibly low when one takes into account the ethnographic literature which has emphasized the great amount of maneuvering that is done by the peasant to augment his holdings. They inherit from both parents; but they also purchase, rent, and sharecrop land as well. How then can they possibly have only 1.8 or 2.3 plots? The construct of "concealment" comes to mind.

The data collected in Kinanbwa gainsay such conservative estimates of the number of plots in the typical holding. Even though the data were collected by village interviewers, we may still assume there was at least some underreporting. Nonetheless the average holding in Kinanbwa turns out to be split up into no fewer than 5.8 plots, the
median number being 5, the mode being 6. The data are represented graphically on Figure 5-2. To interpret the figure, read: "There are 38 cultivators whose holding has 5 plots, there are 47 cultivators whose holding has six plots, etc."

The dynamics underlying this fragmentation are to be found on the one hand in the manner in which the inheritance partition is done locally. A holding of four plots which must be divided among four siblings, for example, stands a good chance of being divided into sixteen plots. Many individuals would prefer a small piece of each of the plots than a whole plot left intact. Comhaire-Sylvain also found this pattern, and attributed it to "deep-rooted feelings of distrust of one another among the peasants (1952:182)."
It is true that Kinanbwa siblings probably mistrust each other as much as siblings in any agrarian system where land is transmitted via inheritance. But it seems unnecessary to resort to the characterological construct of mistrust as an explanation for certain features of the basic landholding morphology of a society. If cultivators opt for fragmentation even where the acquisition of more consolidated holdings would be possible, there is a good chance that a different type of calculation is at base. In this instance a good case could be made for risk-minimizing behavior as an explanation for the intentional fragmentation.

Against what risks are the cultivators defending themselves? When data are presented on the market orientation of the Kinanbwa cultivator, it will become clear that market fluctuations in themselves constitute an important source of insecurity. But the greatest insecurity facing the Kinanbwa cultivator is the simple physical insecurity of not knowing for sure whether the crop he has planted will in fact give a harvest. Reference has already been made to the crop losses, especially in sweet potato, sustained on tè frêchê, local "wetland." It became clear early in fieldwork that, though a majority of individual crop cycles appeared to make it through to harvest time, there were a substantial minority that did not, and that this risk was a salient factor in the concerns and behaviors of the cultivators. Some attempts were made to assess the quantitative importance of these crop losses by simply asking cultivators for each one of their plots whether they had ever completely lost a harvest (pèdi rëkêt) on it. The answers are given in Table 5-5.
TABLE 5-5

Vulnerability of Plots to Crop Damage

Has a harvest ever been lost on the plot?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>453</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>769</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>1222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The fact that some four out of every ten plots have at one time or another lost a harvest provides important incentives to cultivators to diversify their holdings as much as possible. But the manner in which the crops were destroyed is equally instructive. A follow-up question as to the cause of the harvest loss was posed if the cultivator indicated that one had occurred. The answers are given in Table 5-6.

The fact that both drainage problems on the one hand, and aridity problems on the other, enter into crop losses means that the cultivators are literally getting it "from both sides" and are in an unusually unpredictable situation. Though there are rarely aridity problems or salinity problems on tè fréchê, tè rouzay can have all three problems, and this land accounts for most of the cropped plots in the community. In short the lowland ecology of the plain, with alternating aridity and drainage problems, is a very vulnerable environment in which to pursue agrarian living. If siblings would rather have four smaller plots in four different locations than one larger plot all in one piece, the reason is probably less mistrust of
TABLE 5-6

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Causes of Crop Destruction</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Land too wet</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land too dry</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salinity</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
<td><strong>453</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

each other than mistrust of an environment which has displayed its treachery on many occasions in the past.

But strategies of diversification against ecological risk account for only part of the process of fragmentation. The fragmentation of holdings is also a partial by-product of feverish community maneuvering in the rental, purchase, and sharecropping of land. The dynamics of this maneuvering will be one of the central topics of the evolutionary analysis. And when plots are sold, rented, or shared out with a tenant, it is frequently done in a piecemeal fashion, dividing the plot up, and transacting or sharing only a part of it. The turnover in these maneuvers is furthermore impressively rapid—"hectic" one might be tempted to say in many cases.

I had gained a sense of this land maneuvering early in fieldwork and tried to capture it in figures. It is from the data collected on these patterns that the operation of a microevolutionary process was first perceived. To glean some idea of mobility in land I ascertained for each of the plots the length of time its current cropper had been working it, in whatever capacity (køyê dat li gê sou tê-a). The
somewhat astonishing data in Table 5-7 confirm the general impression. A model of land tenure depicting lifelong attachment to plots inherited from one's ancestors is obviously out of kilter with the reality of Kinanbwa. In about half of the plots, the current croppers have been there for less than five years. In this feverish land shuffle, the fragmentation that is a natural by-product of the local inheritance system is further intensified.

<p>| TABLE 5-7 |
| Rapidity of Turnover in Land Control |
| Number of years each plot has been cropped by the person currently working it |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-2</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3-5</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-9</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10+</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The implication of this table is profound. It means that even older cultivators continue acquiring—and relinquishing—control of plots throughout their economic career. But there is an order to this, an order that is intricate and relatively recent, the product of a microevolutionary change in local land tenure. The exact analysis of this "land shuffle" must first await the presentation of more background data, however, and will not be undertaken till the final section of this work.
To label the fragmentation as an "adaptive maneuver" is looking at the process only from the point of view of the problems immediately confronting the cultivators, problems which lead them into adopting these short range solutions. To see the strategic elements in their behavior, and to detect its evolutionary impact, is not however to state that the entire process is necessarily adaptive in the long run as a final solution. The evidence is that it is not.

One by-product of this fragmentation is that the actual plots on which food is produced are truly small, much too small to support any type of agrarian activity except the labor intensive variety currently practiced. The degree of this fragmentation can be assessed in Table 5-8, which shows the sizes of individual plots (as distinct from the "holdings," which are combinations of several plots). The median size plot in Kinanbwa has a small quantity of land which is locally referred to as a démi-ka ("half a quarter of land")—i.e. one eighth of a carreau. (This is close to a fifth

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Distribution by Size of Individual Plots*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.03 Cx or less</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.031 - .12 Cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.121 - .25 Cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>.25 - .5 Cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Over .5 Cx</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Measured as percentage of a carreau
of a hectare, or about two fifths of an acre). But this median figure masks a great deal of variety in terms of the sizes of individual plots. About a quarter of the plots are in fact substantially smaller than this fifth of a hectare. On the other hand, larger plots are somewhat rare. Fewer than 5% of the plots approach the size of a hectare, and very few of them actually attain that size. The size data on the 1225 plots is broken down in the table using decimal points. The decimal points should be taken with a grain of salt, since the sizes were elicited from the cultivators, who described the plots in terms of locally used measures such as démi-ka ("half quarter"), râ ("row"), bout ("end section"), lîg ("line"), lâlé ("alley"), in addition to more standard measures such as "quarter" "half carreau" and the like. Each of these folk measures has a rough correspondence to a quantity of land, permitting construction of a reasonably accurate size distribution.

The preceding may be summed up. As a supplement to ethnographic case studies of individual cultivators, efforts were made to gather quantitative data permitting characterization of the typical holding of the community, and the range within which intracommunity land differentials expressed themselves. Special data gathering procedures were utilized to maximize the chances of eliciting economic data that were complete and accurate to the degree that completeness and accuracy are feasible in such a sensitive area. The result was a picture of a community in which holdings were somewhat larger than those traditionally depicted in the literature (though still small in cross-cultural perspective) and in which the average cultivator was working
a substantially larger number of plots than is commonly believed, evidencing a much higher degree of economic energy and maneuver than conventional accounts would lead one to suspect. In addition to being small and dispersed, the holdings are also characterized by internal diversity of land types, a diversity made necessary, or at least immediately adaptive, by the ecologically based insecurities which accompany local agrarian pursuits. Some four out of ten plots were reported to have had at least one (and frequently more than one) harvest destroyed, a state of affairs which casts systematic plot fragmentation in a new light as a sensible adaptive strategy for minimizing the risk of total economic disaster in any given cropping year.

The data have been presented in the form of simple frequency distributions. They do not tell the entire story; they miss the dynamics of how the patterns are actually produced. But they have been a necessary preliminary to give us a reliable quantitative placement of the cultivators of this community. These data on holding size, plot dispersal, land types and the like provide a picture of the external contours of local landholdings. It is now time to look more closely at the individual plot, and examine at least briefly the manner in which it is prepared, arranged, and exploited as a source of income and food.
INTERNAL MORPHOLOGY OF THE LOWLAND PLOT

The patterns which have been described in the preceding section basically involve quantities and distributions. In this section I will briefly present certain basic features of local land use. A detailed sequential account of cropping techniques would be tangential to the main thrust of the presentation. What I will do here rather is to provide enough background information on the structure of local agriculture to place this particular food producing system in broad anthropological perspective. There are three anthropologically "interesting" dimensions which form a useful conceptual grid for briefly characterizing this agrarian system and placing it in cross-cultural perspective. On the one hand, we can look at the local "agrarian architecture," the manner in which land is physically readied to receive crops. We can then look at the general manner in which the crops are placed on the plot. And finally, perhaps most importantly, we can look at the type of crops that are systematically chosen, paying particular attention to their "cash crop" or "subsistence crop" character. The critical dimension of labor mobilization and labor inputs will be given separate analytic treatment.

LOWLAND AGRARIAN ARCHITECTURE

The agrarian architecture prevalent in the fields of Kinanbwa, the physical preparation and arrangement of the land for planting, uses in a sense a somewhat "maverick" design principle that cannot be fit into either of the major land-use types dominating most discussions of agrarian systems. On the one hand it is not a traditional
swidden system where the physical morphology of the plot retains the appearance of a "state of nature" to which principles of methodically arraigning plants one after the other are somewhat alien. There is an impressive degree of highly visible physical order in the arrangement of the land in the Kinanbwa plot prior to planting.

But on the other hand neither does local field preparation conform to the long furrow system which characterizes modern agriculture and many traditional peasant systems where animal-drawn ploughs are used in the preparation of the land. The preparation of land in Kinanbwa is done strictly with the hoe. Hoe cultivation is generally associated (in the literature) with highland cultivation and thus will frequently be associated with swidden plot morphology. Such a morphology has in fact been reported as characteristic of different regions of Haiti (Bastien 1951; Moral 1961). But in Kinanbwa we have the interesting situation of the hoe being used as the only major ground preparation tool functioning in a lowland environment. The result of this is a characteristic plot morphology that is neither swidden nor furrow in its basic design.

In the vast majority of cases the fields of Kinanbwa are converted into well ordered rows of small squares, somewhat reminiscent of certain types of paddy morphology, except that the squares are generally smaller. But within the guidelines of this general "checkerboard" design principle, there are two major variants.

In one variant the major crop will be planted on the floor of the square. This is the structure that is generally used for most grains, including rice and beans, and also for certain tree crops, such as plantains. The square is referred to as a karo, and may be from 10 to 15 feet on each side. To distinguish this terminologically from
the large land measure of the carreau (pronounced the same), villagers sometimes refer to this smaller plot division as a ti-karo.

The other variant, which is by far the more laborious (and visually more impressive) of the two, is the variant that is used for crops that will be planted, not on the floor of the square, but rather on top of or on the side of the wall itself. This variant is given a name (bit) which is cognate with the French word for mound ("butte"). But the structure itself is very unlike the conical mounds, for example, on which the aborigines of Hispaniola were reported to plant manioc. The bit of Kinanbwa are well-ordered squares, left unclosed at one point, whose exceptionally thick walls (six or seven inches wide) may be anywhere from 12 to 18 inches high, in contrast to the narrower, three or four inch high walls of the above described ti-karo. But if the walls of the bit are higher and wider, the surface of the floor is substantially less, the individual quadrangular bit structure occupying only a third or fourth of the area occupied by the larger ti-karo.

Whereas the strategy of the ti-karo then is to leave as much space as possible on the floor, the strategy of the bit is to have most of the surface taken up by the thicker walls, since it is there, not on the floor, that the plants will be inserted. The bit is given even additional wall space, and reduced in floor area, by the construction of perpendicular protuberances from the main wall into the center of the square, protuberances which extend about half way across the floor, creating the impression of the letter "F". Whereas the ti-karo is used for grains and most fruits, the bit is used for sweet potato and sugarcane.
Both structures are utilized principally with a view to facilitating the irrigation process, which is also done with the hoe. For this purpose the individual bit and ti-kare are organized into higher-order rows (râ). During the irrigation process the cultivator will proceed row by row, channeling the water by erecting barriers which will divert the water into a particular row, and proceeding square by square watering the ground within that row. When all the squares of a particular row are finished, the earth barrier is demolished and relocated so that the water will flow into the next row.

Briefly summarizing, the agrarian architecture conventionally used in Kinanbwa involves the imposition of a high degree of physical order on the plot, unlike the less structured morphology of traditional swidden horticulture. The order imposed, however, is not that of the elongated furrow, but that of the checkerboard divided into squares. Though comparative research has not been done, the context for the utilization of such an agrarian design appears to be 1) lowland cultivation 2) utilizing irrigation and 3) hoe technology.

RESTRICTED INTERCROPPING

If the agrarian architecture of Kinanbwa has a number of features which set it apart from swidden or plough systems, its strategy of crop placement is equally hard to categorize. No documented peasant community practices genuine monocropping. Every peasant group will plant a variety of cultivates. The question is whether the different crops are grown apart on separate plots or are intercropped on the same plot.
There is a great deal of systematic intercropping in Kinanbwa, but it appears to differ greatly from the intercropping practices reported in the hills. In a classical swidden system there may be no "principal crop" on a plot. A number of essential cultivates may be strategically mixed on the plot in such a manner that they maximize exploitation of the soil nutrients, but do not interfere with each other's growth. In Kinanbwa, on the other hand, intercropping occurs only in certain fixed contexts and is a temporary phase in the "life history" of a plot. It generally takes place in newly cleared fields which will be dedicated to a perennial (generally either sugarcane or plantain) but in which a harvest of some other crop can be quickly "snuck in" before the major crop has grown to the height where its shade will interfere with the intercropped cultivate. When new sugarcane is planted, the intercropped plant is inevitably sweet potato in Kinanbwa. The sweet potato is planted on the crest of the bit, the sugarcane being planted on the lower part of the wall. When a new plantain grove is started, a quick grain harvest (usually beans) will be inserted. Both plantain and bean are sown on the floor of the ti-karo.

Though this is clearly intercropping, it differs radically in certain ways from traditional swidden intercropping. During most of the cropping cycle the plot on which sweet potato or beans have been intercropped will be a one-crop plot. After the initial harvest of the intercropped cultivate has been made, no other plants will be intercropped during the life of the garden, as competition from the now advanced sugarcane or plantain would prevent such intercropping. This period of monocrop maturity can last four or five years in the case of sugarcane and several decades in the case of plantains. Thus
in such cases intercropping emerges as a momentary expedient, a tactic for extracting a few extra gourdes from the plot. It is not a generalized strategy of continual crop management and crop staggering as in a genuine swidden system.

Other crops such as rice and shallot are not intercropped. What is occasionally done is to plant an ancillary crop on the wall of a ti-karo when rice or beans are being planted on the floor. But for all practical purposes, the plot is treated as a monocropped garden. Though these other crops—usually vegetables of different sorts—are highly visible, their importance in the diet and crop inventory of the community is so small that they did not even warrant enumeration in the quantitative analysis of crops that will be given in the following section. In short, the plots of Kinanbwa are not strictly monocropped as in a modern Western system. But neither are they systematically intercropped in the manner of the traditional highland swidden.

**PATTERNS OF CASH CROPPING**

It is relatively easy to make an inventory of the crops in a given community. It is much more difficult to assess their relative economic importance, since this latter can be defined in so many different ways. There are eight cultivates—rice, sweet potato, sugarcane, beans, millet, plantains, eggplant, and shallot—which occur with sufficient frequency in Kinanbwa to merit enumeration. In terms of the amount of space regularly occupied, sugarcane occupies larger tracts of ground—perhaps half of the cropped land in the community—for longer periods of time than any other of the crops.
But though sugarcane dominates so many of the fields, it is paradoxically not the most "popular" crop in another sense. The price paid for it is relatively low. A demi ka of rice or shallot, for example, will produce multiples of the cash income produced by the same quantity of land planted in sugarcane. And what is more important, these other cultivates will produce this income in a third of the time. First harvests of sugarcane stands are generally not made before 18 months. Three cropping cycles of other crops can generally be made in the same period of time; and the crops themselves may yield more income per unit of land, as has been pointed out.

If sugarcane is so important in the local crop inventory, it is principally because so much of the land is arid. Sugarcane has low water demands in relation to other crops; water shortages may reduce its yield but will not destroy it, as will occur with beans, for example. Sugarcane furthermore will grow in land whose salinity would "burn up" (brûlé) most other crops. Salinity, in fact, is to some degree an advantage in the case of sugarcane. It will make the individual stalk slightly heavier and hence draw a better price.

Thirdly sugarcane has extremely low labor demands during most of the life of the plot. Though a great deal of maneuvering will have to be done at harvest time to mobilize labor, the individual cultivator can handle large quantities of cane during most of its growing season. Finally, though sugarcane pays relatively little, the cultivators like it because on jwèn tout kòb-la ñăm--you get the money in one lump sum, without worrying about marketing it in the internal market system.

In short, sugarcane has a number of advantages which account for its prevalence in the fields of Kinanbwa.
But though sugarcane is occupying so much of the land, it must be recalled that most of the land on which sugarcane stands would not produce other crops, either because of saline soil or lack of adequate irrigation. A different type of analysis will produce a more realistic picture of the rank-order of importance of different crops. For each of the plots, I determined what was the crop currently planted thereon. In addition to this I also questioned the cultivators about the next crop which would be planted on that plot of ground in the year of the survey, to get a complete picture of an annual cropping cycle for the particular plot. Thus in effect the unit of analysis is the cropping cycle, each plot having two cropping cycles per year, except those which have sugarcane or plantain. Over 2,000 "cropping cycles" occurred in the community during the final year of research. A plot on which sugarcane and sweet potato were intercropped I have counted as two cycles. Table 5-9 determines the number of cropping cycles allocated to each crop in the year in which the survey was made.

Under this breakdown the economic role of sugarcane in the community is placed in its proper context. It emerges as accounting for about a fourth of local cropping cycles, with about the same frequency as rice. The average sugarcane plot, however, is over twice as large as the average rice plot, which increases the physical importance (and visual prominence) of sugarcane. But in terms of per hectare cash yields, its worth is substantially less than that of a rice harvest, making its overall contribution to village income somewhat less.
TABLE 5-9

Preponderance of Different Crops in Kinanbwa Gardens

Number of cropping cycles dedicated to each cultivate during research year

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Crop</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sweet potato</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>709</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sugarcane</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>651</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Millet</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantains</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggplant</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallot</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2458</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are two crops in the local inventory—plantain and shallot—whose per hectare cash yield is greater than that of rice. If rice is planted with greater frequency, it is because of the availability of marshy terre which accounts for almost four out of ten plots in the community. Plantains and shallot both have requirements not easily met on most of the land of Kinanbwa.

What should be clear from this discussion is that the cropping decisions which a cultivator makes are generally made in view of the salability, rather than the edibility, of the cultivates. The "classic" peasant has of course generally been involved in economic structures...
that transcend the boundaries of his community. But peasants are frequently seen as selling their "surplus." If this is taken literally to mean that the peasant grows what his family eats, puts aside enough for domestic consumption, and sells the rest—the model does not apply to Kinanbwa. On the contrary, many of the major cultivates are not consumed as staples in the village, and the two major staples (millet and cornmeal) occupy an extremely low place in the local crop inventory. The peasants of Kinanbwa, in short, tend to sell what they grow and buy what they eat.

The extent of this can be assessed by dividing the cultivates into three major categories: exclusively cash, principally cash, and mixed cash/consumption. Sugarcane, shallot, and eggplant would go into this category. Much sugarcane is chewed, it is true, and small quantities of shallot and eggplant may be eaten. But virtually all of these items are sold in their entirety. The same is true of rice, beans and plantains, but to a somewhat lesser degree. Rice and beans are eaten by the ordinary household somewhat in the nature of "special occasion" foods. But better off households will attempt to store a larger quantity of these than is true of shallot, for example. Nonetheless in cases observed the quantity saved as opposed to the quantity sold never even approached 25%. These three crops would be "principally cash" crops.

The case of sweet potato is changing. It used to be a subsistence crop par-excellence. But a demand for this item has grown in the internal market system, and at least half of the sweet potato grown by villagers is now sold. Nonetheless a cultivator will generally set apart rows which are specifically used for the daily food of his
household. Thus I have labelled this as "mixed cash/consumption." (I have included millet in this third category as well).

Table 5-10 joins these eight cultivates into the three above mentioned groups, and ascertains what percentage of local "cropping cycles" are dedicated to each general type. It becomes immediately

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exclusively cash</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Primarily cash</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>711</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed cash/consumpt.</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>2374</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

clear that the label of "subsistence cultivator," frequently employed by developmental agencies to describe groups such as the Kinanbwa cultivators, is grossly misapplied. About seven out of ten local cropping cycles will be dedicated to crops that are totally or principally destined to market. The Kinanbwa cultivator does not have any major item in his crop inventory grown exclusively for the consumption of his family.

It is easy to look from afar at a wattle-daub village and its hoe-toting inhabitants and apply labels such as that of subsistence cultivator, fancying that here is a community where money plays
but a small role. But if the fabric of local economic life is unravelled strand by strand, the observer may be surprised at the number of coins that come clinking from the seams.

One solution would be to change the label and call these cultivators "farmers" rather than "peasants." But until more quantitative, plot by plot analyses are available on so-called classic peasants who supposedly sell only a surplus and whose principal goal is the feeding of their family, a safer move would be to loosen up the definition of peasant. I suspect that if plot-by-plot counts of cropping cycles are done in this fashion in a number of peasant communities both inside and outside the Caribbean, a great many peasants will turn out to be much more deeply involved in local cash markets than has heretofore been suspected. And the involvement will not be that of a seller of occasional surpluses, but rather that of a cash-oriented cultivator, whose very choice of crops is made with both eyes on the marketplace.

The impression that emerges from observing the course of events in a Haitian community is that the trading activities of the women provide most of the cash. And there are in fact periods of the year—between harvests—when the women do in fact supply most of the food (cf. Murray and Alvarez 1975:122) in the village. But the high visibility of these female trading activities, and the somewhat greater economic autonomy which the Haitian woman appears to enjoy in comparison to her Spanish-speaking counterpart across the border, for example, could lead to an overemphasis on the percentage of annual income supplied by female trading as opposed to male gardening.
Though domestic income analyses will not be undertaken here, it appears that for most households the gardening activities of the men still play a preponderant role in generating income, the trading activities of the women being on a somewhat smaller activity involving capital that rarely reaches the sum of $100.00. In the traditional system as reported in the literature, the very stock which the woman sells comes from the garden of her husband. This is rarely the case in Kinanbwa. The village women are professional traders who leave the village, not with produce, but with capital and/or credit contacts. Those husbands who do underwrite the trading activities of their wives—and most husbands appear to contribute at least something to their wives' trade—do so with cash rather than agricultural produce. The three major crops—sugarcane, sweet potato, and rice—are marketed through channels which generally do not involve their wives. Sugarcane goes directly to the Company, sweet potatoes are generally sold in the garden before harvest to ambulant intermediaries who harvest the crop themselves. Only rice will occasionally be brought to the capital by village women, and many do not do this. Thus when a husband contributes to his wife's "commerce," it is generally with money from produce which he has produced and sold.

These agricultural activities by themselves appear to generate more income than the trading activities of the women considered separately. This impression was generally shared by the cultivators, who when questioned in general as to whether farming (jade gaso) or female trade (komës dëm) brought in more cash, overwhelmingly chose farming as a more important element of the domestic economy (cf. Table 5-11).
TABLE 5-11
Perceived Economic Contribution of Farming versus Trade
"Which do you think produces more income?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Farming</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trade</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This does not appear to be merely a male point of view, but reflects economic reality for most households in the village. The income potentialities of female trade are fairly constant, but relatively small except for those commanding larger degrees of capital which permit them to enter the ranks of the "traveling intermediaries" (cf. Murray and Alvarez 1975). Most of the village women function as smaller scale retailers (révâdëz) on the capital street markets.

But at any rate it is clear that an essential feature of the internal dynamics of farming in Kinanbwa is that they are strongly governed by considerations of an external market. To the degree that "surpluses" are sold, this is true of any genuine peasant community. But in rural Haiti this "surplus" model of market involvement is somewhat at odds with the facts. The crops themselves are chosen less with a view to consuming them than with the clear intention of selling them.
In concluding this brief description of cropping patterns in Kinanbwa, it will be useful to emphasize the somewhat unusual position, in Caribbean context, in which these cultivators stand vis-à-vis the Sugar Company. The Company in Caribbean history has been an economic force engineering profound structural changes in the lives of rural dwellers. Most Caribbean sugar has, in the modern age, been produced under two conditions. One arrangement has been for the company (be it private, or governmental as in the Dominican Republic) to purchase or rent land and to hire the labor to work the fields and cut the cane. An alternative arrangement has been for the Company to enter into contracts with large landowners, who will grow the cane as colonos of the Company. The Company provides capital, machinery, technical assistance, and the like, for different phases of the productive process. The colono himself then hires the necessary labor to produce and cut the cane. The two arrangements differ in terms of who owns the cane while it still stands in the field. But in either case the cane is grown by highly capitalized economic actors and cut with the labor of a rural proletarian workforce.

The Haytian American Sugar Company utilizes both of these arrangements in different places. But the cultivators of Kinanbwa, though they are clearly part of the sugar economy, have entered it as genuine yeomen. They own their land. The sharecropping that is done in the community is done on the land of other villagers; the Company does not control a foot of the ground worked by the cultivators. And though some tasks in some crops are done with local wage labor, the cutting of cane is paradoxically one of the few tasks that is never done
with wage labor in Kinanbwa. The cane is inevitably cut with a type of peasant exchange labor whose dynamic will be described below. Though this matter will not be pursued here, the cultivators of Kinanbwa and other similar communities have "held their ground."

From one point of view their position in this sugarcane economy is weak. They have no "contracts" of any sort. They plant cane knowing that the Company will buy it. The price they are paid per ton is several dollars less than what is paid to colonos in the Dominican Republic, for example. They are not even present at the weighing of the cane; they load their cane on a train wagon (pak) and a few days later receive written notice of how much it weighed and how much they can come to collect. They even have to pay a type of "tribute", as regular practice, to the local representative of the company in Les Bayahondes to secure a sèp—i.e. a "date" for cutting and delivering cane. Some who have refused these few gourdes have been kept waiting for months, to the detriment of the crop.

Yet despite these weaknesses in their position, they are one of the few communities in Caribbean history that has been able to "make a living" from the sugar economy without turning into a proletarian labor force. They continue to be peasants. They grow sugarcane—-but it is one among several crops. The bulk of their economic activities are oriented toward crops destined for the internal market system. And above all, the vast majority of them do not sell their labor in the fields, would in fact be angered and insulted if any fellow villager offered them such employment. It is to this question of labor that discussion will now turn.
CHAPTER SIX

THE MOBILIZATION OF LABOR

The story of the Caribbean is largely the story of labor needs. But more specifically it has been the story of the quest for "alien" labor. And in this sense Haiti has been a true Caribbean society. Much of the history of Haiti has been dominated by the maneuvers of different groups to get others to work their land. The slave trade which peopled the island with Africans was the most dramatic manifestation of this quest for alien labor. But the policies of the earliest Haitian leaders were also aimed at getting others--the masses--to labor on the fields as well. One might suspect that the major shift brought about by the triumph of the peasantry was the bringing of a sudden halt to this hungry search for the labor of others, that henceforth the story of the island would be that of individuals working their own land. If one were to phrase it this way, one would be wrong.

Though in a radically different fashion, the contemporary cultivator of Kinanbwa continues in profound dependence on the labor of others. His success in life entails not only the acquisition of land, but the systematic mobilization of the energies of other individuals as well. The emphasis of the preceding chapter was on the landholding cultivated by the peasant. Much of his behavior will not be understood, however, unless his radical dependence on the labor of others is clearly perceived, and the structure of local labor mobilizing alternatives available to him is identified and described. This domain is of particular importance, because it was a demographically generated disruption of the traditional labor mobilization system which triggered
off the evolutionary transformation which will be documented in these pages. The impact of labor needs did not cease, then, with the ejection of the French. They continue to dominate the life chances of the contemporary yeoman.

**GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS**

**HOE TECHNOLOGY**

The general dependence of cultivators on the recruitment of the labor of others will be to some degree a function of the prevailing tool inventory of the society. The greater the quotient of human energy inputs, as opposed to animal or machine inputs, the greater will be the needs of that particular system for human labor, and the greater will be the vulnerability of the system to human labor shortages.

The agrarian system of rural Haiti is dependent, to a degree that is perhaps unusual in lowland peasant settings, on energy inputs flowing directly from human organisms. Though there are horses and mules in the community, most cultivators do not own any. And those that do own them use them strictly for purposes of transportation and carriage, never for field traction. A small number of individuals own teams of oxen; but these are never used to pull plows. Their use is confined rather to the pulling of kabwa, large wheeled wooden carts generally used to transport newly cut cane from the gardens to the location of the tracks where the cane will be loaded. Cows, pigs, and goats do play an important role in the domestic economy of most households. The distribution of these three animals in the community is seen in Table 6-1. Some two out of three households own
at least one of each kind. Most households that own a cow own only one. Most households that own pigs or goats own more than one.

But what is important is that animals are not used as a direct source of agricultural energy in the community. Nor are the three major animals generally used as a source of local human energy— they are rarely eaten. Except on special days in the year or on special domestic occasions, such as when a woman has delivered a child or a household is staging ancestral rites, animals are almost never slaughtered and eaten locally. They are raised almost exclusively for sale, either in Les Bayahondes or in a market closer to the capital.

The tool inventory of the community is thus virtually restricted to items manipulated directly by human beings. The four major tools—the hoe, the machete, the knife, and the axe—have iron or steel cutting edges, and thus have to be purchased. When they are purchased they are blunt. The cultivator himself generally sharpens the latter three tools. Hoes, however, are generally taken to specialists
(outside of the village) with the proper equipment, who heat and pound (bat) them into usable form. The machete and the knife are always purchased with their handle. Axes and hoes will frequently be purchased without the handle. Some individuals in the village earn a few gourdes by shaping and fitting long (generally from six to eight feet) handles onto the hoes of other cultivators.

The quantitative distribution of these four tools contrasts systematically and clearly illustrates the special role which the hoe plays in this particular culture. Each member of the adult male population was questioned as to the number of each kind of tool he owned. The figures are given in Table 6-2. To interpret the Table, read across: "Of the 226 cultivators, two of them own no hoes, one hundred and fifty four (68%) of them own one hoe, and seventy (31%) of them own more than one hoe, etc..." A very clear rank order of

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Tool</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>One</th>
<th>More than 1</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hoe</td>
<td>1% (2)</td>
<td>68% (154)</td>
<td>31% (70)</td>
<td>100% (226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machete</td>
<td>17% (38)</td>
<td>73% (164)</td>
<td>10% (24)</td>
<td>100% (226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knife</td>
<td>24% (55)</td>
<td>71% (160)</td>
<td>5% (11)</td>
<td>100% (226)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Axe</td>
<td>65% (148)</td>
<td>34% (76)</td>
<td>1% (2)</td>
<td>100% (226)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
importance emerges among the four tools. Only two cultivators own no hoe. A progressively larger number of cultivators own no machete, knife, and axe in that order. Likewise some three out of ten cultivators will own more than one hoe. A progressively smaller number of cultivators will own more than one of the other tools.

These patterns are created, not by the different costs of the four tools, but by the differential centrality of their roles in local agriculture. Most of the major tasks are performed by the long handled hoe. Its role is most clear in the cultivation of sweet potato. The hoe is used not only in the laborious turning over of the entire plot (rabouré tê) that precedes the planting, but also the subsequent raising of the "mounds" (fouyé bit) on which the sweet potato will be planted, and the pre-planting irrigation of the plot (rouzé jadê). The sweet potato cuttings (buwatat) are planted by hand. But the subsequent weeding of the garden (saklé tê) will also be done by hoe, as will the various irrigations before the harvest. But even the harvest itself is also done with hoe. The sweet potato is the most "traditional" of the crops. A larger percentage of this crop than of any other is set aside for home consumption. It is the one perhaps most frequently subject to garden magic (ralé jadê) in which crops will be surreptitiously siphoned off into a malefactor's garden. It is the crop which is perhaps most frequently given as a gift between households. It is the one crop of which, if a neighbor "happens by" when it is being harvested, the owner of the garden is expected to make at least a small gift. It is hardly a coincidence that this most traditional of crops is the one which, from beginning to end of the sequence, is handled almost exclusively with that most
traditional of local tools, the long handled hoe.

The other tools are, of course also essential to the agricultural cycle. The knife is used in harvesting rice. The type of machete used in Kinanbwa is the long and narrow variety, rather than the broader and shorter machete used in some other settings. The major use of this tool is in cutting sugarcane, but it is also used for a variety of other tasks, including the making of the holes in which beans and corn will be planted, and in certain types of weeding tasks too delicate to be done with the hoe. Though the four tools enumerated here are the major items in the local tool inventory, other items also occur. Of particular interest are short wooden dibbles used in transplanting rice. These are fashioned for the occasion and are subsequently discarded.

**NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTARY LABOR INPUTS**

What is clear from the above is that virtually all of the energy inputs into Kinanbwa soil flow directly from human organisms, unaided by animal or machine inputs of any kind, and based on a nutritional foundation that is short on protein and deficient in many ways to a degree perhaps unparalleled in the New World (cf. Beckles 1975). The nutritional question will not be explored here. But it is quite likely that this factor would be found to increase the general vulnerability of the local population to questions of labor need. When questioned as to why they sought supplementary labor on this or that occasion rather than performing the task themselves, the cultivators' frequent response was that they "lacked strength" (mâkê kouray). They generally did not mean this literally. This phrase in most instances is a figurative way of referring to time constraints. The
person with a large number of plots "lacks the strength" to work them himself. In other contexts the phrase means "lacking money." For example, a cultivator who uses exchange labor rather than wage labor for a given task will explain by saying that he lacks strength, in which case kouray must be glossed as "economic strength." But though the meaning is changed by context, it is perhaps not without significance that this phrase, whose primary meaning refers to physical weakness, should occur so frequently as an explanation in this particular culture, many of whose members do appear to be physically undernourished by most international standards.

Nonetheless one does not need the construct of malnutrition as an explanation for the pattern whereby virtually no garden will be worked from beginning to end by a lone cultivator. Stated more abstractly every single garden is produced with energy outputs stemming from several human organisms. The owner of the garden may in the long run supply the bulk of the inputs into this or that garden. But in all cases the energies of others will have been applied, their labor utilized.

Though it borders on the obvious, it perhaps should be pointed out that this absolute need for supplementary labor does not arise from the total of labor hours required in the cultivating and harvesting of an average sized holding. That is, the number of labor-hours that are required to crop an average holding during any agricultural cycle falls well within the capabilities of a lone cultivator to provide if he could space out his inputs evenly throughout the entire cycle. But of course he cannot. The need for additional labor on even modest sized holdings comes from the presence of peak labor periods,
days and weeks when certain tasks, which might take a lone cultivator weeks to complete by himself, must simply be completed in a much shorter period of time. Such peak labor periods are produced on the one hand by environmental and botanic factors, and on the other hand by the existence of a number of "man-made" organizational constraints.

Most discussions of peak labor periods in agrarian settings allude to the environmental and botanical bases of these patterns. Clearing and preparing the ground must be coordinated with rainfall patterns; planting must be done within a short period; and harvesting of certain crops must be carried out when the crop is at its maturational peak. These environmental and botanical constraints also operate in Kinanbwa, needless to say, and contribute heavily to the seasonality of labor outburst that occur there as elsewhere in the agrarian world.

However it is useful to point out that there are certain man-made factors as well which intensify the seasonality of agricultural activities, and accentuate for individual cultivators the imperative to carry out certain key tasks in a brief, collapsed period of time.

Much of the cultivation carried out in Kinanbwa is done within the framework of an intricate irrigation system. This governmentally controlled groundwater supply is distributed within the confines of a strict monthly schedule, by which every cultivator has a few hours of water for a given plot. Planting activities must be coordinated with the availability of this water. The presence of this man-made irrigation system and its man-made distribution schedule thus serves to accentuate and solidify the presence of "peak labor" periods when the average cultivator will be constrained to recruit, not only the labor of other members of his family, but also the help of neighbors.
But there is yet another such man-made constraint creating especially strong telescoped labor needs, this time with respect to harvesting. The botanical characteristics of some crops impose a tight harvest schedule; rice, for example, must be harvested within a very brief period, or part of the crop will be lost. But there are other cultivates, notably root crops, which have a much wider leeway. Though there is a peak of maturational development, the curve leading up to and declining from that peak is gentle. The cultivator has weeks, and even months, of decision leeway. Sugarcane, a major crop in Kinanbwa, is one of the cultivates enjoying this botanical flexibility. The physical quality of the cane would not be greatly affected were the cultivator to cut two weeks earlier, or two weeks later.

In this sense it would be theoretically possible for a lone cultivator to cut his canefield bit by bit, delivering it to the Company cart by cart. But this botanical flexibility, which might permit the gradual cutting of a large cane field over several weeks, is counteracted and effectively nullified by the organizational requirements of the sugar industry for whose market the Kinanbwa cane is produced. The Company must have cane in large quantities; it is interested therefore in purchasing and transporting quantities of produce which fill, or nearly fill, a pak (train wagon). Most cultivators do in fact plant enough cane to interest the Company—but they must deliver it all at once.

The Company assigns them a day (sèp) on which it will collect all of the cane of a given cultivator; the cultivator is thus constrained to cut his entire field on a schedule that will permit the delivery
of the cane on a given day. If sugar cane has a leeway when it is
still on the stalk, this leeway disappears once the cane is cut.
The cultivator who must deliver his cane on such-and-such a day
does not have the option of beginning his cutting by himself a month in
advance and letting the cane accumulate on the ground. It will have
spoiled by the time of the collection day. He is thus constrained
to recruit large quantities of labor on the two days preceding his
scheduled delivery. Thus we have a combined botanical/man-made
structure of constraints which create strong labor recruitment
imperatives even for cultivators with modest sized holdings.

In short built into the very fabric of Kinanbwa life is the
imperative of labor recruitment. One's own labor is not enough;
the labor of others simply must be marshalled as well. In a very
real and concrete sense, the resident of Kinanbwa must be not
only a cultivator of land, but a mobilizer of labor as well. If the
calculations of Kinanbwa informants are correct, an individual who
attempted to undertake cultivation on his own, without any help from
family members or neighbors, would have to restrict his activities to
a plot of ground that is non-viably small, or would have to engage
in superhuman outbursts of sustained labor that are unrealistically
large. Such a hypothetical individual does not exist in the community.
Cultivators call upon their family and neighbors, not only when they
wish to expand their cultivation activities, but even to maintain
their habitual level of operations. In mobilizing labor, however,
they do not in general invent any new maneuvers. They rather take ad-
vantage of a pre-existing structure of conventional labor mobilizing
arrangements utilized by the community at large.
There is a multifaceted structure of labor-mobilizing alternatives resorted to by the cultivators. This structure, however, is best captured within an actor-oriented framework emphasizing the availability to a labor-needy cultivator of alternative strategies by which he can acquire such labor. The "structure of labor alternatives" is then converted into a more dynamic maze of alternative economic paths open to a villager in this domain. Figure 9-1 is a schematic representation of all the statistically important labor acquisition paths that are in fact utilized in the contemporary community.

Though the matter is being conceptualized as a series of alternative paths, by no means are the paths mutually exclusive. On the contrary, it will be an extremely rare garden that is not cropped using several of the alternative devices. The use of certain paths almost never will exclude the use of certain others for that particular cropping cycle. In general there tends to be a combination of tactics for any given cropping cycle.

The major dividing line on Figure 6-1 is the one between domestic and extradomestic labor. It is perhaps departing somewhat from conventional practice to treat domestic labor as a type of "labor mobilizing strategy" on the part of a peasant. Many discussions of the matter treat domestic labor as somewhat automatic, a taken-for-granted by-product of a peasant family system. This view, though defensible, misses certain features of local reality in Kinanbwa. A cultivator must take positive steps if he is to secure the continued labor of his young adult sons. This domain is as "problematic" to him, as much a matter of strategy and maneuver, as is the acquiring of garden assistance from the neighbors. As will
FIGURE 6-1
Structure of Contemporary Labor Options

1. Use domestic labor → Use family members "môtè ti-moun-yo na jadè"
2. Enter symmetric relation → Join closed exchange group → Rotating labor squad "marè vajou"
3. Use non-domestic labor → Join open exchange group → Loosely structured group "prâ kékou"
4. Enter asymmetric relation → Pay wages → Per unit work "bay djob"
5. Collect rent → Per unit time "achté vajou" → Harvest-help "rélé moun pou rékot"
6. In money → In produce → Rent out land "fàmè tè"
7. Give land to sharecropper "bay moun dèmvalyè"
be seen in a later chapter, the conceptualization of domestic labor as a variant of peasant labor recruitment permits an analytically more powerful analysis of the entire question of labor, and of the entire dynamic of the evolution of land tenure in the community.

If the cultivator decides to resort to non-domestic labor, there are seven somewhat distinct alternatives available to him. Two of these involve the entering of symmetric relationships with other cultivators sharing the same labor needs as he does. The remaining five entail instead the establishing of asymmetric relationships in which the labor needy cultivator enters the higher of the two statuses as either wage payer or landlord.

With respect to this latter maneuver, the giving out of one's land for the collection of some sort of rent, certain patterns which emerged in Kinanbwa and which will be presented below have forced a departure from a convention conceptualization of the structural meaning of sharecropping. The agrarian landlord is a figure who has somebody else work his land and collects rent. Conventional analysis emphasized the rent collection. Here, in view of the centrality of labor needs to the present discussion, emphasis will be given to the labor needs which have motivated and sustained the emergence of such patterns. Both elements enter in. But patterns of intracommunity sharecropping turned out to play a totally unanticipated but structurally critical role in the economic organization of Kinanbwa. The dynamic underlying these intricate relationships, in which smallholding peasants themselves emerge as landlords, loses its enigma only when patterns of labor shortage are identified, as well as the more obvious patterns of land scarcity which such
sharecropping arrangements presuppose.

The diagram of labor alternatives presented in Figure 6-1 is "dynamic" in that it shows a structure of alternative behavioral paths. But it is not "diachronic." It is rather a synchronic summary of the contemporary situation. Had such a diagram been drawn a century ago, it would have looked somewhat different. Indeed a reader familiar with the literature on Haiti will be surprised to find that the famous kòbit, the colorful work parties complete with music, food, and klérè, does not even appear on the diagram. In the two years of fieldwork, no traditional kòbit was in fact given. The symmetric exchange-labor arrangement called locally præ kòkou (cf. Figure 6-1) is the closest contemporary analog of the traditional kòbit. But the music, drama, and ritual fanfare have all disappeared; and the number of workers present at any one moment is small. Thus the diagram is faithful to the contemporary situation in the research community, purposefully eliminating arrangements which, though occurring in other times and/or regions, did not occur in Kinanbwa. Each of the alternatives will be discussed in turn.

1. With respect to the Creole terms employed, the same labor arrangements will be found under different names in other parts of Haiti. It is also worth noting that the diagram adheres more closely to an etic taxonomy of behavioral arrangements than to an emic taxonomy of folk terms. But it must be emphasized that all of these arrangements are in fact utilized and distinguished from one another by the villagers. Even in the absence of specific, locally stereotyped lexical items, for example, there is clear local recognition of the differential status implications adhering to the use of "asymmetric" as opposed to "symmetric" options. The absence of a general term encompassing all symmetric arrangements and distinguishing them from a term which encompasses all asymmetric arrangements should not cloud the existence of this analytically relevant category in the de facto behavior of the community. Etic patterns manifest themselves, and must be captured, even in the absence of emic lexification.
DOMESTIC LABOR

The first major category of supplementary labor power utilized by a cultivator consists of the energies of his coresident dependents (moun ki sou kòt-li). All members of the household, wife as well as daughter, are described as being sou kòt ("on the account of") the husband father. Though such domestic labor will be distinguished from extradomestic sources of labor, it is useful to keep in mind that even this labor is "alien," not only in that it is provided by muscular systems other than that of the cultivating landowner himself, but also in that its mobilization and continuing availability is contingent on the application of certain incentives and sanctions by the cultivator. It is, in short, by no means automatic; and its dynamic is as much a problem for analysis as is the dynamic of extradomestic exchange or wage labor.

THE TRADITIONAL SYSTEM

It was suggested in earlier chapters that the economic organization of rural Haiti passed through two major periods in the nineteenth century, each characterized principally by a different state of resource-availability. In the earlier part of the century, land was "up for sale." The contingencies of wealth acquisition at that period involved maneuvering for land via purchase. But by the closing decades of the nineteenth century, most of the land had fallen under the control of owners of one sort or another, radically altering the life chances of the generations who were to follow. These cohorts were to depend on the resource route of inheritance. They had other sources of land acquisition, but on the whole they were to a much greater degree dependent on inheritance than their
parents or grandparents had been. The social-organizational and domestic consequences of this turn of events was to be profound.

In terms of this discussion a highly significant adjustment was to occur in the realm of labor mobilization. Though reliable data are lacking, the evidence seems to be that during this period cultivation of the land was carried out in the organizational context of centralized, multi-household lakous under the control of an adult male. This mét lakou, who in some instances is reported to have even used a military title (Moral 1961:169), was able to command the labor power of his sons for the collective cultivation of tracts of land that were multiples in size of the fractionalized holdings of today. The continuing availability of the labor of the sons even into their middle or late twenties was assured via the granting of pre-inheritance plots, which not only kept the son physically tied to the region of his birth, but kept him under the authority of the parent who had supplied him with the basic resource of land.

This phase of rural Haitian history might be called the Era of Domestic Power. The resource control exercised by adult males, and the absence of significant landlessness, brought to the fore an economic organization whose basic unit was the patrilocal extended family whose nuclear clusters of husband-wives-children remained residentially contiguous and organizationally united to other nuclear clusters in the same compound. Though this era was also the era of the famous kôbits, the "work parties" of tradition, its most salient hallmark was the supremacy of domestic labor as the basic principle of energy mobilization.

At present time domestic labor is merely one source among many used by the cultivators. There is no question but that it still plays
an important role, and that the cultivator who can mobilize domestic labor will be less dependent on extradomestic labor. This is illustrated dramatically in Table 6-3. There were over 125 cultivators in the community who had live children and who were queried as to whether in general they depended more heavily on domestic or extradomestic assistance in the cultivation of their fields. As the table indicates, there is a dramatic decrease in dependence on extradomestic labor as the number of children increases. There are 54 cultivators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Live Children</th>
<th>Domestic % (N)</th>
<th>Extradomest. % (N)</th>
<th>TOTAL % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1-3</td>
<td>10% (5)</td>
<td>90% (49)</td>
<td>100% (54)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-6</td>
<td>48% (19)</td>
<td>52% (21)</td>
<td>100% (40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7+</td>
<td>60% (21)</td>
<td>40% (14)</td>
<td>100% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35% (45)</td>
<td>65% (84)</td>
<td>100% (129)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 25.4^* \]

2 df

\[ p = .001 \]

*Yates correction applied

in this group who have three children or fewer. Nine out of ten of these rely more heavily on extradomestic labor. There were 35 cultivators in contrast who had seven children or more. With this number of children many will be of the proper age to give effective garden help. Only four out of ten of these "child rich" cultivators reported relying more heavily on extradomestic labor, a highly significant difference.
This table illustrates various points. On the one hand it shows that domestic labor is still an important source of agrarian energy for many cultivators. It furthermore suggests that the principal "spigot" of this labor is a cultivator's children, rather than his spouse. All of the 129 cultivators in this table were currently mated. But only those with a certain number of children began freeing themselves from heavy dependence on extradomestic labor.

But though these figures give us some insights into the place of domestic labor in Kinanbwa, in another sense they could be interpreted as evidence for the unexpectedly low importance of domestic labor. Fewer than four out of ten cultivators report that they utilize domestic labor more heavily than extradomestic labor. And it must be recalled that some 100 cultivators in the community had not been included in this tabulation, either because they are not currently mated, or if mated do not have live children. These cultivators would undoubtedly join the pool of the 84 who rely more heavily on extradomestic labor. This would lower the quotient of those using more domestic labor to a modest 20% of the cultivators of the community. Furthermore even among those who have seven or more live children, a substantial minority (four out of ten) still continue to depend more heavily on extradomestic labor. In short, though the table gives strong statistical indication that the likelihood of heavier use of domestic labor increases with the number of children, it also indicates that the overall quotient of cultivators utilizing this as the principal source of agrarian energy is very low, perhaps surprisingly low in view of the "typical" peasant's dependence on such labor.
FEMALE LABOR

To zero in on some of the more specific issues, it will be useful to analyze the more general rubric of domestic labor into two components: labor provided by wives and daughters, and labor provided by sons. With respect to female labor, attention will focus on the labor of wives and mothers. Young daughters worked on their fathers' gardens, but very little.

Ambiguities in the Literature

The literature in some cases creates the impression that female labor is very important in the agrarian economy of rural Haiti. Many accounts leave one with the impression that perhaps the bulk of agricultural labor in Haiti is (or at least was) carried out by women (Leyburn 1966:201-2; Simpson 1940:513), the men's role being principally that of clearing the ground. The women are then depicted as having major responsibility for the gardens once their husbands have done the heavy work of preparing the ground for planting. Many other accounts, while not giving to women an explicitly preponderant role in the fields, nonetheless do report that they regularly work in the fields (e.g. Comhaire-Sylvain 1961:215; Moral 1961:176; Bastien 1951:87-8; Underwood 1964:474). But though these observers have emphasized the direct energy inputs that women make in the gardens, there are other observers who make very little mention of women working in the fields, or who state outright that the bulk of agricultural labor is done by men, the women's contribution occurring more in the realm of domestic tasks and trade (Herskovits 1971:67-8; Mintz 1964:258; Courlander 1960:113).
The Kinanbwa Woman: Commercante, Cultivatrice, NoR

It is this latter viewpoint which corresponds most closely to the reality which was observed in Kinanbwa. When dealing with direct labor in the gardens, women were generally conspicuous by their absence. There are some tasks—such as the planting of beans, the harvesting of rice—in which women were seen to take part. But the days of significant female field labor in Kinanbwa have long been over. Informants indicate that in times past women used to provide much more direct labor in the fields (though never attaining the preponderant role which some sources attribute to them), but that the increase in female trading activities which has occurred over the past two decades in the research region has resulted in the virtually total withdrawal of females from significant physical involvement with the gardens of their husbands (cf. Murray and Alvarez 1975:121).

This linkage of trade with the phenomenon of relatively low participation in agricultural activities by Kinanbwa females needs much more exploration than can be given here. But a brief appeal for caution and logic can be made. In their desire to laud the energy of the Haitian female, who has frequently been praised as being a harder worker than her husband, some commentators have attributed to her the superwoman skill of carrying on two incompatible professions at the same time. Moral's catchy reference to the Haitian woman as "à la fois cultivatrice et commerçante" (1961:176) must be seen as flattering hyperbole. Moral's phrase notwithstanding a woman cannot—at least in Kinanbwa—be a cultivatrice and a commerçante at the same time. As practiced in Kinanbwa female trade is an activity
that is incompatible with the full time care of gardens.

This incompatibility stems on the one hand from competing time demands. It would be incorrect to assume that the Haitian female's trading activities necessarily center around the disposal of her husband's crop at harvest time. Were this the case then she could be a field worker who switches to full time trade after the gardens have been harvested. But the women of Kinanbwa follow a fundamentally different sort of profession. They are professionals who purchase virtually all of their stock. Their activities as traders are hence not limited to the weeks after harvest. They engage in trade during twelve months of the year, though in many months they will spend days or even weeks back in the village. The full-time pursuit of these trading activities is incompatible with full-time tending of gardens.

But the competition for time is perhaps a less serious obstacle than the physical impossibility of being in two places at once. For trade entails not only a full commitment of time, but also extended absenteeism. And a community whose economy relies on the activities of absentee females can simply not rely on their full time assistance in the gardens. Some basic data documenting this absenteeism can be presented. A household census made during fieldwork (cf. Chen and Murray 1976) showed that there were 196 community members (some 15% of the population) temporarily absent in Port-au-Prince at the time of the survey. Table 6-4 breaks down this group by sex. It is obvious that trading activities are producing impressive patterns of female absenteeism. The economic implications of this absenteeism become even stronger when it is pointed out that the 50 males who
are listed as absent are for the most part children. A much larger percentage of the female absentees, however, are adolescent or adults.

TABLE 6-4

Sex-Specific Patterns of Absenteeism

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sex of villagers who were absent in Port-au-Prince</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The same pattern had emerged at an earlier stage of fieldwork. In the third month after arrival in Kinanbwe, I did a household census enumerating, among other things, the age and sex of all individuals who had slept in the house (and who had hence been present in the community) on the night preceding the census. Table 6-5 breaks the population into economically relevant age groups, and shows the sex ratio within each age group. It can be seen that the overall sex ratio was imbalanced, inclining to a preponderance of males. But the imbalance becomes even more impressive as the population is broken down into economically relevant age groups. There is a marked 60-40 imbalance in the teenage group, as the girls of this cohort, virtually none of whom will have entered conjugal unions, spend lengthy periods of time in Port-au-Prince, returning to the community only for brief
TABLE 6-5

Age-Specific Patterns of Sex Imbalance

Household census made during first three months of fieldwork

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male % (N)</th>
<th>Female % (N)</th>
<th>TOTAL % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>9 or under</td>
<td>52% (120)</td>
<td>48% (111)</td>
<td>100% (231)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19</td>
<td>60% (99)</td>
<td>40% (67)</td>
<td>100% (166)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-49</td>
<td>54% (123)</td>
<td>46% (104)</td>
<td>100% (227)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>47% (45)</td>
<td>53% (50)</td>
<td>100% (95)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>54% (387)</td>
<td>46% (332)</td>
<td>100% (719)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

periods, especially at certain feasts. Mated females, especially those with young children, return to the community with great frequency. If asked why, reference is generally made to the manner in which young wives "miss their children" or "have to wash their husband's clothes." (In the absence of their women Kinanbwa males will tote their own water, cook their own food, and sweep their own house. But they were never observed washing their own clothes).

These stereotyped public rationales for periodic returns home discretely mask other reasons, notably the resumption of sexual activities which such visits permit. But work in the fields is emphatically not one of the tasks which the Kinanbwa woman undertakes when she returns for a visit to the community. The present discussion should not be taken to mean that women do no work in the fields. They do. But it is important to note that they do much less, not only in terms of energy, but in terms of simple time involvement, than their husbands and sons.
"Economic Polygyny": Academic Myth?

This downplaying of the direct agricultural inputs of females seems to run counter to a pattern which constitutes one of the most frequently cited themes in the literature on rural Haitian family organization: the phenomenon of "economic polygyny." Virtually all observers in rural Haiti have commented on the widespread patterns of plural mating which are (or were) to be found. But many of these observers have gone somewhat further, and have attempted to analyze the economic logic behind this pattern. Because the Haitian peasant has many small plots, some of them highly scattered, the argument runs, many cultivators have found it to their advantage to have several wives, who can undertake the cultivation of these fields. The woman's house will frequently be constructed in proximity to the garden or gardens for which she will be responsible. Variants of this "economic polygyny" occur with astounding and impressive frequency throughout the literature (Bastien 1951:142; Courlander 1960:112; Leyburn 1966:195; Mintz 1964:258; Moral 1961: 175-6; Organization of American States 1972:630; Schaedel 1962: 18; Simpson 1942: 656).

If the frequency of reference to a phenomenon is any indication of its importance, then female field labor must be seen as the backbone of the rural Haitian economy, and the phenomenon of economic polygyny could be analytically installed as the cornerstone of Haitian peasant domestic organization. But on close examination, the database supporting this apparently logical and clever stratagem by the Haitian male is disturbingly weak. Though the same could be said of many other aspects of rural Haitian life, at no point has an observer...
ever demonstrated that a majority of polygynous males from any sample entered their plural unions with this labor-mobilizing objective, or even that they are utilizing their wives in this fashion once the union has been established. 

But in calling into question the conventional explanation of Haitian polygyny, the bathwater should not be thrown out with the baby. There are three distinct elements in the traditional model:

1. Haitian polygyny has economic underpinnings.
2. A major economic consideration is shortage of field labor.
3. Cultivators enter polygynous unions to have more wives who will perform this field labor.

How applicable is this model to the polygyny that was found in Kinanbwa? It must be pointed out that polygyny was a statistically important pattern in Kinanbwa, much more important than general anthropological discussions on polygyny might lead one to suspect. It has become almost a cliche that a polygynous society is one in which men are permitted to have two or more wives, but that only a small minority of the men in such a society will be able to take advantage of the option. The following statement by an anthropologist is not untypical:

2. Because so few extended studies have been carried out in rural Haiti, there is an understandable tendency for authors to rely on previously published works when discussing rural Haitian economic and domestic life. One offshoot of this is the unwitting perpetuation of a number of stereotypes which manage eventually to become elements of "received truth" concerning local life. This process was observed in the historical section of this presentation, when some space was spent challenging the frequently repeated assumption that the entire slave population rose up in armed rebellion and abandoned their agriculture for more than a decade. In terms of contemporary life, the notion of "economic polygyny" may turn out to be more of a myth than an accurate characterization of rural domestic organization.
Even in polygynous societies most marriages must be monogamous, for there are not enough women to go around. Since the sex ratio tends to be about even, it would not be possible for every man to have two or three wives; so in polygynous societies, it is usually the wealthier or more powerful men of high status who can afford additional wives, while the common man must be satisfied with one (Barnouw 1975:135).

This appears to be a logical position. Unfortunately it rests on an anthropologically unfounded premise, and is in fact not empirically borne out in Kinanbwa. The sex-ratio premise implies that conjugal unions are generally permanent. This need not be so, and is in fact not so in Kinanbwa. It would be possible, using a model with systematic union fragility, to construct a society in which there is perfect balance between the sexes, in which every man is mated during most of his life, but in which every man could nonetheless be polygynous at some point in his life. There is a great deal of union fragility in Kinanbwa, and the actual patterns which occur move at least slightly in the direction of such a hypothetical model.

A type of "optical illusion" is created by the fact that so many unions--especially polygynous ones--are of relatively short duration in Kinanbwa. One effect of this is that a synchronic view of the incidence of polygyny at any given moment in a community will underestimate its general aggregate importance for the male life cycle. Of some 125 village males who were involved in ongoing conjugal unions during fieldwork, fewer than 15 were currently polygynous. But if we look at the 151 ever-mated males in the community and ask how many of them have ever been polygynous (even though they might not currently be), the matter takes on a different appearance. Table 6-6 indicates that fully a third of the males who have been involved in conjugal unions have tried out polygyny at least once.
TABLE 6-6

Frequency of Polygyny
Percentage of ever-mated cultivators who have simultaneously had more than one wife.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 6-7

Polygyny as a Function of Age
Has he ever been polygynous?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>AGE</th>
<th>Yes (% (N))</th>
<th>No (% (N))</th>
<th>TOTAL (% (N))</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>23% (6)</td>
<td>77% (26)</td>
<td>100% (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>30% (17)</td>
<td>70% (40)</td>
<td>100% (57)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>44% (27)</td>
<td>56% (35)</td>
<td>100% (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33% (50)</td>
<td>67% (101)</td>
<td>100% (151)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Application of Yates correction reduces significance to just beneath .05

\[ x^2 = 6.3^* \]
\[ 2 \text{ df} \]
\[ P = .05 \]
But even this table tends to underestimate the importance of this conjugal mode. For many of the men in this sub-population of "ever-mated" are in a sense merely beginning their conjugal careers and will certainly try out polygyny at some time in their lives. We will get a better idea of the importance of polygyny in the local life-cycle if we just look at the older men. Table 9-7 breaks down individuals in terms of their age. Examining the elderly we see that more than four out of ten individuals over 50 will have at one time or another been involved in a plural union. If we allow for a bit of underreporting, we can suspect that perhaps as many as half of the male population will "try out" polygyny at least once in their lives. In short the data from Kinanbwa strongly confirm the importance which the Haitian literature generally attributes to polygyny.

It is furthermore clear that polygyny had economic underpinnings, in the sense that individuals of lower economic status rarely enter polygynous unions, while individuals in higher statuses stand a very good chance of doing so. Local authorities such as the Matistrat Communal, the chef seksyô, the maréchal who assisted the chef, tended to have more than one wife. Successful houngans are also notorious (or, rather, admired) for the number of wives they can afford to have. It is clear that the achievement of certain local prestige-bearing statuses brings with it the expectation that a man may begin expanding his domestic relationships by establishing independent households (usually in different communities).

But polygyny is not the exclusive prerogative of these political and religious leaders. Most of the polygynous males in Kinanbwa have never been, and will never be, in such statuses. But the impression
emerges from living in the village that even the intracommunity economic differentials that exist play some role in determining whether or not an individual will become polygynous. Though there are many exceptions, those who are polygynous tend to be among the better off; the very poor rarely have two women. Some statistical support is given to this impression by Table 6-8.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has he ever been polygynous?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Has he purchased land?</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>41% (33)</td>
<td>59% (47)</td>
<td>100% (80)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24% (17)</td>
<td>76% (54)</td>
<td>100% (71)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>33% (50)</td>
<td>67% (101)</td>
<td>100% (151)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though factors of religion and age have not been controlled for, nonetheless there is a significant tendency for the polygynists to have purchased land. Two thirds of the polygynists, as opposed to fewer than half of the non-polygynists, will have bought land. The association is not overwhelming, but neither is the immediately visible impression of who becomes polygynous and who does not. There are many individuals not among the wealthiest in the community who nonetheless are or have been polygynous. By similar token, there are many rather well-off individuals who have never been polygynous and who give no indications that they intend to become so. There are

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economic correlates to polygyny which only further exploration will uncover. But by no means is it a simple matter of the rich grabbing all the available women while the poor either settle for one or do without. In terms of plural unions, there are quite a few economically average individuals who in local idiom appear to be "doing all right for themselves" (boulé byé).

When we come down to specifics, the traditional version of economic polygyny begins to fare even worse. There is simply no indication that those individuals who do enter plural unions take on the extra wives principally as a source of agricultural field labor for newly acquired gardens, as the conventional model states. If this were the case, then the more land an individual has bought, the more likely he should be to fall into the category of polygynist. But in examining the behavior of polygynists, no tendency was found for polygyny to be associated with number of gardens worked. And of greater importance, no significant association was found with amount of land purchased. Table 6-9 examines the 80 males in the community who are, or who once have been, in a conjugal union and who furthermore have purchased land. If the "economic polygyny" model applies—if land purchasers take on new wives to work the land—then a larger percentage of "heavy" land purchasers should be polygynists than is true of the "light" land purchasers. But Table 6-9 indicates that the tendency to polygyny is randomly scattered among both groups. A slightly higher percentage of the heavy purchasers are polygynists, but the edge which the have in this matter comes nowhere close to attaining statistical significance. The traditional model simply does not stand up under any sort of close scrutiny.
TABLE 6-9

Polygyny Unrelated to Light vs. Heavy Land Purchase

Has he ever been polygynous?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has he ever been polygynous?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How much land has he Carreau bought?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than carreau</td>
<td>37% (13)</td>
<td>63% (22)</td>
<td>100% (35)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carreau or more</td>
<td>44% (20)</td>
<td>56% (25)</td>
<td>100% (45)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>41% (33)</td>
<td>59% (47)</td>
<td>100% (80)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 0.43 \]
2 df
Not sign.

The economic polygyny model is contradicted not only by this landholding data, but also by attitudinal data purposefully collected around this issue. Though the matter was not a central focus of fieldwork, it was clearly important enough to merit at least some quantitative documentation. Hence two relevant items were inserted into the Agricultural Survey. It was felt that if plural wives were in fact an important source of field labor to a cultivator, then polygyny should generally be regarded as an economic asset to individuals well-off enough to enter such unions. Informal conversations with villagers, however, had led to the distinct impression that plural wives were an economic drain.

To verify this respondents were simply asked the general question whether they thought that on the whole two wives were an economic benefit to a husband—"boost him up"—or an economic liability—"drag him down"? (The respective Creole terms mostra and desan have unequivocal economic referents in local usage). The pattern of answers, shown in Table 9-10, is clearly detrimental to a simple labor-theory of Haitian polygyny, at least as it operates in Kinanbwa.
Non-polygynists as well as polygynists tended to view plural wives as a distinct economic liability. They do not increase a man's assets, they rather cut into them.

This response pattern merely validated what informal conversation with villagers had already appeared to indicate. But a more open-ended question was also asked, in which respondents were queried as to what advantages they perceived polygyny had, to cause so many men to take on more than one wife. The intention was to see how many of the cultivators would directly mention field labor as a reason for entering plural unions. But though a variety of reasons were given, not one of the more than two hundred respondents mentioned the wives' contributions to field labor as a motive for entering polygynous unions.

Though they permit no definitive conclusions (apart from the local irrelevance of female field labor as a motive for polygyny), the answers which the cultivators did give deserve at least passing comment (see Table 6-11). Some observers have stated that sex is not
the principal factor underlying Haitian peasant polygyny. The Haitian peasants who were asked, appeared to disagree. The most frequently given response, usually involving the word bâbochá ("to ball") or prâ plézi yo ("get their pleasure"), indicates that sexual

TABLE 6-11

"Why do some men have two wives?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reasons</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bâboch, plézi</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>They have the money</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To get more food</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Showing off (lway)</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While one's away, other tends you</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To make more children</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Take better care</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

motivations might be playing a larger role than proponents of female field labor might be aware of. Following close behind is the consideration of "getting more food." Though this might be construed as a poetic way of saying the women will grow food in the man's garden, in Kinanbwa it means in fact that the husband will have more than one house in which food will be cooked for him. The notion of social prestige comes out in the response of lway, and the oft-cited notion of the desire for children also is seen as a consideration. But these both occur much less frequently. The responses lumped under "misc."
included responses such as "One woman can be disrespectful (déréspéta)"; "he wants to sleep in a lot of houses;" and others.

Though such attitudinal survey data are useful in helping us to avoid wasting time pursuing a simplistic field-labor explanation of Haitian polygyny, they merely leave us where we started. We still have not credibly tied in polygyny to other aspects of local economic and social organization, an achievement that must remain a matter for future work. This discussion was entered here, not to resolve the polygyny issue, but to point out that, at least in Kinanbwa, women as a group do not make the substantial, direct field-labor inputs that they have been reported to make elsewhere. It is not an either-or situation. Many wives do some tasks in the fields (especially in planting and harvesting); a few wives do many tasks; but many wives do virtually no labor in their husband's garden. This particular source of domestic labor, then, though important to cultivators in many other cultures, is of relatively little use to the cultivator of Kinanbwa searching for assistants to help him in his fields.

THE LABOR OF SONS

Of somewhat greater importance to the cultivator are the inputs made by adolescent or young adult sons. Though even small children, both male and female, can be of some utility to a cultivator at different points in the cropping cycle, the agriculturally most useful members of his household are those sons who are old enough to mëyé rou (literally to "touch a hoe"). But there has been a profound change over the generations in this area. It is still true that sons do work on the gardens of their fathers. But it is equally true—and will to some degree be shown in figures—that their contribution is now
substantially less than it used to be. The change has affected the opportunity structure of both groups (fathers and sons). The father can count on his sons for a substantially smaller percentage of the inputs into his gardens than was true in past generations. Conversely, a substantially smaller part of the total agricultural activities of dependent males will go into their fathers' gardens, a substantially larger percentage will go elsewhere, than was true in the past.

The chapters on the evolution of land tenure will go into great detail on this question of filial labor. This sphere has in fact been the portal through which population growth has "entered" the system, forcing adaptive maneuver and consequent evolutionary change. The withdrawal of filial labor has not come as a result of emigration. Emigration has occurred to some degree, it is true. But most children still stay put. The withdrawal of filial labor has come about not as a product of the physical withdrawal of the sons themselves, but as a result of the diverting of their energies into other local channels. The specific dynamics of the change will be discussed later, as well as the "competing" channels into which so much filial labor is now siphoned off.

One result of these changes in the objective contributions which sons make to the gardens of their fathers is what appears to be a radical alteration in the entire local value scheme within which the utility of children is assessed. It is an anthropological commonplace that the nature of peasant economic organization, with its emphasis on the agricultural contributions made by adolescent or young adult male dependents, places a premium on having a large number of male
children. These latter tend to be preferred over female children.

To see whether this in fact held in Kinanbwa, I inserted into the Agricultural Survey an item which would elicit preferences in this sphere. Direct questions on these matters tend to elicit a stereotyped its-up-to-God response (cf. Murray 1972; Chen and Murray 1976). Rather than directly asking, then, whether the individual preferred male children or female children, I presented the contrasting case of two cultivators, "just like you," each of whom had four children. But one of the cultivators had four boys; the other had four girls. The respondent was asked which of the two he thought was better off (pi byeq). A small number said that both were equally well off, but the majority indicated a clear preference. The responses, perhaps somewhat surprising in cross-cultural perspective, are given in Table 6-12, and show a quite marked preference for female children.

Persons familiar with the economic organization of rural Haiti

---

TABLE 6-12

Preferences with Regard to Sex of Offspring

"Which cultivator is better off?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One c. 4 boys</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One c. 4 girls</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
might attribute this pattern to the important economic role which women play in the arena of internal trade. Such an interpretation, though fully consistent with local economic reality, would be none-theless off target. Before posing the above-mentioned anecdotal question, I had asked, in an open-ended manner, each cultivator's opinion as to the reasons why people in Kinanbwa "liked to have children, didn't like to remain childless." I had expected, of course, that a large number of respondents would mention the work children could do in the fields and at home. The focus of concern that actually emerged, however, was quite different. I have coded and collapsed the answers into various types, four of which are given in Table 6-13, along with the percentage of the 227 respondents who gave each type of reason. If a respondent gave more than one reason, his answer was coded twice, bringing the total number of responses above the number of respondents.

The data strongly suggest that the current utility of children in the ongoing domestic economy has come to play a secondary role in the eyes of the Kinanbwa parent. The vast majority of responses indicate

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6-13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Perceptions as to the Utility of Children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of cultivators who mentioned different advantages of children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% of 227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and domestic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unspecified &quot;useful&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Old age and sickness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burial</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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strong concerns on the part of parents with respect to sickness, old age and death. The surprising emphasis on burial must be seen in the light of the very strong ancestor cult which flourishes in the village, a cult whose economic function will be discussed in the final chapter of this presentation. The emphasis on old age and sickness is probably not unrelated to somewhat high patterns of morbidity which in fact prevail in rural Haiti. But the entire pattern of responses, with the de-emphasis of the specific agricultural utility of children, must be seen at a deep level as reflecting the objective decline in the importance of filial assistance on parental holdings.

But the question still remains as to why females should be preferred. Is it because they are seen as being more solicitous about parental well-being in old age than male children? These attitudes are in fact heard with some frequency, joking references being made to the irresponsible nature of males (gasô sé vakabô). But these stereotypes are themselves the product of a deeper etic pattern with profound social implications: the pattern of matrilocal residence patterns.

Both normatively and statistically, the "rule" is for newly mated couples to set up house next to the parents of the woman, and for the husband eventually to build their house there. There were 143 houses in the community which had been built by the husband residing there. To assess the degree of actual compliance with this cultural rule, I determined on whose compound the house was located. As Table 9-14 clearly shows, in almost eight out of ten cases the house will in fact be next door to that of the woman's parents, and consequently removed from that of the man's parents.
TABLE 6-14

Patterns of Postmarital Residence

On whose compound did the couple build the house?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Man's</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman's</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>110</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bought land</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is in this light that the initially puzzling preference by cultivators for female rather than male children begins to make objective sense. Since the importance of sons in field labor has declined, the utility of children as supports in old age and death has come to the fore. But since it is his daughters who will be living next door to him with their husbands and children, it is perfectly understandable that he should express preferences for female children. It is true that daughters are frequently absent in trade; but a parent living in the daughter's compound will benefit from the weekly shipments of food which she sends home for her husband and children, even though she may not be physically present in the compound. His sons on the other hand will either be living in some other part of the village or, just as frequently, in some other village, next to the parents of his wife. The "plates of food" (plat maje) that pass from house to house and on which elderly parents heavily depend, tend to be restricted to the same compound. Thus
the cultivator's sons will not only be of limited help in his fields; they will very likely be absent in his old age as well.

But my concern here is less with the cultivator's old age than with his strategies for mobilizing labor in the prime of life. These other concerns have been discussed as illustrations of a critical aspect of economic life in the contemporary village: the decline of the relative importance of domestic labor in the total agrarian economy of the community. The decline is subtle, visible only in examination of aggregate patterns. One can still see young boys working on their father's fields. But viewing this through the framework of time, their contribution is substantially less than was true in the days of old, creating a fundamental shift in the very criteria by which children's "value" is assessed. Children are no longer primarily valued as workers in the field; they are now seen rather as crutches in old age—rather unreliable crutches, in the case of male children.

This shift in perceptions and values is the emic offshoot of etic changes in patterns of agrarian labor mobilization. I have not discussed in detail precisely how and why domestic labor has declined. For the factors underlying this decline are the very factors which have brought about profound microevolutionary changes in the local institutions of land access. The entire last section of this presentation will be devoted to precisely that matter. At present it will suffice to point out that the importance of domestic labor has declined. If the cultivator needs assistance in his fields, he will have to look beyond his own front door. It is to these extradomestic sources of labor that discussion will now turn.
To expose the nature of what occurs when the cultivator looks beyond his front door for assistance, it will be useful to adopt a stance which views the cultivator as purchasing labor whenever he recruits another individual to work on his gardens, even his own sons. Within such a framework, alternative strategies will be viewed as differing in the currency with which the cultivator will purchase the needed labor. In a very basic sense cultivators need "alien energy," and in an equally basic sense, they must purchase it. In the traditional framework of rural Haiti, the "purchase" of filial labor had been made—and to some degree continues to be made—through the granting of pre-inheritance plots of land, which the son may then cultivate as though they were his own. The recipients of such grants are expected to maintain regular assistance to the father on his gardens as well. Though this arrangement is not generally described as a "purchase," the son can be viewed as trading part of his labor, and the father as trading part of his land.

If intrafamilial labor mobilization can be construed in an exchange framework, a fortiori the same is true for the utilization of extradomestic labor recruitment options, where the tit-for-tat nature of the arrangement is more openly visible than in the disguised and camouflaged exchanges occurring in the utilization of domestic labor. The selection of one option as opposed to another is largely governed by the particular currency in which the labor-recruiting cultivator wishes—or is able—to make his energy purchase.

There are wage labor arrangements where energy is purchased by the direct outlay of cash. There are other arrangements in which the cultivator pays his helpers with part of the harvest. And there are
others in which the cultivator purchases energy with his own energy. Exchange labor arrangements in Kinanbwa, though they frequently involve some provision of food by the landowner to the neighbors coming to help him, consist basically of direct energy exchanges, in which a day of labor is traded for a day of labor. Finally there are energy purchases in which the cultivator pays by temporarily ceding part of his land to the "laborer"—i.e. to a sharecropper or renter. The "land payments" made by the owner in such sharecropping and renting arrangements, however, differ from the land payments of the pre-inheritance system by which filial labor is mobilized. The latter grants involve permanent forfeiture of parental rights in the ceded plot. But in the case of sharecropping, for example, the relinquishing of land by the landowner is temporary, and he still receives half of the produce from the land.

In short, there are four major "currencies" with which peasants, including those of Kinanbwa, have been known to pay for the alien labor utilized in the cultivation of their fields. They may pay in cash; they may pay in land; they may pay in produce; or they may pay in energy. But whatever the form of payment, labor recruitment—including the recruitment of members of one's own household—is a form of transaction, in which the recipient acquires something only because he is willing to cede something else.

Each of these options has its advantage, and each has its disadvantages. Yet in the long run there has been a clear selective pressure leading to the eventual dominance of one of them over the others, though all are still used. Our examination of each one of them will be made with a view to exploring the reasons governing the selection of this or that option.
Exchange labor is a phenomenon whose presence has been documented in countless agrarian settings around the world. It is a very broad analytic category which lumps together arrangements which in their details may differ profoundly from one another. It is generally contrasted to wage labor, and in that sense is frequently treated as a "moneyless" labor recruiting option, as opposed to the obligatory cash outlays which conventional hiring of others entails. But this distinction is in a sense erroneous, in that it misses the defining feature of a true exchange labor relationship: the obligation which the recipient of labor has to reciprocate with labor of his own on the garden of the donor.

In this sense exchange labor may not be a "moneyless" labor alternative, available to a cultivator who totally lacks cash. For in Haiti, and in many other peasant settings, the recipient of exchange labor must, on the day that it is his turn to receive labor, provide his neighbors with food and drink (including on occasion alcoholic beverages). Many of these offerings must be purchased. There are furthermore exchange labor arrangements in Kinanbwa where a donor of labor may, when it is his turn, take the group and "sell" their labor to a third party and pocket the cash himself. Cash outlays do not therefore necessarily remove a work arrangement from the rubric of exchange labor. If groups are constituted whose participants are obliged to work on each others' gardens, we are dealing with exchange labor, whether or not money may happen to enter in. Using this broader definition two important varieties of exchange labor can be identified in Kinanbwa. One variant operates in a "closed" modality; the other in a highly open one.
KOLON VAJOU: ROTATING LABOR COLUMNS

In the "closed" variety, five or six cultivators, generally kinsmen or neighbors of roughly the same age and economic status, will form what is called a "pre-dawn column" (kolon vajaou). These labor columns will spend a specified number of hours (generally three or four) on the garden of each member of the column. They may form for simply one "round" (r3); but generally they survive for several rounds, and may even re-unite in the following cropping cycle.

The distinguishing characteristic of these columns is the strict and immediate rotation which is followed in the reciprocation of labor. The commonly used slogan describing these--"today for me, tomorrow for you"--is generally adhered to quite literally. They are a true group in that the same contingent of individuals who appear on one garden will be present the following day on another garden. They are closed, bounded groups in that there are clear notions of who has to show up, and outsiders do not generally attach themselves to the group once a given round has commenced.

It will frequently happen that a complete round will be uniformly dedicated to the same task--e.g. hoeing the ground in preparation for planting--on the gardens of all the members. But frequently members will use their turn to involve the group in some other task. In that sense the unit of exchange is the labor-hour. What members owe each other is not this or that specific task, but rather a certain number of hours of labor.

This arrangement is a fairly straightforward example of classic exchange labor. Yet in its actual operation it may turn into a
type of wage labor, as was indicated above. A member of the column has the option, when his turn comes, to use the labor of the others in the manner in which he sees fit. With great frequency he will contract the group out to another community member willing to pay wages. (At the time of research three hours of labor cost about a gourde and a half per head--i.e. about $0.30 in U.S. currency). The member who "owns" the column on that particular day brings the group to the garden in question on the assigned morning. On completion of the work, he pockets the entire arrangement, since the other column members are returning labor which he had given to them (or are anticipating labor which he will soon give).

Variants of this closed, quickly reciprocated labor exchange have been identified in many regions of Haiti, and have been described at different historical periods. Readers familiar with the literature of Haiti will recognize in this arrangement a "descendant" of the larger and more flamboyant work societies of 19th and early 20th century fame. The specific rules of the game may differ from region to region. And there is great variety in the terminology used to refer to the arrangement. In Kinanbwa the group itself, as was pointed out above, is referred to as a "column," though the term "squad" is also heard. To participate in such a group are usually said to be "tying down the pre-dawn" (mare vajou), though the verb makoné (to yoke, as with oxen) was also heard. The use of the term vajou itself is now somewhat metaphoric. Field labor in Kinanbwa rarely begins before dawn. The sun will be well above the horizon before the first hoes of the pre-dawn column dig into the soil.
There is another type of exchange labor, very common in the village, governed by a fundamentally different type of dynamic. Though this arrangement has come to be used for a variety of tasks, its most frequent use is in the cutting of sugarcane, and the rules and regulations informally governing the arrangement have come to shape themselves to the reality of the canefields. There are two important features of the sugar cycle which make the use of rotating labor columns somewhat inapplicable. On the one hand, the cutting of a canefield must be done in a brief period of time, as was indicated in the preceding chapter. There has to be coordination with the Company's schedule. But the cultivator cannot begin cutting until three days before delivery. Cane cut earlier and left to lie on the ground would partially spoil and become unacceptable to the company. These timing constraints in combination with the heavy labor involved in the task mean that there are exceptionally heavy supra-individual labor demands at harvest time. The four or five individuals who usually form a labor column will not be sufficient to cut the canefield in the time available. Furthermore the strict and immediate rotational modality—"today for me, tomorrow for you"—which governs the closed labor column makes it inapplicable to the cutting of cane. It will be very rare for the members of a column to have canefields with back-to-back assigned harvest dates. And the particular months in which sugarcane is cut are not months where other agricultural tasks are frequent enough to warrant the establishing of labor columns. In short this particular type of labor exchange is somewhat out of rhythm with the demands of sugarcane harvesting.
As a result of these conditions a special type of exchange labor event is convoked for the harvesting of sugarcane, similar in some ways to the traditional kōbit. It may occasionally be referred to locally as a kōbit; but this term is much less frequent in Kinanbwa than the term këkou ("helping hand," probably cognate with French concours). The këkou groups, however, differ from the columns, in that they are not closed groups with carefully specified membership. Invitations are issued to appear in a field on a certain day; it is never known who will appear, though a general idea is had. The owner of the garden prepares some food, though not the feasts of traditional kōbit fame. And a careful mental record is kept by all concerned--garden owner as well as assisting neighbors--of the number of days which each has put in on the gardens of others.

The cultivator who has called for neighborly këkou may not repay this labor until much later--perhaps more than a year in the future--when each individual who has appeared will himself have cane to cut. But though the entire event is phrased in the idiom of disinterested neighborly help, careful mental accounting is carried out. Anecdotes are told of court judgments made against cultivators who refused to help out on the canefields of neighbors who had earlier assisted them. The offenders have on occasion had to pay five gourdes (U.S. $1.00) to their neighbor who had helped them, in payment for the unreturned work day. Though such payments are rare, their anecdotal salience gives testimony to the strictness of the underlying rules of the game, and clearly shows that the këkou arrangement, despite its informal, open, and neighborly surface modality, is in fact founded on a somewhat more tightly built economic substructure of intracommunity labor-credits and labor-debits.
DISADVANTAGES OF EXCHANGE LABOR

Myth of the Jovial Field Gang

I have been stressing the economic imperatives which motivate the entering of various types of exchange labor relationships in Kinanbwa. But it is also clear that in some instances an element of simple preference enters in. It would be a naive caricature to assume that cultivators place their neighbors on their gardens only when the task is above their physical capacity to perform by themselves. With respect to Haiti, frequent references appear in the literature to the traditional communal labor tradition of the kôbit. Though there is a solid base of strict economic calculation underlying the organization of a kôbit by a cultivator (cf. Metraux 1971:320-22), the literature is nonetheless rich in its description of the ritual and recreational aspects of these gatherings (Herskovits 1971:70; Moral 1961:190-3; Courlander 1960:116-20; Leyburn 1966:199-200). The impression emerges from the literature, and from observation of communal work in Kinanbwa, that there are a number of momentary, quasi-autonomous social and personal rewards attached to working in a group rather than working totally alone.

But the indisputable presence of these socio-personal payoffs should not be allowed to cloud the issue. Whatever interpersonal and social dynamics accompany the execution of group labor, it is important to keep in mind the solid substructure of cogent economic logic which would assure the continuation of such group labor even were the social dynamics somehow to cease their operation.

Conversations with the cultivators seemed in fact to indicate that the social and recreational aspects of group work played a very
minor role in their calculations and decisions. To validate this impression, basic attitudinal data was collected by the insertion of relevant items into the Agricultural Survey. Cultivators were simply asked, in a purposefully general fashion: is it better to cultivate your garden completely alone, or is it better to bring in other people? The question's vagueness makes it amenable to different interpretations by respondents; but the answers given are nonetheless highly instructive. Table 6-15 shows the simple frequency of the answers. As was expected a heavy majority of cultivators chose the "help"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alone</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>With help</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

option. But about a quarter of the cultivators indicated their feeling that it would be better for them were they able to cultivate their gardens alone.

A follow-up question was then asked, in which the respondent briefly explained his choice. Of special relevance to the present discussion are the perceived advantages of group work over solitary work. In including this question, I expected that at least some cultivators would refer to the pleasures of jovial company and joking conversation, as opposed to the somber silence of solitary labor.
No cultivator, however, mentioned this as a factor. The two major types of response involved considerations of timing and time pressure, on the one hand, and on the other hand the potentiality which group labor gives of undertaking the cultivation of more land than would otherwise be the case (see Table 6-16). In short despite the presence of joking and conversation in exchange labor events, they are undertaken primarily as a matter of economic necessity, not of cultural preference.

**Costly in Energy**

Despite their convenience, however, exchange labor relationships have a number of serious disadvantages which prevent them from being the sole, or even the principal, extradomestic labor mobilizing strategy in the community. I have indicated that exchange labor is to

---

**TABLE 6-16**

**Perceived Advantages of Group Labor**

Reasons that cultivators gave for preferring group labor on gardens.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Time pressure: ou fè travail-la pi vit</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Increase amount of land you can work: édé koure</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>173</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Some degree a substitute for the dwindling stream of domestic labor. But it is a substitute that is extremely costly in energy. The cultivator who uses his sons in the traditional framework repays them with land, principally in the form of pre-inheritance land grants which permit them to have gardens of their own at the same time that they are helping their father on his gardens. But the cultivator who calls in his neighbors will eventually have to repay them with his own labor. Thus the use of exchange labor instead of filial labor entails an increase in a cultivator's annual energy investment.

The problem becomes more acute as the cultivator begins acquiring more land. As will be seen, the purchase of small plots of land tends to begin when cultivators are in their early or mid thirties. But the problem becomes most serious when the cultivators leave the forties and begin entering their fifties. A critical feature of the traditional system was the provision it made for the gradual withdrawal of cultivators from heavy field labor. Their sons began taking over more and more of their land. As we shall see, this is no longer the case to such a large degree. Cultivators retain control of their holdings now until old age. But exchange labor is a poor energy mobilization device for individuals in their fifties. The purchase of energy with energy is a feat that becomes ever less feasible as the years roll on.

**Sloppy Work**

But exchange labor has one other disadvantage that cultivators frequently complain about and that induces them, where possible, to use other strategies for the mobilization of extradomestic
labor. It will be recalled that, when questioned as to whether they prefer working with help or working alone, there were fifty three cultivators who expressed a preference for lone labor over group labor. It must be pointed out that those who answered in this fashion were describing their preferences, not their actual behavior. The interview protocols indicated that virtually all of them in fact utilized the labor of others on their gardens. Whereas the majority group discussed above had interpreted the question as asking "Do you find yourself obliged to recruit the labor of others?" and gave answers consistent with that interpretation, this minority interpreted the question to mean "Would you rather not have to recruit the labor of others, preferring to do the work all by yourself?" Their explanations of why they would prefer to do the work by themselves are also instructive. A variety of reasons was given for preferring lone labor. "The work is done better." "You don't have to spend money." "The presence of many people distracts from the work." "You don't have to return the labor." But by far the most frequent type of answer given concerned the poorer quality of the work that is done by exchange labor. Interpreting this in the light of the general discussion, we again see that the utilization of the labor of other community members is clearly a case, not of cultural preference, but of economic need. The quality of gardens on which exchange labor was employed is seen as being lower. This option is resorted to only because of the economic considerations which dominate Table 6-16.
INCIDENCE OF EXCHANGE LABOR

Thus, in spite of its disadvantages, exchange labor continues to be frequently utilized in the community, and there are few cultivators who do not resort to it. Every cultivator was queried as to whether in the preceding 12 months he had utilized an exchange labor arrangement, and if so what type. The answers are given in Table 6-17. In reading this table it should be kept in mind that many cultivators used both types.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 6-17</th>
<th>Incidence of Exchange Labor</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Did the cultivator resort to exchange labor in the preceding 12 months?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Closed kolôn</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Open kêkou</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As might have been expected, a substantially larger percentage of individuals engaged in the more loosely structured (and less demanding) kêkou groups. But the fact that about half of the cultivators also engaged in the more demanding rotating labor columns also attests to its importance in the contemporary economy of Kinantwa. But this static frequency distribution masks a very important specialization by age. If the population of cultivators is broken down into appropriate age groups, it becomes clear that the use of exchange labor is a phenomenon that is not randomly dispersed in the population.
TABLE 6-18

Exchange Labor as a Life-Cycle Phenomenon

Have you joined a column in the preceding 12 months?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes % (N)</th>
<th>No % (N)</th>
<th>TOTAL % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>72% (71)</td>
<td>28% (28)</td>
<td>100% (99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>34% (22)</td>
<td>66% (42)</td>
<td>100% (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>26% (16)</td>
<td>74% (46)</td>
<td>100% (62)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48% (109)</td>
<td>52% (116)</td>
<td>100% (225)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 39.3 \]
2 df
\[ p = .001 \]

but is rather linked to movement along the life cycle. Table 6-18 indicates the nature of this movement.

As with so many other economic phenomena in Kinanbwa, the mid-thirties emerges as an important watershed between different stages of the life cycle. Whereas some seven out of ten individuals under the age of thirty five will join rotating labor columns, only some three out of ten individuals above that age will do so. A similar but less marked decline also appears in the use of kékou, though a majority of cultivators in all age groups still resort to this arrangement for cutting sugarcane. But in general the use of heavy, demanding exchange labor in the context of rotating labor columns tends to be the resort of the young. As a person moves into his thirties and begins acquiring more plots of ground, his entire labor mobilization strategy undergoes a profound transformation. The disadvantages of exchange labor begin making themselves more sharply felt. And furthermore the cultivator will now have other currency, besides that of his own labor, with which to recruit the labor of other community members. Many of them begin resorting to another tactic which will now be discussed.
This discussion of the disadvantages of exchange labor leads somewhat naturally into the consideration of wage labor. This latter arrangement frequently emerges as the major alternative—and the major competitor—to patterns of exchange labor in peasant societies. And its increasing appearance is frequently taken to be symptomatic of the disappearance of a traditional way of life. The case of Kinanbwa provides an interesting caution against overly simplistic models of the transforming impact of the arrival of wage labor.

Wage labor does occur in this community. But I will present data which strongly suggest that wage labor has been integrated into the ongoing system and now stands in a type of quasi-complementary distribution to exchange labor in the life cycle of the ordinary cultivator.

Discussions of wage labor in a peasant community frequently entail discussions of emigration, as villagers will frequently have to leave the confines of their own community to find such cash earning opportunities. I have indicated that migration has occurred in Kinanbwa, but to a relatively modest degree. Most of the emigration that has occurred has been to the neighboring Dominican Republic. Each year some two dozen young men will leave the village to al koupé kân na pêyol ("go cut cane in Spanishland"). Virtually all of them are still dependents in the homes of their parents, and most of them will return to the village, though a handful will not. This "migrant" sector accounts for a relatively small percentage of the village population. I had a village assistant make a complete list of all the people "missing" from the houses in the village who were in the Dominican Republic. At the time the count was made, 53 individuals,
mostly males, were enumerated, some of them who had been absent for over ten years. These individuals accounted for only some 5% of the village population. Among the cultivators who were present in the village during fieldwork, 24 reported that they had been to the Dominican Republic. They amounted to about 10% of the adult male population.

Thus the migrants are clearly a minority group. The vast majority of adult males in the village had never directly earned money of any sort outside of the confines of Kinanbwa and Les Bayahondes. In discussing patterns of wage labor, then, I am principally concerned with the occurrence of paid field labor within the village, and with the relationship between the utilization of this labor and the utilization of exchange labor. The integration of wage labor into the modal life cycle of the Kinanbwa cultivator has been done not through emigration. Emigration still continues to be the tactic of a minority. Wage labor has rather made its way into the internal machinery of the village itself.

VARIETIES OF LOCAL WAGE LABOR

There are two types of wage labor commonly used in the village. These correspond in a rather precise manner to the conventional rubrics of task labor and day labor, and both occur with moderate frequency. A cultivator who hires a fellow villager to complete a certain task for a specified price is said to be "giving a job" (bay djob). When a job is given, the timing of the task is up to the employee. Individuals who sell their labor in this fashion generally worked alone, but other "doers of jobs" were observed to bring sons
with them to help out. The sons are, of course, not paid separately. If the worker wants to bring them, "it's his business" (zafa pel) and he will pay them out of his own wages if payment is necessary. The defining characteristic of the job is that the employee does it when and how he wishes.

The other type of wage labor—"day labor"—involves the selling of one's energies for a specified period of time. In Kinantwa a person doing this is said to be "selling his pre-dawn" (van vajou). This selling of a pre-dawn is distinct from the "tying" of a pre-dawn discussed above, as the local term used for joining a rotating exchange labor column. When one sells a pre-dawn, in contrast, as often as not he will be alone. The term pre-dawn will generally be used even if the work is done later in the day.

In the case of such day labor, the purchaser of the labor will generally be there to supervise the work. Since the workers are being paid by the hour, so to speak, cultivators consider it somewhat foolish not to be there to supervise. Even in the case of a fixed "job," the owner of the garden will more often than not be present. Supervision is quite open, criticisms of the work quite blunt. A major disadvantage of exchange labor, it was seen, was the poor quality of the work. The idiom of egalitarian neighborliness in which such exchange arrangements unfold precludes any expression of authoritarian control. No such delicacy applies to the djob or the purchased vajou. The quality of the work done under these arrangements is higher because purchasers of labor on the whole seem quite open in their directives and criticisms. This is a major advantage of wage labor from the point of view of the purchasers. It is simultaneously one of the more odious
aspects from the point of view of the seller of labor.

There is yet a third type of somewhat disguised wage labor that is used by the majority of the cultivators at one or more points in the agricultural year. The one phase of the cropping cycle for which labor is virtually never purchased with cash is the harvest. In the case of sugarcane, the harvest is usually done with the looser variety of kékou exchange labor described above. In the case of other crops, especially rice, where there are stringent botanical pressures to harvest the entire field in a brief period of time, cultivators will "call in people to help on the harvest" (félé moun pou édè nā rékêt). The people who usually come are older men and women, as the harvesting of most crops in Kinanbwa is done in a non-strenuous fashion. Rice, for example, is slowly and carefully harvested plant by plant with a small knife clasped between the index finger and the thumb. Sickles or machetes are never used; cultivators say too much rice is lost in that manner. Those individuals who show up to "help" get a portion of the harvest "as a gift." Though it is disguised in this manner, this arrangement is in effect a type of wage labor. It is furthermore very common in Kinanbwa; a heavy majority of the cultivators reported using it at least once in the year preceding the survey.

THE INCIDENCE OF WAGE LABOR

Limiting discussion to the varieties of wage labor that entail the payment of cash, the vâjou (day labor) is preferred over the djob (task labor). This is less out of a preference for day labor as such than out of adherence to a custom that has been briefly mentioned. Young people who have "tied in" to a rotating labor column, when it is their
turn to receive the group's labor, will frequently contract the group out. This brings cash advantages to the person selling the vâjou and labor advantages to the person purchasing it. It is these advantages which the group arrangement brings which push the frequency of the vâjou slightly above that of the djob. The frequency with which community members purchased both forms of wage labor is given in Table 6-19.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 6-19</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidence of Wage Labor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of cultivators hiring wage labor during the research year</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vâjou</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Djob</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one sense there is no specialization between the two variants of wage labor. Most of those who have given a djob have also purchased a vâjou; most of those who have not done the one have not done the other. But in another sense there is somewhat strong specialization. It is very rare for the same individual to purchase labor and to sell it as well. The selling of labor, especially the djob or the "solitary" vâjou (as opposed to the group one), is done only by persons who are near the bottom of the wealth scale in the village. And those who do it are in a minority. Thus, for example, only 38 of the 226
cultivators queried (17%) reported that they had "done a job" during the year preceding the query. We are confronted, then, with a somewhat paradoxical situation. In most situations where wage labor occurs, the purchasers of labor tend to be a privileged few, and the sellers a resourceless many. In Kinanbwa, on the contrary, more than half of the cultivators are purchasers of labor in one form or another; but they purchase it from a much smaller pool of less well off sellers.

As might be expected the more gardens an individual works, the more likely is he to be a purchaser of labor. In this sense the static breakdowns of the simple frequency distributions given above are somewhat deceptive. Table 6-20 breaks down the cultivators according to the number of gardens they are working. This breakdown reveals a dramatic increase in the use of purchased labor as the number of gardens one is working increases.

But there is an equally impressive internal breakdown of the data which indicates that these differentials tend to be associated

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of Gardens Worked</th>
<th>Has he paid for a job?</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 or less</td>
<td>33% (17)</td>
<td>67% (34)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-5</td>
<td>38% (29)</td>
<td>62% (48)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6-7</td>
<td>52% (33)</td>
<td>48% (30)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8+</td>
<td>74% (26)</td>
<td>26% (9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46% (105)</td>
<td>54% (121)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ x^2 = 17.7 \]

3 df

\[ P = .001 \]
with the local life cycle rather than with local class stratification of any sort. The matter of internal economic stratification will be discussed in greater detail in later chapters. There were 107 cultivators who reported relying more heavily on extradomestic than on domestic labor. I asked these cultivators whether on the whole they relied more on wage labor or on exchange labor as a source of assistance in their fields (ak kiës ou boulé pi fo na jalg-ou).

Some four out of ten of them reported using wage labor more heavily. But Table 6-21 exposes internal patterning in these responses by breaking the respondents down into three age cohorts. What emerges is a smooth and consistent progression up the age hierarchy. Whereas

| TABLE 6-21 |
| Use of Wage Labor as a Function of Age |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>On which type of labor does he depend more heavily?</th>
<th>Wage Labor</th>
<th>Exchange Labor</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>16% (6)</td>
<td>84% (31)</td>
<td>100% (37)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-49</td>
<td>37% (15)</td>
<td>63% (26)</td>
<td>100% (41)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>69% (20)</td>
<td>31% (9)</td>
<td>100% (29)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>38% (41)</td>
<td>62% (66)</td>
<td>100% (107)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 17.0^* \]
\[ 2df \]
\[ p = .001 \]

*Yates correction applied

fewer than two out of ten individuals under the age of 35 rely more heavily on wage labor, some seven out of ten of the oldest group does so. In fact about half of the heavy users of wage labor are from this elderly cohort, though they account for a much smaller percentage
of the group queried on this matter.

This Table then shows the other side of a coin which was partially revealed in an earlier table. I had already presented data showing that the use of rotating exchange labor systematically declined as one moved up the age scale—a somewhat paradoxical situation in view of the fact that people begin acquiring more plots of land as they grow older and would presumably need more supplementary labor, not less. But the data in Table 6-21 give some indication of why such a decline is possible. If the cultivators become less and less traders of labor as they enter their twilight years, it is because they have become more and more purchasers thereof.

**DISADVANTAGES OF WAGE LABOR**

But the figures presented above must be interpreted with logical rigor and caution. The figures merely indicate what percentage of the population has resorted at least once to the purchase of labor during the research year, and show that most older persons will have resorted at least once to wage labor. They by no means indicate that older people cultivate most of their land with wage labor. This would be going far beyond what the data can indicate, and would be in fact incorrect. Though the older members of the community hire labor for certain tasks, most of the energy going into their plots does not come from wage labor.

There are in fact three major drawbacks to wage labor which prevent it from being truly the major mobilizer of human energy in the community. If the entire energy expenditure for an agricultural
year could be measured, I doubt that wage labor would account for 20% of it, though an exact analysis of case study data has not yet been carried out. In the first place money is simply a somewhat scarce item in the community, much scarcer in absolute terms than in virtually any other New World setting.

But though the general poverty of the community enters in, this argument does not cut much ice, since the going wages are themselves extremely low (about 30 cents in U.S. currency for a half-morning of work, as indicated earlier). Of equal and perhaps greater importance is the fact that traditions of cash investment in the community follow fundamentally different routes. Entrepreneurial behavior may take many forms; the individual entrepreneur in general will follow the models in his social environment. For very concrete historical reasons, the investment model which the Haitian peasant follows orients him toward saving his money for the eventual purchase of land. Most cultivators will make "waystage" investments in the form of livestock purchases. And many husbands give at least some trading capital to their wives. But direct investment of cash in the productive process itself is still done somewhat hesitantly. In view of the data I have earlier presented on frequency of crop destruction, such hesitation appears to harbor a great deal of economic rationality.

But this hesitation comes from the quarter of the potential purchasers of labor. Equally serious are the resistances met from the other quarter, that of the sellers of labor. On the one hand wages are low. But there is another pattern which can be only briefly touched upon here, but which appears to play an important role in the
economic organization of the community. This pattern is a deep-seated reluctance on the part of villagers to be seen doing field labor in the pay of other members of their community.

The genesis of this reluctance to do wage labor needs more exploration. It has been historically encountered in other parts of the Caribbean as well, and appears to be associated with slavery. If this analysis is correct, then the plantation system is exercising an impact long after its death. The social division between landowner and slave has a somewhat modified vestige, in the form of the distinction between employer and agricultural employee. Many rural Haitians continue to reject the latter status with a vehemence that in at least some cases must certainly rival the antipathy that the freed slaves felt to any situation which smacked of their former condition.

At any rate the villager who decides to accept the offer to "do a job" for someone else in the community has made a decision to swallow his pride and to publicly admit in effect that he is hard up (afè-1 pa bò). An increasingly frequent practice is for young men in need of such employment to absent themselves from the village. I have already alluded to the young men who leave the village each year to cut cane in the Dominican Republic. Others go to other nearby communities; at least there their humiliation will not be as visible to the members of their own community.

These patterns of reluctance are very strong. But they must be correctly characterized. They in no way evince a lack of interest in money, as was so erroneously thought by 19th century observers of the Haitian peasant. Nor do they entail per-se an unwillingness
to work for wages. The few public service jobs that are available are avidly sought after. They do not even entail a total unwillingness to do field labor for money. It is seen as normal and non-demeaning for a young man to adventurously depart for the Dominican Republic to cut cane (though many parents will try to prevent their offspring from making this leap, and leaving them in the lurch with respect to labor on their own fields).

What the pattern of reluctance to do local wage labor entails is rather a specific reluctance to perform field labor in the pay of another member of one's community. The combination of this clear reluctance with the equally clear hesitation of cultivators to spend a great deal of money in the productive process itself has operated to confine the operation of wage labor and to prevent it from being the major mobilizer of energy in the community.

To sum up: I have discussed in some detail the three major sources of labor mobilization that generally provide the bulk of agrarian energy inputs in a peasant community: domestic labor, exchange labor, and wage labor. I have shown that the role of domestic labor in Kinanbwa has declined seriously over the decades, and that villagers rely systematically on a number of extradomestic maneuvers that fall more or less into the categories of exchange and wage labor. A brief description has been given of the different varieties of exchange and wage labor that occur in Kinanbwa, and some quantitative data have been presented on their actual incidence in the village. In terms of the percentage of cultivators utilizing it, exchange labor is still much more important than wage labor and appears to account
for a much more substantial proportion of the total energy input into Kinanbwa soil than does wage labor.

Nonetheless the quantitative data have exposed a latent complementarity between these two varieties of extradomestic labor mobilization. Though this was not part of informants' emic explanations of how their system worked, I have shown that there are statistical patterns of life-cycle variation in adherence to one or the other of the labor-mobilizing strategies. Heavy involvement with exchange labor is more the strategy of the young. As men leave their thirties, and enter into their forties and fifties, there is a statistically strong tendency for them in fact to pull out of heavy exchange labor commitments. They are able to do this partially because they increase their utilization of wage labor, indicating that these two energy mobilizing strategies are in effect in a type of "complementary distribution" along the axis of age. This presents the cross-culturally interesting situation where the phenomenon of wage labor has entered an agrarian system without being associated with the existence of local economic stratification. Wage labor has rather been incorporated into the local system as part and parcel of a life-cycle scheme of resource control. This concept will be pursued in a later chapter.

But by no means does wage labor become the major source of extradomestic energy for the cultivators of Kinanbwa as they move along in their economic careers. It is true that they gradually withdraw from heavy commitment to symmetric labor trading arrangements (except for the harvesting of sugarcane). And it is true that their strategy becomes one of becoming involved in asymmetric arrangements. But the payment of wages is only one form of asymmetric
labor recruiting tactic (cf. Figure 6-1). And because wage labor has certain disadvantages, some of which have been discussed, the Kinanbwa cultivator has come to depend more heavily on the other major variant of labor mobilization, that of the *collection of rent*. The major form which this strategy takes in Kinanbwa is a variety of *intracommunity sharecropping*.

But a discussion of the phenomenon of sharecropping presupposes a discussion of the institutions of land tenure in rural Haiti. It is to this task that the next chapter will be dedicated.
CHAPTER SEVEN

LAND TENURE AND INHERITANCE

As discussion turns to the realm of Haitian peasant land tenure, it is essential to have a clear overview of the nature of the population that is being discussed. In the context of agrarian societies of the Western Hemisphere, Haiti bears the distinction of an exceptionally low rate of landlessness and a low incidence of large, absentee-owned land concentrations. The concentrations that do exist are small in comparison with the latifundios of Latin America and account for a low percentage of Haiti's land.\(^1\) The peasant of Haiti is then a proprietor to a much higher degree than his counterparts in many other societies.

But though he is a proprietor, it must also be kept in mind that he is a "peasant" in an anthropologically strict understanding of the term. Because he is a peasant, by virtue of his membership in a society controlled from an urban center, much of his behavior has come to fall under the sway of formally codified laws of one sort or another. At the same time, however, his physical removal from this urban control center also leaves him room for maneuver in those interstitial realms of behavior which are either not covered by law or are not amenable to—or important enough to the authorities for—strict enforcement.

\(^1\) Cf. Comhaire-Sylvain (1952:182) and Mintz (1966:xxvi) for similar assessments. A contradictory opinion is expressed by Casimir (1965) who claims that the prevalence of concentrated holdings is one of Haiti's major problems. This unconvincing assertion, which forces analysis of Haiti into a conceptual frame more appropriate to Latin American societies, was based not on firsthand observation of Haitian life but on long distance interpretation of certain census figures whose accuracy Casimir himself questions, and goes against the findings of analysts who have actually travelled, lived, and/or worked in rural Haiti.
It is this actor oriented theme of strategic maneuver within a structure of preexisting institutional constraints which will give shape to the content of this chapter. The opening section will contain a discussion of the legal framework within whose confines the drama of local land maneuver unfolds. The second part will describe a series of folk strategies by which the population systematically circumvents the mandates of the institutional structure.

**THE INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK**

I will show that the dynamics of the land tenure system of Kinanbwa are heavily informed by local patterns of economic maneuver that imbue the system with an air of innovativeness and adaptive inventiveness. But such maneuvering occurs within the confining framework of an institutional structure which sets a number of basic ground rules in the area of land control. Though the cultivators succeed in dodging around, slipping through, and squeezing by various components of this structure of constraints, the formal structure itself must nonetheless be taken into account in any analysis of peasant behavior.

The nature of the formal regulations governing land stem directly from certain historical experiences discussed in an earlier chapter. Correctly perceiving the status of land as the most valuable wealth-generating resource in Haiti, early leaders were quick to design legislation regulating the access of the population to this land. As in so many other institutional spheres, in the realm of land laws the early Haitian leaders looked directly to French institutions for models on which to base their own procedures. The result was a series of land laws, systematized in the Code Rural of 1826 and subsequently
modified in later Codes, which on the whole and in most of their
details were, with few exceptions, remarkably similar to the laws
governing the peasants of France (cf. Renaud 1934: Chapter III;

PROPERTY IS PRIVATE

There are at least five major principles which emerge from these
European-derived land laws and which continue to exert an incalculable influence on much of the behavior of the Haitian peasant
toward his land. Perhaps the most important of these concerns the
legally individualized nature of ownership of land. This widespread
Western land-control principle is a major premise of the contem-
porary agrarian economy of rural Haiti. Land is divided into dis-
crete plots with clear boundaries and is controlled, worked, and
disposed of by individuals. This individualism which manifests itself
in local behavior toward land is accompanied by strongly articulated
attitudes emphasizing the desirability of "land ownership."

Though couples, rather than individuals, are sometimes described as
"owning" land (e.g. Comhaire-Sylvain 1952; Bastien 1951), this phe-
nomenon of joint ownership is probably less prevalent than in
many other peasant societies, for reasons discussed above. It is
the individual, and not the household group, who becomes the locus
of ownership.

It is important to emphasize the private nature of property for
at least two reasons. In the first place not infrequent reference is
made in the literature to a number of somewhat colorful exchange
labor institutions in rural Haiti, which create a general air of
neighborliness and community orientation. These institutions have led at least some observers to posit a "community centered" or "non-capitalistic" economic orientation among Haitian peasants. The non-capitalistic nature of much of the rural economy in Haiti will be documented below—but not in terms of any supposed "community orientation" with respect to property. Any communal orientation overtly restricts itself for the most part to the sharing and exchanging of labor. Rarely does it involve the pooling of money, and even less rarely—if ever—the communal pooling of land, or the collective disposal of crops. Though energy may be pooled and shared, property is generally not.

A second point of possible confusion resides in the frequent (and in certain senses accurate) references made in the literature to land that is "collectively" or "jointly" owned by sibling groups. Simpson, for example, says that about one fourth of the peasants with whom he had contact lived on "undivided family land," rather than "individually owned pieces of land" (1940:504-05). This is technically correct, but has led to potentially misleading formulations such as Holly's reference to land "held in partnership by a number of co-heirs" (1955:45). It is true that, for reasons to be described below, most sibling groups will not effect a legal division of their parents' property on the death of the latter, and that such land is thus technically "co-owned." But if such property is good cropping ground, a de-facto (though extra-legal) division will in fact be made. It will not be collectively worked. The only passage in the literature which has been found to suggest the existence of a
collective cropping of the land is a reference by Herskovits to a practice reported by older informants whereby siblings would collectively work land that had been set aside for the earning of money for family ancestor rituals (1971:133). But Herskovits himself indicates that other informants denied this; and the impression is that this custom, if it did in fact ever exist, was more honored in the breach than in the practice. At any rate, two years of fieldwork in the Cul-de-Sac Plain have failed to uncover any cases of such ritually motivated collective working of land—though the Cul-de-Sac was one of the specific regions where, according to Herskovits, such practices were said to flourish concerning the disposal of land.

In short the ethnographic evidence points to a high degree of individualization of land control, in a fashion that is highly consistent with the European-derived formal laws concerning private property. Though the extra-legal nature of the informal land division commonly effected leads to references to "joint ownership," it is important to distinguish between terminology and behavior. The idiom of collective ownership contrasts with actual practices of individualized cropping and marketing. Rarely, if ever, will there be sibling partnerships in production. We are dealing with a cropping system that is founded on private property.

**Ownership of Land Rests Ultimately on the Authority of the State.**

There is a second general principle derived from the Western corpus of law which has as its immediate result a recognition on the part of all participants in the system that the only legitimate guarantee of exclusive, unquestioned access to a given plot of land rests in the
possession of a legal title to the land (cf. Underwood 1964:470). In the context of modern Western societies, such a pattern is not surprising and might be left unstated as an obvious given. But there are at least two phenomena common in rural Haiti which could partially conceal the importance which this principle also has there.

In the first place there are occasional references in the literature, both historical and ethnographic, to the phenomenon of squatting. Though land purchase was probably the major land acquisition strategy of early 19th century Haitians, I earlier indicated that squatting occurred, especially in the mountainous areas more removed from Port-au-Prince and provincial towns. In modern times Simpson reported the existence of a local "twenty year law" by which a person who has occupied a piece of ground for that length of time can no longer be evicted by the owner (1940:505). And Comhaire-Sylvain reports a similar thirty-year limitation in the South (Comhaire-Sylvain 1952).

On the one hand such contemporary references attest to the existence of squatting as a phenomenon to be dealt with (though it was not a local phenomenon in Kinanbwa, and it apparently accounted for a very small percentage of the occupied land even in the regions where it has been reported). But on the other hand, the very emergence of legal or folk "statutes of limitations" beyond which eviction can no longer take place, and the enthusiastic acceptance of such statutes by the folk, attests to an awareness that eviction is a predictable consequence of not having the proper piece of paper. Haitian society, and the Haitian peasant, have from the outset adopted the Western penchant for validation of ownership through paper. And the Haitian peasant has become fully Western in his interest in acquiring and protecting documents assuring
him of unquestioned access to his land.

If references to squatting create the impression of extralegality and an anarchic orientation to land, the problem of deedlessness does so even more. The literature is replete with evidence documenting the widespread lack of legalized land deeds in Haiti. How then can one speak of an emphasis on legal titles in a society where so few cultivators are known to possess them? Though the assertion may seem contradictory, the evidence from Kinanbwa is convincing. It is true that few titles were possessed by individual cultivators. Nonetheless there was frequent reference to the phenomenon of the grâ-pyès, the "big deed" containing title to the legally undivided land. Though individual cultivators might not be able (or willing) to show an inquirer a legal title to the plots of land he was cropping and claiming as his own, reference would inevitably be made to the larger deed for the entire family estate kept by such-and-such an elder sibling, cousin, uncle, grandfather, or the like. Such titles did in fact exist in a large number of cases. But even those cases where reference to the grâ-pyès might prove fictional, the very utilization of this fiction implies acceptance (albeit reluctant) of the need for a certain piece of paper to guarantee oneself of unquestioned access to a plot.

Thus in this second area—in his reliance on, or reference to, a State-validated document—the Haitian peasant is operating in the framework of a Western land-control system with clear antecedents in the institutions of the erstwhile European colonists. Though his genealogy might give him immediate informal claim locally to this or that plot of land on the death of a parent, the ultimate security
of his tenure is felt to reside on the existence of a piece of paper validated by the State.

**LAND IS ALIENABLE.**

The principle of the individual's right to alienate land is a third cornerstone of the land-control system which operates in rural Haiti. The alienability of land will, in fact, be found to constitute the mainspring of the microevolutionary resource-circulating innovation which has arisen on Haitian soil. But once again, though the ethnographic literature is replete with information attesting to the ubiquity and centrality to rural life of land purchases, there are other references which, if taken out of context, could obscure this pattern. Herskovits, for example, was told by old men of ancient customs whereby certain plots of land purchased by founding ancestors could never be divided or sold.\(^2\) And the patterns whereby ancestral spirits are seen as dwelling in the family land is occasionally referred to in the literature in the context of land tenure discussions, creating the impression of custom-based or ritually generated reluctances to sell land. Such an impression would be quite in line with the pattern which has been documented in nearby Jamaica, whereby "family land" is considered a separate and non-alienable category of cropping land (E. Clarke 1971).

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2. Herskovits 1971: 133. Paradoxically Herskovits was told that the Cul-de-Sac Plain, the region in which Kinanbwa is located, was one of the areas where such a prohibition was said to operate. He says the custom there was to "alienate" land for ritual purposes, but his discussion indicates that "alienate" was being used in the sense of "holding apart and not selling" rather than its more conventional meaning of "selling."
But for Haiti the bulk of the evidence points in precisely the opposite direction. Ethnographic studies of rural Haitian land tenure emphasize the frequency of land purchases and land sales. And the research in Kinanbwa has documented the existence of a land transacting pattern that in some aspects is little short of feverish. It may be true that spirits dwell in the ground, making certain areas somewhat sacred. But the spirits in Kinanbwa generally dwelt in special plots of ground in or near the residential lakou, in which they have been ritually installed and "trapped" (bôné). The same process which has specialized communal land-ownership to residential plots has also confined spirit residence in the ground to specially designated and ritually consecrated sites near the lakou. No references were heard in Kinanbwa to family spirits dwelling in cropping ground, nor are family rituals generally performed there. And certainly no ritual prohibitions exist against the selling of cropping land one has inherited from one's ancestors. On the contrary, it is precisely the opposite danger which threatens the devotees of Kinanbwa. Individuals and sibling groups fear chastisement from their ancestors if they fail to sell part of their land on certain occasions. Thus land alienation is not only statistically prevalent; it is ritually mandated as well.

INHERITANCE IS BILATERAL.

Yet a fourth cornerstone of the land control system of rural Haiti takes the form of a pattern whereby an individual will inherit from both maternal and paternal sources. On the one hand the kinship system of rural Haiti may have the patronymic bias common to most Western societies, in which children are given the name of their father.
the other hand the prevalence of matrilocal post-marital residence patterns in Kinanbwa (and other communities of the Plain) may create there a matrilateral bias in terms of actual clusters of coresiding kin. But the kinship system itself is strongly bilateral. No traces of any tendency to unilineal affiliation are evident, and familial ritual events involve the gathering of groups of kindred.

The inheritance patterns associated with such a kinship system are, as might be expected, also strongly bilateral. An individual can expect a piece of any property owned by either father or mother. We have seen that the alienability of land receives ritual justification. The same is true of the bilaterality of inheritance. For one aspect of the folk theology posits the inheritance by all individuals of family spirits from both their father and their mother (lwa bô papa, lwa bô mâmâ), and healing rituals are frequently preceded by divination sessions in which a major task of the curer is to determine from which line--paternal or maternal--the afflicting spirit proceeds. Thus the theological system not only incorporates, but also gives ritual prominence to, a bilateral inheritance pattern that is so crucial to the local allocation of the community's major resource--its land.

INHERITANCE IS PARTIBLE.

The bilaterality of inheritance discussed above deals with the question: from whom does an individual inherit land? The fifth of the formally codified land-control principles to be discussed involves a slightly different question: to whom do individuals pass property on? At the time the early Haitian laws were drafted, the alternative of
partible inheritance and the alternative of primogeniture were both present in different parts of Europe. The model chosen for Haiti, of course, was the partible inheritance mandated by French law. All children, both male and female, have a legal right to a portion of their parents' land. This legally codified right is fully supported by the actual customs and practices prevalent throughout rural Haiti. The marginalization and elimination of some of the children is, as will be seen, done subtly and almost "invisibly." The principle—both formal and folk—is: all children inherit.

There is one major exception to this. The French law which endows with inheritance rights only those children born of a legally validated conjugal union was found to be highly inappropriate to the early Haitian situation—since so few couples were married—and a very important modification was this inserted into the Haitian laws. As will be discussed in more detail below, "natural" children who have been recognized by their father will also inherit, though less than legitimate children. Children not recognized by their father—usually outside children whose recognition has been blocked by the legal wife of the father—do not inherit. This is the only exception to an otherwise strongly applied principle whereby all children are seen as having a right to their parents' land.

These five principles described above constitute the guiding framework of land transmission in rural Haiti. The inheritance and property rules which derive—or are at any rate homomorphous with—the European models from which the earliest Haitian legislators took
their lead are in many respects virtually identical with the rules governing land transmission among French peasants. Yet what occurs in Kinanbwa is not identical with what occurs in a European village, is in fact quite different. The difference will be seen to stem less from outright violations of the codified principles by the villagers of Kinanbwa than from a series of locally evolved folk-maneuvers by which, even though remaining within the guiding constraints of the laws, they nonetheless succeed in injecting a locally adaptive and hence highly "Haitian" character to inheritance patterns as they actually unfold in village life.

FOLK PATTERNS OF LAND CONTROL

The process of intergenerational land transmission in Kinanbwa unfolds within the confines of a series of legal guidelines and constraints, guidelines which, as has been suggested, were institutional impositions deriving "from above." Had early Haitian rulers made no rules, a land transmission system quite different from the present one might have evolved. But though the land control patterns which evolved are not of purely autochthonous origin, the rather undeveloped technology of control which has characterized the Haitian State from earliest days, and the absence of large scale economic incursions by foreign agents into rural Haiti, has left room for the play of local forces in shaping local patterns. These folk maneuvers in effect transform the system, creating patterns which, while not violating the law, produce patterns not foreseen by the law.
PRESERVATION OF COMMUNAL LANDS

I have discussed the manner in which the formal laws have left their impact on rural Haiti. Specifically we have seen the strength of the principal of private property. Virtually all cropping land is divided up into individualized, multi-plot holdings under the control of a publicly recognized mèt-tè (owner of the land). The conditions of this ownership may not always correspond to the exact prescriptions of the law; but the acceptance of the principle of individual ownership does.

But a qualification must be repeated. Private property is the modal tenure pattern for cropping land. The spread of the principle of private property in land has not been total. There are conditions under which a different sort of land-control principle will swing into action, a principle which does no violence to any written law, but whose application is governed more by local custom than by any written mandate. If the principle of private ownership has come to rule with respect to cropping ground, another modality governs access to a certain type of grazing land and, more importantly, to most of the residential land containing the dwellings of the villagers.

There is a great deal of land on the Plain that, although too saline for cropping, nonetheless produces certain types of low vegetation which is suitable for the grazing of minor livestock. In the case of good cropping land, siblings will generally effect an informal division of parental land into individualized plots. But in the case of this saline land which will never be suitable for cropping, no such division, even on an informal level, will be effected. The land will generally be left to lie as a unit, and any érityè ("inheritor")
has rights to graze his or her animals on that land. Such agriculturally impoverished and communally held land is quite common in the fields around Kinanbwa. It is true that most serious grazing of livestock is done on recently cropped, or on temporarily fallow, plots controlled by specific owners. But the presence of large tracts of marginal, communally owned land is an interesting manifestation of a different type of land-control principle. And though grazing commons are certainly present in many peasant settings of European tradition, the communal land principle takes a slightly different twist in rural Haiti. There it is membership in a kin group, rather than in a particular localized community, which gives an individual access rights to such land.

But a much more important manifestation of this same principle occurs in the case of residential land. If most individuals will probably not make use of communally owned marginal grazing land, the same is not true of the residential land controlled under the same type of customary arrangements. As was seen in Chapter Six, village houses are for the most part built by men in close proximity to the dwelling of the parents of their wives. The access which the couple has to this land comes by virtue of the inheritance rights which the woman has in that plot of ground. But even when the house has been built, the couple are by no means considered the "owners" of that piece of ground. Custom gives them right to the house site as long as they in fact have a house there; but if the house is removed, they lose exclusive claim to that piece of ground. Custom will furthermore prohibit another inheritor from building a house directly in front of the main entrance of the couple's house (the
part referred to as the dévâ-pôt of a house). But a house may be built alongside. Custom will also tend to reserve contiguous spaces for siblings or first cousins of the woman of the house; distant relatives are less likely to suddenly erect a house in the midst of the already existing houses. In short the specific customs governing the use of this communally owned residential land do guarantee at least a minimum of privacy and exclusivity to a couple.

But it must be remarked that the principles governing control of this residential land are in sharp contrast to the individualized rights governing control of cropping ground. An individual is referred to as the met ("owner") of a piece of cropping ground; in contrast he or she merely gè dwa ("has a right") in the land on which he or she is living by virtue of membership in a kin group. The terminological distinction involves important behavioral consequences as well. Dwellers on communal land frequently say that they have to put up with verbal abuse from a relative; they cannot chase him away (kwapê-1) from in front of the door. An individual is in contrast the owner of a garden, and can literally order any unwelcome visitor off of the physical confines of the plot. We are dealing with two fundamentally different land control principles, and when emphasizing the dominance of the principle of private property in Haiti, it is worth noting that only cropping ground has fallen under its virtually total sway.

It remains to be seen whether the retention of residential land under different land-control devices is to any degree an ecologically determined pattern. In this sphere we suspect there is much regional variation. The nucleated settlement patterns of the Plain appear to
contrast markedly with the more dispersed settlement patterns which prevail in the highland or plateau communities reported in the literature. In these latter communities, there may be found a greater frequency of purchased residential land under the same type of individualized control as cropping land. But in the nucleated settlements of the Plain, it is the commonly owned ground which is more commonly used as the site for erecting dwellings.

Comparative analysis through examination of the literature is rendered somewhat difficult by the general absence of the distinction being made here between communally controlled land and individually controlled land. The frequent references in the literature to "communally owned land" appear almost always to refer to cropping ground which siblings divide informally. But the "communal ownership" of such land is a legal fiction. In terms of actually occurring patterns of control, such land will be individually cropped, and hence is more appropriately classed as "privately owned" land. The communal access-and-control principles governing residential land no longer apply to cropping land which siblings have informally divided up. Henceforth such plots are treated as the "private property" of the recipient, though the lack of separate titles leads some authors to refer to them as communally owned.

But the communal ownership that is being referred to in this section is a pattern of genuine and permanent kin control—the resistance of parcellization—that prevails on certain types of land, notably residential land. The emergence (or survival?) of this type of land-control principle in the vital domain of residence should on the one hand make us qualify our comments on the dominance
of "private property" considerations among Haitian peasants, and on the other hand sensitizes us to the highly eclectic nature of the spread of institutional control. Though the law theoretically governs all types of land, in reality the behavior of the folk follows formally codified procedures with respect only to certain types of land. Their maneuvering around the interstices of the law for other types of land produces a system which in its actual operation is neither fully "institutionalized" on the one hand, nor totally "folk" on the other.

FORFEITURE OF UNCLAIMED PLOTS

But there are yet other domains in which the actual practices of the villagers tend to "slip around" the formal mandates of the law. If the formal inheritance system were to function "perfectly," every individual would potentially have access to small sections of innumerable plots of land stemming back five and six generations. But the system does not work in this mechanical fashion. In the days before land pressure had become a serious problem, outmarrying children moving to communities several hours away would fail to lay claim to much of the land legally belonging to them in their home community. The relinquishing was rarely stated formally, but was rather a matter of de-facto abandonment. The land was then taken over by children who remained closer to home—and in turn by their children.

In the absence of the relatives who were living elsewhere, the inheritors who stayed behind would divide up the land in the informal manner in which such land divisions are generally made. But though
they divided all the land among themselves, they had—and they knew quite well that they had—uncles, close cousins, and distant cousins who could conceivably appear and claim their portion of the ancestral land.

But in most cases the absent cousins will never make their claim. When asked why they did not attempt to get a piece of the land which certain ancestors of theirs had left unclaimed, the villagers of Kinantwa would generally refer to their fear of sorcery on the part of those whose de facto enjoyment of the land they would be threatening (cf. Moral 1961:181). Whether this was in fact the principal consideration, or whether perhaps distance, unfamiliarity, and fear of becoming involved in lawsuits played a more important role, could be validly argued.

But the reference to sorcery is highly significant in another sense. The users of sorcery were seen as being those who were on the land, not those who wanted to intrude. That is, the act of establishing a long forgotten claim is in fact viewed as a somewhat "immoral" intrusion, and the intruder is more vulnerable to avenging magic. Thus we appear to be viewing a locally evolved diachronic land-control pattern whereby the intergenerational peeling off of emigrating inheritors, and the pressure-relieving impact that such departure brings, is ideologically and ritually supported by a shared construal of any subsequent third or fourth generation claim as an unwarranted and punishable intrusion. The law permits such distant relatives to stake their claims; the folk customs define and treat it as a sort of criminal invasion.
In this pattern we are seeing yet another folk-modification introduced into a process ostensibly governed by law. In this case the folk-modification of the formal pattern has created a situation of profound social-organizational relevance. Certain passages in the literature create the impression that the Haitian peasant is living under the constant fear that outsiders with no rights in the land will stake fraudulent claims and win land through manipulation of the local authorities and courts. Indeed one of the fears that made many of the villagers less than enthusiastic at the arrival of a foreigner into the community was precisely this. But though this fear exists, there is a much more dominant fear of a different nature. The major perceived threat to the holding of the villager of Kinanbwa comes not from aggressive outsiders with no rights in the land, but rather from the danger of distant kin who the peasant knows well do have a legal (if not moral) claim to part of the local land pool. The first folk pattern discussed concerned patterns of kin residing on communally owned land. This pattern also concerns kinship relations—but of a potentially hostile nature.

PRE-INHERITANCE PROVISION FOR THE MALE

There is yet another folk-maneuver providing a solution to a problem created by an impracticality in the formal inheritance laws. These laws mandate the separation of an individual's land at his or her death, not before. The inheritance system is thus a somewhat cumbersome economic arrangement from the point of view of the provision of productive resources to individuals when they are biologically able to utilize such resources. In its ideal operation,
the law would have individuals wait until the death (or at least the retirement) of parents before beginning their own economic career. The effects of such a system have been documented in the case of Ireland (Arensberg and Kimball 1968).

Haiti has chosen a fundamentally different route. The primogeniture system which makes delayed economic maturity more feasible (or somewhat less unfeasible) in the Irish case is in Haiti replaced by a partible inheritance system. This makes the economic fate of more individuals contingent on the acquisition of family land, and consequently places greater pressure on elders to release land earlier.

The arrangement common throughout Haiti involves a type of "pre-inheritance" in which an adolescent male's father will allocate to him a plot of ground, which will henceforth be cropped by the young man and whose fruits will be solely his. This plot of ground will then be among the plots which the individual will receive as his patrimony on the death of his father. Different versions of this pre-inheritance endowment have been reported in Marbial (Bastien 1951:38-41) as well as in Mirebalais (Herskovits 1971:101). The entire complex, though it has reportedly led to squabbles and even lawsuits between siblings (cf. Herskovits 1971:131) can nonetheless be viewed as an essentially effective folk-modification introduced as a compromise with the formally codified bilateral inheritance system. It gives young adult males much earlier access to their patrimony than they would enjoy under strict application of the inheritance laws.

The villagers of Kinambwa, in their own explanations of the
inheritance system, gave basically the same version of the "typical" strategy for starting one's sons off in life. It is the duty of parents to provide their adolescent sons with plots of land on which to begin their own careers as independent cultivators. The unanimity of local opinion concerning the appropriateness of this pre-inheritance arrangement as the typical path to economic autonomy for adolescent males, and the correspondence of this consensus to the patterns described in the literature, mark this arrangement as a major intergenerational land transfer ideal on which the inhabitants of rural Haiti endeavour to model their own behavior. The somewhat idealized nature of this cozy intergenerational land-transfer model will become clear as data are presented on the patterns which actually occur. But though it may follow slightly different routes in actual practice, the system does in fact make at least some provision for the incipient economic autonomy of adolescent and young adult males.

In recent years the specific manner in which this autonomy of the young has come to express itself has taken a new turn. As was probably true under the traditional variant of the system as well, the typical "start" in life for an adolescent male in Kinanbwa begins, not with an independently cropped garden, but rather with independently owned animals. Young boys typically become livestock owners several years before they work their first independent garden. There is at least general correspondence between folk ideals, which refer to the desirability of children learning to take care of animals when they are young, and folk practice. Table 10-4 presents data
on the 101 adolescent male dependents still living in the home of their father. The criterion for inclusion in the table was whether the child had begun to mëyë rou, handle a hoe, to help out with the heavy labor on his father's garden. Virtually all males over the age of 13, and a handful of boys that were younger, are thus included in this table. A substantial majority already own some animals of their own, as can be seen from the Table, and almost half are already working their own gardens. Those 54 youths who are not working their own gardens tend, of course to be in their early teens. By the late teens and early twenties virtually every dependent male will have some animals of his own and will be cropping gardens of his own.

There is, however, a wrinkle in the system, an increasingly prevalent pattern which evokes less-than-enthusiastic comments from the parents of these young men. In the "good old days," lads living in their father's home, even though they were given plots to crop on their own, would nonetheless have as their basic economic task the

---

**TABLE 7-1**

**Economic Autonomy Of Working Male Dependents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does he own his own animals?</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does he crop his own gardens?</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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assistance of their father on his plots of land. But the young of today are turning increasingly—in some cases exclusively—to the cultivation of their own gardens, frequently neglecting the filial aid that is traditionally given to parent cultivators on their own gardens. The dynamics underlying this subtle diachronic change will be discussed in the following chapters, since this change in filial behavior was to contribute to the transformation of local land tenure.

DE-FACTO MAGRINALIZATION OF THE FEMALE

If the situation of the young males is becoming somewhat more precarious, that of their sisters is if anything more so with respect to land. The specific pre-inheritance customs which evolved and have spread in rural Haiti can be viewed as a manner of circumventing delay in economic adulthood. The basic strategy involves the provisional granting of plots which will one day belong to the individual anyway. But we must also ask: what about the females? It will be recalled that the legally mandated partible inheritance patterns make no distinction on the basis of sex, and in fact envision an intergenerational land-transfer patterns which should result in ownership by females of roughly one half of the inherited land.

But though the system is ideally designed to effect this 50-50 division between the sexes, in its actual functioning it does not in fact do so. There are a series of folk-maneuvers whose principal effect is the partial marginalization of females in the area of land-control. The word "partial" is very important; females are by no means shoved off the land by their fathers and brothers. But there
is nonetheless a series of subtle patterns whose long-range aggregate effect is to funnel a substantially larger portion of the cultivable land into the control of males than their sheer numbers would warrant. It is probably true that husbands in general control their wives' land in peasant settings. This is not what was found to happen in Haiti. The beneficiary of the females' partial marginalization is not usually the woman's husband, but rather her male consanguines. 3

At Her Marriage

In the presence of the traditional pre-inheritance land allocation to males, one would expect some analogous arrangement giving a daughter a similar "advance" on the land that will one day be hers. In light of many other peasant societies, one would expect these advances to be made in the form of a dowry at the time of the girl's first marriage. If land were to be included as part of a dowry, there are several possible manners in which this might be effected. The different alternatives, however, would be of academic interest, since research in Kinanbwa turned up no such pre-inheritance land provision for females analogous to that made for males.

The literature on this point is highly inconsistent. Moral states flatly (citing no sources) that women—even those not legally married—bring dowries of land to their husbands (1961:187). Simpson, who had done some systematic fieldwork in the rural areas, states equally flatly that they do not (1942:662). Underwood

3. Renaud (1934:144-5) was told by a Port-au-Prince lawyer that parents would exclude their daughters entirely from land in some cases. This is highly unreliable information despite Renaud's assurances that his urban informant "knew well the customs of the peasantry." Marginalization of females proceeds in a much subtler fashion, to be discussed here.
gives the matter a different twist by stating that it is sons who are given land at marriage—though apparently residential land was being referred to (1964:470). With respect to female land dowries, Underwood says that the custom is rare and exists only among a few well-to-do families (1964:471). Herskovits introduces an important distinction by pointing out that, whereas land-dowries are rare, females are generally given animals and other minor property as a type of de facto dowry, but still maintain intact their inheritance rights in their parents' land (Herskovits 1971:131-2). Bastien introduces another important element: the time dimension. He points out that in times past females used to receive substantial land dowries of several hectares, but that this practice had greatly diminished by the time his own fieldwork was carried out (Bastien 1951:138-40).

It is this latter diachronic process which perhaps accounts for the present lack of any mention of a dowry in Kinanbwa. Later I will discuss the emergence in the 19th century of pre-inheritance arrangements for males. One would be justifiably surprised had no analogous arrangements been made for females. But the same processes which have led to the diminution of the pre-inheritance land grants to young males have also led to the virtual disappearance of the land dowry in the case of young females. At any rate legal marriages are not accompanied in Kinanbwa by any regular allocation, official or informal, of land to the female or her spouse. A fortiori the dowry would be absent in plasaj unions as well.

Is there then no advantage accruing to a young man by virtue of his marriage to the daughter of a well-to-do cultivator? The long range advantages are clear; the young man will one day, albeit it
in the distant future, become co-owner of the land which the woman will inherit. But in short range terms the issue is not that clear. The daughter is, and for a long time remains, landless; and any other minor livestock or household goods which she brings to the wedding are scarcely sufficient to offset the added costs which the young man will eventually incur in building an exceptionally good house for a wife of that social position.

These factors combine to reduce greatly the immediate economic advantages enjoyed by a male who "marries well" in Kinanbwa. The system now operates in such a manner that females have no common access route to the land of their parents, and at best their spouses will become tenants. It is perhaps this feature of the land-control system which is responsible for a quite marked lack of any noticeably excessive enthusiasm on the part of young men for the daughters of the better-off as opposed to the daughters of the average cultivator. Informants will cite the disadvantages (generally sociopersonal) of marrying into a better-off family with perhaps more frequency than the eventual advantages. Conversely cultivators with larger than average holdings will in general express preferences for poor but hard-working sons-in-law over better-off candidates who show tendencies to pursue non-agricultural employment (such as tailoring). Such statements are neither sour grapes on the part of the less well-off nor empty platitudes on the part of the well-to-do. Given the existing system, little immediate advantage will in fact come to an in-marrying male. And even less advantage would accrue to a father-in-law of a well-to-do young man. What a land-prosperous cultivator needs is a hard-working son-in-law who will be
a conscientious and productive tenant. The local land control system, in short, with its elimination of any genuine land dowry for females, creates a situation whereby "class endogamy" would lose much of its conventional economic meaning and rationale. Young people (and their parents) will in fact frequently prefer hard-working and economically productive spouses (or children-in-law) rather than less competent ones whose only advantage is a well-to-do father or mother.

During Her Adult Life

The land control patterns which reduce the contributions of the typical woman to her husband's holdings at the time of their marriage (or plasaj) continue to operate through a large part of her life. The contribution which spouses make to the holdings of their husbands remains relatively marginal. This is attested to by informant statements on the one hand, and by a close examination of the land tenure data for Kinanbwa on the other. Of the 111 currently mated males interviewed, only 37 (33%) reported working on their wives' land. But even this figure is deceptively high, in terms of the gross female contribution to holdings. It will be recalled that the typical holding has many plots, and that a more accurate assessment of the preponderance of different tenure arrangements presupposes a plot-by-plot, rather than an individual-by-individual analysis. Examining the 1,227 separate plots being cropped by the cultivators of Kinanbwa, only 57 of them (5%) belong to the cultivator's wife. That is, though a third of the currently mated male villagers may be cropping at least one plot of their wives,

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most are only cropping one such plot. The plots contributed by the women constitute a minimal fraction of the total holding pool of the village.

And what of the plots which the husbands could theoretically crop for their fathers-in-law? Once again, though this dowry-replacing strategy does exist as one locally practiced alternative, the frequency with which it is actually utilized is in fact rather low. Looking at the 539 sharecropped plots on which relevant information exists, only 69 of these (13%) have been acquired by the cultivator through kin relations between the owner and the cultivator's wife. And since many of the 69 plots so obtained are being cropped for siblings or collaterals of the wife, it is clear that fathers-in-law are in fact providing very little land to their sons-in-law. In short the local economic system, while it allocates a perhaps unusual economic importance to the commercial activities of the cultivator's wife, gives her little means for contributing to the major resource of her husband, his landholdings.

If her husband's holdings receive little increment by virtue of her own property, the woman's contribution to the incipient economic autonomy of her adolescent sons is equally marginal. Since inheritance is bilateral and since both spouses have presumably inherited property, when adolescent males are allocated land to crop, one might expect roughly half of the land they thus receive to come from their mother's portion. But the actual functioning of the land-control system, by delaying daughters' access to parental land until the latter's actual death, means that when she has adolescent
sons. She will in many cases not have come into control of her own heritage. The result is that the little pre-inheritance land which males receive tends to come for the most part from their father's side of the family. There were 169 cultivators who reported receiving at one time in their lives such pre-inheritance land. Table 7-2 breaks down this sub-group into those whose plots came from their fathers and those whose plots came from their mothers.

| TABLE 7-2 |
| Source of Family Land Allocated to Male Dependents |

| On the land of which parent did he work as a young man? |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Father's</th>
<th>Mother's</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>78%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>132</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There is an increasing number of young men who can count on neither source. But as the Table suggests, even those who receive something will, in eight out of ten cases, receive it from their fathers. This highly significant bias—which would be somewhat hard to explain in a system that is genuinely bilateral—is in fact produced by the de-facto delay that females must undergo before gaining any access to their parents' land.

It must be pointed out that this emphasis on land received from the father, as opposed to land from the mother, is by no means a
mere terminological fiction created, for example, by a fusion of male and female holdings into sole control by the male. In plasaj unions this fusion does not generally occur. Villagers distinguish quite clearly and consistently between their dwa bô papa ("property from their father's side") and dwa bô māmā ("property from their mother's side"). If cultivators report having worked their fathers' land, they mean it quite literally. Because of local land-control patterns, and in spite of the legally mandated bilateral inheritance patterns, their mothers will simply have had less land with which to help them get a start in life.

At the Death of Her Parents

But eventually the woman will come into her own property—simply because her parents will one day die. Unlike the typical male life cycle, where patterns of land purchase (to be discussed in more detail below) create abruptly burgeoning patterns of land proprietorship at substantially earlier ages, the acquisition of land by females is for the most part tied to the more smoothly flowing biological cycles of old age and death among their parents. 152 of the cultivators gave information on the landowning status of their wives. As Table 7-3 indicates, there is a quite consistent and highly significant increase of female proprietorship the closer one comes to the age group where many, if not most, of the women's parents will have died.

But the death of his wife's parents, and her subsequent inheritance of her share of the family land, gives little cause for secret rejoicing on the part of the cultivator of Kinanbwa. Even after this long wait, it turns out that in most cases he will not be the one to work the newly acquired plot. Even at this stage in his life, he will generally (though subtly and gently) be denied firsthand access to
TABLE 7-3

Patterns of Delayed Land Ownership by Females

Does the cultivator's wife own land?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
<td>(N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(5)</td>
<td>(29)</td>
<td>(34)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age of 35 - 49</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(22)</td>
<td>(36)</td>
<td>(58)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultivator 50 +</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(34)</td>
<td>(26)</td>
<td>(60)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(61)</td>
<td>(91)</td>
<td>(152)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 14.4^* \]
\[ 2 \text{ df} \]
\[ P = .001 \]

* The Yates correction for continuity has been applied to this table and will be applied to every cross-tabulation in which there are fewer than six cells or in which any cell has fewer than ten cases.

---

TABLE 7-4

Marginalization of Husbands from the Land Owned by Their Wives

Does the cultivator himself work any of the land that is owned by his wife?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
his wife's land, especially if—as is usually the case—they are plasé rather than marié. As table 7-4 indicates, only one out of three cultivators whose wives have come into land will actually be working any of that land. And though the Table doesn't indicate it, even those who do will generally be working only some of their wife's land.

To understand how this comes about, it is necessary to refer to the prevalent pattern of sharecropping. In very many cases, when an elderly parent dies, he will already have turned over most of his land to tenant-sharecroppers, in many cases his own sons or nephews—i.e. to the brothers or male cousins of the woman who will inherit. When the old man dies, his plots will in numerous cases be under the effective control of such sharecropping relatives, whose harvest-time payment is substantially less than the half which could be exacted of non-kin.

After the funeral the land will be divided up by the siblings, and the woman will of course be allocated her share. But she would meet with a storm of familial disapproval were she then to "evict" the current tenant—frequently her own brother (cf. Comhaire-Sylvain 1961:196)—in order to turn the plot over to her husband. To take land away from a relative currently cropping it and to turn it over to a plasé husband is a move not frequently done in Kinanbwa. It appears that in a greater number of cases the land will be continue to be cropped by the same individual who was tenant before the death of the owner; there has merely been a change of landlords. It will be the woman to whom the "owner's" portion will now be given.

The rather marginal position of the plasé husband in these events should be clear. But his marginality is mollified and partially masked

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by a somewhat honorific role he begins to play as the supervisor of the tenants. Though a woman may own land and have a sharecropper on it, it will be a male of her household who undertakes the close supervision that is practiced in Kinanbwa and who will harvest her portion of the harvest when the time comes. It is generally the husband who performs these tasks. His ancillary role will often be terminologically disguised; husbands in such situation will generally describe themselves as "giving out sharecrop land to others" (bay lôt moun démâtyé), a condition that brings not a little status in Kinanbwa.

It is in this sense that we can best interpret the impressive leap in the percentage of "landlords" with sharecroppers among the husbands of land-owning women. Table 7-5 indicates that whereas only half of the cultivators will be landlords to tenants if their wives own no land, almost nine out of ten cultivators will be able to describe themselves in this locally prestigious idiom if their wives do own land.

But the high percentage of "land-givers" in this group should not
blind us to the often powerless subordination that adheres to a husband in this position. Though he is, as the owner-wife's representative, "giving out land" to others in the community, familial and social pressures frequently will have given him little choice in the matter. And though he will harvest his wife's share, he does not dispose of even that partial fruit of the plot in the same manner that he would, did the plot belong to him. His wife is the owner of the plot, and his wife is thus the owner of the landlord's portion of the harvest. Though not all will do so, many wives will insist strictly on their control of the produce. The husband may end up receiving a token pittance due him by virtue of the energy he expended in supervising the cultivation, and harvesting his wife's portion, of the crop.

In this light we can sense the operation of a conflict-avoiding latent strategy, by which the honorific title, and associated status, of "landlord" are functioning as quasi-compensatory "pacifiers" of plasé husbands who are, if looked at in another light, being in fact excluded from all or part of their wife's land. Such patterns and dynamics are camouflaged, masqueraded, and generally hushed, as a crucial prerequisite to their conflict-avoiding role. Were things to be called by blunter names (and gossiping neighbors will be chucklingly blunt when referring to a male who depends largely on this sort of income), the pattern would not operate as smoothly as it now does.

The degree of posture involved in this pattern makes it difficult to collect reliable survey data on it, and we can only give impressions as to the actual prevalence of such arrangements. They will certainly be less frequent among legally married couples, where the husband has

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both a legal and community-supported right to directly control and
crop, if he wishes, any land of his wife's. But the plas€ husband
does not enjoy this access to his wife's property, and very many of
them appear to be subtly cast into some variant of the arrangement
described above.

But one thing does emerge with clarity from the figures. A
local land-control system has emerged which, operating in the
context of the largely extralegal mating system which prevails
at village level, functions to keep much of the property of a woman
under the effective control of her male consanguineal kin, and
to simultaneously deprive her husband of genuine direct access
to that cropping land. Though rarely discussed overtly in the
village, the low percentage of men whose holdings are augmented
by their wives' property is an effect of a land-control dynamic
which subtly marginalizes local females during much of their life.

At Her Husband's Death and Her Own Death

The dynamic which maintains the separateness of plas€ spouses
property operates to its eventual and logical conclusion in the declin­
ing years of the couple. If the husband dies first a landless plas€
widow may find herself in a precarious position. If she has in
fact inherited cropping land of her own, then she will continue giving
it to a sharecropper (perhaps one of her own children) and living
off her portion of the harvest. But if she has inherited no land of
her own, the land which her husband had inherited and had worked
during his life passes directly to the children. It is said that
children then have the right to tell their widowed mother: "Mama,
kite dwa papa-m, se pou mwé li yé" (Let me have my father's land, mother;
it's mine now). Though this type of son-mother eviction rarely if
ever occurs, nonetheless the plasé widow, no matter how many years she
had lived with her husband nor how many children she had had by him,
has no legal rights to any of the property which came to him via in-
heritance. Even if the husband had purchased land during their
union, the purchase will in most cases have been registered solely
under his name. The plasé widow has no rights to any of this land;
it belongs solely to the children. If the couple should be childless,
all the property of the husband will revert to his siblings, unless
the woman had been legally married to the man. In this latter case
she will inherit half of whatever property had been acquired since
the beginning of their union (cf. Underwood 1964:471, 479-80; Herskovits

There appear to be substantial regional differences in terms of
the grass-roots modifications actually made to circumvent some of the
formal requirements of the law. In Kinanbwa, for example, widows of
legal marriages will generally retain control of all of their deceased
husband's property, until their own death. Furthermore even landless
plasé widows are at least in a relatively strong residential position.
Uxorilocal residence patterns produce a pattern whereby women are
living on land that belongs to their own family (and cannot be evicted),
and local custom, supported by local courts, assigns house ownership to
the female rather than to the male partner in the case of such
uxorilocally established domiciles. This differs, for example, from
Marbial and the Beaumont plateau, where virilocal residence has widows
living on the property of their deceased husbands and thus more vulne-
rable to eventual eviction in the absence of living children from
the union (Underwood 1964:480). In short, the same land-control system
which prevents a female from contributing heavily to the holdings of her spouse during the latter's life may continue to "plague" her even during her old age, leaving her with no guaranteed access to the cropping ground from which she and her husband lived during his lifetime, and making access to residential ground contingent on the presence of living children from the union. The system itself makes little provision for them, and they must henceforth—if they are propertyless—live strictly on the good will of their children.

But the land control system perhaps most clearly reveals its nature and basic direction in the paradoxical twist matters will take when the woman herself dies. Her children will suddenly come into control of cropping ground to which her husband—their father—could never gain access. The legal restrictions and community norms which prevent a placed husband from making strong approaches to the patrimony of his wife do not apply to the woman's children—once the woman is dead. These latter have every right—which they generally exercise—to take over any land which had been the property of their deceased mother, no matter who happens to be cropping the land at the time of their mother's death. The subtle intrafamilial dynamics which keep land under the control of male consanguines of the female cease their operation, now passing to the hands of her children, upon her death, the land to which the inheritance system gives them a right.

This pattern comes out rather clearly in the Kinanbwa land data. We have already seen that only one out of twenty of the plots currently being cropped by Kinanbwa cultivators belonged to the cultivator's wife.
And we have used this as a demonstration of the low importance which uxorial property plays in the domestic economy of Kinanbwa. We furthermore saw that young men also receive little land help from their mothers and count much more heavily on land which their fathers turn over to them, and that the woman is of little help to her sons either in this sphere during her life. But the fact that death changes this can be seen in Table 7-6. There were 202 plots in Kinanbwa being cropped by cultivators who had inherited them from their deceased parents, and for each of these plots it was ascertained from which

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Specific Origin of Inherited Plots</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From whom did the cultivator inherit the plot?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mother</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Both</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

exact source the plot had come. It turns out that in fact some four out of ten plots are intergenerationally transmitted via the maternal line, which is double the contribution which mothers make to their adolescent sons, and eight times as high as the contribution wives make to the total holdings of Kinanbwa husbands. Even in Table 7-6 the fathers still maintain an edge over the mothers, an edge which
stems from the greater amount of land purchasing (in their own name) which they will do during their lives. But the earlier gap has been substantially narrowed.

We can sum this discussion up. There is operating in Kinanbwa a somewhat latent, camouflaged, but statistically clear land control pattern by which the land due females by virtue of the inheritance process is partially and subtly withheld from them during their lives, effectively depriving most husbands and sons from direct access to this land. It is only after the woman's death that her children will finally come into the land. Such patterns are rarely discussed in the village; and indeed their maintenance presupposes a general policy of discreet silence in their regard. But what is cloaked by omission from daily conversational reference is exposed in a plot-by-plot count.

Anthropologically what leaps out is a systemic emphasis on consanguineal, as opposed to affinal, kin ties, whereby land goes from parent to daughter to grandchild without coming under direct control of sons-in-law. But in this process it is hard to avoid concluding that in many instances the plots of the women are being covertly controlled by her brothers and male cousins. The fact that village women do not discuss—and perhaps do not perceive—the processes that are partially alienating them from their land does not change the actual patterns of plot distribution. What is masked by social etiquette and acceptance is exposed by quantitative research, as one more folk-modification—one which is understandably "hushed" in village life—has been found to imbue local land-control with a further extralegal modality.
DODGING THE LAW AND ITS CONSTRAINTS

In addition to the three maneuvers just discussed, there are other local land manipulation devices. One entails dodging a restriction in the law which, as it is actually applied in the region of Les Bayahondes, will under certain circumstances tend to handcuff the owner and place quite clear constraints on what he may do with the land. These constraints arise from a potential conflict of interest that arises between the owner and his children. When conflict arises—when, for example, an elderly parent wishes to do something which may reduce the inheritance of his children—the latter may take the parent to court to restrain him. In such cases, the children—at least in the research area—will usually win.

The device of a will, which in other settings can be used by parents to allocate their property differentially among their children, will be of little use to a resident of Kinantwa. Though Haitian law recognizes the right of an individual to write a will, his right to distribute his property as he wishes does not extend to land. In the Cul-de-Sac Plain local courts will not honor the attempts of an individual to favor some of his children over others in regard to land, or to will a piece of land to an individual who is not part of the locally recognized inheriting group. In these areas wills may be used to allocate only other (usually less valuable) types of property.

The legal basis for this locally practiced restriction is not clear. Renaud (1934), who has done the most thorough study of Haitian land law, does not deal with the question of wills. The restriction is clearly not confined to the Cul-de-Sac Plain; Herskovits was given the same information by his own informants in Mirebalais (1971:130). It
seems highly unlikely that there is any specific statute in Haitian law prohibiting the willing of land. The de facto restriction may come as an indirect result of the general lack of individual titles throughout rural Haiti. Such an individualized title would presumably be a prerequisite for the willing of a specific plot, according to Comhaire-Sylvain (1952: 181; 1961:218), though such a deed is not needed to sell a plot in Kinenbwa.

At any rate there is a widespread belief among the peasants that the law forbids the discrimination by a parent against any of his children with respect to land. Though the belief may be more a reflection of strongly valued local custom than of legal fact, the courts reportedly honor this local belief. Anecdotes are told of children who were able, for example, to bar an angry father from selling all his land with a view to disinheriting his children. Though actual cases of children publicly and legally restraining parents are somewhat rare, a type of local folklore concerning such situations has arisen.

But why does such a situation of conflict between parent and children arise in the first place? There are two sets of circumstances in which an individual may find the dictates of the law at odds with his own personal preferences concerning the ultimate disposition of his property. There are cases on the one hand where a parent wishes to favor one of his children. The child would of course inherit a normal portion of the property anyway; but in the eyes of the parent he may be seen as meriting for one reason or another a larger share
Another situation reportedly arises when a parent may make attempts to keep the holding as intact as possible and to funnel as much of it as possible into the hands of one of his children. Though no example of this was seen in Kinanbwa, Comhaire-Sylvain reports that it used to occur elsewhere (1961:196). The father also may practice pre-inheritance discrimination; he may allocate more land, or better land, to one of his sons during his, the father's, lifetime. But on his death he is aware that any advantage thus bestowed will be ephemeral; the siblings of the favored child will be able to reduce his holding via the local courts.

These instances where the parent wants to funnel more land into the hand of a particular child are frequently mentioned in the village. But there is yet another type of situation that is of relevance here. There are instances where the property owner's concern is, not to give a lion's share to one of the legitimate inheritors, but rather simply to include in the heritage one or more individuals whose claims the law will not recognize. The most frequently cited variant of this situation concerns the discrimination which, as we have indicated above, Haitian law makes against children who are not offspring of legally validated unions. A reading of the specific statutes indicates that Haitian law in fact distinguishes between three types of children: enfants légitimes, enfants naturels, and enfants adultrins (cf. Renaud 1934:213-15). Legitimate children are those born to a man of the woman to whom he is legally married. The children may have been born before the couple was legally married. Such marriages will frequently occur late in the lives
of a couple. The "natural" children born to the union when it was a
polyamous union are automatically "legitimized" by the marriage of their
parents.

An *enfant naturel* is a child born to a man of a polyamous wife,
a child who has furthermore been publicly recognized by the man
as being his child. In Les Bayanades and surroundings this recognition
is given in the context of baptism. It is the father who "gives his
child a baptismal certificate," sponsoring the baptism of the child.
This entails a prior registering of the child as his own in the local
civil registry. Henceforth the child is considered an *enfant naturel*
of that man.

The case of the *enfant adulterin* is somewhat different. There
are a small number of children whose fathers have not given them the
baptismal certificate in the manner described above. When this occurs
it is generally not paternal reluctance which causes it. In most cases
the situation arises when a legally married man has an outside child
by another woman. But legally married males are not permitted to
recognize such children unless their legal wife gives her formal
consent. Since recognition of such a child--its elevation to the
status of *enfant naturel* of the husband--will bestow property rights
on it, the married women of Kinanbwa do not generally grant their
spouses this permission. Thus the child remains *adulterin*. This
third class of children constitutes a small minority of the population.

The inheritance rights of an individual will vary depending on
which of the three categories he falls into. If a man dies unmarried,
and his children are all consequently "naturels," all will inherit
equally from him, no distinction being made between children of different
unions that he may enter during his life. But if the man was legally married to one woman, but had had children by several, each child of a plural marriage is entitled to only a third of the property that will go to the child of the legally validated union (cf. Renaud 1934:213-15; Herskovits 1971:129-30; Bastien 1951:138; Underwood 1964:472).

The specific application of this discrimination will vary from court to court, from case to case. But the discrimination itself appears to be universally applied throughout rural Haiti. Underwood notes the approbation given to those women who, on the death of their legal husband, waive the rights of their own children to larger portions of her husband's property (Underwood 1964:474). No example was found of such largesse in Les Bayahondes or Kinanbwa. On the contrary the differential property rights holding among half-siblings, some of whom were legitimate, was a crucial and frequently alluded to organizational cornerstone of more than one lakou in Kinanbwa. Children whose father was legally married to a woman other than their own mother would inevitably receive a substantially smaller portion of the inheritance than their "legitimate" half siblings.

Knowing of the economic discrimination that will be thus practiced against their later offspring, many men engage in a series of ploys to thwart any future efforts on the part of their legal wife and legitimate children to leave his subsequent children propertyless. The most frequent ploy resorted to is that of secret land purchases in which the purchase is registered under the name of the outside woman and locked up until the husband's death. Since the land has been purchased, and the records list the plot in the name of the woman, the legitimate
children of the man have no claim on the land. It henceforth belongs to the outside woman, and her children will in turn inherit it from her.

The matter is less simple when the parent wishes to will extra land to one of his legitimate children. In such cases the most frequently used tactic appears to involve, not a clandestine purchase, but rather a fictitious sale. A parent will simply "sell" a piece of the family property to a favored child, telling the other siblings that an emergency has come up and that one of the children has come up with some money to purchase land and thus give the parent money with which to resolve the emergency. It is hard for the other children to object, since it is seen as more proper, when selling land, to sell it to a person who would have inherited it, than to an outsider. The parent and the child will register the "sale" duly in the office of a notary, though no money has changed hands.

To sum up: we have been discussing a series of ploys to circumvent various types of legally imposed constraints which prevent individuals from allocating their land completely as they might wish. It is noteworthy that such tactics are discussed quite openly. We have seen that, with respect to other "folk maneuvers" already discussed, no overt references will be made to the existence of certain patterns. But these latter efforts by parents to give all of their children land, or to favor somewhat a child who has been more generous with the parents, meet with general community approval. The tactics used to achieve this are thus part of the public domain and of local folklore. The presence of these tactics lends one more local, extralegal modality to the inheritance system as it actually functions in Kisanbwa.
AVOIDING LOCAL AUTHORITIES

The tactics described in the preceding section entail certain behaviors on the part of parents. But the cases in which parents will resort to such maneuvers are exceptional. In the majority of cases, though elders may attempt to retain control of their land for as long as possible, they will not as a rule contrive to circumvent the equal distribution of their land to all of their children. And since most males are not legally married, they need make no secret provision for children against whom the law will later discriminate. In most cases, therefore, the siblings will effect a roughly equal distribution of their dead parent's holding.

But like their parents, they also have their maneuvers for circumventing certain aspects of the law. When the parents die, and the time comes for them to receive their legacy, they are not passive followers of legally mandated procedure. On the contrary, as will be seen here, the steps they will take to divide up the land differ quite profoundly from the process as it appears in Haitian law.

Absence of Deeds

The formal law envisions a sequence of events activated by the death of a landowning parent. If they adhere to this ideal sequence, the inheriting sibling group would gather, presumably examine the land titles of their dead parent, and reach an agreement among themselves concerning the division of the land. From there the group would take steps to legalize this partition, by contracting a government-licensed surveyor (apâtè) to set the new boundaries, and by paying a notary (notè) to validate this new partition by writing up separate deeds for each of the new holdings created by the division.
The fees of these representatives of the public sector are generally paid in cash, though payment through land has been reported elsewhere in Haiti.

Table 7-7 shows rather dramatically the frequency with which this ideal sequence, mandated by law, actually occurs. The 199 plots appearing in the Table were the currently cropped plots which cultivators indicated that they had inherited from one or another of their parents. The percentage of plots which are formally surveyed and deeded after a sibling land division is negligible. The virtually universal pattern is for the villagers to carry the process only as far as the informal division made by agreement among the inheriting survivors. It is an extremely rare case in which a surveyor and a notary will be contacted to legalize this division.

The more common procedure is for the surviving inheritors to carry out the division of the dead parent's land using an informal rope measure with which the parent's land is evenly divided up. Henceforth each recipient inheritor will behave toward his or her

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<th>Prevalence of Informal Land Divisions on Inherited Plots</th>
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<td>Has the cultivator taken out a formal deed?</td>
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allocated plots as though a legal validation of the division had been made. That is, it will be cropped on a purely individual basis, sharecropped, rented, or even sold. Though the law assumes an officially supervised surveyal and subsequent legal, individualized entitlement as a prerequisite to such ownership behavior, the actual sequence that usually occurs involves in almost all cases a total bypassing of such involvement with the formal authorities. The villagers will proceed directly from the informal division to the assumption of a publicly (if not officially) recognized status as owner (mêt) of that plot, and to the proprietary behavior which such a status socially legitimizes.

The most visible result of this folk process—the consequence which appears to jolt many commentators on rural Haiti—is the almost total absence of individualized deeds to the hundreds of thousands of tiny plots that are being cropped throughout the nation (cf. Moral 1961: 179; Organization of American States 1972:630). As actually stated, the pattern of deedlessness is a fact. Probably fewer than 1% of the cultivators in rural Haiti could justify their claim of "ownership" by presenting a valid, individualized title to each and every one of the plots which they report themselves as owning.

Nonetheless this widespread absence of individualized property titles has frequently been interpreted in a somewhat questionable framework. The Haitian peasant has on more than one occasion been depicted as feeling the insecurity of an outright squatter. Holly assumes this psychological insecurity and discusses what he believes are its deleterious economic consequences (1955:47). And Moral
quotes an anecdotal vignette in which an influential urbanite arrives in a village, bearing a phony deed, and accompanied by a governmental surveyor and the local chef de section, and calmly goes about the process of evicting the unfortunate peasant, who will be summarily arrested if he makes any protest (Moral 1961:179). Though Moral himself (on the following page) mentions in passing that of course such evictions have rarely taken place in rural Haiti, the impression that has been created by such an anecdote is quite vivid. The peasant who does not have a deed can feel no more security than a total squatter.

Such scenes were not witnessed in Kinanbwa, nor had they ever occurred, though local rumors were that a highly placed physician in Port-au-Prince was attempting to gain control through the courts of a large tract of land in another part of the Plain. Such rumors, however, combined with mistrust of the courts (see below), hardly touch one's security in the knowledge of one's possession of one's land.

This security stems on the one hand from the unquestioned social recognition by other members of the community of the "ownership" status of individuals toward land they had inherited or purchased. Everybody was in the same general boat, and land division followed a locally inculcated procedure. There was no chaos or anarchy in the procedure, and no ambiguity concerning subsequent ownership, in the vast majority of cases.

But the security rests not only on the unanimity of local opinion. Though individual cultivators did not take out deeds, it will be recalled that the countryside is dotted with pieces of paper called grâ-pyès, old deeds registering large blocs of property as belonging to (usually defunct) ancestors. It is not clear how vulnerable such deeds would be to systematic attack; but the point is
that deeds do exist. Most of the land in the Les Bayahondes region would probably be found to be covered by deeds of one sort or another, and most of the villagers of Kinanbwa would possibly be able to trace their descent from the defunct ancients in whose names these deeds were made out. It is unlikely that they will ever have to do this. But the knowledge of these deeds is another pillar on which their sense of relative security in their holdings rests.

There is no total absence of insecurity. I have already remarked that there is the danger that some distant relative who in times past was somehow excluded from the informal partition will show up claiming his portion. But the sorcery complex covering such eventualities (mentioned above), and the rarity with which such claims are actually made, render this a not-very-salient concern. At any rate the widespread lack of individualized titles to the vast majority of rural Haitian landholdings by no means indicates that we are dealing with a nation of "squatters" fearing the arrival of a notice of eviction. A modus vivendi has been reached with the law, and individuals become relatively secure property owners through a series of locally evolved arrangements which, while doing no violence to the codified laws, nonetheless manage to circumvent some of their specific mandates.

Deedlessness is frequently related to an alleged frequency of legal battles over land among peasants. There has been an unfortunate tendency, in discussions of land tenure in rural Haiti, to emphasize the fact that lawsuits have been fought, and are being fought, over questions of land. That such events occur is undeniable. But that
their prevalence or frequency warrants the emphasis given them is highly questionable for probably most regions of Haiti. In the Les Bayahondes region most people who appeared before the law were involved in disputes over livestock. In the two years of fieldwork not one of the villagers of Kinanbwa was seen to be involved in any land litigation (cf. also Moral 1961:181). There was in short evidence for neither the insecurity nor the tendency to run to the courts that reportedly have existed in other parts of Haiti.5 Informality of land division has other roots.

Reasons for Proceeding Informally

If such is in fact the case, the question then becomes: why do villagers generally circumvent the law and proceed in the informal manner described above? The dynamic which sustains the folk procedure and precludes utilization of the legal procedure is quite complex, but its basic elements can be listed.

The most frequent explanation given for not acquiring an individualized title to plots of land revolves around the costs of such a procedure. There is a fixed per-carreau rate for the surveyor, and the notary's fee will also vary according to the size of the plot for which a new deed is drawn up. Though in some parts of Haiti the

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5. To present evidence on the absence of actual evictions or the lack of any evident overwhelming concern in this matter among the peasants is not to say that the matter may not change in the future. If outsiders--be they urban Haitians or foreigners--were suddenly to take an interest in the land, giving it thus a new speculative value, we could expect more maneuver on the part of outsiders. The security of the peasant would then plummet. For this reason an analysis such as the one presented here should not be construed as a justification against making efforts to strengthen the legal position of the peasant vis-à-vis his land. Cf. Moral 1961:182.
surveyors and notaries are paid almost exclusively in cash (as was the case in Les Bayahondes), in other parts of the country the tradition of paying them with a small piece of land means that the very act of officially registering a new holding will in effect reduce the size of the holding (cf. Underwood 1964:472; Casimir 1965:41-2).

In short the generalized reluctance throughout Haiti to follow the legally mandated procedure must be seen as at least in part stemming from the economically burdensome nature of those procedures.

But there are other factors involved as well, considerations which may surface less easily under direct questioning than the obvious economic ones, but whose power is nonetheless manifested through other types of subtle indication. One of these considerations involves the profound mistrust of local authorities which much of the traditional behavior of these latter has generated among the rural populace. The concept of blind justice being administered in the local courts, and the construal of judges and lawyers as defenders of impartial rectitude, would probably be a somewhat naive idealization in most social systems. The villagers of Kinambwa are not idealistic in this sense. They have clear notions concerning what they perceive to be the motivations of local authorities and the manner in which decisions are actually made in a great number of cases. Surveyors, lawyers, notaries, judges—such officials are publicly and matter-of-factly assumed to be highly amenable to cash inducements. Many take it for granted that most judicial decisions will be made in favor of the disputant who has been most generous in his behind-the-scenes offerings to the local judge. Simply stated the courts have more than once been used, not to administer justice, but to permit certain citizens
to wrest property away from other citizens. The local tribunal is as much an arena of conflicting economic interests as it is a locale for the administering of justice. Not only lawyers and judges, but even surveyors, have been reportedly bribed by one sibling who is intent on maximizing his own share of the common patrimony (cf. Underwood 1964). This generalized mistrust and fear of local officials combines with the above-mentioned economic considerations to perpetuate the practice of informal division of land, rather than risking involvement with local authorities.

Yet a third factor was seen to enter into the common policy of avoiding legal land divisions among the populace of Kinanbwa. The very function of this factor prevented it from being overtly stated by informants. But several spontaneous and unguarded comments gave evidence of its presence. The informality of typical land distribution arrangements among kin permits the creation of certain compromise situations which are accepted by all parties as provisional, temporary, and subject to subsequent revision. Relatives who depart to a distant community (or emigrate to the Dominican Republic), for example, may allow their siblings to crop their share for them. And though they are theoretically entitled to some of the produce (or to some of the revenue from the sale of the produce), they rarely insist on their claim.

If we view such a process in terms of its long range effects, we see that we are dealing with a mechanism which permits gentle "easing out" of a not insubstantial number of potential claimants to the increasingly limited land supply. Though some sibling divisions are seen as definitive, there is an impressive number of these more
"tentative" arrangements, by which a number of relatives are in effect removed from the scene, but in a non-belligerent and non-disruptive fashion.

The very mention of the courts abruptly terminates this informally reached modus vivendi. To effect a formal division of the land, it is required that every single potential heir to that land be notified and invited to attend the judgment. The social and intrafamilial impact of this turn of events is devastating. A can of worms has been foolishly opened, and the proverbial sleeping dog has been needlessly disturbed, setting the stage for the resurrection of dormant antagonisms whose expression will redound to the benefit of only those authorities whose pockets will be lined by the bribes of the aroused disputants. Rural Haiti has witnessed the emergence of quiet folk arrangements for softening and forestalling the expression of conflicting economic interest among relatives--arrangements which are disguised as "provisional" and protected by a subtly imposed layer of discreet silence. The economically deleterious and intrafamilially devastating impact of involving the courts constitutes a third major (though unspoken) factor inducing the rural Haitian populace to continue dividing its land in the context of informal agreements reached among kin. 6

6. It is in this area that the effects of research can also be detrimental. The many less-than-equitable "provisional" arrangements that have been made and accepted by all parties come to be dismissed from daily life. During certain in-depth interviews, probing case histories of inheritance and land acquisition, it became clear that in some cases dormant resentments were being activated and aroused by the very interview process itself, and the subject was changed. The major danger of research is generally seen as being the provision of
It is perhaps the combined operation of this factor with the preceding factor which has generated yet a fourth major dynamic supporting and legitimizing the informal mode, rather than the legal mode, in the intergenerational transfer of land. A generally shared "definition of the situation" has arisen in which the contacting of surveyors and lawyers is seen, not as a normal episode in the inheritance sequence, but as a symptom of intrafamilial conflict. It is, of course, quite common in cross-cultural perspective for villagers to employ folk-mechanisms for dispute resolution, using the courts only as a last resort. But in Kinambwa a definition has arisen whereby even surveyors and notaries are defined as such last-resort resolvers of conflicts rather than providers of services which are solicited in the normal course of events (as the law would have it).

Because they are thus defined, villagers will tend to solicit their services only when there is in fact an intrafamilial dispute. Much praise is heard for those sibling groups who can divide their patrimony in harmony among themselves, without involving these external agents of conflict resolution. And we thus have the paradox whereby those who bypass the "official" way of doing things are seen as acting in a superior fashion.

This paradox should not be lightly dismissed as a self-explained aspect of village life, in which folk-patterns are preferred to official patterns. This is emphatically not the case, for example, in the potentially damaging information to outsiders. Here, however, we have a situation where the researcher should hesitate seriously before creating a situation where the informant will begin ruminating over bits of information that will disrupt a modus vivendi he has arrived at with his kin and himself.
sphere of mating. Those who get legally married are almost invariably seen as having entered a state "superior" to that of informal plasaj. But the utilization of the formal land-division mechanisms among siblings as opposed to informal agreements is emphatically not seen as a superior strategy. It is seen rather as symptomatic of conflict and shameful intrafamilial discord. The first three factors provide the economic framework for the perpetuation of informal land divisions. This fourth factor, the pejorative construal imposed on the use of official agents in land division constitutes the clinching ideological validation of the folk pattern.

The Nature of the Land Division Procedure

On examining the literature, it appears that the very informality of the folk process makes for variation between regions in the actual procedures utilized to divide land. In Kinanbwa the division was generally made with a long rope or cord (referred to as a pêlé), which was distinguished by villagers from the surveyor's chain (chên apâtê). The inheritors proceed as a group to different plots. To allow for differences in the quality of the different plots of the dead parent, the more frequent procedure appeared to be that of allocating to each inheritor a small portion of every plot rather than assigning different plots in their totality to different heirs (cf. Underwood 1964:473). If the dead parent had taken out individual deeds to any of his plots of land (as might be the case, for example, if he had purchased land from a non-relative), or if he had been the

7. It is significant that the negative construal of use of surveyors by siblings does not apply to the use of a surveyor (or a notary) by a person who has purchased a piece of land from a non-relative.
holder of any grâ-pyès containing the record of larger holdings as of yet undivided, such documents will generally pass into the hands of his eldest son. It is quite significant that, though females are placed in charge of many types of economic transactions in Kinanbwa, with respect to the keeping of land titles, the task will generally fall to the eldest brother. In the lakou where we lived, the eldest legitimate male survivor of the dead founder of the lakou was generally recognized to be somewhat incompetent and dull-witted (moun ki pa gâ lèspri). Yet the deeds were entrusted to him, as the eldest male in the family.

In other parts of Haiti, where different conditions prevail, the procedure will vary from the one common in Kinanbwa. Métraux has reported that in Marbial, coheirs to a small holding will in many cases sell off the entire holding and split the proceeds (quoted in Underwood 1964:473). Herskovits came across the pattern of one or two siblings being allocated all of the land but subsequently purchasing land for their non-recipient siblings. The pattern which Bastien (1951) reported in Marbial, whereby males would build their houses right near the plots which their parents had allocated to them during the latters' lifetime, undoubtedly made for a different procedure in dividing the holding from what holds in Kinanbwa. In Kinanbwa settlement patterns are nucleated; houses are not built near the gardens, but are rather clustered in large residential units. Cultivators walk out to the fields from this nucleated settlement rather than dwell near them, as in Marbial. In the latter case the practice of allocating to each heir the plot on which he had built his dwelling was probably more practical than the practice of giving each heir a small piece of each
plot. What will be common to all regions, however, is the virtual universality of informal divisions among siblings, and the rarity of legal deeds being taken out.

The chapter can be summed up. Because of the centrality of issues of land tenure to the general hypothesis of this presentation, a detailed discussion was made of certain features of Haitian land tenure. Attention was first focused on the legal framework that sets the basic contours of land allocation and land control patterns in Haiti, and a number of critical European-derived institutional patterns were identified and discussed. Following this, however, I presented ethnographic and quantitative information on a series of informal folk maneuvers which permit individuals to slip through the interstices of this institutional structure and imbue local land maneuver with an air of autochthonous individuality and local adaptiveness, despite adherence to the institutionally mandated ground rules. The result is a system whose final shape is quite different from that envisioned by the law.

But these maneuvers, however, operate so to speak on the surface of the system. By themselves they would leave untouched the basic character of the system, and were there no other intervening forces, the end product would still be a traditional peasant system in which the major mechanism of land transfer was the inheritance process and in which most cultivators would be found in basic dependence on the plots which they inherited from their parents.

Other forces have intervened, however, forces that plunge much
more deeply into the internal machinery of local land tenure than
the surface maneuvers that were described here. These forces have
in effect transformed the system itself and turned it into something
quite different. The following chapter, which will be the concluding
chapter in this section, will document the presence of these unex-
pected forces.
CHAPTER EIGHT

SYSTEMIC Riddles: Stratum Internal Sharecropping

There are changes that come over human systems in the form of an exposed, highly visible sequence of events that can be perceived and described by an onlooker. Other changes, however, occur slowly, quietly, and with a subterranean subtlety which, in spite of their profound structural impact, renders them nonetheless well nigh invisible to the naked eye of even the most careful observer. The former type of change is amenable to at least preliminary analysis via the conventional tool kit of descriptive ethnography. The latter, taking the form of subtle, modest shifts in the behavior of a population, may escape the attention even of participants in the system, who will be unable to alert researchers to the nature of the transformation that is working its way into their lives. The identification and analysis of such changes requires the application of research tools which supplement and go beyond the techniques of descriptive ethnography.

There are various types of quantitative techniques which aid in the detection of such subtle aggregate patterns of change, techniques which indeed expose such patterns even when the researcher may not have suspected their existence. The analysis of land tenure in Kinanbwa was "thrown up for grabs" precisely by the emergence of such a pattern. One still hears skeptical criticisms of quantitative research that allege that, after all, you can "prove anything with figures" if you try hard enough. Experiences with the data from Kinanbwa force me to dissent from this view. Precise economic data on the entire male population have, if anything, slowed down analysis. The illusion of uniformity, and the facile ethnographic generalizations which such an illusion permits
are cruelly denied to the researcher who has factual information on the manner in which people actually behave. During fieldwork I found that theories of life in Kinanbwa were relatively easy to concoct, and that impressions and anecdotes could easily be marshalled to support virtually any such theory. But examination of data hand-tabulated in the field, and--especially--inspection of larger quantities of electronically processed data after fieldwork had been terminated, rendered most of these pet theories quite untenable, and several returns "to the drawingboard" were necessary before theory and fact began to mesh. Thus the availability of quantitative data changes the nature of analytic intellection. One is no longer simply marshalling anecdotes to support a pet theory; one rather begins spending at least some time concocting a theory to account for embarrassing patterns which emerge in the data and which don't seem to make sense. Both varieties of intellection are admittedly fun; but when quantitative data capture unperceived patterns lurking "in the real world," the scientific payoffs of the latter brand of intellectual activity will probably be greater.

THE MODEL THAT FAILED TO WORK

This discussion of the impact on theory of recalcitrant data is a suitable kick-off to the discussion of microevolution in Kinanbwa. The existence of a demographically generated adaptation within the internal machinery of the local subsistence institutions first manifested itself in the form of a number of embarrassing inconsistencies within the data, patterns which simply did not correspond to what the
literature generally reported, to what at least some villagers likewise affirmed, and to what I myself had consequently come to assume. Since some preliminary hand tabulations were done in the field, a number of important "glitches" were caught early enough in fieldwork to permit the gathering of follow-up data before leaving the research area.

For purposes of the present analysis, the most serious inconsistencies concerned the very nature of the land tenure system which was supposedly prevailing in the community. There was one system which prevailed in the literature, a system which furthermore corresponded in general to explanations villagers would tend to give when questioned on the matter. But there was a substantially different sort of system which emerged on the basis of a plot-by-plot count. What prevailed in the literature is a rather common variant of a traditional peasant land tenure system in which the bulk of an individual's wealth stemmed from the land he had inherited, in which the principal mechanism for the intergenerational transfer of this land was the inheritance process, and in which young men get their start in life by cropping plots which parents allocate to them "provisionally," but which will presumably be part of their permanent legacy when the parents die. Other land-acquisition mechanisms were also reported—renting, purchasing, sharecropping, "borrowing"—but these emerge in the literature as sources of marginal increments, the bulk of land being rather moved through intrafamilial inheritance channels. For purposes of this discussion, this will be called an "inheritance model" of peasant land tenure. It is this type of system which has been generally reported as prevalent throughout rural Haiti.
In the chapter on the evolution of the Haitian peasantry, it became clear that the foundations of private ownership in rural Haiti depended principally on land grants made by the government, and on land sales made not only by the government, but also by the different landowning groups who were unable to organize efficient plantations. Thus the first Haitian owners did not inherit their land. But once the land of the Republic had been largely parcelled out, once large numbers of independent smallholders had acquired access to land, then the "rules of the game" were to undergo a change. The children of these early land acquirers were no longer to have the same opportunities which their parents had had. The opportunity structure had undergone some fundamental alterations. These up-and-coming generations were to depend much more heavily on the land which their parents were to leave them. Thus there was a period in Haitian history where inheritance was truly the mainstay of personal fortunes. Most of the accounts in the literature would appear to indicate that inheritance still plays a central role, and most discussions of Haitian peasant land tenure are in effect "inheritance models."

**APPARENT SUPPORT**

In the light of one type of data, the inheritance model of Haitian land control appears to receive at least basic validation as an accurate representation of what actually happens. The body of quantitative data that has been relied on most heavily for insights into the conditions of life in rural Haiti is the Census of 1950. Though this Census was to make the error of using locally inappropriate categories and of simplistically labelling anyone who owned one of
the plots in his holding as a "proprietor," earlier research had already begun to make finer distinctions. The Marbial research project utilized an instrument which distinguished between plots of different tenure status, even within the same holding. Using this framework, it was found that in fact at least seven out of ten families were cropping at least one plot of inherited land on their holding (Comhaire-Sylvain 1952). Since inherited land enters into the holdings of such a large percentage of the community, the inheritance process appears to be a major land-acquisition route in rural Haiti.

Even the data from Kinanbwa, when broken down in this fashion, point in the same general direction. Of the 227 holdings that constitute the land pool of the villagers of Kinanbwa, 139 (61%) contain at least one plot that had been inherited by the cultivator. Add to these those holdings (about one out of every three) which

1. The internal tenure heterogeneity of the average Kinanbwa holding renders almost absurd the categorization scheme used in the Census of 1950, in which the population ends up being divided into five categories which supposedly are mutually exclusive: proprietors, renters from the State, renters from private owners, managers, and sharecroppers. This scheme is totally inappropriate for dividing the population of rural Haiti into meaningful economic categories. I have already presented data showing that we are not dealing with a population in which "the cultivator crops his plot of land." The average cultivator was found to be cropping a holding which consisted of more than five plots, generally small and for the most part scattered. But in every single case these plots were being cropped under more than one tenure relationship, frequently three, and sometimes even four. But using the categories of the Census, a cultivator cropping one plot of his own, three plots on a sharecropping basis, and one plot on a rental basis is taxonomically equated with a cultivator cropping four plots of his own and one on a sharecropping basis. A categorization scheme that lumps two such disparate economic types misses the dynamics of local agrarian life and cannot possibly achieve an economically meaningful breakdown of the population.

Yet many authors simply take the Census findings at face value. Moral's discussion of land in rural Haiti falls into this trap (1961: 178), as does Wingfield and Parenton's sweeping reference to "more than 90 percent of the peasants own(ing) their plot of land (1965: 347)." But

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had at least one plot belonging to the cultivator's wife, and lump them (as was done in Marbial) into the same category as holdings containing land inherited by the cultivator himself, and we will have an "inheritance quotient" that is very close to the seven-out-of-often reported in Marbial. Thus even in Kinanbwa an assessment of inheritance as a major land acquisition route appears to fare rather well.

The cultivators of Kinanbwa—who are admittedly in an excellent position to comment authoritatively on such matters—also lend support to this model. Every adult male was queried as to his general impression whether economically better-off villagers reached their position principally through the land they inherited or through land acquired by other means, especially land purchase. Though opinion was not unanimous, it was highly one sided. Of the 224 individuals queried, 172 (77%) were quite clear in their choice of inheritance as the major

even the anthropologist Bastien, who did several months of fieldwork in a peasant community, relied on the Census for his quantitative land data and thus falls into the same questionable idiom of analysis. He reports, for example, that 82.7% of the couples in his community were owners of their plots ("dueños de sus milpas") and thus fell into the category of "propietarios" (Bastien 1951:25-6). This statement, which implies a situation in which most holdings consist of a single tenure type, is highly suspect. That Bastien's community did not crop single-plot holdings under uniform tenure relationship is attested to by simultaneous quantitative research that was being carried out in the same general region (Comhaire-Sylvain 1952). Given the fact that both men and women inherit land, we would expect at least two plots per household as a minimum. Though Bastien's reference to "couples owning their plots" is compatible with this, the implication of homogeneous tenure relations within a holding is misleading.

I have attempted to avoid these pitfalls by gathering land tenure and land use data on a plot-by-plot basis. Respondents were not asked to generalize about their holding as a unit, but were asked to list each plot and were asked separate questions, including tenure relationship, for each plot. For a detailed discussion of the methodology employed and the safeguards to maximize accuracy, see Appendix B.
land-acquisition route. This highly consistent attitudinal pattern, in combination with the actual cropping patterns listed above, would seem to lend high credibility to an inheritance-model of land control in rural Haiti.

**NON-RANDOM ATTITUDES: A GLITCH IN THE MODEL**

But a tiny fly in the ointment can already be seen even within the strictly attitudinal data. The opinion of the villagers was not unanimous. A minority disagreed in effect with the inheritance model. Who were these 52 "intellectual rebels" whose view of their system was at odds with the majority opinion? Table 8-1 breaks the male population down into three age groups, separating within each

---

**TABLE 8-1**

**Age-Specific Distribution of Beliefs about Inheritance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age of Cultivator</th>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Disagreement</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>82% (81)</td>
<td>18% (18)</td>
<td>100% (99)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 49</td>
<td>80% (52)</td>
<td>20% (13)</td>
<td>100% (65)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 +</td>
<td>65% (39)</td>
<td>35% (21)</td>
<td>100% (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined</td>
<td>77% (172)</td>
<td>23% (52)</td>
<td>100% (224)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 6.46
2 df
P = .05

---

2. Herskovits was also told by his informants that the foundation of a person's wealth is the property which he inherits.
group those whose opinion supports the inheritance model and those
whose expressed opinion in fact contradicts it. Though the supporters
still constitute a majority in each age group, there is a subtle but
significant decline in such support among the older men. The
young and middle aged appear fairly consistent in their attitudes;
it is in the over-50 group that a somewhat different pattern begins
to appear.

Are we dealing with a simple generation gap? It is not likely.
There is other evidence that it is not age itself, but another dynamic
associated with age, which is more at the root of this attitude
"change." Table 8.-2 breaks down the adult male population into
three economic (rather than age) groups: those who have purchased no
land, those who have purchased some land but less than a carreau,
and those who have purchased a carreau or more of land. As with
the age groups, the supporters of the inheritance model have been
separated from the non-supporters within each of the economic groups.
Under this breakdown the non-random attitudinal variation becomes

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Amt. of land cultivated} & \text{Agreement} & \text{Disagreement} & \text{TOTAL} \\
\hline
\text{None} & 83\% \ (111) & 17\% \ (23) & 100\% \ (134) \\
\hline
\text{Under a carreau} & 73\% \ (33) & 27\% \ (12) & 100\% \ (45) \\
\text{Over a carreau} & 62\% \ (28) & 38\% \ (17) & 100\% \ (45) \\
\hline
\text{COMBINED} & 77\% \ (172) & 23\% \ (52) & 100\% \ (224) \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[\chi^2 = 8.4 \quad 2 \text{ df} \quad P = .05\]
even somewhat stronger. The more land an individual has purchased, the more likely is he to be inclined to a skeptical minority view concerning the all-importance of inheritance in contemporary Kinanbwa.

Such an attitudinal pattern is perhaps to be expected among those who have in fact purchased land, and the data do not in themselves disprove the validity of the inheritance-model, especially in light of its stature as the dominant model in all three age groups and all three economic groups. But these patterned minority opinions are nonetheless suggestive. We are dealing with a community in which there is a widespread folk version of the local land tenure system and the local road to success. This folk version will be held by the majority of the people (who will in turn transmit it to ethnographers). But the older a man gets and the more he actually achieves locally defined success (via land purchase), the less likely he is to adhere any longer to this popular notion. This pattern, which is being interpreted as a "change of mind" on the part of certain older and more successful community members about the way things "work" locally, should at least sensitize us to the possibility that the inheritance theory shared by most of the community may have at least some element of mythology in it.

THE MODEL THAT FAILS TO WORK

The suspicions become heightened when we leave the realm of the villagers' attitudes and enter the domain of their actual behavior. We will continue to focus our attention on the two pillars of the model being tested: the hypothesized prevalence of plots being cropped by cultivators who have inherited them, and the hypothesized predominance
of parentally allocated pre-inheritance plots in the incipient holdings of young adult male dependents. We may examine critically both of these areas to determine just how important a role such inherited plots actually play.

As for the general pool of plots being cropped by the community at large, the superficial support which the inheritance model receives from examining the number of households cropping at least one inherited plot vanishes when the data are looked at under a sounder breakdown. Recognizing that the individual holding has many plots, we will examine the actual tenure of each plot, and see what percentage of the plots have actually been inherited by the individuals cultivating them. To do this validly, it is necessary to break down the category of "owner" into a finer distinction between those who own the plot because they have purchased it and those who own the plot because they have inherited it. Besides separating inherited from purchased plots, it will also be useful to distinguish plots that belong to the cultivator's wife from those which he himself owns.

Table 8-3 separates the plots in this manner into six different groups, according to the route which the current cropper took to gain access to the particular plot. This detailed breakdown leaves one astonished at the small percentage of plots that are in fact being cropped by inheriting owners. The belief of villagers concerning the supreme importance of inheritance in the local economic system can by no means be dismissed as totally erroneous—but it must be radically reinterpreted. Fewer than two out of ten plots are in fact being cropped by their inheritors. The overwhelmingly preponderant tenure mode is that of
sharecropping. Generally treated as an occasional alternative tenure arrangement in the literature, sharecropping in fact emerges here as the dominant tenure arrangement which covers the majority of plots being cropped in the community. Under the guise of a conventional inheritance system, a fundamentally different type of land control dynamic has suddenly surfaced.

The first pillar of the inheritance model—the assumed predominance of access-via-inheritance—has not fared very well. What of the second conventionally accepted element of the model, the acquisition of pre-inheritance plots by young male dependents? We have seen that there are 47 young men in the community still living with their parents, but cropping gardens of their own. How do they in fact get access to this cropping land?
At this point some terminological distinctions are necessary. To say in Kinanbwa that an individual is "working his own garden" (ap travay jadé pal) is to say that he is the principal owner of the crops, but not necessarily of the land on which the crops are being grown. The word jadé refers principally to the crops; to refer to the piece of land itself, villagers will generally talk of the moso tè ("piece of ground"). In the case of the 47 young male dependents described as "working their own gardens," it thus remains to be seen exactly who were the owners of these plots. Were the plots in fact allocated to the young men by their parents, in a manner consistent with the pre-inheritance model that is reported? Some plots in fact were—but most were not.

Once again, in creating categories for an analysis the complexity of the actual situation must be taken into account. Because most of these young men are already working more than one garden of their own, and because they will have frequently received land from different sources, we must ask for each tenure category how many individuals are working at least one plot under that particular tenure arrangement. There were four generally possible sources of such land common in Kinanbwa, and Table 8-4 asks how many of the 47 young men cultivating their own gardens have gained access to at least one of the plots via each source. Once again the traditional model fares somewhat poorly. It immediately becomes clear that, though youths do rely on their parents (especially their fathers), they rely much more heavily on land which others will give them to sharecrop. The intrafamilial pre-inheritance arrangements which normatively constitute the proper path to economic autonomy are in fact less important to the up-and-coming generation.
TABLE 8-4

Sources of Cropping Land
Available to Dependent Males

What % of the 47 dependent males receive cropping ground from each source?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>% of 47</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>From father</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>From mother</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharecrops for others</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purchased</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

than the device of sharecropping for other members of the community.

But the situation departs from the conventional norm even more than Table 8-4 indicates. For the individuals who are listed as having received land from their father or their mother cannot be assumed to have received this land "for free" in the manner normatively preferred under the traditional pre-inheritance patterns. On the contrary, data presented in the next chapter will show that the modality of sharecropping has come to prevail even within households, as parents have increasingly turned to the custom of treating their own sons as sharecropping tenants. Not only will children frequently have to turn over a substantial part of the harvest to the parent (rather than keeping it all, as is frequently described in the literature). But such sons are even called sharecroppers (démwatyé) and so describe themselves. In short the second pillar of the inheritance-model of land control—pre-inheritance plots given to young men—has fared somewhat poorly when subjected to quantitative validation.
The preceding can now be summed up. Ethnographic research in Kinanbwa, utilizing conventional interview and observational techniques, produced a description of local land tenure dynamics that was in basic conformity to the inheritance and pre-inheritance models described for other rural communities of Haiti as well. But an additional utilization of somewhat more precise data on actual cropping patterns has raised the question of whether this traditional model truly accounts for the land control system as it actually operates, or might not rather be in certain aspects an ideal model of what villagers feel ought to happen. Specifically, quantitative data has exposed an unexpectedly high local dependence on the modality of sharecropping as the major access-route to cropping land. But this overwhelmingly preponderant role of sharecropping in Kinanbwa not only has no precise parallels in the literature, but also is not a particularly emphasized part of the model which emerges in villagers' versions of "how things work" locally. As occurred in other ethnographically documented villages, the peasants of Kinanbwa tended to emphasize the central role of inheritance as the principal access route to land.

The clear manner in which the figures reject a literal acceptance of this inheritance model suggests that we have captured quantitatively a commonly alluded to phenomena: the frequent disparity between belief and practice in human society. The disparity in this case revolves around a local belief in the importance of parental legacies as the foundation of the economic life of one's children, a version which parents as well as children tend to accept. This belief stands in somewhat sharp contrast, however, to the reality of a situation in
which most gardens in fact are being cropped under the less idyllic modality of démoutré, tenant sharecropping. Under this arrangement the tenant cropping the land will have to turn over a stipulated portion of the crop to a landlord—in many cases his own parent.

The data presented above strongly indicate that the land control system currently prevailing in Kinanbwa does not follow an inheritance modality, that there is a lack of fit between the traditional model and the systemic facts. There are two major alternative interpretations which come to mind. Either the elders of Kinanbwa and the ethnographic literature are somehow incorrect in the model they have all generally agreed upon. Or there has been change. The latter interpretation seems more warranted. Data will be presented below showing that in fact profound changes have indeed come over the land tenure system in the past decades. And when behavioral systems are in a state of flux, a disparity between ideas and practice is to be expected. The lack of comfortable fit between an inheritance model and the actual facts of contemporary land tenure in the community will emerge, then, as a symptom of deep reaching changes which this component of the local adaptive system is undergoing.

But systems in flux remain systems nonetheless. If the inheritance model does not provide an accurate systemic blueprint, then a model must be devised which does. It is the salience of sharecropping which is the most impressive systemic fact which emerged. But sharecropping seems, at first glance, to imply the existence of internal stratification, to call for a "stratificational" blueprint of a system where it prevails. Indeed, Haiti as a national entity
is a stratified society with a non-agrarian elite, and the occasional discussions of sharecropping which appear in the ethnographic literature do in fact tend to allude to the presence of occupationally distinct absentee landlords. The first impression is, therefore, that some sort of stratificational or class model might provide the appropriate framework within which to analyze contemporary land tenure dynamics in Kinanbwa. It is to this issue that discussion will now turn.

SHARECROPPING AND LOCAL STRATIFICATION

The question of social stratification and classes in Haiti is generally discussed in the context of urban elite vs. rural masses, the latter generally being dealt with as a basically homogeneous social unit. There are occasional references to internal differentiation among the peasants, with the gro abitā possessing more land than the ordinary cultivator, and this latter individual being distinguished in turn from the pèv nèt who is landless or nearly so (cf. DeYoung 1958: 34-5). But these differences appear to be one of degree, and not of kind. One would be hard pressed to defend the thesis of stratification in rural Haiti on the basis of the published evidence.

The presence of sharecropping in a community might seem to alter that. The tenure mode which accounts for most of the plots being cropped in Kinanbwa is rendered in Creole by the lexical item dëmwatyé. Because this tenure arrangement entails the appropriation by a landowner (mèt te) of part of a harvest produced by the labor of a "tenant," it has been rendered in English by the term "sharecropping." But in using and interpreting this term care must be taken to restrict its
meaning to the essential feature of sharecropping—the forfeiture of part of the harvest—and not to assume any additional components to the relationship which, though they might occur in other settings where sharecropping prevails, are of questionable applicability to the rural Haitian variant which has been documented in Kinanbwa.

Particular care must be taken to avoid the unwitting importation of unwarranted social-structural assumptions concerning the relationship between the landlords and their tenants. The fact that such relationships are so prevalent would appear to indicate that we are dealing, not with a "classic" Haitian freeholder community of the type portrayed in most of the literature, but rather with a more conventional "Latin American variant" of peasantry whose members are in many instances landless and as a result depend on tenant-access to land controlled by a socioeconomically distinct class of absentee latifundistas.

The presence of "sharecropping" as a category in the National Census of Haiti has indeed led some analysts into perhaps premature diatribes against the "absentee parasites" who presumably own all this sharecropped land. Though he doesn't tell us exactly who or where they are, Casimir for example has inferred the existence of such "parasites absenteistes" from his examination of census materials and breezily lays much of the blame for Haiti's stagnation on their exploitative shoulders (Casimir 1965).

Writers with a penchant for black-and-white class analyses, where the good guys (the exploited masses) are easily distinguished from the bad guys (the exploiting elite and the ideologues who complacently obfuscate their nefarious maneuvers), will presumably find as many villains in Haiti as in any other human society. But we are dealing with sharecropping,
and the data from Kinanbwa indicate that a class analysis, penetrating as it is in exposing latent configurations of economic interests in other settings, seems to offer few insights into the dynamics of sharecropping in Kinanbwa.

IDENTIFYING THE LANDLORDS

Residence of the Landlords

To expose what is happening, the first task is that of locating and identifying the landlords. Who are these individuals who own more than half of the plots being cropped by the cultivators of Kinanbwa? It will be instructive here to analyze and interpret several types of data which were collected on these landlords.

To begin, it will be useful to examine first the more than five hundred sharecropped plots whose owners were not immediate family members of the tenants. It is among this non-related landlord group that we should find our city-based, occupationally and residentially distinct rent-collecting class if such is indeed the context of Kinanbwa sharecropping. Table 8 -5 breaks down these plots in terms of the residence of their owners. What immediately becomes clear is that, if the owners are parasites, they are at least not the absentee type. They are rather a curious group of locally residing smallholders who in their vast majority live but a stone’s thrown from the front door of their tenants.

As the Table indicates, some eight out of every ten sharecropped plots have owners who live either in Kinanbwa or one of the several adjacent hamlets. (This quotient of local residents would be even higher if plots sharecropped for immediate family members were thrown in.)
### TABLE 8-5

Residential Distribution of Non-Related Landlords.

Where does the owner of the sharecropped plot reside?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Kinanbwa and surrounding hamlets</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Les Bayahondes</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elsewhere</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>539</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It must be pointed out immediately that the 539 separate plots here did not have 539 separate landlords. Many landlords were giving out more than one plot. Though an exact tabulation has not been made, the 539 plots were owned by between 250 and 300 landlords. That is there is little tendency to concentration. Few landlords were giving out more than five plots, though most were probably giving out more than one.

What emerges from the above data is the clear finding that the absentee landlord is a very rare figure in this process. Even the two out of ten who appear to reside either in the nearby town of Les Bayahondes or Port-au-Prince are scarcely "absentee landlords" in a conventional understanding of that term. Les Bayahondes is a twenty minute walk from Kinanbwa, and most of the plots owned by landlords listed as living in the town were, it was determined,
owned in fact by small cultivators living in one of the hamlet-like appendages to this town. That is, the number of genuinely town-based landlords of a different occupational class from the peasants was extremely low. And the quantity of sharecropped land owned by people residing in Port-au-Prince was clearly negligible. This handful of Port-au-Prince owners consisted for the most part of recent male emigrees who had turned to full time collaboration with their wives in urban trade.

The occupational and social-structural implications of these residential data are important. Quantitative data has already been given on the general lack of non-agricultural livelihoods in Kinanbwa. Those activities that did exist were at most minor appendages to the more fundamental role of cultivator. The fact that virtually all of the landlords were members of this hamlet, or of nearby hamlets, clearly indicates their membership in the same fundamental occupational and social sector as their tenants.

To avoid oversimplification, however, there is at least one major source of internal heterogeneity in the landlord group that must be pointed out: the variable of sex. In an earlier chapter, data were presented on the manner in which women are subtly marginalized from the land control arena. Nonetheless they do inherit and it would be expected that at least some of them would have land on which tenants are working, and that there would hence be a contingent of female landlords in the countryside. This suspicion is borne out in Table 8-6, where we see that some three out of ten sharecropped plots have female owners.
TABLE 8.6

Sex of Landlords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>538</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Depending on one's premises, one can be impressed either at the small number or the large number of sharecropped plots with female landlords. Under conditions of partible inheritance and prevalent conjugal property separation, one might expect more females to emerge as landlords. The dynamics preventing this were discussed in a preceding chapter. On the other hand the exclusive control of property by males that holds in some other peasant settings might make another observer remark on the high percentage of plots owned by females. But whatever the assessment, the social structural implications of the landlord data remain unchanged. Whether the owner is a local cultivator, or the wife (or sister) of a local cultivator, the landlord-tenant relationship of Kinembwa retains its status as a fundamentally intraclass phenomenon.

If residential propinquity and occupational similarity set the basic tone of landlord-tenant relationships, the realm of kinship also enters into play and will now be discussed.
Sharecropping and Kinship.

The preceding discussion indicated the degree to which landlords and tenants belong to residentially and occupationally identical social sectors, making somewhat forced the application of a stratificational analysis of this phenomenon. The domain of kinship reinforces the above discussion. Not only do landlords and tenants belong to the same class; they will in very many cases belong to the same kin group. Table 6-7 separates out those sharecropped plots on which the tenant is a relative of the landlord from those on which he is not. Though the latter constitute a majority, still

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>285</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>382</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>667</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

more than four out of ten sharecropped plots have been turned over by their owner to a relative of one sort or another.

The reason underlying this pattern is not as self-evident as might seem. In general the landowner is paradoxically better off if he gives the land to a non-relative. Given the current "rules
of the game" which are in fact generally followed, it is to the immediate economic benefit of a landlord not to have a relative as a tenant sharecropper. The key issue in this matter concerns the balance between the landlord's portion of the harvest versus the tenant's share therein.

An important determining factor of the balance that will finally be struck up in this area is the presence or absence of a kin relationship between tenant and sharecropper. The manner in which the division is made reflects the intra-class nature of sharecropping in Kinanbwa. The landlord is not an urbanite or idle townsman who waits for the tenant to bring half the harvest to his storehouse. He is rather a fellow villager who must **himself harvest his own portion**. This practice, which is adhered to in every crop except sugar cane, is explained locally in terms of "mistrust" of the tenant by the landlord, who fears he would otherwise get less than what is due him. Thus local explanations emphasize the conflict aspects of this arrangement rather than the class identity of landlord and tenant. Whatever the explanation, the point is that, come harvest time, it is not the harvest itself which is divided, but rather the as-yet unharvested garden. The plot of land will be divided into two sections. The sharecropper harvests one as his; the landlord harvests the other as his.

But the arrival of this moment can be the occasion for some hefty haggling. The current "rule" is that the landlord is entitled to half of the harvest, and that the land should be divided to reflect this agreement. Thus if there are less productive areas within the garden, they will be divided equally. But if the tenant is kin to the landlord, it is generally accepted that he should be permitted to
retain a larger portion of the harvest. The grumblings which landowners make on this point, and the general eagerness of cultivators to sharecrop for a close relative, seem to indicate that this unwritten rule is generally honored.

There are few if any countervailing advantages to having a relative as a tenant which might offset this clear economic disadvantage to the landlords. There is no evidence, for example, that a landlord can count on a sharecropper being more diligent in working the plot productively if he is a relative. On the contrary local norms permit much more impersonal supervision and the use of veiled threats of eviction toward non-kin to insure satisfactory performance on the plot, interactions that would be seen as less appropriate were the tenant a relative.

The question then would appear to be: why do so many landlords give to kin at all? At least some of the pattern may be analyzed in terms of a now-generalized construal whereby a landlord is described as "helping other people live" (fè lòt moun viy). It is seen as more appropriate that a needy relative should be the beneficiary of this largesse, rather than a non-relative.

But the prevalence of kinship relationships between landlords and tenants is probably governed by a somewhat different dynamic, one whose outline becomes visible if these relationships are categorized more specifically. Table 6-8 looks at the 285 sharecropped plots being worked by a relative of the owner and separates them out according to the specific kin relationship holding between the parties. Four out of ten such plots are accounted for by an arrangement
which will later be shown to be one of the major results of micro-evolutionary change in land tenure: relationships between parent-landlords and tenant sons. In terms of the proportion of the harvest which the landowner will receive, these are by far the most disadvantageous types of arrangements into which a landowner can enter. But there has operated in rural Haiti a very special type of microevolutionary dynamic bringing into statistical prominence this cross-culturally unusual type of relationship in the research community. This will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

The prevalence of kinship ties between many landlords and tenants imbues the sharecropping relationship with a highly egalitarian interactional texture and removes most traces of the social distance between the two parties which sharecropping may entail in other societies. But there is yet another intracommunity mechanism

| Nature of Kin Relations Between Landlords and Tenants |
|---------------------------------|---|---|
| **%**                          | **n** |
| Parent-Child                    | 39% | 110 |
| Other lineal                    | 13% | 37  |
| Close collateral                | 20% | 58  |
| Distant collateral              | 13% | 38  |
| Affinal                         | 11% | 31  |
| Other                           | 4%  | 11  |
| **TOTAL**                       | 100%| 285 |
operating toward the same general end: ritual kinship.

Though there is a proliferation of intra-community ritual kinship bonds, and though individuals become kōpē and kome in a variety of ceremonies which involve not only the baptism of children, but even somewhat less seriously taken rituals as the baptism of drums, there was a surprisingly low incidence of ritual kinship ties reported between landlords and tenants. When the sharecroppers were asked about the relationship between themselves and the landowner, only a handful reported working the plot of a godparent or ritual co-parent.

But there is evidence that this low incidence may possibly be more a function of the phrasing of the question rather than of the genuine absence of the relationship itself. The answer to the survey question "How is the landlord related to you?" (Ga li ye pou ou?) elicited only consanguineal or affinal ties. Ritual kinship ties did not appear to fall under the lexical domain covered by the question, and a separate query was not asked about ritual kinship.

But other types of ethnographic evidence indicated that two individuals between whom long-standing landlord-tenant ties had existed would in fact tend to formalize this relationship by establishing ties of ritual kinship through the baptism of a child. In most cases the landlord appeared to baptize the child of the tenant, imbuing the pattern with a certain asymmetry. But the asymmetry was not manifest in the form of any generally obsequious behavior on the part of tenants. An egalitarian definition of most interactions appeared to be steadfastly maintained.
Though linguistic factors prevented the surfacing of these ritual kinship patterns in the expected section of the survey data, evidence was sought in other components of that same corpus of data. Information existed for each male concerning the number of godchildren he had—a reasonably direct indicant of the frequency with which others had asked him to be a ritual co-parent. The possession of land is certainly not the only factor which elicits invitations to baptize children in Kinanbwa. But if it was a factor at all—and that is the point under discussion—then it was felt that the more godchildren a person had, the greater was the probability that he would in fact turn out to be a landlord with one or more tenants on his land.

This hypothesis is tested and strongly supported in Table 8-9. There are 64 males with a large number (four or more) godchildren. Seven out of ten males are also landlords in this group. There are

| TABLE 8-9 |
| Relationship Between Sharecropping and Ritual Coparenthood |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Is he a landlord?</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No. of god-</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>children</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| No. of god-      |       |       |       |
| children          |       |       |       |
| baptized.        |       |       |       |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>None</th>
<th>23% (12)</th>
<th>77% (40)</th>
<th>100% (52)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>37% (16)</td>
<td>63% (27)</td>
<td>100% (43)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-3</td>
<td>54% (36)</td>
<td>46% (31)</td>
<td>100% (67)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4+</td>
<td>70% (45)</td>
<td>30% (19)</td>
<td>100% (64)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>48% (109)</td>
<td>52% (117)</td>
<td>100% (226)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
52 men, in contrast, who have no godchildren. Only two out of every ten such men will be landlords. The vast majority of males without godchildren are also without tenants on their land. There is an impressively smooth progression in the data, which indicates a clear association between having tenants and having a larger number of godchildren and ritual co-parents. In terms of the social dynamics which produce this pattern, it seems rather obvious that it is the status of landlord which increases one's probability of being a sought-after godparent rather than vice-versa.

This apparent association of ritual kinship with the dynamics of sharecropping combines with the earlier mentioned prevalence of consanguineal kin-ties to foster an egalitarian construal of such arrangements and to militate against the symbolic or social expression of the resource differentials which in fact underlie most landlord-tenant relationships. Whether a social, economic, or purely occupational definition of social class is used, it is clear that the landlords of Kinanbwa, despite the slight "edge" they have over neighbors in terms of landholdings, are virtually all members of the same peasant class as the tenants who work on their land.

**THE STRATIFICATIONAL MODEL FAILS.**

The abovementioned bodies of data seemed to point in the general direction of an intraclass rather than an interclass model of Kinanbwa sharecropping. But it must be admitted that the invoking of such residential, occupational, and familial data constitutes at best an indirect support of this claim. But there are other pieces of information that can definitively settle the matter once and for all.
The entire discussion up until now has proceeded on the premise that the landlords and the tenants constitute, if not two social classes, at least two discrete groups of individuals within the community--i.e. that one could theoretically line the landlords up on one side of the village, and their tenants on the other. This premise is itself, however, false. For a surprising pattern has emerged in the data indicating that the majority of individuals occupying the landlord status vis-à-vis one individual will simultaneously be occupying a tenant status vis-à-vis another. That is, landlords and tenants cannot possibly constitute two separate economic classes, since the same individuals tend to straddle both groups simultaneously.

To unravel this bewilderingly complex fabric of overlap, I will have to refine our breakdowns. Now the task will be to determine more specific patterns of sharecropping involvement, to learn precisely what percentage of these cultivators occupy the status of "landlord," and what percentage of them are "tenants." This breakdown of the population is carried out in Table 8-10 which makes two independent breakdowns of the population of 227 Kinanbwa cultivators. On the left hand side it asks how many of these cultivators fall into the category of "landlord" by virtue of their letting someone else crop at least one of their plots as a tenant. On the right hand side the Table asks (of the same 227 cultivators) how many of them are in fact "tenants" by virtue of their cropping at least one plot as a sharecropper for some other member of the community (including members of their own household, if such be the case).
The astronomically high quotient of "role mingling" becomes obvious. From the left hand side of the Table, the cultivators of Kinanbwa emerge as a paradoxical population of small-holding peasant cultivators, whose principal livelihood is working land and raising livestock, yet half of whom are simultaneously landlords. They turn over plots to others (bay lôt moun démyaté), collecting a landlord's share of the harvest. And if the simple quotient of landlordism is high, its intensity is no less so. For these 109 cultivator/landlords will generally have more than one tenant. Fifty nine of them (54%) are in fact giving out two or more plots on a sharecropping basis.

Surprising as this pattern is, it leaves one unprepared for the pattern which emerges on the right side of the Table. Looking at these same 227 cultivators from a different point of view, the Table reveals that fully seven out of ten of them are also tenants, working at least one (and frequently more than one) of their plots on a sharecropping
basis, turning over a share of the harvest to a landlord. This somewhat unusual situation, whereby half of the cultivators are landlords, but almost three fourths of them are also tenants, can occur only because there is a large number of individuals simultaneously occupying the status of landlord and tenant.

The degree to which this occurs can be documented exactly. Table 8-11 looks at the 109 cultivators who have tenants on their land—i.e. the 109 landlords—and asks how many of them are themselves tenants on the property of others. Table 8-12 then looks conversely at all of the tenants in the community and asks how many of this subgroup are simultaneously giving out land to others on a sharecropping basis. The degree of overlap is quite impressive. Among the pool of 162 "sharecroppers" in Kinanbwa there are 63—some four out of every ten—who also give land out to others. But the figures for the landlords are even more striking. Almost six out of every ten individuals who have tenants working on their land are simultaneously working as tenants on the land of others.

This enigmatic pattern of overlap will be carefully unwound and analyzed in later chapters. But there is one very important point to be made here. It should by now be clear that a conventional class analysis will fail to account for many aspects of the land tenure situation in Kinanbwa. In terms of the presence of economically burdensome liens on part of the harvest of a tenant-producer, the rural Haitian landlord-tenant relationships which have been discussed here must definitely be placed in the genus Sharecropping. But in terms of the residential, occupational, familial, and intracommunity social dynamics govern-
### TABLE 8.-11

**Landlords Who Are Simultaneously Tenants**

Does this landlord simultaneously sharecrop as someone else's tenant?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### TABLE 8.-12

**Tenants Who Are Simultaneously Landlords**

Does this tenant simultaneously give out plots as someone else's landlord?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>162</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
ing such local arrangements, a cautious analyst would place it tentatively in a somewhat different "species" from the class-governed aparcerías of Latin America, and approach it carefully with somewhat different analytic tools.

In summing up this chapter, it will be helpful to bear in mind the demographic hypothesis underlying this entire presentation, emphasizing the notion that agrarian societies can be expected to respond to the phenomenon of population growth. The thesis was forwarded that there has occurred in the part of rural Haiti where research was carried out a microevolutionary adaptation of the land tenure system as a response to demographic increment. The "tip of the iceberg," the exposed corner of this change, manifested itself as a curious incongruity between the traditional model of land tenure attributed to Haiti, and the pattern which emerged on the basis of statistical, plot by plot analysis in Kinanbwa. The lack of fit between the contemporary reality and the traditional model manifested itself principally in the form of an unexpected and puzzling systemic emphasis on sharecropping as the prevailing tenure mode rather than traditional inheritance.

Because sharecropping is generally associated with interclass patterns of rent collection, and because of the general importance of asymmetric economic linkages in peasant economic systems throughout the world, special attention was given to examining the validity of a stratificational framework to analyze sharecropping in Kinanbwa. The most valid guiding assumption, in cross cultural perspective, was that sharecropping in Kinanbwa would turn out to
be a spin-off of local class structure.

But a series of careful tabulations have shown that this could hardly be the case. The evidence points strongly to the fact that Kinanbwa sharecropping is fundamentally an *intraclaw* rather than an *interclass* phenomenon. Most impressive was the pattern whereby the landlords and the tenants are frequently merged in the same individual. It is clear that analysis in the idiom of discrete classes would do violence to the data from Kinanbwa and would constitute an unwarranted forcing of a conceptual shoe onto a foot that simply has a different shape.

Thus the analytic problem, the paradox, remains unsolved. Thus far I have succeeded in showing only that two models—an inheritance model and a *stratification* model—do not account for the contemporary land tenure system, that a system is operating to which neither of these conventional blueprints even closely applies. The careful "refutation" of these models in the preceding pages has been more than a simple presentational device. It is in a sense merely the replication of what occurred over and over again in the process of analysis. The collection and electronic processing of detailed land tenure data, rather than facilitating analysis, systematically invalidated theory after theory about what was happening in the village. The result was the disquieting experience of having several "insights," product of two years of fieldwork, mercilessly demolished by quantitative data which refused to "fall into place."

After several "returns to the drawing board," the enigma has, I believe, been substantially cleared up. Order was finally thrown into
the data by the application of an evolutionary model of change in which the impact of the historically documented demographic increment is followed step by step. The system is in a state of flux, and the puzzling discrepancy between local belief and local action can be seen as a normal characteristic of systems undergoing such change. If we assume that the inheritance model represents an anterior state of the system, if we put it aside, and if we approach the data from the vantage point of demographically induced microevolutinary shifts, a new order and a new system emerge. But it is an order and a system for which I believe there currently exist no precise ethnographic analogs.

I view the remainder of the task as follows. The opening chapter of Part Three will supply the quantitative data supporting a detailed macroevolutionary model which I believe accurately reconstructs the "dissolution" of certain central features of the traditional economy of rural Haiti under the impact of population pressure, and which accounts for the otherwise enigmatic switch from a system based on inheritance to one in which stratum-internal sharecropping is the dominant tenure mode. Following this chapter, a revised blueprint will be given of the manner in which the new system works. Finally an analysis will be given of the unanticipated manner in which Haitian voodoo has emerged as the etic mainspring of the transformed system.
PART THREE

THE EVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION OF LAND TENURE
CHAPTER NINE
THE EVOLUTIONARY MODEL

Part Three, the final section of this presentation, will throw order into initially enigmatic land tenure patterns via the application of an evolutionary model of adaptive change. But the application of an evolutionary model implies to some degree the utilization of a "before and after" construal. The general outline of the before state will be described through a discussion of the traditional peasant adaptation of nineteenth century Haiti. The transformed after state surfaced in the sharecropping data presented above. The analytic challenge is to reconstruct the exact movement of the system from Point A to Point B.

But to discuss the dissolution of certain features of the old system, and their replacement by a series of demographically generated adaptive modifications, we will need a fairly detailed blueprint of the "traditional system." For the objective is not only to show that a particular system can be said to have changed over time. The task is further to specify the precise dynamics of this change, indicating which particular aspects of the preexisting system were placed under stress by the process of local demographic increment, how this stress was translated into modifications by individuals of their economic behavior, and how these aggregate patterns of changed individual behavior remeshed into a somewhat transformed variant of the traditional system, thus maintaining the viability of the basic structure of traditional economic life. For if some features of local life had become unfeasible, the adaptive maneuvering of the population succeeded in salvaging a number of other essential features.
By identifying the operation of an underlying system, and by blueprinting its basic structural features, analysis will avoid getting lost in myriad individual details and will be able to focus in on those lifespheres where the microevolutionary "action" has been most deep-reaching and impressive. But at the same time an insistence will be maintained on translating all abstract "systemic" formulations into types of comprehensible, logical individual human behaviors. Analysis will thus be forced to avoid the facile invocation of enigmatic "structural-functional" inventions of one sort or another, a deus ex machina tactic which has damaged the credibility of more than one analysis of social life. Thus the analysis will not only endeavour to expose certain latent linkages between population and culture, but will further attempt to reconcile the conflicting demands of two separate conceptual worlds, the abstract world of systemic analysis, and the more concrete world of intelligible human behaviors.

The vehicle for this conceptual integration will be an evolutionary model of change, in which the transformation of a land-control system is followed step by step, as successive generations of economic actors are subtly but effectively veered into economic pathways that in the aggregate differ from the paths trodden by their forbears. The cumulative result of these demographically motivated "deviations" from the ways of the elders is a transformed land tenure system whose principal feature is the community-internal proliferation of resource-circulating landlord/tenant dyads.

To construct (or "reconstruct") a useful model of the traditional
A SYSTEMS APPROACH TO AGRARIAN STRUCTURES: THE CASE OF TRADITIONAL HAITI

PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION

In devising abstract models as structural blueprints for concrete systems, anthropologists as well as ecologists have found it useful to resort to the construct of energy flow. Viewing sociocultural systems as being, at a very deep level, mediators of energy flow, we can heuristically isolate, at an abstract level, at least two major basic functions which such energy systems must carry out: the allocation of resources to economic actors within the system and the mobilization of energy putting these resources to productive use. These root constructs—resource allocation and energy mobilization—provide a penetrating device for apprehending the dynamics of the microevolutionary sequence which has unfolded in Kinanbwa.

The concrete form which these abstract constructs will take depends on the nature of the society. In agrarian societies, such as the one being studied here, "resource allocation" largely (though not exclusively) comes to be dealt with under the more specific rubric of land tenure. The concept of energy mobilization, in turn, tends to be more concretely embodied, in such societies, under the rubric of labor arrangements. The major source of wealth in agrarian societies is the soil; the major form of energy which produces the wealth is the energy flowing directly from human organisms in the form of field labor. Whether we view land as a resource and labor as an exploiter of that resource, or whether—perhaps more correctly—
we view both land and labor as basic resources, in singling them out for analysis, we will have plunged directly to the heart of agrarian life.

Though the land allocation function is carried out under quite divergent tenure arrangements by different food-producing systems, there is little ambiguity in the basic cross-cultural "placing" of the tenure system governing land in traditional Haiti. In his discussion of peasant land tenure types, Wolf singled out one type whose defining characteristic is the fact that "...land is viewed as private property of the landowner, an entity to be bought and sold, and used to obtain profit for its owner (1966:53).

This characterization, which he labels as mercantile domain, applies in its entirety to the Haitian peasantry. Throughout Haiti cultivation is done in the context of a private-property system in which land, as well as the produce grown thereon, can be and are freely transacted in the market.

In an earlier chapter, a discussion was given of a number of background features of the land tenure system currently prevailing, not only in Kinaanbwa, but throughout rural Haiti. Of particular importance for the present discussion is the pre-existing institutional structure which to a very large degree was used as a model in the codification of land control patterns by the earliest Haitian leaders. This model, which was a variant of French land tenure institutions adapted to an overseas plantation colony, left Haiti the legacy of a private property system in which land was both inheritable and alienable. I have described the complex maneuvers entered by the villagers to skirt certain aspects of this European institutional structure. But the basic axioms of European land tenure—the
private, inheritable, and alienable nature of real property—have continued to thrive as cornerstones of contemporary land control throughout Haiti. The microevolutionary modifications which a changed resource base has brought about in Kinanbwa are profound, but they have occurred within the context of, and left totally intact, these basic institutionally mandated premises.

The importance of these pre-existing institutional givens should not be underestimated. The literature on agrarian ecology has documented several instances in which communal institutions of land control have yielded to private property under conditions of demographic pressure. But in Haiti—and in other post-colonial systems such as Haiti—such a development did not occur. The societies rather started with a private property system. The Haitian case is of particular interest because, as will be seen, the aggregate impact of the changes which have occurred pushes the system "back" somewhat into a quasi-communal "land-circulating" modality—but always within the context of private property and the individual proprietary behavior which such a system legitimizes.

The nature of the traditional land tenure system is fairly well understood. It is the other root function of an agrarian system—the energy mobilization function—that bears more careful discussion. In an earlier chapter I described the structure of labor alternatives currently utilized in Kinanbwa. But the entire question of agrarian labor mobilization must be given a careful systems conceptualization if the impact of population pressure is to be understood.

In any pre-industrial food producing system, especially in a
labor intensive system such as Haiti's, where even the animal drawn plough is rarely used, the mobilization of human labor must be ana-
lytically recognized as a genuine problem, a focal point of economic maneuver, whether we are talking in terms of systemic design principles or of consciously perceived individual human concerns. But human labor is mobilized only in terms of some describable reward structure. A grasp of the prevailing reward structure, then, will be one of the keys for understanding the dynamics of any particular system.

It is perhaps true that in some private-property pre-industrial food-producing systems, the labor-rewarding function is largely carried out in terms of the payoffs accruing directly to the landowner. That is, if the bulk of the human energy inputs into the soil are provided directly by the landowner himself, the reward system has as its central component the harvest itself, which the laboring landowner will dispose of as his. In such a setting there is no separate systemic "problem" with respect to labor mobilization, apart from the successful harvesting and disposal of the crop. Cultivators are simply working for themselves.

But no real-life system works this way. When dealing with labor-intensive agrarian systems, it is doubtful whether many cases could be found where even the bulk of the caloric input into any plot in the course of a cropping cycle is made by the landowner himself. In all systems a great deal of the labor will be provided by other individuals, and there are clearly systems where most of the human energy applied to most plots of land will have come from individuals whom the landowner has in one fashion or another recruited to
work on his land. Such patterns of "alien" labor recruitment—whether it take the form of exchange labor, wage labor, or even domestic labor—is in its essence a built-in design feature of such systems, mandated by the very nature of the tasks being carried out. The existence of seasonality in the agricultural cycle, of periods of peak labor demands, of tasks which require coordination between several individuals—these and several other "manmade" features discussed earlier create a pattern whereby the cultivators of Kinanbwa, as with their counterparts around the world, find themselves regularly obliged to mobilize the labor of other individuals on their plots, as essential supplements to the energy inputs which they the landowners themselves physically supply.

The need for supplementary, supra-individual energy inputs could quite well be termed a universal pattern in agrarian societies. But though the ubiquitousness of this pattern makes it part of the "normal scenery" in peasant settings, it will here be singled out and placed in the spotlight of analysis. For it is precisely through the intervening variable of "supra-individual labor needs" that population pressure has worked its system-transforming wedge into the machinery of rural Haitian subsistence.

Because the domain of supra-individual labor needs is so critical to the analysis, it will be useful to examine carefully the nature of the reward structure within whose context such labor is mobilized. I have briefly mentioned three "brands" of such supra-individual labor: exchange labor, wage labor, and domestic labor. Exchange labor is clearly mobilized in the context of a
local structure of work-trading arrangements, whereby individuals purchase labor with labor. There are many variants of this arrangement, including (in Kinantwa) arrangements whereby an individual may repay labor by sending his son off to work on the land of the other. Supplementary payments—especially in terms of food given to those who come to labor—are also common features in many exchange labor arrangements. But the essential principle is that labor is purchased with labor. Equally straightforward is the reward structure governing wage labor: labor is purchased with money. Whether the arrangement is one of payment per unit of time, or payment for the completion of a specific task, the basic principle is that labor is purchased with cash. In both of these cases, the obvious need for a formalized remuneration structure is taken for granted by analysts, and a detailed description of such arrangements is a standard part of many ethnographies of peasant communities.

But it is rare to find equally detailed discussion of the "reward problem" with respect to the third type of supra-individual labor: domestic labor. It is clear that exchange labor is purchased with labor, wage labor with cash. But the "transactional" nature of the mobilization of domestic labor is not frequently alluded to. It seems frequently to be assumed that the regular availability of such labor is somehow a taken-for-granted side effect of the operation of a peasant family system. It is only if he is short on domestic labor, the argument might go, that the cultivator has a "labor problem," that he must maneuver to "recruit" labor.

I would like to explicitly call to attention the false premise which underlies much of this view. A grasp of microevolutionary
process will be greatly facilitated if explicit recognition is given to the "problematic" nature of the mobilization of domestic labor as well. The regular acquisition of such labor inputs is as much the function of a palpable reward structure as is the regular acquisition of other types of supra-individual labor. It is a matter of systemic design, and of the behavioral maneuvers which are the concrete manifestation of such design. To understand how the system "works" in mobilizing this type of labor, the nature of the reward structure must be as explicitly blueprinted as is the case with the recruiting of exchange and wage labor.

It is not possible to state with any exactitude what proportion of the energy inputs in a traditional cropping cycle of rural Haiti were typically supplied by each of the major labor sources (landowner's labor, domestic labor, exchange labor, wage labor). What does appear clear is that in the traditional system the inputs from domestic labor were indeed great. A discussion in an earlier chapter has alluded to the apparent centrality of female labor in the traditional system. Furthermore, not only the reminiscences of Kinanbwa elders, but also ethnographic accounts of traditional family life indicate the central role which the labor of sons played in the lakous of old (e.g. Bastien 1951:128-9; cf. also Moral 1961: 169-70). The larger size of the landholdings during the 19th century meant that even the presence of a large contingent of adolescent and young adult sons in a lakou did not free the lakou from the need for participating in one or more of the large scale (and ethnographically colorful) communal work arrangements prevalent in by-gone decades. But the indications are that the fountainhead of agrarian energy flow was the domestic group.
Because of this importance of domestic energy in the context of traditional life, ambiguity as to the nature of the reward structure within which this current was mobilized would constitute a defect in any purported blueprint of the system. The matter is especially crucial since it is this particular span in the chain of agrarian energy flow which would first buckle under the impact of demographic stress, this particular aspect of the system's machinery which was demographically sabotaged. In exploring this machinery, it is of particular importance to identify the mechanism for mobilizing what in Kinanbwa has always been the more critical subcomponent of domestic labor: the energies of adolescent and young adult males.

PRE-INHERITANCE: MECHANISM OF FILIAL LABOR RECRUITMENT

From their earliest years boys began working on the gardens of their fathers. By the age of eight or nine many of them were already mâyè rou, wielding a hoe. Data from Kinanbwa indicate that in contemporary times males will stay in their parental homes till their late twenties before establishing their first conjugal union, and that in traditional times the onset of the male conjugal career began a few years later. This means that the rural Haitian male potentially supplies some twenty years of labor to his father. But his most important labor contributions, those in which his output capacity is at its height, are precisely in those years when he is biologically capable of leading his own economic and conjugal life. Analysis, rather than assuming that his free labor will come automatically, by virtue of his residence in his parental home, should rather wonder at and probe the enigmatic mechanism which sustains this astounding energy flow from male dependents to the gardens of their fathers.
It is here that a systemic view of traditional life will expose linkages easily missed by the tools of descriptive ethnography. How do fathers extract this sustained labor? It is true that local ideal norms dictate that dependent males will work on their father's plots under his supervision; but anthropologists know well that human beings are notorious for breaking local ideal norms. Peasant domestic systems must incorporate carrots and clubs if they are to remain viable. What is the carrot (or club) in this particular system?

As in so many other peasant settings, much of the power that fathers wield over the behavior of their sons stems from their control of the crucial resource of land. In systems where inheritance is the dominant land transmission mode, the life chances of children are directly dependent on what they receive from their parents. This is precisely the situation which prevailed in the traditional system of Haiti. The twenty years of labor which children gave to their fathers—particularly the last ten years thereof—was directly related to a reward structure in which their own eventual access to cropping ground was contingent on the regular prestation of such labor. This is a logical conclusion; but I will present data showing that it is an empirical fact as well, that there is in fact a clear linkage between the parental behavior of allocating land and the filial behavior of expending most of one's energies on parents' gardens.

But here the task is still diagrammatic. To say that land is the incentive is too general. It yet remains to identify the specific
"circuits" by means of which the reward of land was able to mobilize filial labor (and to some degree continues to do so) in this particular system. Land is a fairly generalized reward in peasant systems. But if we want to trace the path of microevolutionary adaptation within a given system, a clear knowledge of the internal wiring of that particular system will be required.

We have already come across the principal mechanism governing father-son labor relations in the traditional domestic system of rural Haiti: the pre-inheritance land grants made to sons in their teens and early twenties. There are systems in which no regular land provision is made for the young until the formal retirement of the parents from economic life. For a number of reasons, such a system never took root in Haiti. The presence of European land-control institutions were a pre-existing "given" which determined some basic features of the land tenure system that was to emerge in Haiti. But these institutional givens provide at the most a broad series of guidelines and constraints. The room for considerable systemic maneuver within these guidelines has made the system highly amenable to influence from other determining forces.

Demographic Underpinnings of Filial Autonomy

One determinant was the demographic situation of the 19th century decades which witnessed the crystallization of Haitian peasant lifeways. After the expulsion of the Europeans, and for many decades thereafter, there were too few people to cultivate all of the land. Though a paradoxical reverse of the current problem, it will be recalled that early Haitian leaders were so concerned about Haiti's
"population problem" that the device of importing Africans and American blacks was actually resorted to. Thus the peasant system which eventually took root, did so in a Haiti that was quite different from the Haiti of today. It was the low population density, and the concomitant abundance of land, which played a major part in shaping the land control system which was to emerge.

The officially sanctioned breakup of the land which eventually came, the widespread granting and selling of plots on the part of the government, resulted in the acquisition by thousands of individuals of holdings that frequently went beyond the combined labor capacities of the owner and his family members. Though one cannot fix exact dates, by the last quarter of the 19th century probably few tracts of arable soil were not either under cultivation or at least under the claim of one or another owner. The "frontier" or "land available" situation had in short been a passing stage in Haitian history. But even when the land frontier closed, the situation was one of relative abundance for that generation which had participated.

An agrarian society had emerged in which domestic landlessness was virtually non-existent. But the claims which were eventually laid to most of the nation's arable land, the effective closing of this internal land frontier, meant that a landless section was bound to arise: the young. The extradomestic land-acquisition options which had been so important for the creation of the holdings of the parental generation were not as available to subsequent cohorts. These latter depended for their own start in life on the land they would eventually receive from their landowning (and relatively land-abundant)
parents. Hence the power which the patriarchs exercised over their children.

But the manner in which this power came to be exercised was directly shaped by the prevailing land-abundant situation. Young men, it might be expected, pushed for their independence as quickly as they could achieve it. And the very abundance of land enjoyed by those already established in a sense enhanced the "bargaining power" of this younger generation. Because it was still difficult to find the labor necessary to put all land into effective cultivation in these formative generations, many local landowners were quite eager to supplement their own labor (and the domestic labor they could mobilize) by working at least part of their holdings under an arrangement that had been present in rural Haiti since the beginning: the arrangement of sharecropping. That is, the young could easily find land to work in those days, even though they would be sharecroppers.

But such behavior on the part of the young—-their sharecropping for others—was a direct threat to the domestic economy of their parents. It would constitute a direct drain on the domestic labor provided by these sons. Were the sons to go elsewhere for their land, the very basis of parental power to elicit filial labor would be undercut. But this was a crucial source of labor, and an arrangement had to be worked out whereby the land-abundant situation would not sabotage the liens which parents needed to maintain on the labor of these sons.
Pre-Inheritance: Mechanism of Parental Control

Now I believe that we are in a position to see clearly why the traditional land control arrangements of rural Haiti took the shape that they did. A combination of land abundance and labor scarcity underwrote the emergence of the arrangement whereby labor needy parents allocated land to sons in their late teens to crop "as their own." These pre-inheritance grants, reported throughout Haiti, have traditionally been the principal gateway to economic autonomy on the part of the young. Bastien expressed surprise at the autonomy which parents in Marbial granted to their children under this arrangement (1951:37-40). But if we look at the demographic antecedents of this pattern, there is little paradox: the parents had little choice. To prevent the crucial labor power of their young adult sons from being drained off into the plots of others, they were effectively maneuvered into making the sons a better offer. In these formative years, when the basic patterns were taking shape, the holdings of the parents were generally large enough to permit the granting, "no strings attached," of a substantial plot of land to the young man, to use as though it were his. This was an offer that no competing neighbor was likely to better.

But of course there was a hidden string, a quite powerful one in fact. Now in possession of his "own" provisionally granted plot, the young man was in no position to scot off and moonlight on the plots of labor-needy neighbors. What father gave, father could take away. The maintenance of his newly acquired land was contingent on the young man's fidelity to local domestic norms, particularly that
rule which bound him to regular unremunerated labor in his father's gardens. The traditional domestic system thus emerges here as incorporating a utilitarian, short-range solution which killed two birds with one stone. On the one hand this solution—the pre-inheritance grant—supplied the young with land. But it did so in such a fashion that it simultaneously secured the allegiance of these children to their parental estate, and guaranteed the continuing availability of this invaluable young-adult male labor to the parents as long as the youth remained in the home.

Land is in general a source of power in peasant settings. But I insisted above that, to understand the workings of a specific system, the exact "power circuits" must be traced. The land-abundant context in which the Haitian peasant adaptive system crystallized led to a type of "wiring" in which the institution of pre-inheritance land-grants came to be the concrete manifestation of domestic power.

The basic surface features of this domestic system have been faithfully captured by most ethnographers; but the underlying power linkages are generally ignored. The use of the pre-inheritance land grant as a weapon of domestic power has, to my knowledge, not been adequately clarified. It is common, rather, to focus on the autonomy-granting aspects of the traditional land-endowals. Parents are construed as helping their sons move toward economic independence. But this is only a partial view, for though to some degree the autonomy of the youth is increased when he begins to cultivate his own garden, it must not be forgotten that the son is henceforth less likely to turn elsewhere in search of gainful employment. And it must fur-
thermore be recalled that even in the traditional system the son turned over most of the profits from his gardens to his parents in preparation for his own eventual establishing of a conjugal union (cf. Herskovits 1971:101). That is the son has been more closely integrated into his own family, not freed from it, by the granting of such pre-inheritance land.

The land-grants were not made, of course, in the naked idiom of economic calculation. Nor did sons preface their aid to their parents with spoken provisos concerning the land they were expecting. All was done in the context of custom and intrafamilial harmony. But ideologies of domestic harmony and of familial obedience are notoriously flimsy under conditions of breakdown in the technology of control. And it is in this light--its use as a vehicle of control--that the pre-inheritance land grant is most penetratingly analyzed.

But if the arrangement is profitably analysed in terms of individual economic maneuver, its systemic aspects must not be lost sight of. At the beginning of the chapter I heuristically singled out for discussion two central functions carried out by any viable socio-cultural system: the allocation of resources and the mobilization of energy. In the context of the traditional pre-inheritance system presented here, the subterranean linkages between these two functions lies analytically exposed. Long-term currents of domestic energy, critical to one group of economic actors, are mobilized and sustained via the reverse funneling of the resource of land, critical to the suppliers of the labor. By any definition of the term, we have a genuine system at work here, composed of separate but functionally linked components.
Thus the two levels of analysis—the systemic and the individual—are attended to in this model. The basic drama is one of individuals pursuing their objectives along a trajectory guided by a pre-existing structure of technological, demographic and institutional constraints. The offshoot, however, is the crystallization of regularized, aggregate patterns of resource allocation and energy mobilization—i.e. the birth of a system. Thus do systems emerge; and thus was born the particular land-control system which was for a brief period of history to guide the economic destinies of the Haitian peasant.

**Population Pressure, Microevolution, and the Florescence of Sharecropping**

Emphasis in the above conclusion must clearly be placed on the word "brief." On the one hand the system which evolved in rural Haiti proved extremely viable. If the literature and the testimony of older informants is to be believed, this system produced its own "golden age." History was to bestow several decades of prosperity on the children of those slaves who had achieved the unique feat of expelling European masters. But on the other hand such a system is extremely fragile. On a small enclosed island habitat of Hispaniola, in the presence of population growth, such an arrangement could not last. The golden age of this land control system was, in fact, to be quite short-lived.

Before long the system had already begun to come under stress. Though there are no reliable indications that the reproductive output of the Haitian population was any greater than that of other Caribbean societies, the outlets for this population were demonstrably fewer. The relative isolation in which Haiti had lived since its earliest
days as the only Caribbean island population to physically eject the European colonists was, in Caribbean context, unusually high. Emigration, though it existed, occurred at a lower rate than in most other neighboring islands still attached to a recipient metropolis. And the metropolitan sources of capital, which created various non-peasant occupational outlets on many other islands, were not to be found to any large degree in Haiti. The result has been a population which has not only increased geometrically from its 19th century state, but which has remained for the most part directly tied to the land. This internal growth has reversed the land-abundance of the formative years. The inevitable diminishing of modal holding size has had profound consequences--human as well as systemic--for the particular group of people who have inherited the dilemma.

On the one hand, this rapid decline in the prosperity of rural Haiti is a very specific problem affecting a very specific group of human beings. But at the same time the problem is very broad and general. Because of its intimate linkage with the process of demographic increment, the bind into which the agrarian system of rural Haiti quickly entered is a microcosmic replay of a larger theme which has affected the economic destinies of untold myriads of human beings in different world regions, at different periods of human history. Yet it is a process which is only now, within the past few decades, beginning to be understood scientifically. It is for this reason that care will be taken to reconstruct empirically, with as much systemic detail as possible, the particular rural Haitian replay of this archaic theme.
The specific task here is to take this traditional system, whose internal functioning has to some degree been analyzed, and to follow it step by step as it passes through a microevolutionary sequence. In the preceding chapter I have shown that the dominant feature of the contemporary system is an intricate web of community internal sharecropping. The evolutionary model must therefore account for the step-by-step transformation of a system from one based principally on inheritance to one based principally on sharecropping. In laying bare the details of this sequence, analysis will shed empirical light on the larger question of the impact of population growth on human behavior.

The presentation will be made in two parts. To permit succinct presentation of the entire model, quantitative evidence for (and detailed discussion of) specific nodes in the microevolutionary chain will be held off until an overall presentation of the entire sequence has been made. But once this overview of the path of local microevolutionary change has been given, and the contemporary proliferation of "landlords" and "tenants" thus accounted for, analysis will backtrack, to perform the critical task of documenting empirically this process. The evolutionary drama will be analyzed into its component sequences. Discussion of, and evidence for, each of the smaller sequences will then be presented, to indicate that the sequence of events posited by the model did in fact historically occur in Kinanbwa. The result will be a fairly detailed model of the step-by-step transformation of a land tenure system under the impact of population pressure, along pathways consistent with the application of an evolutionary paradigm.
THE SEQUENCE DESCRIBED

The Arrival of Stress

The baseline state for the analysis is the period of 19th century prosperity. The critical feature of the system is the custom which arose and was rapidly institutionalized of making "no strings attached" pre-inheritance land grants to all male dependents in their late teens or early twenties. Such a custom, predicated on the availability of abundant unused or underused land in the holdings of parents, is a systemic device for ensuring that the young men continue giving unremunerated labor on the gardens of their parents. The alternative would be to lose the labor of the sons, who would search for sharecropping opportunities—readily available—on the land of other community members, and would curtail their own labor prestations on the gardens of the fathers.

As time passes and descendants multiply, the bestowal of such pre-inheritance land becomes somewhat more problematic. In the face of a fundamentally unchanging hoe technology, the productive capacities of each generation of young remain fundamentally unaltered. But the ka tè—the quarter of a carreau—which the fathers made to young men in those days, becomes increasingly expensive. As each generation passes this ka constitutes a higher percentage of the total parental holding than was true in previous generations. Stated differently, this allocation of pre-inheritance land becomes an increasingly expensive strategy for securing the labor of sons. The value of the child's labor on the garden does not increase; but the relative cost of giving him a ka of land most certainly does. For each successive generation, the allocation of an acceptably large pre-inheritance plot constitutes an ever larger cut into one's total holdings.
The aggregate parental adaptive response to this dilemma was quite predictable. Slowly but surely, pre-inheritance land grants are diminished, delayed, curtailed in some cases. Unlike the olden days, when much land was unused or underused, the smaller size of holdings means that the making of a substantial pre-inheritance grant would cut seriously into the cropped sections of the holding. When land use was less intensive the forfeiting of sections of underused land to sons would not generally reduce to any large degree the total annual output of the parent. The remainder of the holding—after land had been parcelled to sons—was still large enough to absorb labor and give an impressive annual income if cropped intensively. But when the normal state of affairs slowly becomes that of cropping all of one’s holdings, then the making of a pre-inheritance grant to a son is a serious bite into one’s own economy. The result: the grants are diminished, delayed, or curtailed.

**Labor Shortage, Not Food Shortage**

This highly understandable decision on the part of parents to give their sons less than they may have received at a comparable stage of their own career, and/or to delay that bestowal, constitutes the first major demographically induced modification in the land control system. At this stage actual crowding beyond the food-providing capacities of the land is not the major problem. What has been jeopardized directly is not the food-supply of the population, but rather a particular land-costly labor-acquisition strategy which becomes increasingly less feasible. I.e. demographic increment has undermined the labor supply long before it seriously threatens the food supply.
How has it sabotaged the labor supply? If the response of the parents is highly understandable, that of their children is no less so. Two critical patterns become increasingly more frequently. In the first place the young are forced to resort more and more to a series of extradomestic resource options which have always been present in Haiti, but which had come to play a less prominent role in the heyday of land abundance. In turning to these extradomestic options, they increasingly make a second important decision. Though living in their parents' home, their resource-base no longer depends so heavily on grants of land from their parents, and they put in increasingly less time helping out on their parents' gardens.

It is in this manner that demographic pressure is directly translated into labor shortages for the parents. The truancy of their sons—which may be only partial, but is palpable—constitutes a drain on the labor they need to cultivate their holdings. It should not be assumed that the smaller size of his holding frees a cultivator from the need for domestic or extradomestic supplements to his own labor. Unless his holding is extremely small, the seasonality of the agricultural cycle, the total local reliance on human labor, and the pressing occurrence of peak labor-demand sequences in the agricultural chain will combine to perpetuate the dependence of the cultivator on supra-individual supplements to his own labor. His most important source of such ancillary labor—his sons—has been threatened, but his labor-acquisition needs have not thereby been eliminated.

It must be repeated that the nutritional base of the community, the total "carrying capacity" of all the available land, need not yet have been threatened. Conventional discussions of the deleterious
impact of population growth on pre-industrial agrarian communities tend to depict hungry masses huddling on overworked, postage-stamp plots of land. Though such may be an eventual consequence of the process carried to its logical end, stress enters the system through a different gate, at a much earlier period of time. The objective is not that of shocking the industrialized world with vignettes of Third World hunger, but of understanding the behavior of systems. In Kinanbwa the first inroad which population pressure made was in sabotaging the systemic mechanism that had been established for the mobilization of critical streams of domestic labor. The systemic adaptation that has subsequently occurred has focused on this problem, rather than the nutritional problems associated with postage-stamp holdings. If the objective is to trace the linkages between demographic pressure and subsequent behavioral responses, it is important to recognize that, in Kinanbwa, the creative maneuvering of individuals, and the consequent systemic shifts, have been focused on the domain of labor.

Viewing the matter within such a systemic framework, what had occurred was an incipient disruption of an energy-flow system. The traditional arrangements evolved in the context of land abundance; the recruiting of filial labor via generous pre-inheritance land grants was a feasible strategy. But when the feasibility of these grants was reduced, so also was the security of access to the steady labor of one's young adult male dependents. The course of events that followed upon this disruption, however is more clearly grasped, not in the idiom of an abstract systemic analysis, but in the idiom of individual life chances. Demographic increment had
drastically altered the immediate life-chances of two economic actor types: the young adult male who needed land, and the established cultivator who needed supplementary labor at several points in the cropping cycle. If the traditional system constituted a relatively cozy mutual exchange, the disruption of this system meant that the sons would gradually have to rely more and more on extradomestic sources of land, and that the parents in turn would gradually have to turn more and more to extradomestic sources of labor. Microevolution had been set in motion.

And because the process is one of evolution, the concepts of evolutionary theory provide a powerful idiom for analyzing the course of events. The arrival of the demographic bind constitutes a clear case of "pressure" and "disequilibrium." Behaviors that once constituted the normal survival strategies for fathers and sons now become less feasible. Alternatives must be utilized. If there are in fact pre-existing alternatives—i.e. sources of behavioral "variety" in the local repertoire—which permit the landless young to acquire land outside of their homes, and which permit established cultivators to acquire labor without the total forfeiture of the produce from substantial plots in their holdings to their adolescent and young adult sons, then we would expect the demographically generated pressure to place a selective advantage on the utilization of these other strategies, and to trigger off a gradual switch toward dependence on these alternatives, away from dependence on the traditional domestic land/labor exchange. We would expect, in short, a systematic, diachronic transformation whose manner of unfolding would place it under the rubric of "cultural evolution."
Systemic Readjustment: Younger Tenants, Older Landlords

The nature of the "pressure" has been discussed: the disruption of a resource circulating system, the interference with a smooth flow of land to the young and labor to their parents. What is now crucial is to trace exactly the path of systemic readjustment. As with all such processes, the epistemologically reliable course is to focus insistently on the course of individual human behaviors.

There was in the repertoire of rural Haiti a "pre-existing" alternative, a source of behavioral variety, which served on the one hand as a source of land for the landless and a source of labor for the labor-needy. This was the device of sharecropping. Each of the threatened groups—the fathers and the sons—have come to turn increasingly to this arrangement. Though it solves different problems for each group, it nonetheless is a common solution. The pre-inheritance land grants had killed two birds with one stone. Though the killing is less smooth, sharecropping does the same.

We may look first at the case of the landless young. Their sabotaged lifeline—the vanishing pre-inheritance grants—has forced them into adaptive maneuver. Up until then, freely-granted parental land has been the major livelihood for the young. But it has never been the only source; it has coexisted with other livelihood-earning alternatives, among them emigration, local wage labor, renting of local land, and sharecropping of local land. But emigration has been restricted, wage labor (for reasons discussed) done locally is an extremely unattractive option, and renting costs money. Hence sharecropping emerges as the most feasible alternative to the starting out of one's own economic life.
Thus to an increasing degree, the up-and-coming cohorts of landless young in Kinanbwa resort to the expedient of extradomestic sharecropping as the principal pathway to economic autonomy. With this switch an important transformation had worked its way into the modal life cycle: the young pre-inheritors of yore, cropping land that would one day be theirs, were slowly replaced by an increasing mass of young sharecroppers, who established independent ties with other members of the community and who entered relationships in which much of the produce on "their gardens" went to these landlords.

The establishment of this quasi-independent access to land removes much of the power from the hands of fathers. Though local norms give them a continued moral right to the physical labor of sons still living under their roof, their ability to enforce this norm has been undermined. The sons stop coming, not totally or abruptly, but quite perceptibly. Their preference for laboring on their own gardens, located on land which they are sharecropping, and the absence of any effective economic sanction on the part of their parents, combine to create paradoxical labor binds. The increased man/land ratio which demographic increment has locally produced would logically be predicted to generate a surplus of labor. And a potential surplus may well exist. But human labor must be motivated and mobilized. By causing sons to go elsewhere for land, local demographic increment has in effect undermined the traditional labor-mobilization sequence and made paradoxically common a situational labor shortage for semi-abandoned fathers whose sons are off sharecropping land for someone else.
In terms of individual behaviors, the systemic transformation seems eminently logical. Parents who give less land to their children than the wealthy patriarchs of old are behaving quite understandably. No less understandable is the behavior of sons who, having been forced to sharecrop elsewhere, are less faithful in the performance of filial labor duties on the gardens of their fathers. The reconstruction is eminently credible from the standpoint of individual behavior. The apparent glitch in the model concerns the more basic empirical question of how the sons find local land to sharecrop. The ethnographic literature on occasion fails to confront systemic "problems" such as this. The process of land sale, for example, will frequently be cited as the misfortune of those in crisis—but no indication will be given as to who is the buyer. Conversely, land purchase will frequently be cited as the "small holder's" way of augmenting holdings. But no mention will be made of who the sellers are. Where there are buyers, there must be sellers. Where there are tenants there must be landlords. The advantage of a systemic focus is that it forces answers to questions which are more easily overlooked in the descriptive exuberance of conventional ethnography.

The problem here is real—not only for the participants in the system, but also for its analysts. The availability of sharecropping land in the "golden age" was associated with a land abundant situation. But the very existence of the new demographic bind means that these holdings are no longer as great. The fount of sharecropping land would appear to be cut off just as decisively as the fount of pre-inheritance land allocated by parents.
This logical problem overlooks, however, an empirical fact. Data from contemporary Kinanbwa show clearly that the landlords are not a group of particularly wealthy individuals. We will have trouble empirically accounting for the prevalence of the sharecropping arrangement unless we face squarely in the face the enigmatic pattern whereby even ordinary cultivators with moderate holdings also provide land to others to sharecrop. That is, the young who find land to sharecrop are paradoxically sharecropping that land for individuals who in many instances are at about the same economic level as their own parents. I have been concerned with maintaining analysis in the framework of credible human behavior. The model is most taxed by this pattern which emerged in the data, whereby even individuals with moderate landholdings will themselves become providers of land for others under the arrangement of sharecropping. It is this phenomenon which demands explanation.

In terms of the evolutionary transformation being discussed here, the contemporary sharecropping data indicate that, whereas pre-inheritance land may be curtailed, there is still a steady stream of sharecropping land. Thus if the young have been able to utilize sharecropped land as their traditional inheritance grants have declined, it is because ordinary cultivators are for some reason continuing to make such land available.

But the reason is no longer enigmatic if we look at the systemic underpinnings of traditional life, as was done above. There is a linkage between land-granting and labor-receiving. When the former is no longer possible, the latter dwindles. An alternative source of labor must be found. Wage labor costs money and, as has been
discussed, individuals in rural Haiti are reluctant to do wage labor in the fields of other community members. Hence the very same process which has led the young to turn to sharecropping as a source of land will simultaneously lead the old to turn to sharecropping as a source of critical labor which they can no longer mobilize domestically. It would be convenient for the landowners if they could continue to receive the labor of their sons without granting the traditional pre-inheritance land. But they can not. They choose then a slightly lesser evil and make part of their land available for other community members to sharecrop. The landowner does not enjoy all the fruits of that plot; but then again he does not have to forfeit as much land in the form of "no strings attached" pre-inheritance land to his sons. By turning to the alternative of sharing out part of his landholdings, he is making himself somewhat less dependent on his sons as a source of labor.

In systemic terms, it is clear that this process constitutes a "vicious circle," or at any rate a spiral path. A deviation-amplifying feedback loop has been unleashed within the machinery of the local land-control system. Young men look for extradomestic land to sharecrop; and as a result parents look for extradomestic labor in the form of tenants. The result is a proliferation of landlord/tenant dyads in the community. The enigma underlying the surprising prevalence of sharecropping in contemporary Kinanbwa has been basically removed. There are myriad questions which yet remain to be answered. But the basic nature of the answer is now clear, and has been provided by the application of a cultural-historical
evolutionary scheme to a body of facts. Selective pressure operating in this specific environment and under these specific circumstances has led to a series of fairly clear and understandable economic decisions on the part of fathers and sons in Kinanbwa. In the process the option of sharecropping, which was once a statistically marginal land control arrangement in rural Haiti, has been pushed forward as the cornerstone of the economy of contemporary Kinanbwa.

**Parent Landlords, Tenant Sons**

There is one major question that cries out for at least brief comment here. There seems to be a missing link somewhere in the model. We have on the one hand a land-needy group of siblings who receive too little land from their fathers and who consequently sharecrop for other community members. They then curtail their labor assistance to their fathers. This in turn produces the phenomenon of labor-needy fathers, who themselves will subsequently search for tenants. Why doesn't the father simply make his son the tenant on the land, even though he cannot make a traditional pre-inheritance land grant. Something appears better than nothing. Why should a father permit a situation to arise in which his sons are sharecropping for a neighbor while someone else is sharecropping for him?

The question is on target, because this maneuver is precisely what many parents do. The phenomenon of fathers who are "landlords" collecting rent from their sons is a cross-culturally unusual arrangement. But data has already been presented attesting to its frequency in Kinanbwa. There are problems and resistances of
a sociopersonal nature which imbue a landlord-tenant relationship between a father and a son with certain taboo-like delicacy. But taboos and delicacies are notoriously flexible under the pressure of changing life-chances. This arrangement of convenience, whereby sons sharecrop land for their fathers, though still a matter of some embarrassment for both father and son, is becoming an increasingly common feature of the life cycle. This pattern constitutes one of the most drastic departures from traditional mores. Its emergence and spread in Kinanhwa is a natural spin-off from the more general turn toward sharecropping depicted in the evolutionary model just presented.

To sum up: the outline of a microevolutionary model has been presented, a model whose major feature is the diachronic transformation of land control patterns in a region of rural Haiti. Within the framework of this model, local demographic increment emerges as an equilibrium-disrupting intrusion into an energy-flow system which had crystallized in the land-abundant era of 19th century Haiti. The land-expensive labor acquisition strategy of pre-inheritance land grants to young adult male dependents became less feasible. When this source of land began dwindling for the young, there was a concomitant dwindling of guaranteed domestic labor for the gardens of cultivators who were already established. Both groups—the young men and their parents—began resorting increasingly to a pre-existing alternative land-and-labor mobilizing arrangement, the arrangement of sharecropping. It is this demographically generated metamorphosis of local resource control patterns which accounts for the unexpected
prevalence of démwayé as the dominant land control mode prevailing in contemporary Kinanbwa. The result of this process has been a fundamental readjustment in the internal machinery of the local land control system, as the modality of the "inheriting cropper" working land left to him by his parents has been slowly replaced by the modality of sharecropping. In this step-by-step fashion, carried along on a current of individual economic maneuvers leading to one aggregate effect, a land tenure system can be adaptively transformed.

COMPONENT SEQUENCES: EMPIRICAL DEFENSE OF THE MODEL

It is one thing to present a model; to defend it empirically is another matter. From the standpoint of logical, step-by-step individual economic decisions on the part of peasant cultivators (and their sons), the model is plausible. It furthermore invokes none of the quasi-magical ready-made "inventions" which plague many theories of agricultural intensification in the technological sphere.

But a plausible hypothesis is still a far cry from a body of established fact. To what degree can it be demonstrated that local history has actually unfolded in the manner depicted by the model? It is in this stubborn realm of hard evidence that anthropological analysis is often most anemic. In the case of Kinanbwa, relevant land tenure data are simply not available for past generations (and, as fieldwork has shown, is extremely difficult to obtain even from the present generation). Nonetheless the judicious analysis of carefully collected synchronic data can, in fact, give us solid glimpses of diachronic patterns. I will use such data,
not to prove every single point of the model, but to give at least a modicum of empirical validation to its more important components.

The term component is used purposefully. A careful examination of the model indicates that it is in fact a composite of several analytically distinct historical sequences. If the model is to be more than a string of hypotheses, each of the constituent sequences must in turn receive some sort of empirical validation, to indicate that the sequence of events posited by the model corresponds to local historical fact. The ultimate objective is to abstract out of the data a general microevolutionary process which may be found to occur elsewhere as well. But unless evidence can be given that the process actually occurred historically in this one setting, no "findings" can be said to have been produced, but only a handful of hypotheses for future researchers.

To bring the model to at least some level of factuality, there are four key historical sequences for which at least some evidence must be marshalled. If these sequences occurred, the model applies. If they didn't the model needs revising.

1. Land has become not only scarcer but also more valuable, in such a fashion that the granting of free pre-inheritance plots to sons becomes an increasingly "expensive" labor-acquisition device.

2. Children through the decades have been receiving fewer such pre-inheritance grants, and have been turning more heavily to sharecropping for their start in life.

3. Children who have not received the traditionally expected pre-inheritance grants in fact give less free labor on their
parents' land, creating labor needs for the latter.

4. Parents in turn increasingly utilize the sharecropping option for reducing their own labor commitments to part of their own holdings, one result of which is the increasing appearance of landlord/tenant relationships between parents and children.

In identifying these crucial sequences, I have operationalized the model in the form of highly concrete and testable hypotheses. The available evidence, though not overwhelming, is nonetheless impressive. Local history does, in fact, appear to have unfolded in precisely this fashion.

But as has already been emphasized, the objective is not only to document historical change, but to show that this change has occurred along channels consistent with evolutionary theory. When can we reliably identify a "change" as a case of evolution? The issue is important. The argument will be made that the burgeoning growth of the sharecropping modality in the community is a microevolutionary adaptation to population growth. It is dangerously easy to rely on elegant jargon, to apply labels and assign clever functions to different social patterns. But the pages to follow will attempt a more formal documentation of the claim. For an evolutionary theory to be taken seriously, the analyst must first provide some sort of evidence that local change has in fact occurred in the lifesphere which has reportedly "evolved," and must secondly show that this change is amenable to analysis within the general framework of evolutionary theory. This latter requirement would appear to involve as a minimum the utilization of three
key constructs of evolutionary theory.

In the first place evidence must be given to the presence of variety in the population on some behavioral or cultural dimension. Secondly there must be documentation of the presence of some stress-producing modification in the physical or social environment, a modification which clearly alters the relative feasibility or desirability of the variety-constituting behavioral alternatives. And finally—perhaps most importantly—evidence must be given that there was a gradual and statistically significant shift in the relative preponderance of the different alternatives over time. Unless such evidence can be given, the use of evolutionary terminology to analyze a change may be more in the nature of academic poetry.

The source of environmental stress in the model being proposed here is the altered man/land ratio which has overtaken Haiti as a whole. The local effect of this environmental change will be worked out step by step. This stress, occurring in the context of a resource-control repertoire including several varied behavioral options, will be shown to have produced a number of crucial, subtle, but statistically significant diachronic shifts in predicted directions. Three key constructs of evolutionary theory will, in short, be incorporated into an analysis of what has happened in Kinanbwa.
Phase One: Increase in the Costliness of Land

Phase One of the model posits not only that the population has increased, but that this increase has had direct repercussions on the value of land. If the allocation of land to one's children has been an increasingly "expensive" way of securing that labor, it must be because more of the land is being put to "productive" use, less of it is being left unused or unused. But if this is true, this increasing value should be clearly reflected in an increase in the monetary value of land on the market.

There fortunately exists general data on 19th century land prices in Haiti. Writing in 1828, Franklin indicates that the abundance of land in relation to the available labor was so great as to reduce the monetary value of the land to virtually nothing.

The finest land in the republic would not sell for more than sixty dollars per acre, although contiguous to a port of shipping, and of a quality so strong and nutritive, as to be capable of growing any of the tropical productions. The mountain-lands, and the lighter descriptions in the plains, suitable for cacao and cotton, can be obtained for a price varying between twenty and thirty dollars in any quantity from ten to five hundred acres (Franklin 1970:314).

With respect to the land in the general area of Les Bayahondes, Franklin notes that "...although in this part of the country the soil is exceedingly deep and strong, land hardly finds purchasers."

The contrast between this 19th century situation and the land situation in contemporary Kinshasa is dramatic. Though land transactions will be discussed in more detail below, it can be pointed out here that the days of large scale land purchase have long been over. Though a large percentage of adult males will in fact purchase at least one plot of land during their lives, the average transaction can now
be more appropriately measured in the more common unit of the katê, (a
fourth of a carreau), a measure which contains only a third of a
hectare (or some four fifths of an acre). In the early 19th century
some officials were scandalized when the government began selling off
plots of land smaller than 50 carreaux. Nowadays the transactions that
involve more than a carreau in Kinanbwa have virtually ceased to
exist. The 600 land transactions on which data were collected in-
volved on the average slightly more than a quarter of a carreau per
transaction, a mere fraction of the more ambitious purchases of
fifty carreau or more characteristic of the golden years of 19th
century Haiti.

But if the quantity of land transacted is now less per transac-
tion, the value of the land has skyrocketed. In the Haiti of the
1820's the cost of land appeared to average some $30.00 per acre, if
Franklin's figures are correct. Computing the per-acre cost of the
transactions studied in Kinanbwa, and conservatively eliminating
a number of transactions where the price seems excessively high,
we nonetheless arrive at an average contemporary per-acre price of
three hundred and thirty two dollars. And this is a conservative
estimate. That is, in the space of 150 years the price of land
has increased tenfold. It is true that many non-demographic factors enter
into rises in the value of land: general inflation, increase in the
commercial value of crops, and the like. But it is the relative
per-capita scarcity in comparison to bygone epochs to which the brunt
of this astounding increase may be most reliably attributed.
This comparison of contemporary Kinanbwa with early 19th century Haiti illustrates well the effect of local population growth on the value of land. But we need not resort to this rather ambitious "before-after" contrast to depict the process. Even restricting analysis to the land transactions on which information was obtained in the community, the dramatic intergenerational effect of population growth can be seen. For each transaction, some twenty variables were coded, among them the crucial variables of size of the plot, amount paid for the plot, and—of particular relevance to the current discussion—approximate year in which the transaction took place, elicited by the question "How long ago did you purchase (or sell) the plot?"

Though most of the transactions on which data were obtained occurred during the ten years preceding village fieldwork, over two hundred of them occurred earlier, at different periods. This permits constructing and testing of a diachronic hypothesis. If the increasing demographically generated land scarcity is in fact leading to increases in the monetary value of land, we would expect to find, even within the Kinanbwa land data, significant differences in the prices paid for land at different periods of time.

There is a problem, in that respondents were asked how much they had paid for the plot involved in the transaction. But the hypothesis involves a posited increase in the value of the land itself. To test this the absolute price paid for the plot cannot be used, since plots are sold in different sizes. If an eighth of a carreau of land is purchased for $150.00, for example, and a half carreau is purchased elsewhere for $200.00, the first transaction, though
involving less money than the second, nonetheless involves more valuable land. To test the diachronic hypothesis, the value of the land on the transacted plots has been computed by calculating the cost of that land per standardized unit, in this case the common unit of the "quarter" (ka tè). In the above examples, then, the per-quarter value of the land on the first plot would be $300.00; the corresponding value of the land on the second plot would be only $100.00.

If the hypothesis is correct, the villagers should be found to be paying slightly more per unit of land as each decade passes. The data dramatically confirm this hypothesis. Breaking the transactions down into three groups according to the year in which the transaction occurred, and computing the cost per quarter of land for the land in each of the chronological groups, we find a highly significant increase in the relative price of the more recently purchased land.

Table 9-1 presents the data in cross-tabulated form. Before

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year Before 1950</th>
<th>Before 1950-1959</th>
<th>After 1959</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 250</td>
<td>29% (32)</td>
<td>44% (95)</td>
<td>100% (157)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>250-750</td>
<td>19% (22)</td>
<td>33% (106)</td>
<td>100% (148)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>750-1250</td>
<td>32% (63)</td>
<td>17% (40)</td>
<td>100% (103)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1250+</td>
<td>19% (38)</td>
<td>14% (30)</td>
<td>100% (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>52% (139)</td>
<td>34% (186)</td>
<td>100% (324)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$\chi^2 = 37.9$

4 df

$P = .001$
1950 we see that about half of the transacted plots contained land that was worth less than $250.00 per quarter. Only one out of five transactions involved highly valuable land costing more than $750.00 per quarter. Already by 1960 the situation had reversed. By then in almost half of their land purchases, the villagers were already paying more than $750.00 per quarter of local land. In only one out of five transactions were they paying under $250.00 per quarter of land. This ascending market value of land can be taken as a convenient diachronic indicator of its growing scarcity. And this process triggers off shifts in parental behavior vis-à-vis the granting of land to their sons. It is to this segment of the model that analysis will turn.

Phase Two: Decline in Pre-Inheritance Grants

The decrease in the custom of making pre-inheritance land grants might be considered as Phase Two of the model, a response to the stress created by the Phase One tightening up of local land availability.

1. Data which are cross tabulated in this fashion are amenable to another interpretation: perhaps the value of the land has remained constant, and the peasants are merely tending to purchase the more valuable plots in recent years. But this interpretation, which runs counter to common-sense intuitions of peasant economic behavior, is also not supported by the data. The value of the land can be assessed not only by the price paid, but also by the type of land contained on the plot. The major categories are highly valued "wetland" (tè frèchê or tè muyay) whose marshy subsoil frees it from the need for irrigation; and "dryland" (tè rouzay) which demands irrigation as a prerequisite to safe cultivation. Wetland is much more highly valued (and has always cost considerably more per unit of land) than dryland. For each of the transacted plots, data were therefore collected on the plot's membership in one of these two major categories. Controlling for landtype, it was found that the proportion of wet and dry plots does not change over the decades. I.e. it is the per-unit cost of land in general, rather than the villagers' preference for wet land as opposed to dry land, which has been changing.
It must be emphasized that these grants have not ceased abruptly; the process is rather one of gradual microevolutionary movements, perceptible only through analysis of aggregate trends. In allocating pre-inheritance to their sons, parents traditionally had a great deal of behavioral leeway, in terms of the specific amount of land allocated, and in terms of the plots which would be allocated to each son. But they also had leeway as to the timing of the land release. They could give it to the son when the latter was in his late teens, or they could delay the grant—in effect withhold it—forcing the son to go elsewhere for the first garden of his own. Such withholding may have been motivated by special circumstances—including an unusually small parental holding. But the motive is of less import here; what matters analytically is that there have always been precedents for the alternative option of delaying and withholding pre-inheritance grants. That is, there has been in this matter a fund of behavioral variety of the type that will be highly sensitive to certain types of pressure and consequently amenable to selection.

The variety that exists in the population along this particular dimension is documented in Table 9-2. All cultivators were asked on whose land they began working their own gardens as young men.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Land for &quot;First Gardens&quot;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parental land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other land</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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The answers have been dichotomized in such a fashion that they operate rationalize the behavior of the respondents' parents into the discrete alternatives of helping their sons get a start in life by releasing land, or of not doing so, in effect obliging the son to work on other land. It should be pointed out that those parents who did help their sons in this manner need not have been the only source of land. Many sons, especially in recent years, will seek extra sharecropping land elsewhere in addition to any small plot which their parents might have provided. Such individuals will be listed as starting on parents' land. A simple dichotomy is being made here between those respondents who began on parents' land, and those who had to begin elsewhere. As the Table indicates there is variety within the population along this economically crucial dimension. Though seven out of ten cultivators were in fact able to count on parental land there were three out of ten who were not. As will become clear, this behavioral variety has been a critical target of diachronic selection.

The evolutionary model predicts that the decrease in the availability of land, and its increase in value, will result in a diachronic tendency for pre-inheritance grants to be delayed or curtailed. Since such grants have never been recorded on paper, no written documents exist which would permit diachronic comparison. Nonetheless the contemporary village contains three economically relevant age cohorts among whom the diachronic hypothesis can be tested. We can explore to see if in fact there are statistically significant differences between the cohorts in terms of the treatment which they received from parents with respect to
pre-inheritance land, and whether in fact the differences go in the direction that would have been expected if the evolutionary model described above is correct.

To test this I have broken down the population into different age groups, indicating the year of birth of the individuals involved. If the general hypothesis is correct, one would expect that the percentage of "old timers" who received no pre-inheritance land from their parents, and who were forced to go elsewhere, would be low; but that a significantly higher percentage of the younger men will be finding themselves in that situation.

Table 9-3 provides clear confirmation of this hypothesis. Non-random patterns of intergroup variation emerge in the data, variation which suggests that local history has unfolded as predicted by the model.

\[
\begin{array}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\text{Year of Birth} & \text{Before 1923} & \text{1923-1938} & \text{1939-present} \\
\text{On others' land} & 17\% (10) & 33\% (21) & 40\% (39) \\
\text{On parents' land} & 83\% (50) & 67\% (43) & 60\% (59) \\
\text{TOTAL} & 100\% (60) & 100\% (64) & 100\% (98) \\
\hline
\end{array}
\]

\[x^2 = 9.3, \quad 2 \text{ df}, \quad P = .05\]

---

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Among the men over 50 years old, only 17% had to start life in this fashion, on land other than that given by parents. But the percentage more than doubles in the youngest of the three age groups, those under 35. Four out of every ten members of this latter age group have had to begin their own cropping activities on land other than that of their parents.

Interpreting this pattern in the light of the evolutionary model, the Table has captured in figures what is perhaps the major entry-point through which population growth has intruded into the institutions of access governing the relations of men to the land they crop. If it a historical fact that the population has been increasing throughout rural Haiti, Table 9-3 has shown dramatically that it is an equally undeniable historical fact that in Kinanbwa parents have simultaneously been giving out less pre-inheritance cropping ground to their sons. The connection between these patterns is made clear in the framework of the evolutionary model.

The genuinely evolutionary nature of this shift should also be clear. On the one hand the shift has been gradual, not abrupt. It is discoverable only through statistical examination of subtle aggregate trends. On the other hand the change has operated through selection on "pre-existing variety." That is, the shift has involved no invention, but rather the simple exercise of a pre-existing behavioral option: the withholding of land from one's young adult male dependents. Price data had been earlier used to validate the claim that population growth has made the granting of pre-inheritance cropping ground a prohibitively expensive option for many parents.
The data presented here have in turn given support for the second phase of the model, the notion that parents have responded to this land scarcity by withholding more land and by forcing more of their children to rely on other land for their start in life.

**Phase Three: Withholding of Labor by Sons**

Phase Three of the model then posits a quasi-retaliatory response on the part of young men. Deprived of the traditional land-grants, they will be less faithful in the supplying of their labor to the gardens of their fathers. This is a critical feature of the entire scheme proposed here. The model as currently formulated depends on the existence of at least some degree of aggregate "truancy" among young men deprived of traditional land grants. Such absenteeism need not be total or even blatant. But it must have enough aggregate impact to create a labor shortage which will motivate parents into their adaptive maneuver of searching for tenants. But though this "truancy" on the part of children seems reasonable and logical, has it in fact happened? To what degree is this plausible reaction in fact a historical reality?

On the one hand we have the testimony of older informants that the "young" cannot withstand the hours of labor which they themselves withstood in their own youth. This is interpretable as a complaint that sons are not giving the labor which they, the old men, had given to their own parents. We furthermore have statements to the effect that sons--even though still living with parents--are off working their own gardens on land which they
have acquired from others as sharecroppers. Fathers were heard to complain of this, but not too vociferously. It is well known that a father who can provide his sons with abundant land could control the energies and labor of his sons. It is further known that the absence of a son or sons is most likely a reflection of the inability of the father to make these provisions. The complaints against such absentee sons are thus somewhat muted. But their occurrence seems to indicate that young men are in fact now putting in, on the aggregate, less time on parents' gardens than was true in the days of old.

Yet important as such general statements about the "good old days" are, such reminiscences are notoriously unreliable, and it would be unfortunate if an evolutionary model had to rely strictly on such evidence for the validation of one of its major links. Is there any independent, statistically sounder evidence for a link between parental "land failure" and filial absenteeism from parents' gardens? In fact there is. The evidence is furthermore amenable to the same sort of evolutionary "select on" analysis as was applied to iachronic shifts in parental land-allocation behavior.

I have earlier indicated that of the hundred or so male dependents in the village who are old enough to "handle a hoe," and who are still living with their parents, forty-seven were, at the time of research, working gardens of their own as well. That is, they had acquired access to land, either through their parents or through other community members, either as quasi-inheritors, or as sharecroppers. They were responsible for planting, irrigating, cultivating, and harvesting those gardens.
However their status as quasi-independent cultivators is merged with another status: that of coresident dependents in their parents' house. With respect to the former status, they make independent decisions about the allocation of their time and energy. With respect to the latter status, however, custom and parental expectation impose upon them the obligation to give free labor in their parents' gardens. Even if his father was the source of his land, the young man makes a clear distinction between his own garden, which he must cultivate on his own with help from siblings and peers in similar situation, and his father's gardens, on which the young man is still expected to help out.

But the ultimate decision is up to the young man himself. There is in fact behavioral variety in this group of young cultivators along the dimension of time allocation. As indicated in Table 9-4, some young men spend more time on their own gardens; whereas others spend more time on the gardens of their fathers. The hypothesis here is that there will be a functional linkage between a young man's time-allocation decision and the help (or lack thereof) which he has received from his father in terms of access to cropping ground. The evolutionary model posits a pattern

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>His own gardens</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>55%</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His father's gardens</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 9-4
Allocation of Labor Time by Dependent Gardeners
On whose gardens does the young man spend more time?

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whereby parental failure to provide traditionally allocated land leads to consequent filial absenteeism on the father's plots.

Though diachronic data is lacking on this matter, it might still be possible to utilize the behavioral variety within the contemporary population presented in Table 9-4. We know that some of the 47 dependent gardeners have received traditional pre-inheritance grants from their fathers; others have not. Making the uniformitarian assumption that what occurred in the past continues to occur today, the model would lead us to hypothesize that those young men receiving pre-inheritance land from their fathers, being more dependent on him for their resource, will tend to follow the normatively prescribed pattern of spending more time on his gardens, less time on one's own gardens. Those young men who do not receive traditional pre-inheritance grants, on the other hand, would be expected, in the framework of this model, to spend more time on their own garden--i.e. to belong to the group of quasi-truants.

The hypothesis is tested and strongly confirmed in Table 9-5. Despite the small number of individuals involved (47), their tendency to behave as the model predicts reaches statistical significance. There is thus a tendency for those young men not receiving traditional pre-inheritance grants to absent themselves from their traditionally mandated labor prestations on their father's gardens. It might be added that several of those who do receive pre-inheritance grants supplement their incipient holdings by share-cropping a plot or two elsewhere. But these individuals conform to
TABLE 9.-5
Parental Land Shortage and Filial Absenteeism

On whose gardens does he spend more time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has he received pre-inheritance land?</th>
<th>His father's</th>
<th>His own</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>62% (16)</td>
<td>38% (10)</td>
<td>100% (26)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>24% (5)</td>
<td>76% (15)</td>
<td>100% (21)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>45% (21)</td>
<td>55% (26)</td>
<td>100% (47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$X^2 = 5.2^*$
1 df
$P = .05$

* Yates correction applied

the traditional pattern. What appears to produce the absenteeism is the failure of the father to give any land, or his decision to give the land to the son as a sharecropper, rather than as a quasi-owner.

When dealing with such a small number of cases, it is difficult to factor out the influence of different forces. Age might seem to play a role in determining a young man's behavior. That is, "truancy" might conceivably be part and parcel of the normal life cycle. As the young man moves closer to establishing his own household, he might logically be expected to spend less time on his parents' gardens, even though he is still living in his parents' house. Indeed if the 47 dependent gardeners are broken down by age, this is precisely what appears to occur. Dichotomizing the 47 young men into those who are at or above the median age (23) for the group, and those who are below, Table 9.-6 shows that it is the older males who
tend to work more on their own gardens. Hence the pattern of
truancy might be viewed as part of the "life cycle," rather than
as a response to parental land-withholding.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 9-6</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

**Age as a Factor in Filial Absenteeism**

On whose gardens does he spend more time?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>His father's</th>
<th>His own</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 23</td>
<td>65% (15)</td>
<td>35% (8)</td>
<td>100% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23+</td>
<td>25% (6)</td>
<td>75% (18)</td>
<td>100% (24)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>44% (21)</td>
<td>56% (26)</td>
<td>100% (47)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 6.1^* \]
1 df
\[ P = .05 \]

* Yates correction applied

But a closer scrutiny of the data does not lend support to this
view. The association with age appears to be secondary and hence
somewhat spurious. Younger dependents will "tolerate" delays of
land grants somewhat more than their older siblings. But when their
older brothers begin absenting themselves from their fathers'
gardens, it is less because of their age than because they have
not received the traditional pre-inheritance grants. This claim
is supported by examining only those 24 individuals who are at or
above the median age for this group. Controlling thus for age, and
focusing attention only on the older group, we notice that there
are six unusual individuals in this older group who have continued
to spend more of their time on their fathers' gardens rather than
rather than on their own. Though the numbers are small, Table 9-7 gives us an indication of what makes these six individuals differ from the remaining 18 who are spending more time on their own gardens. What appears to predict truancy is the condition of a son having to sharecrop. It is those who do not have to sharecrop, but who receive instead traditional pre-inheritance grants from their fathers, who continue to give them filial labor.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does he sharecrop?</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Where does he work more?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Father's gardens</td>
<td>33% (2)</td>
<td>67% (4)</td>
<td>100% (6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>His own gardens</td>
<td>83% (15)</td>
<td>17% (3)</td>
<td>100% (18)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>71% (17)</td>
<td>29% (7)</td>
<td>100% (24)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

χ² = 5.4*  1 df  p = .01

* The Yates correction would reduce the significance to just below the .05 level.

The small number of cases involved in these cross-tabulations would make it unwise to construct a theory on them. But the fact is that the associations all go in the direction predicted by the evolutionary model. And despite the small numbers, the associations are impressive enough to attain statistical significance.

Summing up, Phase Three of the model is given statistical support by contemporary patterns of filial behavior in Kinanbwa. Sons do in fact respond to land deprivation by the premature withdrawal of

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of their own energies from the gardens of their parents. Stated differently, parents who can supply children with traditional land grants are more successful in maintaining the labor of these sons for their own fields. But since domestic labor has traditionally played such a crucial role, the dynamics which have created patterns of "absenteeism" on the part of dependent sons have in effect sabotaged a crucial component of the local energy mobilization system.

It might be furthermore added that this pattern once again is highly amenable to analysis in the framework of microevolution. The decrease of pre-inheritance grants themselves is gradual and subtle—more than half of the young men still receive at least some. Furthermore the impact of receiving or not receiving is manifested in subtle aggregate patterns of absenteeism, in gradual tendencies, rather than in abrupt either-or dichotomies. Nor is any sort of "invention" occurring. The pattern is rather produced by the economically motivated decisions of certain individuals—young men deprived of traditional pre-inheritance grants—to opt for one alternative behavior (spending more time on their own gardens) than another.

**Phase Four: Advent of Filial Sharecropping**

The model then moves on to posit yet a fourth major phase, perhaps the most problematic one from the point of view of empirical credibility. Absentee sons, deprived of traditional pre-inheritance grants, have turned increasingly to the option of sharecropping. Their parents in turn, deprived partially or totally of the tradi-
tional filial labor that was part and parcel of the traditional land/labor package, have themselves turned more and more to the option of sharecropping as a labor-acquisition strategy. The result has been a profound shift in the tenor of land control patterns, as the modality of sharecropping has thus come to dominate on the majority of the currently cropped plots. The most crucial "innovation" in this sphere has been the intrusion of sharecropping relationships into the very bosom of the nuclear family, as sons have begun to sharecrop in greater numbers for their parents. In the framework of the model, these patterns of filial sharecropping emerge as a common-sense compromise between the outright pre-inheritance grants mandated by tradition and the total alienation of sons onto the property of others. It is in the general dominance of sharecropping within the community, and in the particular emergence of filial sharecropping as a common practice, that the ultimate impact of population growth on the institutions of access is most directly manifested.

But once again the task remains of empirically validating the credibility of this phase of the model. This involves, in the first instance, showing that the pattern of filial sharecropping was indeed a "pre-existing alternative," and secondly showing that there have been diachronic changes of an evolutionary nature with respect to the prevalence of these patterns in Kinanbwa.

With respect to the pattern itself, the data indicate that filial sharecropping is indeed a statistically important pattern in the research community. I have presented data above indicating that six hundred and sixty seven of the plots in the community (well over half) are being worked under a sharecropping arrangement. One hundred and ten of these plots were being sharecropped by sons for their
own parents. Thus, if sharecropping itself is a statistically
important pattern in the community, then filial sharecropping is
an important sub-variety of this general tenure mode within
Kinambwa.

But synchronic data on the contemporary pattern itself do not
tell the whole story. It is equally important for purposes of
this discussion to document the occurrence of evolutionary
change with respect to this pattern. The model claims that sharecrop­
ping is functionally related, by microevolutionary links, to the
other diachronic patterns which have been discussed here. To
validate this claim, the occurrence of change must be proven, with
more recent generations tending to utilize the practice more
frequently.

Such change cannot be detected within the synchronic data
covering currently cropped plots. But another type of information
was collected which will expose the change. By the time the
Agricultural Survey (the final of the surveys which I carried
out in Kinambwa) was undertaken, the pattern of filial sharecropping
had already surfaced as an important pattern. Thus I inserted
relevant items into the survey instrument to explore certain
basic features of this important pattern. Among other queries,
each cultivator was questioned as to whether at any time in his
economic career, his parents had "lent" him land on a sharecropping
basis.

As was true of earlier discussed patterns, there was a great
deal of behavioral variety in the population along this dimension,
a state of behavioral "polymorphism" amenable to forces of selection.
Parents had several alternative behaviors available to them, some of
which involve outright land grants of the traditional type, and others which involve some sort of landlord relationship vis-à-vis the son. There is a great deal of variation in the manner in which these arrangements work themselves out concretely in real life. The parent may give some land on a no-strings-attached basis, but assign other land on a sharecropping basis. The parent may furthermore be lenient in calculating his share of the harvest, and leave a much larger portion to his son than would be left to a non-related tenant. But as with the first dimension, this polymorphic variety of alternative behaviors has, for purposes of testing the hypothesis, been dichotomized into the two major alternatives of treating sons as tenants, or of refraining from doing so, adhering instead to the traditionally mandated "no-strings-attached" modality of father-son land allocation.

To describe the variety that exists in the population along this dimension, I have distinguished between those cultivators whose parents have never exercised the landlord option vis-à-vis their sons, and those sons whose parents, at one time or another, have. As Table 9 - 8 indicates, in more than half of the cases, the cultivator will have been involved in a tenant-landlord relationship with his parents. The remaining minority—a quite substantial minority—will have received all their land on a no-strings attached basis (or in an exceptionally small number of cases received no land at all, not even sharecropping land).

But the frequency distribution provides a static picture of the situation. The critical hypothesis involves a process of evolutionary
TABLE 9-8

Prevalence of Filial Sharecropping

Has the cultivator ever been a tenant on his parents' land?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>221</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

change. If in fact this pattern of filial sharecropping is properly construed as an evolutionary phenomenon, then it should be more frequent now than before. To test the hypothesis I have again broken down the population into different age groups, hypothesizing that a significantly larger percentage of each succeeding age group will have entered into a filial sharecropping arrangement with their parents. Table 9-9 breaks down the data in the indicated manner.

With this Table the last major link in the evolutionary chain is given empirical validation. The Table reveals a clear and statistically significant trend in the predicted direction.

The parental practice of treating one's sons as tenants—of exacting part of the harvest from them—on land allocated to them is clearly not a new practice. Even among the oldest men some four out of ten had cropped at least some parental land under this arrangement. What has changed, however, is the relative frequency of this behavioral alternative among parents. If exacting part of the
has he ever sharecropped for his parents?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year of Birth</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Before 1923</td>
<td>43%  (26)</td>
<td>57%  (34)</td>
<td>100% (60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1923-1938</td>
<td>51%  (32)</td>
<td>49%  (31)</td>
<td>100% (63)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After 1938</td>
<td>66%  (65)</td>
<td>34%  (33)</td>
<td>100% (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>56%  (123)</td>
<td>44%  (98)</td>
<td>100% (221)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 = 8.8 \]
\[ df = 2 \]
\[ P = .05 \]

harvest from one's sons is a long-standing practice, it is systematically increasing in frequency and slowly replacing the traditional practice of making one's sons quasi-proprietors of small plots of land. Thus, as was true of the retention or releasing of land, it is clear that in this other realm of parental behavior, that of being a landlord to one's sons, there has been yet another microevolutionary readjustment in the relative preponderance of two pre-existing alternatives.

The entire discussion may now be summed up and concluded. In the first part of the chapter a theoretical model was presented which interpreted the contemporary prevalence of sharecropping in Kinanbwa as a microevolutionary response to population growth, a response which has worked itself out through the intervening variables of land shortage and subsequent disruptions in traditional energy mobilization patterns. Having presented the model in a simple
descriptive fashion, discussion then turned to the task of analyzing the model into its component sequences, and of giving empirical validation to the credibility of each of these major phases. Data was presented indicating that

1. land in fact has become more valuable, a clear indication of growing scarcity;

2. parents have in fact been withholding, to an increasing degree, pre-inheritance land from their sons, causing the latter to go elsewhere with greater frequency for their start in life;

3. sons who are deprived of traditional pre-inheritance grants do in fact absent themselves sooner from their parents' gardens, dedicating more labor to their own pursuits;

4. sharecropping arrangements between fathers and sons have in fact emerged as an increasingly prevalent pattern, a strong indication of a middle-ground compromise between the now-too-expensive "generosity" of the traditional system and the normatively unpleasant option of total filial alienation from parental soil.

The discussion has furthermore been framed in the idiom of evolutionary theory. Specific land allocation patterns and labor allocation behaviors have been identified, and diachronic changes in the frequency of alternative behaviors have been viewed as a type of selection on pre-existing variety. Ready made "inventions" have been avoided, and at all times the model has attempted to present a picture of economically rational peasant cultivators making economically intelligible decisions. The abstract rubric of
"cultural evolution" has been operationalized into concrete, economica­
ically motivated shifts in aggregate reliance on certain beha­
vioral alternatives as opposed to others.

Scientific theories tend to be intellectually exciting and am­
bitious. But productive scientific research is generally more
specific, focused, and perhaps unexcitingly prosaic in its choice
of topics. What has been documented here—with an empirical foucs
that might strike some as bordering on methodological fanaticism--
is a rather prosaic diachronic shift in one specific lifosphere
of a group of Haitian peasants. But I have dwelt with such analytic
and empirical detail on this sequence of events simply because
such specific sequences of aggregate diachronic change constitute the
raw material of cultural evolution. And though there is a plethora
of sweeping, bold-stroke macro-sequences which have been posited in the
anthropological literature, there is a paucity of reliably documented
micro-sequences. Yet if macro-movements of "general evolution"
do actually occur, in the last analysis it is only in the form of
such micro-cases of "specific evolution" that they are embodied.
It is the task of scientific analysis to document historically, and
expose the underlying dynamic of, these evolutionary processes.

It is important to point out that such quantitative documentation
is not done as an attempt to "prove" a theory. The empirical evidence
has not simply proven what was already known. On the contrary: in
a somewhat serendipitous fashion, there has emerged from the data a
complex of patterns that would never have been suspected had the
quantitative data not existed. And though the pattern dealt with
here—the shift from a tenure system dominated by inheritance to one dominated by sharecropping—might seem prosaic, the manner in which the transition is now known to have occurred speaks to several larger issues and might in fact compel a revamping of certain features of the idea-system within which human population dynamics are conventionally discussed, even within the anthropological literature.

But the intent of this chapter has been first and foremost that of capturing the path of a change. The preceding pages, though cast largely in the idiom of systems analysis, have in effect
documented the demise of a system, and the obsolescence of the conceptual blueprint which described that system in terms of intrafamilial inheritance. But a revised blueprint for the system as it operates synchronically today has not yet been presented. In performing the adaptive maneuver described above, the population of Kinanbwa had tinkered with a system. But when one component of a system is changed, other components must—if it is a genuine system—also undergo adaptive modifications. The result of this chain of adaptations triggered off by population growth has been a totally transformed life cycle in which other aspects of the system have also undergone a metamorphosis. It is to the task of documenting this new life cycle that attention will now be turned.
CHAPTER TEN

THE TRANSFORMED LIFE CYCLE

At this final stage of the analysis, discussion moves from the diachronic framework of cultural evolution to a more synchronic focus on the contemporary functioning of the transformed system. But in making this shift and in turning attention to the manner in which the system "works" and "hangs together" today, it will be useful to maintain the same dual perspective that has been preserved in the discussion of local microevolution. On the one hand efforts will be made to grasp an overall system, to avoid aimless wandering in an underbrush of abundant and occasionally contradictory detail. On the other hand, to keep analysis from floating off into ethereal heights, insistence will be made on following the behavior of individuals as they move through their lives, watching them choose between different alternatives, identifying those features of the local landscape, perhaps invisible to outsiders, which incline individuals to one class of alternative as opposed to another.

LIFE CYCLE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT SCHEMES

A type of de-facto "stratification" is built into agrarian systems based upon the private ownership of land. Even where social classes have not coalesced, land will be under the control of older generations. Adolescents and young adults who are biologically capable of reproducing and cultivating may not have access to the basic resource of land. A critical dimension of any peasant system, then, is the particular manner in which young men get their start in life.
To see the "large picture" of today, it must be kept in mind that we are dealing with a specific type of resource-control system. The land tenure system of Kinanbwa is by no means unique to that community; but neither does it represent a type of somehow "generalized" peasant land tenure. No such entity could be profitably posited. We are dealing, rather, with a particular type of land-control system, now very common throughout the world, which has been discussed under the rubric of "mercantile domain." This system has as one of its critical features the superficially paradoxical arrangement whereby its peasant participants, though living in stratified societies in which they belong to the subordinate sector, nonetheless are themselves the owners of the major productive resource of such agrarian societies: the land. The subordinate nature of their structural position takes the form of various asymmetric linkages, linkages which are economic, political, and social. But nonetheless they themselves own the land; they themselves allocate it to upcoming generations.

It is the nature of that control and allocation which are in question here. Such a land tenure system, and the majority of individuals within it, can be said to "have a stake" in the establishment and perpetuation of a very special type of strategy of land control. I would like to single out this strategy for closer analytic attention and designate it as a scheme of life-cycle resource management. The emphasis is on "life cycle," and this particular land control scheme presents some crucial contrasts with what might be called a "stratificational" scheme of land control, one based
on the local existence of discrete economic strata.

In no real-life peasant system will there be perfect equality of landholdings among all households of a community. What is designed into many such systems, however, especially those based on partible inheritance, is a mechanism for assuring that most individuals will eventually move up into the ranks of the local "haves" via the process of inheritance. Even if such a system functions "ideally," everyone's holdings will not necessarily be equal. But if functioning is unimpeded by other factors, in such a system the major predictor of an individual's holdings will be his age, rather than his membership in some socially constituted class. That is, a major structural feature of such systems is the tendency—and it will always be a tendency in "real life" systems—for resources to be spread out along the life cycle rather than concentrated into permanent groups. Real-life systems may be seen as adhering more closely to one of these two models. The life-cycle system, and most of the individuals within it, will have a clear economic stake in preserving the age-based resource control dynamic, and impeding the coalescence of permanent resource-controlling groups.

The land control system operating in Haiti's 19th century golden age shared many aspects of a "life cycle" model. But I have shown how the critical mechanism for assuring the continuing, widespread availability of land to all community members had been jeopardized: pre-inheritance land grants diminished. The shift to sharecropping was "undertaken," it was shown, as a solution to certain land and labor problems which arose as the local population increased. What the sharecropping maneuver preserved was a
labor mobilizing circuit, in which land and labor were traded off. In doing this the specific resource allocating mechanism was gradually "eased out" (though it still plays a role even today).

This readjustment has opened the gateway to the eventual disruption of the entire life-cycle system then prevailing, making it vulnerable to replacement by a stratified system, in which land would gradually be concentrated into the hands of a smaller number of domestic group. That is, in preserving the labor-mobilizing mechanism, the life-cycle modality of resource control was threatened, as the danger of local stratification became greater. Why did this threat exist? The question is important.

In the traditional system, where the bulk of labor was provided by domestic labor and exchange labor, and where sharecropping was a statistically minor appendage, there was an upper limit on the amount of land an individual could profitably acquire. Exchange labor was a mechanism for spacing out one's own energy inputs over the course of a cropping cycle, but since all such labor had to be repaid with one's own energies, there was a ceiling on the amount of land a person could cultivate using this arrangement. Thus the major general constraint on the amount of land a cultivator could profitably put to use was his ability to mobilize domestic labor. In this context the concentration of land into the hands of a few households did not occur. On the contrary, in early 19th century Haiti those individuals (generally members of the military) who received enormous land grants would frequently sell their land. The labor mobilization system that had come to prevail in the land-
abundant context of rural Haiti made it senseless to have such large tracts of land. The tendency was for the dispersal, rather than the concentration, of land.

But as land becomes less abundant and as the mechanism of sharecropping emerges as the dominant labor-mobilizing mechanism, the size of one's family is no longer a constraint on the amount of land that can be put to profitable use. Whereas before it made little sense to acquire ever more land, now it makes quite good economic sense to do so, since sharecroppers will be easily found to work it. In the earlier period parents had enough land to give to their children; these latter consequently had small need to resort to the less advantageous option of sharecropping for others. Land to sharecrop was available if needed, but the arrangement was not as widely resorted to as the cropping of domestically allocated land. But now that parents cannot give as much "no strings attached" land, there has arisen a pool of potentially willing sharecroppers, and the individual who can continue to purchase land will never lack labor to put it to use. That is, unlike the old days, arable land today will always be a source of income to the owner.

But it is precisely such a situation which is conducive to the emergence of patterns of land concentration. Such a danger would exist no matter what the pre-existing tenure mode were. But in a society such as Haiti, where even at a "grass roots" level land has traditionally been alienable, the danger is especially great. For where there is land purchase, there must also be land sale and--
ipso facto—the emergence of at least temporary local resource differentials. And where land is further transmitted via inheritance, as is true of Haiti, these differentials will easily be inter-generationally perpetuated. Furthermore, since the children of the better-off start life in a somewhat stronger economic position than the children of the less well off, they are more likely to purchase more land, the differentials will thus increase, and land concentration will have set in.

In short the demographic process which led to the emergence of sharecropping had seriously "tampered" with a system. It first undercut the labor mobilization strategy which had prevailed in the "golden age." But the members of the system quickly maneuvered, shifted gear, and successfully preserved intact the basic feature of this basic component. They would still mobilize labor by allocating land; others would still gain access to land by providing labor. But in pulling off this shift, the population had maneuvered itself (and its future generations) into a position where the specters of local stratification and eventual landlessness now had open doors. Some dangerous seeds had been sown. The danger was that the entire resource-control system would shift from the life-cycle resource dispersal, characteristic of the traditional system, to a stratificational model in which wealth is gradually concentrated into fewer hands, and in which local "classes" could finally emerge.
But this has not occurred. For simultaneously with the gradual shift to reliance on sharecropping, yet another equally fundamental—but analytically more impressive—systemic maneuver has been "pulled off" by the same population. Social classes have not emerged in Kinanbwa. The substantial holding differentials made possible by a sharecropping labor mobilization system have in fact occurred to some extent. But a systemic mechanism has for decades been operating toward the periodic reduction of these differentials. The mechanism has not eliminated differentials, but it has kept them within the basic confines of a life-cycle modality of resource management, and has prevented the emergence of intergenerationally perpetuated local strata. Of all the patterns described in these pages, it is this pattern which had least been expected and which has compelled radical reassessment of the function of one of the most enigmatic topics of Caribbean anthropology: the function of Haitian voodoo.

I will look at this mechanism through the framework of the traditional anthropological concept of life cycle, since it is the life-cycle modality of resource management whose preservation has been its principal result. But the life-cycle construct used here will be a somewhat revamped variant of the one traditionally used in anthropological writing.

A conceptual "overhauling" was in fact necessary to adapt the concept of life cycle to the analytic task which it will be called upon to perform in these pages. Conventional ethnographic descriptions of the "local life cycle" frequently consist of a sequence of
ethnographic descriptions of the major rites of passage prevalent in the researched culture. Individuals will be depicted as passing from childhood to adulthood and old age along a trajectory of rituals and ceremonies, the most salient ones generally involving (in peasant societies) pregnancy and birth practices, courtship and mating patterns, and death and burial customs. Depending on the culture (and the focus of the ethnographer), some detail may also be given to ritual healing, child rearing, or other ethnographic domains, all as part of the discussion of the life cycle.

The use of the concept of life cycle in anthropological writing has brought certain advantages, practical as well as conceptual. From a purely practical point of view, the construct of life cycle has been a powerful organizing device for the incorporation of a wealth of descriptive information within the confines of a text. For fieldwork generates not only abstract analysis, but also concrete descriptive data which can provide useful comparative materials for other researchers working in other settings. But some sort of presentational framework is needed for the organization of these ethnographic minutiae. The chapter on "life cycle" is frequently the repository of such data.

But the concept of life cycle has been useful from an analytic point of view as well. The construal of the "human life cycle" as the movement of a "typical" individual through a series of structures and rites—a movement lubricated with ritual, custom, and belief—captures a very important facet of human life. The human career does in fact tend to be ordered sequentially, with large groups of individuals passing through roughly the same statuses and "stages."

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Despite the unique aspects of each individual life course, most individuals share a common biopath with other individuals of the same social and economic group. The anthropological use of the construct of the "life cycle" captures this shared movement. And because the passage from one stage to another is frequently accompanied by public ceremonies, the focus on ritual is not entirely inappropriate.

But a concentration of descriptive and analytic effort on the domains of ritual and custom exploit only a small portion of the potential of the life-cycle construct. For the overt (and publicly ritualized) aspects of the passage of an individual through life are only part of the picture. There are also latent underpinnings to this movement, patterns of what could be called a "hidden career."

Though many aspects of local life are given symbolic representation and brought to public awareness, there may be other shared features of the local movement through the life cycle which may lie hidden, being either taken for granted or even disguised, and which hence will not form part of the publicly prevalent local theory of the "way things work." We may expect such "hidden careers" to be especially likely when the substructure of economic life is changing, but where the public theories and models of life are lagging somewhat behind.

This is precisely the situation which prevails in Kinantwa. I have shown that the substructure of economic life in Kinantwa has in fact been changing in an important area, and that a demographically generated transformation has occurred in the local life cycle as a result. But this and other transformations have not yet been incorporated into the public explanations given of local village life; and
as a result there are aspects of the contemporary passage through life which constitute in effect a partially hidden career. These microevolutionary shifts have become incorporated into the contemporary life-cycle, and now constitute central components of the local yeoman career. But the state of flux in which this career finds itself has precluded, not only the public ritualization of these new "life phases," but even their clear recognition in terms of verbal descriptions of "local life" on the part of villagers. That is, there is truly a somewhat "hidden career" pulsating under the surface of a life-cycle that is still locally conceived and described largely in terms of a rapidly vanishing traditional way of life.

To capture this hidden career, the handling of the local life cycle cannot be done in the manner of traditional ethnography. The content of the "life cycle" can no longer be viewed as the surface trajectory of an individual through a series of publicly ritualized rites of passage. On the contrary, the camouflaged nature of the newly emergent life path places it somewhat out of the reach of research techniques relying heavily on conventional informant descriptions. The basic construct of a series of life phases shared by many individuals is still valid; but the data this is to be "fitted into" this conceptual structure will be different. To characterize the transformed life-cycle in Kinanbwa, I will rely rather on quantitative data collected on the life history of every adult male in the community. But the microevolutionary transformations have had their most impressive impact on the life sphere of land acquisition, and it will be on this life sphere that the analysis will focus.
STAGE ONE: SHARECROPPING AND INCIPIENT ECONOMIC AUTONOMY

Even in the traditional life cycle, land acquisition was a central organizing feature of rural life. A loose framework of "stages" can be heuristically reconstructed. "Stage one" of economic autonomy in the traditional career began when an individual received land "on loan" from his parents while still living in their house. Stage two came when these incipient holdings were augmented by the definitive inheritance of more land on the death of the parents, and by the achieving of marginal accretions to land via rental and purchase arrangements. "Stage three" might be applied to those years when the cultivator began giving out land to his own growing male dependents to farm on their own. These three major economic functions--receiving provisional land, acquiring permanent land, and "lending out" provisional land--constituted a sequentially ordered series of critical behaviors which males traversed in the course of a traditional career. During the passage, inheritance was the principal mainstay of individual aspiration, the most salient focus of intrafamilial strife, and the principal systemic mechanism for resource transfer.

To some degree stage one of the economic career of the contemporary cultivator still bears a clear resemblance to stage one of the traditional career. In the first place the vast majority of young males still living in their parents' home will have begun cropping their own gardens before they establish their own families. As is probably true in most cultures, there is a latent "timetable" which individuals are expected to follow in making this important first step
toward autonomy. Though ethnographic accounts have indicated that young men receive their first piece of land when they are about eighteen, data from Kinanbwa indicate that, whatever the ideal norms may be, nowadays a good percentage of dependent males will not have begun even by the age of twenty one. Table 10-1 breaks down the 101 adolescent and young-adult male dependents in the community in terms of whether they have started cropping their first garden or not.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>Does not own garden % (N)</th>
<th>Does not yet crop % (N)</th>
<th>TOTAL % (N)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Under 17</td>
<td>17% (6)</td>
<td>83% (30)</td>
<td>100% (36)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18-21</td>
<td>50% (16)</td>
<td>50% (16)</td>
<td>100% (32)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22+</td>
<td>82% (27)</td>
<td>18% (6)</td>
<td>100% (33)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>49% (49)</td>
<td>51% (52)</td>
<td>100% (101)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existence of an implicit timetable is clear. Whereas it is rare for a child under 17 to have his own garden, it is equally rare for an individual over twenty-two not to have taken this first step.

But if the timing of this first step adheres generally to the timing that was prevalent in the traditional system, the preceding chapter has made it clear that there has been a change in the manner...
in which the step is taken. There is a much greater dependence on sharecropping. But we are dealing with an evolutionary trend, and not with an abrupt break. Thus data have been presented indicating that a substantial part of incipient holdings still contain land allocated to young men by parents (cf. Table 8-4). It appears to be the case that young men still living in their father’s home can as a rule count on at least one small plot of land allocated to them under some variant of the traditional pre-inheritance arrangement. What is clear from that Table, however, is that a larger proportion of young men rely on sharecropped land. Thus the internal tenure heterogeneity that characterizes holdings in Kinanbwa is present even in these incipient holdings of the young. Though pre-inheritance plots do appear on most of these incipient holdings, sharecropped plots appear with greater frequency.

The data from Table 8-4 were provided by fathers being interviewed concerning the holdings of their dependent sons. The data agree substantially with data gleaned from interviews with the young cultivators themselves. There are 78 cultivators in the community who have not yet reached their 30th birthday. Though a majority of these cultivators are still living with their parents, some have already established homes of their own. It is the nature of the holdings of these 78 cultivators that is of interest here. Table 10-2 categorizes these cultivators along two independent dimensions, to assess whether inherited land or sharecropped land accounts for a greater part of their holdings. On the left hand side those who are cropping at least some land given by parents are separated from those
who are not. On the right hand side, those who are sharecropping at least some land are separated from those who are not. Virtually the same relative distribution of tenure types is found to hold in this subgroup of the population as was seen in Table 8-4. The number of individuals working on a sharecropping basis is slightly higher than the number who are working on parentally donated land. The fact that a substantial majority are working on parental land, but that an even more substantial majority are also working sharecropped plots, attests to the internal heterogeneity that characterizes the typical holding, even from the earliest stages of the local career. But in light of the consistent distribution which appears in the two independently constructed tables, sharecropping must be listed as the major gateway to stage one of the economic life of the contemporary Kinanbwa yeoman, with pre-inheritance plots being relegated to a close but clear second place.

---

**TABLE 10-2**

Tenure Arrangements of the 78 Cultivators under Age 30

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Does he work any land</th>
<th>Does he work any land lent him by his parents? as a sharecropper?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% (of 78)</td>
<td>N</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>% (of 78)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68% 53</td>
<td>76% 59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>32% 25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% 78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
STAGE TWO: THE PURCHASE OF LAND

If stage one of the economic career of the contemporary cultivator has begun to veer away from the lifepath trodden by his 19th century predecessors, in stage two the break becomes sharp, definitive, and virtually complete. In the traditional system, the incipient holding based on a provisional pre-inheritance grant would eventually be augmented, but principally via the process of inheritance at the death of one or both parents. The cultivator would enter a new economic life phase, but the vehicle carrying him there would be the same inheritance complex which provided the initial land grant. Other alternatives were always available, of course; land purchase has always been a resource acquisition strategy in rural Haiti, as has been sharecropping and rental. But these devices, in the traditional context, remained ancillary sub-plots in a drama that was dominated by the theme of inheritance.

The contemporary system is built up of the same constituent element, but the balance of power has shifted. Nowadays, to make an economically successful and socially respectable entry into stage two of his career, the contemporary cultivator must purchase a plot of land. What was once perhaps the supplementary strategy of a minority has now become the normative rule for the group and the statistical achievement of the majority. This incorporation of land purchase as a central axis of the economic life path is one of the major transformations that have come over the local life cycle. It is via this portal that an increasing number of yeomen are entering stage two of their careers.

The normative aspects of this pattern are truly impressive. In
elicitation sessions in which informants were asked to rank community members economically, land purchase emerged as a neck and neck competitor with having children as the prime criterion of locally recognized adulthood. So important has land purchase become that apparently well-to-do young men in their late twenties or early thirties, though they have inherited more than an average amount of land from their parents, are nonetheless still considered ti-moun (children). "Yo poko achté tè." They haven't bought land yet.

If the purchase of land is now a normatively important prerequisite to local adulthood, quantitative data indicate that it is a statistically important behavior in the community as well. Table 10-3 indicates that fully 44% of the cultivators of Kinanbwa have purchased at least one plot of land at some point in their career. But it is the timing of this behavior which is crucial for the present analysis. During the first phase of a cultivator's

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Has he bought land?</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 10-3
Prevalence of Land-Purchasing Patterns
economic life he is basically a sharecropper of land for other members of the community and a cropper of plots provisionally allocated to him by parents. This state tends to last throughout the twenties. But by the time a cultivator has moved into his mid-thirties, he will find that most of his age mates have begun to purchase their first plots of land, and chances are strong that he will do the same.

This contention is supported by Figure 10-1, which breaks down the population into age cohorts, and specifies for each cohort the percentage of individuals therein who have purchased at least one plot of land. Two things become clear from this breakdown. In the first place the figure of 44% as the quotient for land purchase in the community is deceptively low. Because land purchasing is clearly a life cycle phenomenon, those who are young will not yet have purchased. But if we look at older cohorts we see that more than six out of ten

![Figure 10-1: Land Purchase as a Life Cycle Phenomenon](image)

- $X^2 = 48.2^*$
- 5 df
- $P = .001$

*Yates correction applied*
individuals will have bought land. That is, the purchase of land has clearly become the rule—statistical as well as normative—in the community. Secondly, we also can see that there is a clear social timetable for entering into this phase of life. A few individuals in their late twenties have already begun, but they have clearly gained a head start from the point of view of the behavior of their fellows. But an individual who has reached forty and has not yet purchased land is in danger of being permanently left behind. As in other cultural settings, there is no mechanical adherence to a specific age for entering this new life phase. But there is a general tendency for the aggregate behavior of the cultivators to follow a general timetable. The late thirties and early forties emerge as the age bracket scheduled for local entry into stage two of one's land acquisition career, a move that is made when a man takes the "grown up" step of purchasing land.

One aspect of the land-transacting pattern which emerges in Figure 10-1 at first sight appears somewhat puzzling. If land purchasing is part of the life cycle, why does it seem to level off, and even decline, in the upper age brackets? Why has not the fourth cohort purchased more than the third, and the fifth substantially more than the fourth? And above all, why have the oldest men in the community, those over sixty five, not purchased more than anyone? If the rule were "purchase in your late thirties but never purchase after that," then the levelling off would be comprehensible. But this is a far-fetched explanation, and does not in fact correspond to what happens. Men continue to purchase into old age. And if by some
quirk the land purchasers were the first to die off, then we could see why a larger percentage of the oldest age group should be slightly lower in land purchasing. But this explanation is even more far-fetched than the first.¹

The problem is in fact more apparent than real. On the one hand the "levelling off" is to some degree a function of the breakdown of the data which was chosen. If instead of simply focusing on whether an individual has ever purchased land or not, we ask how much land an individual has purchased, the progression continues up until old age. Table 10.4 focuses on the 100 individuals in the community who have purchased land, breaking them down, first by age, then by the amount of land which they have purchased. Whereas most of those under

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Carreau</th>
<th>Less than a carreau</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 35</td>
<td>28% (5)</td>
<td>72% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35 - 49</td>
<td>36% (16)</td>
<td>64% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+</td>
<td>66% (25)</td>
<td>34% (13)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>46% (46)</td>
<td>54% (54)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

¹ From a statistical point of view, the four upper cohorts are the same as regards the proportion of land purchasers in each group. The differences between them could, with high probability, have been produced by random fluctuations. This is clearly not the case with the first two cohorts, as the chi-square for Figure indicates.
fifty have purchased less than a carreau, a significant majority of those land purchasers who are fifty and over have in contrast purchased more than a carreau of land. Thus land purchasing is a behavior which continues throughout the life cycle.2

But perhaps more importantly, the less-than-impressive land purchasing behavior on the part of the very old is to some degree a result of the fact that there are two quasi-autonomous diachronic trends operating to produce the distribution. On the one hand we have the progress of the life-cycle, in which land purchasing begins at a certain age and continues into old age. But on the other hand we are dealing with a life cycle which in itself has been changing over time. As was demonstrated in the preceding chapter, the current land tenure system is the product of recent microevolutionary adaptations in the aggregate behavior of the local population. Though sharecropping was the focus of attention there, there is also indication that land purchasing has been increasing and has become an especially prevalent component of the life cycle in recent generations. But the "old timers" began their own careers to some degree in the context of the traditional system, where land purchasing appears to have been more marginal. What is impressive, then, is not the manner in which they lag, but rather the degree to which they have almost caught up. At any rate, statistical as well as ethnographic data clearly indicate that the contemporary Kinabwa cultivators are marching

2. An analysis of some 600 land transactions in which community members were involved indicated that the modal land purchase involves about a quarter of a carreau of land. Thus most of the land purchasers have clearly been involved in at least two, and generally more, transactions.
along a life path in which land purchase is a mandated passport to local prestige, a passport which most individuals manage to acquire.

**STAGE THREE: THE SHARING OF LAND**

At this point, however, an apparently self-evident but analytically crucial question must be posed. What do the cultivators do with the land once they have purchased it? The obvious answer would appear to be: they begin cropping it, thus increasing the size of their own effective holdings. There are certainly many young land purchasers who do precisely that. Figure 10-2 breaks down the population of cultivators into six ten-year age cohorts, and computes the average number of gardens which the members of each age cohort are cultivating. It will be recalled that the average cultivator in the community is cultivating between five and six plots. But this average masks

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean number of gardens worked</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-34</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FIGURE 10-2**

Age-Specific Rise and Decline in Energy Output
important age-specific differences which emerge if the population is broken down by age. As Figure 13-2 illustrates there is a peak period of energy output at precisely that point in the life cycle where land purchase becomes the statistical norm. Because they have purchased plots of land to augment their predominantly sharecropped holdings, men at this age step into several years of high energy agrarian output which excels what has preceded and from which they will somewhat retreat as they enter their fifties and early sixties. From a bioenergetic standpoint, then, this period emerges as the "prime of life" in the career of the Kinanbwa cultivator, a stage which is entered via the now mandated achievement of purchasing land.

But here we begin to run into problems with "recalcitrant" data. There are several inconsistencies, troublesome "wrinkles" in the curves, aggravating refusals of the data to pattern themselves in an internally consistent fashion. The sensible notion that men buy land and begin to work it themselves just doesn't pan out.

The first troublesome wrinkle in the data manifests itself as an apparent inconsistency between the number of gardens being worked by men of different ages, and the amount of land which their age group has purchased. Table 10-4 indicated that men over fifty have purchased significantly more land than those under fifty. Yet Figure 10-2 had indicated that those over fifty are not working more gardens than their juniors. On the contrary, they appear to be working slightly less land. There are several possible explanations for this pattern, but it is a warning signal against simplistically assuming that local economic life consists of a simple accumulation and successive cropping of ever more land. Land is purchased, but not ne-
cessarily cropped by the purchaser.

A somewhat more problematic pattern, however, is to be found in the age-specific curve for sharecropping. People buy more land as they progress through life, and supposedly begin cropping that land. One would expect that as they acquire more land of their own through purchase, they would make efforts to extricate themselves from the bonds of tenant sharecropping with which they began their economic life. That is, as the curve for land purchasing moves up through the different age cohorts, we would expect a concomitant decline in the patterns of age-specific sharecropping.

Despite its logic, this model simply doesn't "work." If we do for sharecropping what was done for land purchasing--examine it to see if it rises or falls along the life cycle--the results are somewhat ambiguous. This distribution is depicted in Figure 10-3.

---

**FIGURE 10-3**

Sharecropping and the Life Cycle

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age Group</th>
<th>Percentage Sharecropping at Least One Plot</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24-25</td>
<td>N=42, 81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34</td>
<td>N=57, 75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44</td>
<td>N=50, 66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54</td>
<td>N=33, 70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64</td>
<td>N=26, 65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+</td>
<td>N=18, 61%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* $x^2 = 2.8^*$

5 df

Not sign.

* Yates correction applied
It is true that there appears to be a slight overall decline in the status of sharecropper as one moves up the age brackets. Except for the 35-to-44 age cohort, which steps slightly out of line, there is a gentle but consistent decline in the percentage of individuals who are tenants in each successive age cohort. But this decline is too weak to produce statistical significance. Statistically speaking, though there was a clearly significant increase in land purchasing as one moves from the youngest to the older age cohorts, there is no corresponding decline in the proportion of tenants.3 In short the data seem to indicate that cultivators continue to sharecrop with more or less the same prevalence as they did when they were younger, or that their entry into the status of land purchasers is at any rate much more brusque than their decline from the status of tenant. Though they pick up new plots via purchase, they appear not to release the old plots which they have been sharecropping.

A somewhat different breakdown of the data throws more light on what is happening. If we look at the quantities of land involved, the pattern becomes somewhat clearer. Table 10-5 divides the population into three groups on the basis of the amount of land purchased, and in each group separates those who are sharecropping from those who are not. What emerges is a clear tendency for those who have purchased more than a carreau of land to be less involved in tenancy for others than the rest of their fellows in the community. But the decline is not the most impressive feature of the data. What is more impressive, rather, is the fact that even those individuals who have purchased

3. Because we are dealing with a population rather than a random sample, the decline, though slight, has theoretical significance, especially in view of the fact that it occurs in the predicted direction.
up to a carreau of land will continue to sharecrop for others with as great frequency as those who have purchased no land. And furthermore even half of those who have purchased more than a kero will also continue to serve as tenants on the plots of others.

### Table 10-5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Amt. of land purchased</th>
<th>Does he sharecrop any plots?</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>None</td>
<td>Yes 78% (98)</td>
<td>No 22% (28)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Less than a carreau</td>
<td>Yes 75% (41)</td>
<td>No 25% (14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A carreau or more</td>
<td>Yes 50% (23)</td>
<td>No 50% (23)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>Yes 71% (162)</td>
<td>No 29% (65)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Before discussing why this is so, there is yet a third wrinkle in the data which must be ironed out, the most difficult one of all. The land purchasing behavior of cultivators was measured in two separate ways. On the one hand cultivators were simply asked if they had purchased land. But another type of data was collected on each of the gardens separately. One of the questions asked of each garden was the tenure relationship under which it was being cropped. From this it was possible to ascertain if the cultivator was currently cropping any land which he himself had purchased. Thus there were two separate measures. Data as to whether a cultivator had purchased land at all were given in figure 10-1 and Table 10-3. Additional
data as to whether a cultivator is cropping any of this purchased land are given in Figure 10-4. The pattern which emerges in Figure 10-4 taken by itself, fits in with the general notion of greater land purchasing as one moves through life. But if it is compared to Figure 10-1 then a serious problem leaps out. What emerges from such a comparison is the curious pattern whereby the purchase of a plot of land and the working of that plot do not necessarily go hand in hand. In fact the only cohort in which every individual who has purchased a plot of land is working that plot is the youngest cohort. In every other cohort, the number of individuals who are working on purchased land (Figure 10-4) is smaller than the number who have purchased land (Figure 10-1). That is, in all of these cohorts, there are land purchasers who are not working any of the plots they have bought. What then are they doing with them?

![Graph](image)

**Figure 10-4**

*Age-Specific Patterns of Cropping Purchased Plots*
The answer to this question will bring us into the heart of phase three of the contemporary system. But before answering it, a summary of what has preceded will be helpful. The apparent inconsistencies in the data have forced closer scrutiny, but the result has been the discovery of a system which has operated at a level below the reach of conventional ethnographic description. I have shown on the one hand that inheritance can no longer be treated as the dominant land control modality in Kinantwa. It has been displaced by the modality of sharecropping as the principal source of land for young men beginning their economic careers. This status of tenant-sharecropper, though it declines slightly with age, maintains its statistical predominance through all age cohorts. On the other hand, however, I have shown that land purchasing is also a central feature of the contemporary yeoman career in this community. By their forties, most cultivators will have purchased at least one plot of land. And the older a purchaser becomes, the more land he appears to buy. Some individuals have purchased more land than the average household is cropping. Yet despite this prevalence of land purchasing, tenant sharecropping also continues to be curiously prevalent, even in the older age groups. But the most serious wrinkle, finally, is to be seen in the pattern whereby the number of individuals actually working purchased plots is substantially smaller than the number who have in fact purchased land. The most enigmatic aspect of this is that there are many individuals who have purchased land, are not working any of the purchased land, and yet continue to sharecrop some land for others. These patterns are too common to be dismissed as mere inaccuracies in the data. We are
dealing with a puzzling aspect of the system, one which cannot be shoved aside but must be directly accounted for. There are cultivators who purchase plots but do not crop them. Where are these "missing" plots? What are their owners doing with them?

They are in fact doing something quite sensible with them, something that is important not only to the cultivator himself, but to the functioning of the entire contemporary land-allocation system. The enigma will be removed when we examine one more life-cycle pattern that has yet to be discussed. Age specific data have been presented on land purchasing and on sharecropping. What remains to be examined is the status of landlordism as a component of the local life cycle. Most individuals become sharecroppers at an early age, and stay that way until old age. Most individuals furthermore become purchasers of land. Do most individuals also become landlords, taking on tenants, as part of the "normal" peasant career in Kinanbwa? How is this behavior of "land sharing" distributed along the life cycle?

The question is answered in Figure 10-5 and the mystery is removed from the data just discussed. Dividing the population again into age cohorts, and computing the percentage of individuals in each cohort who are "landlords,"--i.e. who have at least one tenant on their land--it becomes clear that in the contemporary life cycle, the role of landlord has come to constitute the grand finale of local peasant life. Of all the age-specific land-use curves, it is this curve of "landlordism" which shows the most persistent and determined climb up into the higher age brackets. By the mid-thirties some three out of ten individuals will already have entered this status.
the mid-forties more than six out of ten will have become landlords.

From there it is a steady uphill road, culminating in a situation whereby some eight out of every ten of the older men in the community will have entered this status.

With these data on landlordism, the last missing element in the revised systemic blueprint has been supplied, the last systemic gap has been closed in. Land used to be transferred by inheritance. Though this still occurs, now the movement takes place in the context of the three behaviors of sharecropping, purchasing land, and subsequently sharing that land out. These three critical behaviors occur in a life-cycle sequence, and are systematically spread out along the dimension of age. If individuals who purchase land will frequently not be working that land, it is because they are in a system where purchased land is shared with
other community members who will work the land as tenants.

With this pattern, the enigma has been removed from the system, and the puzzling patterns of status overlap—the intricate intraclass dynamics of local sharecropping—have been given meaning. To see this meaning let us follow the steps of a cultivator as he makes his way through this transformed life cycle. We can begin with a cultivator who for years has been cropping his "stage one" holding composed of a mixture of sharecropped and parentally allocated pre-inheritance plots, with a slight preponderance of the former. But in his early thirties he takes an important step and purchases his first plot of land. The addition of this new plot augments his holding, simultaneously augmenting the annual overall energy investment he must make in the cultivation of his gardens. His principal source of supplementary energy up until now has been exchange labor with age mates for those tasks requiring such concentrated inputs. Having purchased his first plot, he increases his own energy investment in these exchange labor arrangements and thus secures, over the course of a cropping cycle, the extra labor that will be needed for the cultivation of his newly acquired land.

In a few years he purchases his second plot. But depending on the size of his holding, he may now think twice about simply adding this plot to his inventory and once again arithmetically increasing his own personal energy investment to handle the new plot. Let us assume he does it, however, as at least some cultivators do.

But when he purchases his third plot, there will be no question of following that simple procedure. He will probably be in his forties by now. His own physical prime may have passed, and at any
rate his age mates have already begun to curtail somewhat the amount of land they themselves will physically handle.

The cultivator, now in possession of yet another plot, has a choice to make. He now has under his control one plot more than he can effectively handle by himself, even taking into account his capacity to mobilize domestic labor or exchange labor. But it will be recalled that his holding will consist of several types of plots. Over and above the purchased plots, he will also be cultivating parentally allocated plots and plots which he has been sharecropping since phase one of his career. In purchasing a new plot, he has exceeded the energy demand that he is able or willing to meet. He must now decide what to do with the new plot of land.

A government agronomist trained abroad, a foreign developmental expert dispensing free advice, or a mediocre ethnographer, would probably advise the individual to give back one of the sharecropped plots. After all, he has to forfeit half the produce from it anyway. He could redirect this partially wasted energy toward the cultivation of the newly purchased plot, all of whose fruits would be his. Fortunately, the cultivators would not as a rule follow such well meant but poorly conceived advice.

In the first place the chances are rather good that the owner of the plots which the cultivator is sharecropping are relatives of one sort or another. In such cases he is probably not forfeiting half of the produce, come harvest time, but substantially less. Kin are criticized for treating tenant-kin in the same way they treat non-related tenants. If the cultivator is receiving two-thirds of the produce from a plot he is sharecropping for a close relative, he would
be rather foolish to abandon that plot and turn full time to the
cultivation of a plot he has recently purchased. His income will be
maximized if, on the contrary, he continues sharecropping as before
and gives out the newly acquired plot to a tenant. To the degree that
the new tenant is a non-relative, the cultivator will be able to
claim as much as half of the produce from the plot. Two thirds
from one plot plus one half from another plot add up to more than the
simple "one" he would be earning were he to behave as most outsiders
might and spend all his energy in his own private plot.

But if maximizing income is one side of the coin, minimizing
risks is the other—and probably more important—side. Anthropologists
have for years been pointing out the strategic value to peasants of
holdings that are diversified, not only with respect to crops, but
also with respect to soil types and hydraulic conditions. This
diversification is a valuable protection against the hazards, both
physical and commercial, of throwing all one's fragile agrarian eggs
into one basket.

The peasants of the Cul-de-Sac Plain are especially attuned to
the wisdom of this practice. Even within the framework of the general
lowland ecology of the Cul-de-Sac Plain, there are important micro-
environmental differences. These differences revolve principally
around the natural moisture of the plot itself, the availability of
groundwater irrigation, and the quality of the soil. In all cases there
is danger of crop spoilage. On the saline land, the cultivator will
plant hardy crops such as sweet potato and sugar cane. The very
salinity of the plot may, however, destroy even these cultivates.
If on the other hand the cultivator has high quality soil, with groundwater irrigation, he will try crops such as beans, onions, and plantains which bring in a substantially higher per-hectare income. But these crops are more delicate and vulnerable to other dangers, and losses are also frequent. In view of the dangers surrounding the farming of any plot in this region, it frequently makes better sense for the cultivator to have **half a stake in two plots** rather than a full stake in one plot. Though his income may not increase, his risks are lessened. Once again there will be a high degree of rationality and feasibility in the behavior of sharing out newly acquired land with another, even though one remains a tenant on some other plot.

But the cultivator who is deciding whether to share out land with another or not is operating not only in the context of the above mentioned structure of **economic** payoffs and pitfalls. On the contrary, there will be clear **social** repercussions to the final choice he makes as well. It would be most surprising if a behavior so crucial to the economic functioning of the community as is the sharing of land were regarded neutrally by the community at large. There are in fact subtle but important social payoffs flowing from the act of sharing out one's land with another member of the community, even though one is collecting as much as half of the produce. The basic feasibility and desirability of sharing out land are established by the above-mentioned income maximizing and risk minimizing implications of such sharing. But even these factors do not mechanically determine a course of action. Their impact is more in the nature of a predisposing "gentle shove" in one direction.
The simultaneous existence of a structure of social payoffs pushing in the same general direction, then, may intervene as an ancillary "extra" which may finally tip the decision scales in the general direction of land sharing.

The nature of the social payoff resides partially in the altruistic construal that is frequently made of the behavior of an individual who is sharing out land with one or more tenants. "Si ou bay démwayé, ou mém ouap viv, démwayé-a ap viv tou." If you share out your land, you'll still live from it, but so will the sharecropper. But perhaps what is more important, evolving village success models have now come to incorporate this behavior as a quasi-mandated characteristic of the successful male adult, in a fashion quite analogous to the current social implications of land purchasing itself. The contemporary yeoman in his forties or fifties is functioning in the context of a land-control system in which a substantial majority of his age mates have achieved this status of local sharer of land. To fail to follow suit is to be left socially behind.

The genesis of this status system is to be sought, of course, in the diachronic process discussed in the preceding chapter. Where land has become scarce, where sharecropping as become an important source of "first land" for young men, it is no surprise that a local status system has emerged rewarding land sharers. To get ahead in this community, one not only buys land, one "shares" it as well. Land sharing may have at base a structure of economic calculation. But a local status system construes this economically sensible behavior as being socially desirable as well.
In short the logic behind the complex and initially enigmatic patterns of intracommunity sharecropping has now been exposed. It is logical from an individual point of view. But there is a systemic logic as well: resources are regularly allocated, labor is regularly mobilized.

It is the data on landlordism, then, which finally flips the switch, the switch that not only puts the system in motion, but that turns on the light for an observer to see what is happening. It is the data on landlordism which exposes the operation of a system. If the traditional system of the nineteenth century is vanishing, we now have an accurate blueprint of what its transformed descendant looks like. It is true that these data—the data on landlordism—are merely an aggregate summary of what are at root individual land-sharing behaviors. But these individual land-sharing behaviors are systemically meshed with the other two major behaviors of sharecropping and buying land.

With the presentation of these data a "hidden sequence" has been exposed, a latent trajectory of three systemically crucial life stages through which the contemporary yeoman will generally pass as he moves through life. He will begin sharecropping. He will then eventually acquire land via purchase. And he will later (or immediately) share this purchased land out with other members of the community. The sequence is "hidden," because there are no rituals or ceremonies marking the passage of an individual into a new phase. But it is "hidden" for a much more important reason as well. The three critical behaviors do not neatly follow each other chronologically. There is rather severe overlap. An individual does not quickly drop his sharecropped plot when he purchases land. He enters the new life stage but hangs on
to behaviors from the old. Likewise when he begins sharing out land with others, he will in many cases continue to work as a tenant on at least some plots. Because of this overlap, conventional descriptive techniques will miss the sequence. It is only through the examination of aggregate data that this scarcely visible but systemically critical sequence gets exposed.

The justification of the use of the term system should be clear. Though land is not controlled and allocated as it was in the "golden age," it is nonetheless systematically transferred under a new modality. It passes from hand to hand as in the old system, and as in the old system those who pass it on tend to be older than those who receive it.

The differences between the new system and the old one, of course, leap out. The young man of times gone by who began life on parentally allocated land has slowly been replaced by a young sharecropper. And the vignette of the old patriarch, surrounded by sons laboring for him on his gardens, is being slowly replaced by a competing "success model." In this more contemporary portrait, the patriarch has been displaced by the image of an elderly but still healthy landlord who, laying down his own hoe, dons a clean, long-sleeved blue shirt, picks up his batô—the elaborate cane which those who have somehow "made it" can carry in rural Haiti—and calmly patrols his holdings, casting an approving eye on the work of his tenants. The actors are the same; but they are performing to the cues of a substantially revised script.
But if certain parts of the script have been changed, the changes have permitted the retention of the basic structure of the traditional framework. Inheritance has to some degree been "sacrificed" and relegated to second place. But this maneuver has permitted the preservation of at least three structures even more central to the march of traditional life. In the first place the demographic threat to the smooth linkage between land allocation and labor mobilization has been averted. Because land became too scarce, parents could no longer as easily "capture" their sons' labor via generous land grants. The shift to sharecropping has permitted the mobilization of critical labor to continue to be made via land prestations, as under the old system. What has changed is the context; the intrafamilial linkages of inheritance land and filial labor have ceded to the largely extradomestic maneuvers of landlord/tenant bonds. But the basic systemic linkage between land-giving and labor-giving, a critical feature of the old system, has been maintained.

Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, local stratification has been avoided. That is, a life-cycle modality of land control has been preserved, a resource management scheme in which land is systematically made available to younger generations, who will in turn acquire land to make it available to their own followers. Such life-cycle schemes of resource management, common in peasant societies, generally depend on intrafamilial inheritance transactions. But here we have a population which has been confronted with demographic inroads which reduce the feasibility of this arrangement and which has devised an adaptive "detour" which leads to the same destination via a somewhat different route.
And thirdly, in making this profound shift, the population has preserved one other crucial feature of traditional life: the "bowing out" phase, the routine which guides and legitimizes the gradual withdrawal of the elderly from active field labor. In the traditional scheme the young would take over the fields of their elderly parents, who would then enter into a quasi-supervisory role. The basic bioenergetic imperative of gradual withdrawal from field labor in old age was heeded, but heeded in a social context where the elders tended to play supervisory, rather than dependency, roles. This same basic format has also been preserved in the new scheme. Though fewer patriarchs are to be seen directing the labor of their sons in the fields, the basic bioenergetic and social characteristics of this arrangement have been preserved in the role of elderly landlord, who gradually reduces the amount of land he crops himself, and increases his stake rather in the gardens of tenants.

In short cultural evolution has once again occurred. The life-cycle which I have presented in this chapter is the product of the same type of adaptive maneuvering which is at the root of change and progress in human society. Threatened by the inroads of population pressure, a culture has maneuvered, adapted, and erected a temporary defense. The prosperity of the traditional system has been irreparably damaged; but its basic viability has been temporarily preserved. If a great deal of detail has been given to the documenting of this drama, it was done out of a desire to study empirically and scientifically a local replay of two archaic, pan-human themes: population growth and the evolution of culture. Throughout history agrarian groups have been confronted with the dilemma of a changing man/land ratio. And throughout history cultures have flexibly maneuvered, ingeniously adapted, and energetically
changed some aspects of their traditional life to preserve the viability of others. In this sense the history of the Haitian peasant, under the surface guise of stagnant adherence to an archaic technology, has in etic fact been a history of maneuver and adaptive change.
CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE RITUAL MAINSPRING: LATENT FUNCTIONS OF PEASANT VOODOO

With the conclusion of the preceding chapter, the analysis would appear to have been brought to an end. The task of accounting for the diachronic emergence of a system based on sharecropping as the statistically most frequent tenure type had been undertaken in an earlier chapter (Chapter Nine). The subsequent synchronic analysis of the system as it currently functions, the identification of a new and still somewhat latent life cycle along which various types of land use behavior are systematically spread out, would appear to have been completed in Chapter Ten. Any further discussion of this land tenure system would seem to be complementary and perhaps somewhat antici- matic.

This impression of closure, however, is an illusion. Up until this point I have been systematically avoiding one devastating question which threatens to demolish the entire structure that has been erected in Part Three of this work. Though much of the discussion has been framed in the abstract idiom of systems analysis, I have attempted at all points to maintain the credibility of the model by constantly linking higher order concepts to specific, concrete, and understandable behaviors (or behavior changes) on the part of individual cultivators moving through life as they make rational and reasonable decisions in terms of the structure of opportunities and constraints with which they are confronted. But there is a disturbing "bug" in the entire system, a missing component which would prevent the model from working in any real life setting. There is a central link missing in the land transfer chain, a gap which must be filled.
The contemporary system, it will be recalled, has taken shape as a result of certain demographically induced blockages of the smooth flow of land via traditional inheritance pathways. The critical behavior in the traditional system was the "pre-inheritance" allocation of land by parents to adolescent and young adult sons. This was the systemically critical link in the traditional land-transfer chain. Now that this transfer has been rendered less feasible by internal demographic increment, the population has devised a rather effective detour leading to roughly the same effect. Young men start out sharecropping on land which to a large degree has been purchased by its owners. The burden has been taken off the intrafamilial inheritance pathway. This latter still functions, of course. But it now bears only part of the land flow. An alternate circuit has been established, and to an ever increasing degree land now flows through this alternate route as well.

But this alternative circuit absolutely presupposes the purchase of land by individuals in their mid thirties and forties. The system no longer relies exclusively on inherited land. Now plots pass from hand to hand via a different channel, one in which an extremely large percentage of the community is sharecropping land for other community members. I have shown that a majority of the cultivators of Kinanbwa have in fact purchased land after a certain age. There is no speculation about this aspect of the model; it is established fact. I have furthermore established that landlordism is the statistically modal state for the older members of the community. Thus the system is not the product of academic inventiveness, but is in one fashion or another a true feature of the "real world" in Kinanbwa.
But somewhere offstage back in the eaves someone appears to be waving a magic wand to keep the whole show moving. It is that critical middle link which still causes problems—the purchase of land by cultivators in their thirties and forties. Raising the money, of course, is always somewhat of a problem. But the system provides for that. It is a cash-cropping system, as was pointed out, where harvest profits may be used for the purchase of land itself or, as is more usual, for the purchase of livestock which will be raised and saved for sale when the opportunity to buy land comes up (cf. Table 11-1). Thus raising the cash may be a problem for the individual, but not

### TABLE 11-1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of Cash for Land Purchases</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sale of animal</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>280</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sale of crops</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other source</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>561</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

an inconsistency in the system's basic design.

Where the system runs into problems is in the making available of land for purchase. The entire land transfer system is now predicated on the purchase of land by people who will subsequently share it out. The strategic systemic question to ask is: where in the world does this land for sale come from? Most of the older males in the community have been shown to be purchasers of land. But where there are
buyers there have to be sellers. Who is selling all this land? It is not the government. None of the land in this region belongs to the State; the presidents gave away or sold most of it during the nineteenth century. It is not the "absentee rich." They also sold off most of their holdings several generations ago. I have given data indicating that the wealthy "absentee parasite" is a non-existent figure in the land economy of contemporary Kinabwa. Nor can we turn to emigrees as the source of all that buyable land. I have shown that there is not that much permanent emigration occurring, and that the little that does occur tends to be by young men who have not yet begun their marital or land-acquisition careers.

So we are left then with this systemic problem: who is selling all the land? We have an impressively intricate system whereby individuals begin life sharecropping to turn into eventual land purchasers and land sharers themselves. All well and good; the system has strategically adapted to certain demographically induced blockages in the traditional inheritance system. But we are dealing with a real life system presumably subject to the laws of nature. And we are dealing with a society where for generations all arable land has been treasured and avidly cultivated. How can you possibly have in such a setting a system that is predicated on continual land purchase? Who is going to supply all this land?

The question is critical but on-target. For the pursuit of an answer has taken analysis into a totally unexpected realm and exposed the existence of a "subterranean" linkage between Haitian peasant land tenure and that favorite topic of visiting anthropologists: Haitian voodoo.
THE STRUCTURE OF PEASANT VOODOO

My coverage here of Haitian peasant voodoo will be schematic and brief. Ethnographic description will be undertaken in other documents. The purpose here is to give enough essential information about the local voodoo cult to cast into perspective the unexpected function it was found to have in the realm of agrarian resource management.

DEFINITION AND PREVALENCE OF VOODOO

The term voodoo as here used applies to the complex of belief and ritual practiced in Kinanbwa involving a number of supernatural and preternatural creatures unfamiliar to the traditional Christian pantheon. The use of the English word voodoo is perhaps unfortunate, as it almost inevitably brings up the image of sorcery and magic death to the native speaker of English. Such sorcery is a small and somewhat secondary aspect of the cult, and in any case virtually never entails the use of the famous pin-ridden dolls with which the English word "voodoo" is associated in popular parlance.

Some scholars have attempted to avoid this difficulty by calling the cult by the Creole term vodun (or vodou, in the orthography being used in these pages). I have avoided this practice because it gives the false impression that this is what the Haitian peasants themselves call their religion. This is emphatically not the case. The term vodou in the lexicon of the villagers refers to a type of event in which drumming, singing, dancing, and possession took place. But this event, highly recreational in spirit, is a secondary and somewhat optional appendage to the more essential consultations, healing rituals, and animal sacrifices which constituted the central events of the cult. These critical events were not called vodou by the
villagers. ¹

There was no noun analogous to "Catholicism," for example, used by the villagers to refer to their own folk cult. There was, however, a verb phrase commonly used: to "serve the lwa" (sèvi lwa). Any person who became involved with the folk spirits—even as a simple observer of voodoo dances—was said by the villagers to sèvi lwa. There were two groups of people in the village who did not serve the lwa. These were groups of evangelical Protestants (levajil) and a small group of individuals who, though not converting to Protestantism, nonetheless publicly declared themselves to be non-servers of the lwa and would not even attend as an observer at any ceremony involving the lwa. This latter group was referred to as "pure Catholics" (katolik frâ). It was possible, using these terms, to divide the adult villagers into three separate religious groups. As Table 11-2 indicates, the Protestants and the "pure Catholics" constituted religious minority groups in the village. Some six out of ten adults interviewed classified themselves quite openly as servers of the lwa.

At other times and in other regions of Haiti, such openness about the service of the lwa would have been unthinkable. Different

¹. This restriction of the meaning of the term vodû is by no means idiosyncratic to the village of Kinanbwa. Moreau de St. Mérý in the 18th century found the same use of the term, and Herskovits reports that in Mirebalais the term vodun "...denotes a form of sacred dance accompanied by spirit-possession (1971:139)." This is identical to the meaning given in Kinanbwa. Though I have visited communities in several parts of Haiti, I have yet to encounter a rural Haitian who refers to the folk religion as vodû. Haitian writers on the topic do tend to use this term. But in doing this they are apparently following what is now standard academic practice, rather than adhering to the terminological practices of the peasants themselves.
TABLE 11-2

Religious Participation of the Villagers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
<td>% (N)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sëvi lwa</td>
<td>62% (127)</td>
<td>59% (128)</td>
<td>61% (255)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Katolik fra</td>
<td>23% (46)</td>
<td>24% (52)</td>
<td>23% (98)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lévajil</td>
<td>15% (30)</td>
<td>17% (38)</td>
<td>16% (68)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100% (203)</td>
<td>100% (218)</td>
<td>100% (421)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

governments have at different times tried to stamp out the cult. Under the American Occupation vigorous measures were taken in this direction. Métraux, whose book on Haitian Voodoo is one of the better ones, ran into problems along these lines when he did his studies in the late forties:

Unfortunately the region where I had to work was the least fruitful for research into Voodoo. The anti-superstition campaign had there enjoyed an almost complete success. Those who in their heart of hearts remained faithful to the ancestral spirits did not dare mention it aloud, still less celebrate public ceremonies (1972:19).

The case of Kinanbwa was the precise opposite. The service of the lwa was in full swing. Those who did not serve were somewhat on the defensive. They were mildly accused of not wanting to contribute to the periodic familial rites which most kin groups eventually stage. It was understandable—and socially pardoned—when a household afflicted with sickness after sickness should angrily reject the lwa and convert to Protestantism. But such conversions were still the exception. Voodoo was by any reasonable definition of the term the dominant religion of the village.

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But a comparative examination of the cult as practiced in Kinanbwa reveals some sharp differences in belief, ritual, organization, focus, and--above all--latent function from the voodoo that has been reported in much of the literature. The majority of published analyses of Haitian voodoo stem from information which researchers gleaned by attaching themselves to one or another important cult center under the control of some important houngan or mambo. Métraux is most explicit in his awareness of the implications of this choice:

We have seen that Voodoo exists in two forms--one domestic and the other public. It is this last which mainly concerns us here. Most of my observations were made at Port-au-Prince where the sanctuaries are numerous and prosperous and where the ritual is full of refinements and subtleties which are lacking in the rural cults. People are prone to suppose that the purest and richest traditions are to be found in the remotest valleys. The little I was able to see of rural Voodoo convinced me that it was poor in its ritual compared to the Voodoo of the capital. Simplicity of rite is not always a guarantee of antiquity. It is often the result of ignorance and neglect (1972:61).

Métraux appears to be asking here: which is the "real Voodoo," the public Port-au-Prince voodoo or the domestic voodoo of the peasant hinterland, such as that flourishing in Kinanbwa? The issue need not be argued here. The voodoo one ends up studying is largely a matter of circumstance. The voodoo that will be described here is the voodoo that was practiced in the homes and compounds of the peasants, most of whom never associate themselves or contract the services of highly organized sanctuaries of the type studied by Métraux and many other researchers of voodoo. Unlike most researchers, I did not seek out houngans as major informants on voodoo. If anything I was somewhat wary of the elaborate explanations which houngans appeared skilled in concocting to various questions and systematically examined explanations.
and meanings of villagers as an aid to understanding rural voodoo. If the theology here differs somewhat from the theology appearing in most published works on voodoo, it must be kept in mind that probably most researchers on voodoo use well known houngans as informants and use the events that occur in highly organized sanctuaries as typical of voodoo as a whole. My informants were all peasants of Kinanbwa.

The theology which emerged was therefore a folk theology that differs in certain important ways from the theories and explanations of the houngans. But more important for these pages, the rituals I witnessed and analyzed were virtually all performed in the compounds and homes of peasants rather than in highly organized cult sanctuaries.

Does this make Kinanbwa voodoo "the real McCoy"? It depends on one's definition. The question of the elegance of the rituals or the preservation of African traits does not concern me in these pages. What I was interested in exploring was the cult as practiced and conceived by the folk, and the interaction of these beliefs and rituals with other aspects of peasant life. A familiarity with the published literature was a help in providing me with the basic terminology with which to interact with villagers on this matter. But after a point the "theology" of the books became an obstacle to communication with the villagers. We would be talking past each other on certain points, as their explanations harbored certain root assumptions that had no precise analogs in anything I had read in the literature.

Once certain basic assumptions were grasped and certain meaning complexes exposed, then the structure of village belief began falling into place. But of even greater importance than such adjustments in my
understanding of the Voodoo belief system, I had further to abandon many
notions of which rites were the most important ones, and which details
were the most worthy of recording. It was in terms of its ritual
focus, on the one hand, and its community functions on the other hand,
that the domestic voodoo of Kinanbwa turned out to differ most deeply
from the "public" voodoo of the more highly organized cult centers
reported in the literature. It will be useful to begin with
a brief overview of voodoo theology as flourishing in Kinanbwa.

SERVICE TO THE LWA

The Familialization of the Major Spirits

The most prominent features in the voodoo pantheon are a group
of spirits called lwa. The major assumption that was emphasized in
the belief scheme of the villagers, but that is generally given less
emphasis in the literature on voodoo, is the familial nature of these
spirits. The literature generally records a strong element of ancestor
worship in voodoo ceremony, but this aspect of the cult tends to be
restricted to houngan-mediated communication between the devotees and
their dead parents or grandparents. In Kinanbwa, however, the theology
of ancestor worship has come to incorporate most of the major spirits
as well.

The primary classificatory division among the different types of
creatures in the pantheon separates those spirits that belong to an
individual's family from those spirits and preternatural creatures which
are alien. All of the alien spirits tend to be harmful most of the
time. Some (though not all) of the family spirits are benevolent
most of the time, provided they are given the proper attention by their
descendants.

The lwa are the major type of familial spirit. These lwa are given a wide assortment of names, some occurring all over Haiti. The more important lwa in Kinantwa were Ezili, Ogou, Azaka, Bosou, and Gédé, judging from the frequency with which they possessed individuals. Each lwa-type had its own personality, and during possession the individual devotee was no longer seen as being present. He was merely the "horse" for the spirit who was mounting him; the spirit would speak through his mouth. Most possessions occurred during voodoo dances, and were more part of a recreational ambience, though the possessions were seen as genuine. At other times possessions are more "serious," in the sense that they are an expected part of the ritual. When a family is offering a long service, extending over days, the inheritors are supposed to become possessed en masse. The animals being butchered are for the consumption of the spirits. But only part of the food is buried. The rest is passed out to the family which has gathered from across the Plain. Presumably they will be possessed by their ancestral lwa—and thus the food is being consumed by lwa. If no possessions occur during these critical moments, the service is considered less successful by the community, the houngan becomes somewhat embarrassed, and the family begins wondering (though will never publicly question) whether the houngan is taking them for a ride.

Thus there are many types of possession. Some possessions, especially those that occur during voodoo dances, are truly violent and individuals appear to be in a genuine trance. Other possessions are less clear, especially those which occur during the proper periods of larger services.
or of healing ceremonies. There does not appear to be a sustained state of physical excitation. What is sustained rather is a type of behavior and altered speech which the family members eagerly support, encourage, and respond to, as it means the spirits are coming and their service or ceremony is going well. The behavior of individuals during these long possessions may lapse back into normal, but they are still possessed. On two occasions I mistakenly addressed individuals by their normal names when they were, unbeknownst to me, possessed by lwa. In the first instance, the individual, whom I addressed by his daily name (Ti-Jwèn), answered gruffly: "This isn't Ti-Jwèn here" (e pa Ti-Jwèn ki la). The second individual was less brusque and explained that his horse (chéval-marde)---i.e. the person I thought he was but who was now merely a vehicle for the spirit---would soon be back and would speak to me.

The manifestations of the lwa during voodoo dances, animal sacrifices, and healing ceremonies are ceremonial, rather than informational. When critical information is needed from one's ancestral lwa (or dead parents), the spirit speaks directly to the kin group from a govi, a special type of clay jug. The houngan secludes himself and summons the spirit up from below by shaking a gourd rattle (asò) and speaking an exotic tongue (lògò). Information is generally obtained in this manner rather than through the mouth of a possessed devotee.

Such features of the lwa in Kinanbwa correspond in general to what has been reported elsewhere in the literature on Haitian voodoo. But there was one rather crucial and initially confounding difference between the lwa of this domestic voodoo and the lwa who appear in the literature on public voodoo of the formal cult centers. In the literature different
lwa, such as Ogou Feray, Dabala Wedo, Ezili Freda, Bosou Twa Kon, and the like, are depicted in a sense as single entities, much in the nature of Catholic saints. Ogou Feray, the "god of war," for example, is frequently associated with St. James, the warrior saint. There is only one St. James the Warrior in Catholic theology. Likewise there would be only one Ogou Feray according to the theological premises which emerge in the literature. Ogou Feray is "a lwa."

If two people in different parts of Haiti are possessed by him, it is presumably the same spirit who is possessing both devotees.

But this is not the case with the Ogou Feray, the Dabala Wedo, the Ezili Freda, and the other lwa of Kinanbwa. Rather these spirits are conceived of in roughly the same terms as the land on which crops are grown. They are "split up" in such a fashion that different individuals—or rather different sibling groups—have different Ogou Feray's in their ancestry. Each group is furthermore seen as inheriting these spirits from their ancestors, just as land was inherited.

It is here that I found one of the major differences between the folk theology of Kinanbwa and the theology which is implicit in the literature. In the village, whether I am a devotee or not, I inherit every single one of the lwa. And furthermore the Dabala that I inherit, for example, is the property of my family. It is not the same Dabala that other kin groups inherit. The name's the same. But they are different individual spirits.

The logic of this theological premise is followed with some consistency into other propositions. Since my father has his own Dabala Wedo, and my mother has hers, then in fact I inherit two Dabala's. The logic tends to be pushed even further back; many people will refer explicitly
to having four of each spirit, one corresponding to each of the grand-
parental branches. But this logic does not operate in the air. It
is critical to determine which of the four Dâbala's is operating in
a given illness in order to know in which compound to hold the ceremony.
The major choice is between the paternal compound or the maternal com-
pound, and most theological emphasis focuses on choosing between these
two major branches. But it is a very salient part of local theology
that the lwa are not universal spirits, not even the major lwa. They
have been fragmented, like land, into discrete "smaller" units, and
each family has its own.²

This aspect of voodoo theology involves a drastic departure
from Christian theology. The major figures in the Catholic pantheon,
for example, are unified spirits. There is one Christ, on. St. Peter,
one St. Patrick. Even the Virgin Mary is one personality. Though
there are many Virgins—the Virgin of Guadeloupe, the Virgin of
Montserrat, the Virgin of Fatima, and so on—there is no conception,
at least in official Catholic theology, that different persons are
involved. They are all the same Virgin. The St. Peter to whom
I light a candle is seen as being the same personality as the St.
Peter to whom a nun in Sicily lights a candle. Furthermore neither
of us inherits this saint as a personal heirloom. But the lwa in
Kinanbwa differ, even the famous lwa such as Esili, Dâbala, Ogôu, and
the like. The Ogôu of one family is not the same Ogôu as the one of
the neighbors in surrounding villages. Every family has its own lwa

2. The connection between this fragmentation and inheriting of even
the famous lwa and the fragmentation and inheriting of land is my own
analogy, not that of the village. I believe there has been a homologization
of the theology to the peasant economic base, though this notion will
not be pursued in these pages.
and these lwa are passed on to children. The people of a family on the whole serve only the family lwa. Some people purchase outside lwa, but this is dangerous and still considered a type of deviant behavior which may end in tragedy for the purchaser. The best course is to tèn ginen-ou—wait for your own family lwa. In short, the explanations of villagers suggest that the theology of rural voodoo involves a high degree of familialization of the spirits served.

**Functional Confinement of the Lwa**

In the village theology the lwa have been further "domesticated" in terms of the powers that are attributed to them. Whatever their scope of activity in their African homelands, there are de facto limitations to their power implicit in villager explanations. The lwa are seen as being subject to God (Bô-Dyé), and much less powerful. In fact certain functions and powers are seen as being explicitly outside the domain of the lwa, such as that of creating life in the womb of a woman. It is hardly a coincidence that the lwa have African names but that God has a French derived name (Bon Dieu). Though the villagers make no explicit distinction between European and African traditions, the curtailing of the power of the lwa, their subjugation to the Christian God, quite possibly has roots in the social dominance of French as opposed to African symbols in Haitian society as a whole (cf. Murray 1976).

In similar vein the familial lwa in Kinanbwa are generally seen as having little power over rain, winds, waters, and the like. The natural disasters of lightning, hurricanes, drought and the like were virtually never attributed to lwa or lesser spirits, but were generally attributed to the will of God. Even though historically
certain of the lwa were associated with specific forces of nature, this association has been dimmed and virtually extinguished in Kinanbwa. There was a clear tendency among most informants to de-emphasize the power of the lwa with respect to rainfall, crop yields, and the like. People on the whole did not perform any ceremonies to the ancestral lwa on their gardens. The lwa confined their physical presence for the most part to specially designated sections of the residential land in the village itself. Though the lwa were fragmented and "inherited" like land, there was little actual attachment of a religious nature to specific plots of ground. Land was shuffled around with a vigor that was impressive. The villagers in general attributed little influence to the lwa with respect to the natural world. It is true, there is a fear of garden magic. Low yields will frequently be attributed to sorcery on the part of other villagers, who will "pull your garden" (ralé jadé-ou) causing most of the produce to be transferred to their own. But the spirits involved in these maneuvers are not ancestral lwa; and the precautions taken against this involve rituals and paraphernalia which belong to a different tradition. The Kinanbwa lwa on the whole do not involve themselves with the forces of nature.

It must be pointed out that this withdrawal of the lwa from involvement with the forces of nature is less in the manner of conscious theological definition than in de facto emphasis in the beliefs and rituals of the villagers. If pressed, villagers might concede that perhaps the lwa could or could not perform this or that natural feat. But it was clear that the theology of the contemporary village de-emphasizes their power in these spheres.
This de-emphasis of one type of activity, however, is accompanied by a compensatory highlighting of the activities of the lwa in another area. The principal sphere of activity of the ancestral lwa is in the minds and bodies of their descendants. The ancestral lwa exercise their power by making individuals behave in certain ways, or by making them physically ill. In these matters the lwa will in general restrict their activity to the minds and bodies of their own descendants. I did not hear of cases where a person's ancestral lwa took direct action against the mind or body of a person's enemies. Persons who wish to use spirits in this fashion in general have to purchase them. They are usually not lwa, but lesser, more malicious creatures called baka. A lwa who wishes to aid his descendant against an enemy will do so principally by "opening his eyes" (ba-je) against the enemy's plans, rather than by directly attacking the enemy. To repeat, the focus of the ancestral lwa is on the minds and bodies of their own descendants. The powerful nature gods of the African homeland have retained many of their names in Haiti; but their actual functions in the daily lives of the peasants have undergone a curtailing and impressive redefinition.

Dichotomization of the Lwa

I have been discussing the lwa as though they were a homogeneous group of spirits. In reality there are fundamental differences between different classes of lwa. It is true that each lwa-type is seen as having its own personality and preferences. But in addition to these individual differences, the lwa as a whole tend to be grouped into two major categories. In the literature these categories are generally
Rada lwa and Pétro lwa (cf. Herskovits 1971: 149; Metraux 1972: 86-8). The former are described on the whole as being gentler, the latter tending to be more violent and troublesome to human beings. A similar dichotomization of the lwa also exists in the theology of Kinanbwa. Though the word "Rada" is rarely heard in the village, there is a category of lwa called Guinée lwa (lwa giné), who are counterposed to a group of lwa called lwa pétro. Every sibling group and every individual inherit the full contingent of both "bands."

This dichotomization of the lwa into two bands is a major structural feature of the village theology, and frequently manifests itself in the division of domestic sanctuaries (kay lwa) into two separate rooms walled off from each other with no doorway between them. Historically there were not in fact two bands (or nations) of lwa, but many. For reasons that will not be explored here, but which might be amenable to an analysis in the framework of structuralism, the historical multiplicity of lwa groups has been superseded by strong cognitive and lexical preferences toward dichotomizing the pantheon into two contrasting (and to some degree opposing) groups.

In a very interesting fashion the Guinée-vs.Pétro dichotomy is on many occasions lexically formulated as a contrast between sweet lwa (lwa dous) and bitter lwa (lwa amè). The more violent Pétro lwa are also referred to as gro lwa, a designation for which there was no corresponding contrast applicable to the Guinée lwa. Among these

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3. The normal glossing of the adjective dous when modifying a person or spirit would be "gentle" rather than "sweet." But when in close juxtaposition to the word amè ("bitter"), an obvious play-on-words dichotomy is being expressed and the word dous is best glossed as "sweet."
Guinée lwa, there are two (Bâbala and Ezili Fréda) who are sometimes called lwa blè (which could be glossed as "white lwa" or, possibly, "foreign lwa").

It has frequently been mentioned in the literature that the Rada lwa (the "sweet" lwa of Kinanbwa) are of African origin, whereas at least some of the Pétrô lwa are of more recent New World derivation. Though this is still a moot point historically, there is a very interesting emphasis in Kinanbwa which is consistent with this notion of differential antiquity on the part of the two groups. In Kinanbwa theology the Guinée lwa are seen as being older, more dignified, and in a certain sense more majestic. They do not eat pork or dark meat in general. They do not drink cheap local clairin either; they prefer libations of rum, a much more dignified (pi fé) and expensive drink. In the olden days they were the only lwa who were given regular ritual attention. It is only in recent decades that the Pétrô lwa have made themselves felt locally (though they have always been part of the villagers' ancestry), only in recent times that they have "taken over the region" (prâ peyi-a). The fact that the gentler lwa, corresponding to the Rada lwa of the literature, are seen as being in one sense older, and are directly called by an African place name (Guinée) does indicate that the hypothesis of different origin for the two groups may be basically correct.

But whatever their origin, both bands of lwa are given regular ceremonial attention in the contemporary village. They are kept strictly separated from each other, but most major ceremonies involve rituals addressed to both groups. A voodoo dance, for example, will
begin with songs, drum rhythms, and dances that are part of the cult of the older Guinée lwa. When people are possessed at this phase of the event, it is only by lwa down. But in the final hours of the dance, the drum rhythms will suddenly change and shouts of n'été sou maji ("now we're into magic") will arise. The dances become more violent and jerky, physical stances become purposefully more grotesque, and possessions are by more violent spirits. The same sequence will be observed in longer family services (sèvis) which may last for over a week. The initial days are spent in attending to the family's Guinée-lwa. Only in the final days of the service will the sèvis pétro be given, a series of events dedicated to feeding, confiring, and chasing out these more violent spirits.

**Demands of the Lwa**

What is it that these spirits are searching for, to motivate such ritual attention? They search for various sorts of attentions from their descendants. The major demand of these spirits is for periodic food offerings, in which animals are slaughtered in ritual contexts, part of the meat being buried in the ground, the remainder being consumed by the children of the lwa, many of whom will be in a state of possession while consuming the food.

The failure to receive these offerings will cause the lwa to inflict their descendants with various sorts of illness. In local terms, they will "grab" (këbé) some member of the family, afflicting him or her with sickness until such time as the proper offerings have been made.
In their behavior the two major groups of lwa differ markedly. On the one hand the demands of the Pétro lwa are much more serious. The ancient Guinée lwa never used to ask for major sacrifices. They would be satisfied with a simple plate of cornmeal, some porridge, or the like. But the Pétro lwa who set the ritual pace in contemporary times are continually hungry. "Nowadays you'll kill three cows, four pigs, five goats, and the lwa are still not satisfied, the service still isn't over as far as they're concerned."

Not only do the lwa now demand more, the seriousness of the physical afflictions they send is increasing. The Pétro lwa especially are violent in their behavior. It was rare for a Guinée lwa to kill one of his descendants. But the Pétro lwa have no compunctions about killing their children if their demands are not met.

It is difficult not to posit some connection between the transformations which older people indicate have come over the local ritual complex and the overall impoverishment of life which has taken place in rural Haiti in recent generations. Hunger, sickness, and death are in fact now a much more prevalent part of the rural Haitian scene; it can hardly be a coincidence that the violent Pétro lwa have also been "taking over." Villagers and outsiders would disagree as to the direction of the causal arrow. The devotee attributes the sickness to the arrival of the Pétro lwa; the outsider attributes the cognitive salience of these bitter spirits to the presence of more illness. But the two maché asan, go hand in hand.

But not only has the local cult changed in the direction of the pétro lwa. Nowadays the control of spirits is much more the prerogative of specialists, much less the domain of heads of lakou, as in times past. A brief discussion of the ritual specialists will be helpful.
RITUAL SPECIALIST: THE HOUNGAN

Basket Hounkan vs. Rattle Hounkan

There are two major categories of "folk specialist" who intervene in matters of sickness in the region of Les Bayahondes. One group concerns itself almost exclusively with various types of illnesses which have been diagnosed as naturally, rather than supernaturally, caused. Such natural illness is generally referred to as a "sickness from God" (maladi Bô-dyé) and is distinguished from sicknesses sent by the lwa (maladi lwa). The specialists who deal with these natural illnesses belong to a different historical tradition from the specialists who handle the spirits. The major folk-curers of natural illness are the midwife and the leaf doctor. The midwife (fâm saï or, more frequently in Kinanbwa, fâm chay) handles not only childbirth. She also has a number of diagnostic and therapeutic techniques which are based principally on skillful massaging (ralé, literally "pull" or "rub") for dealing with a number of female illnesses. Midwives are always females as are most of their patients. The leaf doctor (dokté fêy), on the other hand, is generally male, but his patients may be of either sex. He is a specialist in the medicinal use of the many herbs which grow in the region. There is a widespread local saying that tout fêy sé rémèd ("every leaf is a medicine"); but not every individual knows how to exploit the medicinal potential of every leaf. The leaf doctor is the specialist in this matter. He also is called upon to set broken bones. The leaf doctor appears to be dwindling in importance in the region, and many of his skills with medicinal herbs are being practiced by midwives. The midwives continue to flourish, as most childbirths continue to occur in the homes of the villagers.
Though these two specialists are part of the local healing complex, of much greater structural importance are those specialists who handle sicknesses caused by the lwa. These specialists may also be male or female, but there is no specialization by sex in terms of the roles or talents attributed to each. Both are seen as being equally powerful. The strength of these specialists stems not from their sex, but from their control over the spirits. Female specialists in this realm are called mabò (or mambo in conventional orthography). Male specialists are called ògã (usually spelled houngan in the literature). There were a number of mambos of some repute in the Les Bayahondes area, but the vast majority of ritual events are headed rather by male houngans. No reference was ever heard to the effect that males are "stronger" in these matters (pi fô); but the fact was that most of the "business" was in the hands of males.

In the taxonomic scheme of the village, there are two substantially different types of houngan. One of them is the traditional houngan of times past; he acquires his powers through personal charisma; he deals principally with the benevolent Guinée lwa; and he sells his services for a relatively reasonable price. These houngans are sometimes referred to as houngan Guinée, in accordance with the type of lwa with which they generally deal. But a much more frequent designation for them is houngan makout, literally "basket houngan." This designation probably comes from the shoulder basket in which they place their ritual paraphernalia as they walk up and down the Plain.

Quite different from these is another category of houngan who has appeared on the local scene only in recent years, has acquired his powers through purchase and special initiation rites, traffics more
heavily with the more violent Pétro lwa, and is generally quite expensive in his services. These latter types of houngan are called houngan asson (sugâ asò), the asson being a special gourde rattle employed to summon the lwa, but which can be used only by those who have passed through the lengthy initiation rite (kâzo). This asson is seen as being a source of great power. Even the houngan makout will use a less dignified substitute rattle, a simple maraca, whose rattle is produced by internal seeds. But only the initiated can use the asson, an empty gourde whose rattling sound comes from the elaborate web of snake bones which have been arranged around the exterior of the asson. No person was observed to have picked up the asson on his own; only the initiated dare handle this powerful and potentially dangerous cult object in ritual context.

Until recent decades the asson was unknown in the village, and it is still not used in many regions of Haiti. But ever since the appearance of the asson, and with it the specially trained houngan who has the power to wield it, fundamental changes have come over local voodoo ritual. Traditional ceremonies have become more elaborate, and a number of formerly unknown ceremonies such as calling one's parents back from the dead to consult with them have now become part of the common ritual repertoire of the village. Only the houngan asson can perform such esoteric ceremonies.

Thus not only has voodoo theology been undergoing a transformation, but voodoo ritual has as well. Many older folks speak nostalgically of the ritual simplicity of the past, of the days in which the service of the lwa was a true family cult. In those days it was male heads of household who normally handled family illness. They themselves would
become possessed by one of the ancestral Guineé lwa. This lwa would "give them sight" (ba-yo jë) to choose the proper remedy, to diagnose the cause. There were houngans, but they were houngans who had risen by their own charisma. There was no special rite by which an individual could buy his way into power through the purchase of an asson and the passage through an initiation. And in those days the houngans that were available were resorted to with much less frequency. Ritual power was lodged in the heart of the family.

But now the houngan asson, like the Pétró lwa with whom he so frequently deals, has taken over the region. There is no central organization of any sort; even a houngan asson can win clients only through successful cures. But the fact is that it has now become de rigueur to call on a houngan asson for certain major ceremonies. In this respect a subtle change is coming over the modal career of the ritual specialist, product of the higher esteem in which the power of the asson is now held. The term houngan makout now tends to be said with a somewhat pejorative tinge. And these initially somewhat distinct types of specialist roles (houngan makout and houngan asson) are now gradually being joined as two stages in the same career. Most houngan asson in the region have probably started off as houngan makout. And conversely it is now assumed that a houngan makout who has any success in his craft will eventually "pick up the asson" (prë asë) by going through the lengthy kanzo rite. There furthermore seems to be a subtle tendency, which will only be briefly mentioned here, for individuals in the town of Les Bayahondes to move more quickly into the purchase of the asson, whereas the specialists of the hinterland remain longer—and in some cases permanently—in the status of houngan makout. The end product
of such a tendency would be a true shift in the balance of ritual power, where townsmen would gradually come to account for a disproportionately large percentage of the initiated specialists.

Such tendencies are at present still effectively counteracted by a clear preference of the rural people to contract rural houngan asson, and to laugh at what they consider to be the farcical efforts of townsmen to attempt to take shortcuts to ritual power via the speedy purchase of an asson. Nonetheless, it is clear that even in the rural hamlets the ritual focus has been shifting in the direction of resorting to ritual specialists who have attained their basic status via purchase rather than personal charisma.

The Houngan as Healer

But though the outlay of cash (about $150.00) is a necessary prerequisite to the taking up of the asson, it is no guarantee of a successful ritual career. The houngan has had many faces in Haitian history. Some have seen him in terms of a revolutionary leader, others have seen him more in the light of a potential tool of the government. Still others see him simply as a two-bit charlatan out for a quick buck. But of his many faces, the houngan of Les Bayahondes and Kinanbwa is first and foremost a healer, and the major manifest function of the entire voodoo cult in the research region is the prevention, diagnosis, and healing of illness. If one had to sum up domestic voodoo in a sentence, it would have to be described as a folk-medical system in which most illnesses are healed by various types of food offerings to the ancestors or ancestral spirits of the sick person. It is at once a healing cult and an ancestor cult, the two conceptually distinct elements being functionally joined in the context of a single cult.
This characterization of voodoo on my part as being essentially a folk-medical system has evoked disagreement from other observers who have sought for other contexts—psychological, political, or others—in which to give the cult analytic meaning. A frequent response is to point out that they have been to voodoo dances where no sick people were present and where no curing ceremonies were being staged—so how can you call voodoo a folk healing cult? I am convinced that if observers take their attention away from the details of the drumming, singing, possession, and the like, and ask rather who is financing the ceremony and for what reason he is financing it, they will find that in the vast majority of cases matters of sickness and death have served as the trigger to ritual involvement. To repeat: the major manifest function of contemporary voodoo in the peasant hinterland is that of a healing ritual. There are other faces to voodoo; in this very chapter I will expose one of these faces that has up until now remained hidden. But the best guiding assumption with which to approach a concrete understanding of voodoo in daily peasant life is the assumption that the cult intervenes principally in matters of sickness and death.

In very practical terms this means that most of the income from houngans comes from their services in this domain. A typical sequence begins with a visit by a family relative of a sick person to the house of a houngan. The visitor will not tell the houngan what the problem is. Houngans, though respected and feared, are generally assumed to be tricksters who will pretend to have insights but who will simply use pre-existing information they have about you to lead you on. One frequent defense against this is the visiting of houngans in distant communities who are unlikely to have such information. The visitor will enter the house without specifying what his problem is; the houngan
must tell him that on his own. The visitor comes with a bottle of clairin and a white candle (boujì). He places these on a table, along with five gourdes and tell the houngan that he would like him to fa chapit, the local term for card-reading. The houngan will shuffle and spread out the cards, and will furthermore stare into the flame of the candle through a glass of water. If successful he will gradually work his way around to telling the visitor more or less what it was that he came to consult about. If the houngan fails to identify the general problem area, the visitor thanks him, picks up his five gourdes, and simply leaves, having wasted nothing except time, a little clarin, and a candle.

If the general problem is identified, however, chances are that the houngan will be contracted to pursue the matter. It is a very interesting feature of the folk-medicinal system of rural Haiti that a great number of preliminary diagnoses are made in the absence of the patient. Diagnosis does not always involve the physical examination of the patient by the healer; cures are suggested though the healer making the suggestion may never have laid eyes on the patient. The diagnostic sequence, in short, proceeds along a trajectory of ritual rather than examination of physical symptoms in a large number of cases.

The first element in the diagnosis is the determination whether the illness is natural or supernatural in nature. There are times when the houngan will simply tell the relatives of the sick person to take the patient to a modern doctor or to a midwife, that there is no supernatural force at work here. In the majority of instances, however, the houngan does find some spirit or other creature causing the problem. Many times it will not be a lwa, but some other local mischief maker. Of particular importance in the village are loupard, vampire-like
creatures who are neighbors during the day but who at night roam the village in transformed shape sucking the blood of young children. Other non-familial sources of problems are ghosts (mò). These are not the persons immediate ancestors, but rather wandering souls which an enemy will cause to possess someone in the family. Special lotions and potions must be prepared against the lougarou; rites of exorcism must be performed to cast out the ghost.

Persons with a sick family member may suspect one or another cause. But nowadays nobody in the family will be able to tell for sure, and resort will be made to a houngan. And though the illness of young children stands a high chance of being attributed to the lougarou, most adult illnesses tend to be laid at the doorstep of the person's familial lwa. But it is not enough for the houngan to determine that a lwa is involved. He must determine which type of lwa—whether it is an Ogou, a Sibi, a Bosou, or the like—and, most importantly, he must determine which branch of the person's genealogy the lwa comes from. To say that it is an Ogou causing the illness is not enough; the houngan determines also whether it is the ogou bò mémé or the ogou bò papa. Once the lwa is specifically identified, then the houngan will know on which compound the consultations and healings must be performed. The lwa must be served on their own property.

When the cause of illness is detected, the services of the houngan will further be needed to remove the illness. Most of the diagnoses understandably involve causes which will require the further services of a houngan to remove. The patient's family is under no obligation to use the same houngan; another one may be contracted. But a houngan
who has given a plausible diagnosis of a problem is quite likely to be contracted to give the cure as well.

The cure may involve a great deal of money. If the cause is a ghost, then an exorcism must be performed. But if the cause is a lwa, then the remedy may be an expensive family service. But in most cases the remedy will entail the contracting of a houngan, just as the diagnosis has involved such an individual.

Thus there is a great deal of theological order and logic at the base of these ceremonies. The meaning system that imbues these events with such consistency only slowly reveals itself to an outsider. There is no question of secrecy here. The divination sessions, healing rituals, and animal sacrifices are all public matters, and I had the same access to these events as did any other villager. What took a great deal of time was the unravelling of the different conceptual threads which ran through the ceremonies, and the identification of the underlying theological structure which the villagers took for granted, but which was slightly out of kilter with the voodoo theology which I had gleaned from the literature.

But the pursuit of the emic meaning system underlying the ceremonies is in a sense a siren song which, if not approached cautiously, can lead analysis off in a direction which will in the long run impede, rather than enhance, understanding of what is happening. A critical function of this rich system of meanings will be missed unless we see the behavioral sequences which underlie these folk theories.

What is happening is the occurrence of a number of widely shared behavioral sequences in which ceremonies are staged and money is spent around the domain of ritual healing. When a person gets sick, the family members
are supposed to take economic steps. A growing number of people are
turning to modern doctors in such contexts; but for a majority of
households the advent of illness is the trigger for a chain of events
in which their relatives and neighbors will expect them to spend
large sums of money. I was at first puzzled when I heard a woman whose
child had just died incorporate into her public wails a gourde-by-
gourde account of the money she had spent on various houngans, rituals,
and remedies. It turned out she was merely protecting herself against
accusations of stinginess toward her now dead child. The consequences
of this stinginess were clear in the case of a man whose wife had
died but who had not, in the opinion of her kinsmen, received the
proper attention during her illness. Rather than being consoled by
the neighbors, the man was publicly criticized as a cheapskate and
shamed in front of the community. There is impressive social pressure
in the village to make heavy expenditures on the occasion of domestic
illness. These illnesses are generally caused by the lwa, those
distant, transformed ancestors who expect attention from their
descendants.

THE CULT OF THE DEAD

But the lwa are not the only preternatural creatures with whom
the villagers ritually interact. Of equal importance are the dead
(lémò), especially one's dead parents. Because the lwa are conceived
of as distant ancestors of the villagers, the rituals involving them
must be seen as part of an "ancestor cult." But Kinanbwa ritual fur-
thermore involves dead parents and grandparents, ceremonies which correspond
more directly to notions of classic ancestor cults.
There are three major duties that children have to their dead parents. In the first place there is a very serious duty to provide a fitting wake. Unless the person dies early in the morning, the burial will generally be on the morning or in the early afternoon of the day following the death. Though it is rare for representatives of all households in the village to go to a wake, most households will be represented for at least part of the evening and visitors from surrounding communities will also come. Thus the children of the deceased may find themselves in the position of having to provide some food and drink—especially the locally brewed clairin—for several hundred people. A coffin must also be made, a new suit or dress will have to be purchased for the deceased, a specialist will have to be paid to prepare the body for burial, a brush shelter (tonôl) will have to be constructed for the neighbors, and various other expenses will have to be undergone, including the fees the next day for burial from the church.

The ambience of the Kinanbwa wake is highly recreational. Songs are sung and jokes will be told, though the music and jollity will be interrupted by sudden peals of wailing on the part of the deceased's kin. Groups of men may begin a special type of ambulant singing, to the rhythm of a nail beating a detached hoe head, referred to as gôdê. If the flow of alcohol slows down, the mét vêyé, the adult male who takes charge of organizing the wake, will be mocked in song. Women who go into fits of thrashing and wailing will be tended to by sympathetic neighbors; but underlying the sympathy is an equally visible element of community demand for refreshments, especially clairin. The household that is not generous in these matters is seen

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as cheating the dead person. Such stinginess would be especially reproachable in the case of adult children whose parent has just died. Wakes for children, or for young people whose children have not yet grown, are less elaborate. But wakes for adults, either male or female, with grown children who are themselves economically independent are expected to be generous in their reception of the community.

If the wake were the end of the matter, things would be easier. But on several successive nights following the wake, special prayers will be said, led by a local pê sayân (bush priest), who must also be paid for his services. The number of people assisting will be less than on the night of the wake, but some refreshments must be served. On the ninth day after death once again a major prayer ceremony is held, and once again the number of people assisting increases, causing expenditures to be made. All in all there are few people who can get away with paying less than $100.00 on a burial for an adult, and the figure may come closer to $200.00 in the case of an economically well-off cultivator with adult children.

But the wake and follow-up prayers are only one duty which a villager has to the dead. A second major duty which children have to their parents is to do everything in their power to prevent them from being buried in the ground. Most of the villagers who died during the period of research did in fact manage to avoid this disgrace of being buried in the ground. The proper burial place is in a tomb (key). Most burials now take place in the town cemetery, and many families have constructed elaborate tombs there. The successful man or woman will
have built his or her own tomb before death. Few people manage to achieve this ideal. Most people are at least provisionally buried in tombs that parents, grandparents, or other relatives had built. Generally only four coffins will easily fit into the typical tomb. But crowding is avoided by a practice of secondary burial, in which the bones of those long deceased will be removed from the box, wrapped in a cloth, and placed in a corner back in the tomb, making room for newcomers. But this use of other people's tombs is considered provisional. If his parents have not built a tomb, a child will try to build one for them.

It is because of this practice, which appears to be especially strong in the research region, that the town cemetery of Les Bayahondes strikes the eye of first-time visitors. The tombs of the peasants are well constructed, brightly painted, and in general well maintained, minor repair work being done every year on many of them. Though prices vary, the construction of one of these tombs will generally cost over $150.00. There were a surprisingly large number of masons in the region. A substantial part of their income came from the construction and reparation of these elaborate resting places which the dead of the region expect the living to provide.

But the duties which children owe to their ancestors continues long after the burial. Every single child is said to "owe" his parents a year of mourning. As in traditional Christian mourning, the individual purchases and wears black clothing. But Kinanbwa mourning involves much more. The year of mourning is kicked off by a Mass and a reception in the lakou. It also involves an elaborate and somewhat expensive banquet for the deceased (mâfê mò), in which
the food which the dead person liked during life will be prepared, but
in which special foods liked by the dead in general are also prepared.
The preparation of this banquet in many instances involves a direct
consultation with the dead person. A houngan will be called and the
person will be summoned from the dead to converse with the children
from a govi. Special instructions will be given concerning the
content of the banquet. The food itself will be laid out in the
house of the dead person, if possible. More frequently it is laid
out in the houses of the children themselves, provided these are
located on property which the deceased owned, on which the deceased
was an inheritor, or which the living child has himself purchased.
The "soul" of the food will be eaten by the dead person. The rest
will then be shared out among the residents of the lakou. Visitors
are eagerly shown the banquet, as it is a demonstration of the
fulfillment of a serious duty on the part of children. Each child
frequently will undertake the banquet individually, rather than in
combination with other siblings. There is a sigh of relief when
the meal is over, and people were heard to say happily: kounyéa m pa
dwé akô, I'm no longer in debt. This is a very serious duty which
children owe to their parents. It is a loose end which most hope to
tie up before their own death.

The preceding may be summed up. There is an ancestor cult
flourishing in Kinanbwa. This cult, generally referred to as
"voodoo" or "vodun" by outsiders, is a rich complex of beliefs and
rituals whose description would fill several monographs. I have
singled out from the cornucopia of theological and ritual details
two pillars of the cult which are of particular relevance to the agrarian theme which has dominated the presentation thus far: the cult of the lwa and the cult of the dead. Each of these classes of preternatural beings has been found to make heavy demands on the living. The lwa are seen as being responsible for many sicknesses. Their punishing activities have been increasing over the decades, and to an increasing degree their placation can be done only through resorting to more or less expensive professionals. The other pillar of the cult is the attention given to one's dead parents, including the staging of an expensive wake, the building of an elaborate tomb, and the preparation of a banquet for the deceased at some point during the surviving child's life.

What is important about these elements is the fact that heavy expenditures must be made to fulfill obligations. Villagers speak with fear of angry lwa and angry dead parents; there is obvious anxiety at the thought of retribution from these beings. But of equal importance—perhaps, in the long run, greater importance—in sustaining these rites and in coaxing out the necessary expenditures is the existence of strong community pressure to comply. Failure to make the demanded expenditures will result, then, not only in retribution from the spirits, but in public criticism and ridicule from flesh and blood neighbors. Protestants and "Pure Catholics" escape from many of the demands. But the staging of an appropriate wake and the preparation of an adequate resting place for parents is demanded even of them. In short the villagers of Kinanbwa, by virtue of the presence of a local ancestor cult, are periodically motivated—or browbeat—into ritually directed cash outlays.
All of this is intimately related to the agrarian concerns which have been the focus of discussion from the opening pages of this presentation. At the beginning of this chapter, before undertaking the brief sketch of peasant voodoo, I indicated that there was a baffling paradox built into the machinery of the local land tenure system. The functions of land allocation and land control in the village now unfold along a life cycle in which the purchase of land is a systemically critical behavior, the one that now keeps the entire system in motion. But the question was posed as to how such a system could possibly "work" in Haiti, where land is scarce, valuable, and treasured. For generations most of the land of the Les Bayahondes region has been in the hands of smallholding peasants for whom the acquisition of more land is a central life goal. The system has moved away from an inheritance modality of land transfer. Certain features of local demography were seen to have rendered the inheritance mode of land allocation and labor mobilization combersome and economically unfeasible. The system has responded to population growth by "opting for" a redesign of the basic mechanisms of land transfer, in effect preserving the viability of the system by preserving a general ambience of economic energy and individual land maneuver that would simply not be possible if people passively waited for their parents to die off or bow out before getting access to land. The new strategy for which the system has opted is a statistically interlinked sequencing of sharecropping, land purchasing, and landlordism along a now transformed life cycle.
But though I have documented, in as "hard" a fashion possible, that such a system is in fact operative in Kinanbwa, I have not yet tackled the embarrassing but critical question as to where all this purchased land is coming from. The system could not work unless there were some internal mechanism maintaining a regular supply of land for purchase. This is a real life system; there are no magic wands or rabbits-in-the-hat involved. A model that fails to answer this question in a highly credible fashion has failed to capture the dynamics of land control in Kinanbwa. It was not until somewhat later in fieldwork that the outlines of the etic patterns of land control had begun manifesting themselves, and thus it was not until late in fieldwork that the analytic centrality of that embarrassing question became clear.

In a highly serendipitous fashion, however, I had already in fact—unwittingly—collected the data that were to provide an answer. Much earlier in fieldwork, when patterns of feverish land maneuver had become evident, I began questioning people about the matter. But fortunately, following a methodological hunch that what informant generalizations might miss, plot by plot counts would pick up, I trained and sent out four villagers to gather data on a large number of land transactions that they, their kinsmen, and their neighbors had been involved in. Having no specific hypothesis in mind at the time, I gathered information on some twenty variables for every plot of land transacted, variables which appeared to me to cover the most important parameters of the land transaction sequence. I inquired about the price of the plot, the size of the plot, the type of land involved, the names and rough ages of the transactants at the
moment of the sale, the kin relationship, if any, between buyer and seller, the sex of the transactants, and the source of cash for the buyer. It turned out in almost every single case that both buyer and seller of the land were smallholding cultivators.

Many of these questions, and others which I posed, have as yet to reveal any striking, unseen patterns. But there is one question which scored an accidental bull's-eye on a target which was not to come into view until the question had already been launched. One of the items that was on the sheet with which the village interviewers were sent out was the question as to why the seller sold the land. It was only later in fieldwork that the importance of that question to an understanding of the local system became clear. Not having yet done so, I immediately tabulated the answers given to this question on some six hundred land transactions. I had read of the famous mental "click" that a sudden insight will trigger off in a researcher's head. On looking at the tabulated answers, I experienced such a click, along with a somewhat comical sense of shared anthropological foolishness on realizing that for decades a critical but disguised economic sequence has been occurring under our very noses in Haiti without our having even suspected it.

Table 11-3 breaks the responses down into fourteen types of reasons that occurred for selling plots of land, with the frequency with which each reason motivated the selling of a plot. But the significant internal patterning of these responses is better exposed in a more collapsed breakdown. Figure 11-1 makes such a breakdown, separating those sales of land which cultivators made to finance some sort of ritual from those which were made for non-ritual reasons, such as debts, schooling, food purchase, and the like.
TABLE 11-3
Reasons for Selling a Plot of Land *

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reason for Selling</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bury a parent</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Healing of a sickness</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty: general cash needs</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury a child</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay off debts</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury a sibling</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bury a spouse</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Build a tomb</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anniversary service for dead</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wedding of son or daughter</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buy food</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Raise capital for trade</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pay for child’s schooling</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>589</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* I had attempted to gather information on land transactions myself, but was much less successful than the village interviewers in getting individuals to talk about this sensitive area. Since in many cases both partners to the transaction were independently interviewed I was able to cross check the answers. Though I have not yet analyzed the discrepancies quantitatively, most transactions were reported by both parties and the answers were roughly the same for most important variables. Other types of internal patterning have appeared in the data which would not have occurred unless the data were basically accurate.
It is Figure 11-1 which answers the question posed at the beginning of the chapter and removes the enigma from the system. Whence comes all the land that people in the village buy as normal parts of their economic careers? The answer: the "voodoo" ancestor cult continually churns out plots of ground placing them on the market. In a systematic manner that up until now has not even been suspected, the ritual system which dominates the Haitian countryside has been latently functioning as a circulator of the basic resource of land.
I have shown that sharecropping is the major tenure mode in the community. I have furthermore shown that the landlords are individuals who have purchased land. And now it becomes clear that in three out of four cases buyers find land only because they are living in a community where the ritual system imposes heavy expenditures on local households. Lacking other major sources of income, but not thereby released from their ritual obligations, many households must periodically resort to the sale of land.

If one merely lives in the village and speaks with the cultivators in a general fashion, these ritually motivated land sales can easily pass disguised as occasional misfortunes which this or that household will have to endure. They do not leap out from the background as the major resource-circulating mainspring that they in fact are. Nobody in the village ever told me that the only reason they could purchase so much land is because voodoo rituals of one sort or another regularly forced people to sell land. But what is emically camouflaged can be etically exposed. I have broken the system apart plot by plot and have shown that land purchasing is in fact the lifeblood of the community. But these data on land transactions now reveal that in three out of four cases the systemically critical land sales have been triggered off by ritual obligations.

I believe that this analysis rips the mask off Haitian voodoo and exposes for the first time what is perhaps its bottom line economic meaning in peasant Haiti. The emic focus of voodoo in village life and conversation draws attention in one direction: rituals, possession, singing, dancing, drumming, animal sacrifices, and the like. But
underneath these dramatic ritual and recreational trappings, the local ancestor cult has all along been sustaining a vital etic flow of land. Haitian voodoo has many faces. Many of them are diversionary, clown-like disguises. In discovering this most recent face, however, I believe we have caught the jester in an unguarded moment and have won a fleeting glimpse of what he has perhaps secretly been up to all this time.
CHAPTER TWELVE

SUMMARY

Though a large number of specific themes have been raised and discussed in this lengthy presentation, the central topic has been an analysis of the impact which a century and a half of population growth has had on the economic life of a Haitian peasant community. Beginning with a preliminary discussion of the roots of Haiti's demographic dilemma and the formulation of a guiding research hypothesis, Part One proceeded to reconstruct, within an evolutionary framework, the emergence of peasant lifeways on that part of Hispaniola destined to become the Republic of Haiti. Part Two of the presentation consisted of several background chapters containing descriptive and quantitative data, gleaned during some 21 months of anthropological fieldwork in a community of the Cul-de-Sac Plain, on those peasant life-spheres most directly effected by the process of internal population growth.

The final section, Part Three, carried the major burden of analysis. The first task was to clear away several cultural "camouflages" produced by the disparity between human belief and human action. Examination of several types of quantitative data on the landholdings of the Kinanbwa cultivators exposed a number of inconsistencies between the land tenure system that the villagers themselves (and the ethnographic literature) tended to describe, and the actual land control patterns that were found to prevail statistically in the community. It was this disparity that was used as the entry point into the analysis of a profound but somewhat latent transformation that had in fact occurred in the local institutions of land control as a response to the phenomenon of local population growth.
What had been initially expected was a land tenure system based principally on the cultivation of plots that had been inherited from one's parents. What emerged rather was a land tenure system in which a heavy majority of the plots were in fact being cropped under a sharecropping arrangement. Examination of the data indicated clearly that the sharecropping was not of the interclass, absentee landlord variety found in many parts of Latin America, but was rather a class-internal and community-internal variety in which virtually all of the landlords were themselves peasants and in which a majority of those who were landlords were simultaneously cropping at least one plot as a sharecropper for some other community member.

The complexity of this initially puzzling tenure system was reduced to order through the use of a series of age specific breakdowns of landholding patterns. What emerged from the data was the operation of a transformed and still somewhat "hidden" life cycle in the community. The traditional economic career of the Haitian peasant, in which males received their start in life through land provisionally allocated through inheritance on the death of their parents, had been largely supplanted in Kinanbwa by a new modal career. In the transformed system males tend to begin their economic careers as sharecroppers of land for other community members—including in many cases their own parents. In their mid-thirties they then begin augmenting their holdings via the purchase of land, a process that continues up into the higher age cohorts. But rather than using this land to free themselves from the tenant bonds they contracted in younger years, in many cases they continue working their earlier plots as sharecroppers and turn over their newly purchased plots to other individuals to work.
as tenants. The result is a complex tenure system in which most young men fall into the category of sharecropper, most old men fall into the category of landlord, and most men of all ages are found straddling two, and sometimes three, categories simultaneously.

A major systems-analytic problem arose around the problem of the source of the land that the men were found to begin purchasing in their mid-thirties. The entire system was found to be predicated on the availability of a constant stream of land available to interested purchasers—a highly problematic issue in a country such as Haiti where land is scarce and valued. Who was selling all the land that was being purchased? One of the most unexpected and surprising findings of the study was the latent economic function that the local ancestor cult (generally referred to as "voodoo" in the literature) was playing in this regard. Quantitative data indicated clearly that at least seven out of every ten land sales were made by local peasants who were under social pressure to finance some ritual (in the majority of cases mortuary and/or healing rituals). Thus rural Haitian voodoo emerged as a critical regulatory device sustaining the availability of land, functioning thus as a critical mechanism in a resource control system that had come to revolve around the sequentially arrayed behaviors of sharecropping, land purchase, and landlordism.

This aspect of the analysis constituted in essence a "synchronic" blueprint of a land control system that, in cross cultural perspective, is somewhat unusual. Of equal importance, however, was the "diachronic" task of accounting for the emergence of this system in rural Haiti. Where did this system come from? Once again examination
of quantitative data, broken down by age cohorts, has provided solid clues as to the genesis of this system. We are dealing in effect with the product of a cultural-evolutionary transformation of a more traditional peasant land tenure system, a transformation that was triggered off by the process of internal population growth and the shrinking land base that such growth created. A model was constructed simulating the step by step conversion, under demographic pressure, of a traditional inheritance-based land tenure system into a system whose transformed state is one of reliance on intracommunity share-cropping. For purposes of empirical testing, the model was broken down into several smaller, empirically manageable hypotheses, and quantitative data were marshalled to show that it was precisely such a transformation that had come over the land tenure system of Kinanbwa. Population growth emerged as the principal engine of this diachronic transformation.

The adaptive transformation which has been found in Kinanbwa is highly analogous to changes which have been found by other anthropologists and economists in other world areas. As is the case in many of these other studies, this analysis began with the variable of population pressure as an important catalyst, and viewed the realm of subsistence behavior as a target life-sphere where adaptive modifications were found to take place.

But there is one major difference which must be pointed out. Unlike certain other researched populations, the changes occurring in Kinanbwa have not taken the form of traditional "intensification" whereby the use of more sophisticated productive technology substantially increases per hectare yields. As has already been pointed out,
the evidence is that there are substantially lower per hectare yields in Haiti than in the past. The adaptive modifications which have occurred in Kinanbwa involve rather the transformation of the institutions of access, the land-tenure and land-control arrangements governing the allocation of the resource of land.

The question then arises as to the justification of bestowing the label "adaptive" response" on the process that has been found in Haiti. Could not as equally strong a case be made that what has happened has been maladaptive, has in fact diverted the adaptive energies of the population into a ritualistically guided nontechnological solution that must terminate in a dead end? Why this facile use of the term "adaptive" in anthropological writing?

At first blush it might seem that the "non-intensifying" response made by the agrarian system of rural Haiti is less adaptive than the response of those groups who have adopted improved technology to increase their crop yields per unit of land. It should be pointed out, however, that even those technological responses that have been documented in the literature on other agrarian groups are not solutions to population growth. They are at best delaying actions. If population growth itself does not level off—and the forces leading to such leveling fall outside the scope of the present discussion—then the major eventual solution for an agrarian society appears to be a fundamental restructuring of the economy in such a manner that a structure of non-agricultural occupations arises hand in hand with a mechanization of the agricultural sector. That is, the society must eventually become industrialized. But it is important to point out that the anthropologically documented cases of the apparently "better"
adaptation--technological intensification--do not involve this type of structural change. They involve instead minor technological delaying actions which raise production enough to permit local agrarian life to proceed despite the increased man/land ratio. In this sense, though they do not constitute final solutions, such modifications may nonetheless be validly labelled as "adaptations."

But by the same token we are equally justified in talking about the "adaptation" of the rural Haitian agrarian system to population growth. The evolutionary concepts of "fitness" and "adaptiveness" have meaning only in relation to specific environments and specific problems that a population encounters. I have shown that the earliest effect of population growth in Haiti was not one of food shortage, calling for greater per-hectare productivity. Instead population growth intruded under the guise of "energy crisis." Convenient linkages had earlier been established between the granting of provisional land to sons and the securing of their continued labor on the gardens of their parents. It was this joint labor mobilizing and land allocating mechanism that was first threatened by population growth, and it was this problem, rather than actual food shortage, that triggered off adaptive maneuvering by individual cultivators. By shifting the brunt of their land allocation and labor mobilizing strategies to the device of sharecropping, the population maintained the viability (though not the prosperity) of an agrarian system whose traditional arrangements for allocating labor and land had been forged in the days of a now vanished land abundance. By pulling off this shift, the cultivators of Kinanbwa had thus effected a "delaying action" against the deleterious impact of an increased man/land ratio.
In this sense we are fully justified in speaking of local "adaptation" to population growth. No implication is harbored that the adaptation in any way constitutes a final solution. On the contrary, the evolutionary framework that has been utilized throughout these pages would suggest that this cultural device, as with so many other patterns in human history, must be seen as a transient, ephemeral waystage arrangement that will quickly give way to new forms.

This theoretical perspective—this conviction as to the explanatory power of carefully applied evolutionary analysis—has given shape to the entire presentation. In addition to the general concept of cultural evolution, contemporary anthropologists inherit a growing tradition of provocative "micro-evolutionary" analyses of agrarian adaptations to population growth. I hope to have pushed this tradition one step further along the path by being somewhat more rigorous in terms of the documentation of the posited evolutionary sequence.

Most analyses of local evolutionary shifts have tended to paint "artist's reconstructions" of the intervening changes that have presumably occurred between a before and an after state. But by presenting diachronic data, the analysis presented here can be said to have captured at least one or two "real life photos." The photos capture not only contemporary patterns, but also the trajectory of change itself.

They do not, of course, cover the entire sequence, and many of the links remain hypothetical. But they have covered enough of the process, I believe, to elevate at least some of the model from the status of interesting hypothesis to the plateau of reasonably well
documented fact. It is admittedly a rather low altitude plateau, hopefully to be rapidly left below by methodological innovations of the future. But the concern for humdrum documentation must eventually supplement the penchant for brilliant analytic schemes which the present generation has inherited from some of their predecessors.

In addition to providing documentation, this analysis has further tried to avoid that all-too-frequently invoked *deus ex machina* of quasi-magical "inventions" and "innovations" that seem to pop up ready made when the need for them arises. This analysis has adhered rather to a model that at least in certain key areas remains faithful to the time tried principles of classic evolutionary theory. Though inventions can occur—just as mutations in biological evolution—natural selection itself operates not by inventing but by selecting from among preexisting alternatives. I have documented this brand of classic evolution in the behavior of a community of Haitian peasants. The analysis has posited and documented a step-by-step trajectory along which an increasing number of cultivators have been effectively veered into economic choices that in the aggregate differ from those of their predecessors.

In this process nothing radically or abruptly new was created. That has occurred rather is a genuine "selection from preexisting variety," in the form of an increasing use of economic options which, in somewhat less prominent form, have always been present in rural Haiti, from the earliest years of the independent Republic.

I have, in conclusion, attempted to translate the abstract formula of "Population Pressure Leads to Economic Change" into a highly concrete series of behavioral modifications on the part of
economically rational Haitian cultivators. Though fieldwork was carried out in the exotic Haiti of voodoo fame, what most stood out was the quiet, humdrum, day-to-day persistence of hard working cultivators eking a non-exotic living from a less-than-optimum soil. It is in the slow motion unfolding of these daily behaviors that the process of evolutionary selection has worked its transforming change.
There is a built-in dilemma to the exploration, even aided by new concepts and field methods, of a phenomenon such as agrarian adaptation to population growth. The type of field data appropriate for shedding new light on this general process can be collected only by laborious and determined fieldwork within a particular agrarian setting. The patterns which emerge from a given community will hopefully exemplify general processes. Yet it can easily be the case that the patterns which a researcher uncovers may be to some undetermined degree a function not only of these larger processes, but also of certain idiosyncratic dynamics of local life whose operation he may be unable to perceive or factor out.

Kinanbwa, the community in which this research was carried out, is merely one community in an island society characterized by impressive ecological variation from one region to another, where local climatic, topographic, and edaphic features can impact heavily—in a way not necessarily perceptible to the analyst—on the genesis and functioning of an agrarian adaptation such as the one to be analyzed here. This diversity must be clearly recognized at the outset, and some information given on the factors leading to the choice of a particular research community. This appendix will address itself to that question.

The presentation will begin with a discussion of the decision to channel research into an intensive study of one community (rather than spreading out efforts over several communities) and of the procedures used in selecting the actual research site. This will be followed by an analysis of the "settling in" process, the period of initial "immersion." Examination of this process will focus, not on anecdo-
tal details, but rather on the structural contours of the process, pointing out the operation of four societal dynamics to which early in fieldwork I learned it was best to respond in a quasi-passive rolling-with-the-punches looseness before the onset of active research. The principal objective of this particular discussion will be to analyze the nature and scientific meaning of the conflicting currents in which a newly arrived village-based fieldworker suddenly finds himself immersed. Though some of these currents have to be lightly "bucked," there are others, it will be shown, which unbeknownst to the researcher are carrying him directly toward those regions where his major scientific findings will be uncovered (cf. Arensberg 1961:244-5), in this case the mechanism controlling much of local land distribution.

SITE SELECTION

GENERAL REGION

The original research proposal was built around the notion of investigating the dynamics of population growth in a Haitian community, giving special attention to those aspects of local fertility patterns that touched areas of possible receptivity within the local population to modern concepts and methods of voluntary fertility control. Research was thus sponsored within the country by the Département de la Santé Publique et de la Population of the government of Haiti, under the direct auspices of the physician in charge of supervising all family planning programs within the national territory. This physician had been active in establishing rural clinics in the

1. Dr. Ary Bordes, director of the Centre d'Hygiène Familiale. Dr. Bordes had been responsible for directing public health programs in Port-au-Prince and in some rural areas of the Cul-de-Sac Plain.
Cul-de-Sac Plain. Convinced that high infant morbidity and mortality were of much more concern to the villagers than high fertility, Dr. Bordes was determined to initiate family planning activities in the context of a public health program in which these more critical health problems were being simultaneously treated. Thus the folk-medical system became an important topic of fieldwork, and it was decided to carry out research in the area where new services would be established: the region around the town of Les Bayahondes.

SPECIFIC COMMUNITY

Having delimited the general region of fieldwork, the task became that of deciding on the specific group or groups among whom the research would be carried out. Earlier anthropological research in general, and specific studies of Haiti and other Caribbean societies in particular, provided several alternative models from which to choose:

a. Live in one rural community throughout fieldwork and carry out the bulk of the research in that community (cf. Bastien 1951).²

b. Live in a town, using it as a base from which to study several surrounding communities (Herskovits 1971 and, apparently, Simpson 1940).

c. Study several communities in a general ecological region (Underwood 1970).

d. Cover all of Haiti by visiting briefly various communities representing the major ecological types all over the island (Moral 1961; Schaedel 1962).

² Though he gives no information on the details of his fieldwork, Bastien (1951) perhaps actually lived in the same village as his informants during several months.
Each of these models had something to recommend it; each of the
designs showed the potentiality of producing at least some information
that would be missed by the other designs. A rational choice of a
design would ideally be made under the dual light of a clear notion of
the research objectives combined with a clear notion of the strong
points of each design. These factors were to a large degree taken into
account, but other factors intervened as well—notably previous field
experiences, familiarity with the differing quality of the publica-
tions resulting from different designs, and in the end simple convic-
tion as to the eventual scientific fruitfulness of in-depth extended
involvement with a human group to whom one ceases, at least to some
degree, to be a total outside stranger, and the difficulty of achie-
vying this involvement using a research strategy that entailed substan-
tial mobility or residence for less than a full year among any speci-
fic group. The disadvantages of itinerant research were eventually
felt to be so great as to outweigh its possible advantages, and by
a process of elimination the first of the above mentioned designs
was chosen: an intensive in-depth study of "life in rural Haiti" as
it was lived in one community.

Several decades ago such a choice would have needed no comment.
But there are at least two valid cautions which are now frequently
voiced when discussing the design of peasant studies. In the first
place rural communities are neither economically nor culturally auto-
nomous; and secondly ecological variation between rural areas creates
tremendous subcultural variation between different regions of the same
national society. The first caution implies that much of what happens
inside his community will not be understandable to the researcher unless
he has access to information concerning certain key events outside of the community. The second caution implies that, even if a researcher achieves a structurally perceptive analysis of the internal and external dynamics of local life, there is no guarantee that the findings for his community also hold for other regions. Given ecological and subcultural variation, the probability is that at least some of them do not.

Both of these cautions were taken into serious account. But care was taken to avoid a fallacious interpretation of their implications for research. The first caution—that of structural links between a community and the outside world—means that a researcher's theoretical and analytic perspective must broaden to include consideration of the empirically observable local impacts the outside world exerts locally. It does not mean that it is mandatory, or even wise, to collect exhaustive first-hand field data in governmental or company offices. These are crucial areas which are also valid and important topics for full-time research; but so is the matter of the impact of these patterns on local economic, political, domestic, and social life. A researcher's awareness of structural links should not lure him into the misguided design of overambitious and overextended research into disparate areas, which will produce reliable, in-depth information on none. The implication of structural linkages is basically theoretical and analytic; in terms of the locus of the data-gathering itself, it still seems preferable to gather in-depth data in one setting, rather than superficial impressionistic data in many.

3. A very clear and coherent discussion of this entire problem has been made by Arensberg, in a discussion of a paper in which Manners
The problem of ecological diversity has slightly different implications. The danger here is that the researcher will overgeneralize and talk prematurely about the "Haitian peasant." But once again, this caution has implications principally for the analysis of the research. To interpret it as a command to gather firsthand field data in many ecological settings would once again produce impressionistic and diluted generalities and might even sabotage the effectiveness of the research from the outset by making it general and fleeting, incapable of uncovering some of the latent phenomena which yield only to intensive, concentrated research which is carried out over an exten-

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argues at great length that the "methods and tools of traditional anthropology" must be seriously modified for research in the Caribbean (Manners 1960; Arensberg 1960, esp. pp. 93-6 with respect to the present discussion). In fact a careful perusal of Manners' arguments turns up no specific references to community studies which contained the allegedly common shortcomings against which he cautioned, nor even any concrete suggestions as to how field workers should change their tactics, except perhaps the exhortation to be sure to look at available documents when doing their analysis—which, as Arensberg points out, only a nincompoop would fail to do. In fact Manners' only specific criticism was a brief footnote criticizing Warner's concept of the community as microcosm. Had he cited at least one defective Caribbean analysis where traditional anthropology had succumbed to the dangers he was describing, one could perhaps have gleaned some idea of what exactly he was talking about.

Such referential ambiguity characterizes many of the criticisms that are now being levelled against the "community study method." Anthropologists criticize other anthropologists for failing to take into account "the larger society," or "the structural linkages" between peasant communities and non-food-producing groups in the larger society. It is not at all clear that writers of monographs have been as seriously ignorant of these factors as critics have on occasion implied. But at any rate the important point is that the community study method is basically a manner of gathering data, not a series of chapter headings in which to present the data. If there are shortcomings in the organization and analysis of data in many monographs, these weaknesses are not inherent in the community study method, whose essential feature is the collection of data in natural settings where daily life unfolds. I will argue below that it would be most unfortunate if anthropology were to prematurely abandon this research tool before having exploited fully its unique potential for gathering certain kinds of data.
ded period of time in the midst of a specific human group. 4

Such considerations fortified the decision to concentrate data-gathering, rather than extend it to a degree that would dilute research effort. But the option was still available to choose two or three geographically close communities from the same region, rather than one community. Again, though such a design does avoid the problems of overambitious extension, there still may be an epistemological fallacy involved, which concerns the nature of scientific generalization, and which has to be challenged. It may be feared that research conducted in one community--no matter how carefully done--is not generalizable even to the surrounding communities in the same ecological zone, and that a study of several communities would be scientifically more generalizable. This is simply incorrect.

Generalizability from a sample to a larger population depends on the degree of randomness of the sampling procedure. In no multi-community study ever reported for Haiti or the entire Caribbean (e.g. Underwood 1970; Schaedel 1962; Steward et al. 1956; Clarke 1957; R.T. Smith 1956; M.G. Smith 1962; Comitas 1973) were the communities selected by statistically random procedures. A common-sense impression--

4. This of course does not mean that a researcher confines himself to the boundaries of his community. A practical decision made in this research was to follow villagers in their activities outside of the community, whether in the town of Les Bayahondes, in Port-au-Prince, or in more distant parts of Haiti. Such a procedure was compatible with intensive localized research and did not entail a dispersal of research time and energy. (Cf. Murray and Alvarez 1975.) A powerful and effective methodological approach to the dilemma of ecological diversity in vertically integrated societies was that adopted in the study of Puerto Rico that was carried out by a team of five graduate students and their Puerto Rican counterparts under the guidance of Julian Steward (Steward et al. 1956). In this study a preliminary survey of ecological types on the island was followed by a selection of a community that would represent each type.
istic assessment of typicality is generally the deciding factor.\textsuperscript{5} But from a technical point of view the findings from three or four communities are no more generalizable to several hundred communities in the same region than are the findings from one community in that region.

This fact has important implications for building in the "scientistic" component to field research. It means that scientific generalizability to a larger population will be a rare phenomenon in such anthropological studies, a virtually impossible phenomenon in Third World research, where there are no feasible ways of drawing technically random samples. It means furthermore that the bulk of the "scientific concern" will have to find outlet in the application of empirically rigorous and systematic methods for the study itself, and live with the burden of knowing that the generalizability of the findings will rarely or never be a matter of scientific certitude. When the illusory nature of the quest for scientific generalizability is thus exposed, the meaning of such research takes on a new light. Science is not eliminated from the endeavour; its demands are merely focused in a different direction. The task becomes that of applying penetrating and empirically reliable research techniques to study phenomena whose documentation achieves a high level of scientific accuracy, but whose strict scientific generalizability will remain at best plausible.

Then question then becomes: which design will make more likely the uncovering of significant patterns? A design which spreads out

\textsuperscript{5} This non-random strategy for selecting communities will probably be found to hold true for the literature of other world regions as well.
research time and energy over several communities? Or a design which focuses attention on one plausibly representative community?

The question is of course loaded to elicit an answer in harmony with the research design chosen. This notwithstanding, it should be clear that, even taking a conservative stance, when the issues are subjected to a rigorous logical scrutiny, the traditional anthropological approach of focusing on a single community is as justifiable from a scientific point of view as any other approach. There will undoubtedly be many field workers who for one reason or another opt to abandon entirely the community study approach as traditionally practiced, to expand the physical scope of their research, to gain more geographic breadth at the expense of some of the traditional depth. The present discussion is not meant to criticize such a choice, but merely to point out that its authors should harbor no illusions that they are making it in the name of science.

To eliminate as unrealistic the incontestable statistical generalizability that would come from technically adequate random sampling techniques in selecting communities to be studied is not to deny the possibility—or necessity—of seeking communities that are at least plausibly representative of a broader region or population. There are several techniques that have been used for assessing this typicality or lack thereof in a particular community.

Perhaps the earliest breakthrough made in this regard was the use of national statistics by Arensberg and Kimball to identify and characterize the small-farmer class in southern Ireland, thus lending credibility to the notion that their findings were in fact applicable to a much broader universe than the small sample of families in three
communities which they actually studied. Studies carried out in Puerto Rico and Peru also placed particular communities in statistical perspective (Steward 1950:44).

Insofar as it was possible, analogous procedures were used in the selection of a community outside of Les Bayahondes. Meager as they were, the findings of the national census were kept in mind. Familiarity with the ethnographic literature was helpful to some degree, but not entirely. As has been indicated, most studies had been done in the mountains, and it was clear that even in highly visible matters such as settlement patterns and land use there were obvious

6. Steward (1950:44), either through personal communication with the authors of this work, or through incorrect reading of the text, stated that the authors first examined the census data and then selected communities to study on the basis of what the census indicated was typical. Nowhere in their text (Arensberg and Kimball 1968) do the authors state that this was their procedure. The analysis of statistics might very well have been done after the actual fieldwork was completed. But the point is that the identification of the statistical importance of the small farmer class bespoke the probable applicability of their findings to a broader population. Steward, however, seemed to be going beyond this and implying that this use of national statistics can lead to the reliable selection of a typical community, and states outright that the study done under his guidance in Puerto Rico was one of the few which had "made community selection specifically a sampling problem" (Steward 1950:44). There is something frankly "fishy" about this formulation, a gap in the logic of procedure which should be pointed out. In the first place the census data cover only certain topics. To have chosen a community, for example, where average land-holdings fall within the national range, means that the community is typical in terms of land holdings. But no guarantee exists that therefore other patterns found in the community are also typical. But there is an even more serious flaw. Even knowing that the average land holding size is such and such, and the average income is such and such, how then does one select a community that falls within this range? Strictly speaking, an exhaustive preliminary study would be necessary. The fact is that no matter what use is made of national statistics, the choice of research site remains impressionistic. The use of figures helps to make the choice more intelligent and defensible, but not "a sampling problem." The Puerto Rico study is in many ways yet unsurpassed piece of research that could serve as a model for others; but one of its strengths was not choice of community by "sampling," using a technical definition of that term. If the term sampling is used, it should be termed "impressionistic sampling."
ecologically rooted subcultural variations which suggested extreme caution in using the literature of the highlands to select a community on the plain. Eventually a series of specific criteria were set up and a plan was formulated whereby a large number of local communities would be visited and assessed as far as possible on these criteria of typicality during brief visits.

There were several features that were ascertainable through inspection and at the same time potentially diagnostic of atypicality in important areas, if a community were found to differ therein. Size, settlement pattern, relative incidence of different house types, and proximity to vehicle transportation were among the relevant features probed. Other characteristics were less visible but roughly ascertainable through brief interviews with members of the communities: basic source of livelihood, degree of Protestant evangelization, presence of any unusual developmental inputs from without being some examples.

With an eye to such criteria, visits were made to some two dozen communities in the four directions around Les Bayahondes. The choice was narrowed to two communities, and tentative negotiations for possible housing were initiated. When one of the house deals was brusquely and decisively terminated by the wife of the owner (a sudden outburst that at least some residents of Kinanbwa said was the work of their own ancestral spirits), that community was abandoned and the decision was made to do research in the village of Kinanbwa.

7. Such projects exist in a few communities of the Cul-de-Sac Plain, where wells have been drilled and cooperatives organized by foreign agencies.
SETTLING IN STRUCTURAL "BARRIERS"

The already-alluded to "immersion" which is the distinctive hallmark of anthropological fieldwork implies the existence of an interim period between the selection of a research site and the onset of actual, full-time research. In this period the immersion process begins. It may be experienced subjectively by the researcher as a trying series of one unpleasant anecdote after another, as the fieldworker attempts by frequently painful trial and error to establish a viable daily regime in which basic physical needs are met and in which the beginnings of a social network are forged, contacts which will hopefully crystallize into the deeper contacts from which anthropological insights will come.

But it is easy to misperceive the dynamics of this process. What appears to be a series of anecdotal events are frequently manifestations of structural features of the local social system; and what appear to be "methods" and "solutions" of the newly arrived fieldworker may merely be predictable responses to pre-existing "strategies" and "methods" which the host society has developed for dealing with strangers.

It is in their large structural contours that these "lines of defense" of Haitian society now stand out. A retrospective analysis of the dynamics of immersion that followed site selection but preceded active fieldwork in Kinanbwa reveals the operation of at least four major structural dynamics of local society which intervened in the process of channeling the arrival of an outsider to the community. Three of these patterns were in effect lines of defense whose
operation lightly tended to militate against the move of an outsider into a hamlet; the fourth was a device for relating to and "incorporating" the outsider once the first three lines had been passed. A description of the anecdotal details of this process is of less interest here than a brief discussion of what the operation of the structural process reveals about Haitian society.

Formal Authorities.

As is the case with most other sovereign national entities, Haiti has a government which controls the entry of foreigners into the national territory. But certain features of Haitian history have given a distinct slant to the nature of this control. In recent years an interest in developing tourism has resulted in liberal policies for permitting foreigners to visit the country, and there are few restrictions on movement within Port-au-Prince or its immediate surroundings. But institutional controls over the movement of foreigners reassert themselves as soon as the foreigner tries to travel by vehicle outside of the vicinity of Port-au-Prince. Many visitors are surprised to find that they have to obtain a laissez-passer to travel to other towns on the island. And they tend to be less than enthusiastic at the frequency of military checkpoints along the highways where armed soldiers more often than not stop a vehicle carrying white strangers and copy down the information contained on the laissez-passer. And if the casual visitor elicits such behavior even on fairly well-travelled tourist circuits, the atypical foreigner who intends to settle in an

8. The government reportedly discourages taxi drivers from taking foreigners on tours through some of the less attractive neighborhoods of the city.
out-of-the-way hamlet will do well to come armed with copious official documentation and permissions. The question of the possible historical roots of this institutional stance, or of the degree to which such control is an admirable or not-so-admirable expression of national sovereignty, is somewhat academic at the moment the visitor is challenged. This is perhaps the first institutional line of defense that had to be traversed before the search for a home in rural Haiti could even begin.

Over and above the letters of introduction brought into the field from the U.S., four separate documents were obtained from various Haitian offices, including a statement of support obtained from the Minister of Public Health and Population through the intervention of the Haitian physician under whose auspices research was to be conducted. Upon arrival in Les Bayahondes with this physician, visits were made to the proper authorities.

In actuality the authority structure seemed somewhat diffuse and undefined, there being at least three officials who exercised some sort of jurisdiction within the region where fieldwork was to be carried out. One was the caporal, the commander of the military outpost in the town. Another was the Magistrat Communal, the civilian mayor of the town. The third was the Chef de Section, a military official with jurisdiction over the outlying rural areas, and involved in a chain of command somewhat removed from that of the town's caporal.9 The lack

9. Had fieldwork been done at an earlier period in Les Bayahondes, there would have been yet a fourth authority: the local commander of a militia-type organization known formally as Volontiers de la Sécurité National, in common parlance referred to as the tétou makout. Though this organization still functions in other parts of Haiti, it had been disbanded in Les Bayahondes several months before the onset of fieldwork.
of precedents created initial confusion as to what steps to follow, and the two authorities in the town each made out separate reports and had to inquire several times for more details about the nature of the intended activities. There was hesitation and some initial uncomfortableness on the part of all parties concerned.

Had the proper documentation not been presented, and had I not been personally taken to the town by my Haitian sponsor, it is quite unlikely that I would have been permitted to stay for a long time in the town, to say nothing of moving to the countryside. But the official introduction and documentation ultimately removed any ambivalence. The reports were filed and within a week all inquiries into my activities ceased and were never reinstated during the remaining 20 months of fieldwork, even when both the Magistrat and the caporal were replaced by successors. The stereotyped images of contemporary Haiti projected by visiting novelists and journalists would have led to the expectation of continued surveillance throughout fieldwork. This is a false image. After the initial institutional formalities had been met, and some valuable contacts in outlying communities had been made through the Magistrat, indifference to my activities was the general official reaction. The initially formidable documentation "barrier" erected against foreigners proved to be basically a paper formality maintained more out of institutional habit than out of any particularly strong attitudes toward foreigners on the part of the local authorities of Les Bayahondes.10

10. In other parts of Haiti control is apparently still more stringent. My wife journeyed with women from our village as they engaged in trading activities elsewhere in Haiti, and was on one occasion uncereemoniously turned back from a town by the local military commander.
Class Divisions Between Town and Country.

If the institutionalized paper barrier makes it somewhat difficult for an outsider to establish initial residence in a town, there is a much stronger structural dynamic, which enjoys no codified institutional support, but which operates to keep him residually confined to the town once he has arrived. If allowed to follow its course, this dynamic would result in a type of "commuter's" fieldwork consisting of brief visits to the surrounding hamlets from a base in the town. This dynamic largely takes its force from the local class structure.

A clear existence of a class structure in Haiti has been commented on since the earliest days of the republic and has in recent decades been given explicit scholarly attention (Mintz 1959, 1966; Leyburn 1966; Simpson 1941; Wingfield and Parenton 1965; Casimir 1964). One aspect of the ideological expression of this internal differentiation and stratification is a complex of pejorative stereotypes with which members of one group verbally lambaste members of other groups.

I was thus warned by townspeople that "out there," in the countryside, I would be plagued by mud, mosquitoes, dust, storms, not to mention the machinations of wily peasants whose prime activity would henceforth be that of trying to separate me from my worldly goods by begging and overcharging. Dire calamities were predicted for me were I to forsake the safety of the bok (the town) for the uncharted wilderness inhabited by moun sa-yo ("those people").

11 These pejorative stereotypes were to be reciprocated after I had settled into Kinanbwa, where the term moun Les Beyahondes was almost an epithet. The people of Kinanbwa felt that I had made the right choice in choosing their friendly and more upright milieu over the
Though if pressed each group could be induced to say nice things about other groups, in general there were marked pejorative stereotypes which easily found verbal expression. This structurally-generated feature made my actual settling into Kinanbwa a little bit touchier than it would otherwise have been. The family with whom I had secured temporary lodging reacted to my plans to move to the outlying area somewhat as a type of mild betrayal and preference for "those people."

Nonetheless clear indications had been given, on arriving in Les Bayahondes, that residence there was temporary. And when my decision to leave the bok was seen as genuine, my host in the town actually accompanied me to Kinanbwa and participated in the initial negotiations for renting a house.12 As with the institutional paper barricade, the town-country structural antagonism proved a relatively simple line of defense to break through.

Insecurity of Land Tenure.

If the townspeople were not flattered by my decision to leave them, neither were the people of Kinanbwa overjoyed at their having been "chosen." It was not until fieldwork was well advanced that I was jokingly told why. Generations of informal partitioning and transacting of cropping land had created a situation in which few of the people had separate, personal deeds to their plots of ground. Some old deeds pretentious people of the town and the trouble-making vakabō that plagued the town. But furthermore the villagers also felt that I was right in choosing their more alert company--peasants of the Plain--over the company of the "hillbillies" in the mountains (moun-môn) with their strange customs.

12. Subsequently, of course, my town host adhered to a version of events in which, had it not been for his intervention, the suspicious peasants would never have permitted me to rent a house in their community.
for large plots before partition were still in the hands of old men or elder siblings. But few people possessed or had even seen the formal deeds on which their tenure was ultimately known to depend. Though local ownership was clearly recognized, and there were relatively few cases of land conflict in Kinanbwa during the entire period of fieldwork, nonetheless there was a general awareness that the final legal requirement for uncontested ownership of a plot—the possession of a deed drawn up on the basis of a surveyor's measurement of the actual plot—was present in only a tiny minority of the cases. Thus though the threat of global expropriation was not an overt theme of concern in daily life in the village, there was a latent and dormant insecurity which was shaken awake and which found verbal expression when a foreigner took the unprecedented and inexplicable step of seeking residence in the village. It was openly stated—though never to my face—that I must be after their land.

This suspicion of evil intent on my part was perhaps partially responsible for another fear that was expressed to the effect that whites were lougarou—vampires—who at night "eat children."

The people from whom I eventually rented the house were warned by the neighbors that if they "brought me into the community" (méné-m ná lakou-e)

13. The expression "to eat children" (majé ti-moun), frequently heard in rural Haiti, never refers to physical eating but rather to death by clandestine sucking of children's blood at night by creatures who are people during the day but take the form of small animals at night. The Haitian custom of referring to this as "eating children" is perhaps at the root of the erroneous notions held by earlier visitors to Haiti that there were people in rural Haiti who practiced cannibalism on children. Such practices had never been heard of by even the oldest informants in the village and struck all who were asked as incredibly repulsive. We are probably dealing with a ludicrous example of a pejorative myth concerning cannibalistic practices which arose originally through a mistranslation of a common Creole phrase, majé ti-moun.
their children would be the first to go. Thus clear social pressure was brought against the individuals with whom negotiations for renting a house had been initiated, a defensive barrier which makes perfect sense in terms of the history of rural Haiti.

But the nature of local social organization prevented this opposition on the part of some members of the community from effectively impeding the entry of an outsider. The rural Caribbean is in general characterized by weak local community organization, and a high degree of economic individualization, which stand out in sharp contrast, for example, to effective patterns of community control documented in corporate landholding communities in Mexico, Guatemala, and Peru (Wagley 1960:8-9; cf. also Mintz 1971:37-42).

Thus, despite lack of precedents and the resulting uncertainties and misgivings, the owners of the house finally agreed to rent it over a long period of time. The practice of renting was, after all, fairly common in the case of cropping land, making the rental transaction not unusual in itself. The formalization of the rental by written agreement signed in the presence of witnesses assured the owners that the foreigner would not be able to pra kay-la ("take the house away"). And their knowledge of the local system—that if they succumbed to opposition and forfeited the rental money, some other person in the community would rent his house anyway—clinched the matter. There were simply no local structural mechanisms for converting anxieties at the intrusion of an outsider into an effective blockade. Kinanbwa, as in the case of other rural communities in the Caribbean, has no truly effective mechanism for dealing with the outside as a united social entity. Thus the structurally generated anxiety concerning
possible loss of land was unable to find collective expression in the form of effective social impediments to the arrival of an outsider into the community.

DYNAMICS OF INTEGRATION

If the impression has been given above that the selection of a research site in rural Haiti was done in the nature of a swashbuckling campaign against obstacles pressing in from all sides, the impression is false. The operation of these structural barriers was subtle, frequently imperceptible during the events themselves; and interaction with the villagers was courteous and cordial, if peppered with much of the local haggling over prices that a stranger in need of basic goods and services in rural Haiti soon becomes adept at. It is only in retrospective analysis that the patterns described above became clear.

When the move was finally made to Kinanbwa, however, a fundamentally different dynamic set in. In the early days, relationships with other members of the lakou was cordial, but economic discussions dominated as the still unsettled issues of who would provide me with essential water-carrying, cooking, and washing services—and at what price—were being worked out. But the earlier processes which had

14. During the time that the house negotiations were proceeding, I was blissfully unaware of what was going on, and was under the illusion that hesitation on their part was due to my astute bargaining and refusal to pay an exorbitant price for the house. It was only much later that I learned of my hunger for land and my thirst for children's blood. A full knowledge of this at the time, though it would not have kept me in the town, would undoubtedly have resulted in open references to these matters on my part in the form of impassioned denials—which would simply have worsened matters.

lightly militated against settling in and beginning fieldwork ceased their operation abruptly.\textsuperscript{16} The threats of ostracism to the owners of the rented house gave way to curiosity and to courteous albeit reserved approaches. And a new unanticipated mechanism swung into operation whose effect was to provide all parties a vehicle for the establishing of those preliminary interactions useful to a small face-to-face community confronted with a stranger, and to a researcher desiring to begin fieldwork. The emergence of such a vehicle had been hoped for. It was the quarter from which it came that was unexpected: the rituals of the ancestor cult.

Two related decisions taken prior to the beginning of fieldwork had resulted in a perceptual unreadiness to perceive the importance of local ritual, and in a delay in realizing how significant it had been in establishing relationships in the early days in Kinanbwa. The first factor was dissatisfaction with what appeared to be an exaggerated fascination with exotic ritual on the part of many authors who have made firsthand studies in Haiti. Probably the most easily available and still widely read ethnographic study of rural Haiti is Herskovits'\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{16} My impression at the time was--and still is--that there was noticeably less of the formalized hospitality patterns in this village of the plain than had been experienced across the border in the mountains of the Dominican Republic or that had been reported to exist in other parts of Haiti (Herskovits 1971:68). Food offerings in this community are an extremely sensitive matter, due to prevalent beliefs about the danger of poisoning. As in many settings, to offer cooked food is an act of courtesy, but to accept it is furthermore a public statement of trust. Thus cooked food will generally be offered only to those with whom some trust relationships have been established. There was the further factor of prevalent notions concerning strange dietary preferences among "blä," and perhaps an initial insecurity as to how I would respond to any offer (except coffee). At any rate it is probably factors such as these, rather than poverty or hostility, which accounted for what struck me during the first days as a noticeable absence of the quasi-ritual hospitality patterns that I had encountered in other fieldwork settings.
Life in a Haitian Valley, which ended up dealing heavily with a description and analysis of ritual matters. Outside of publications stemming from the Marbial project of the late 40's\(^7\) few detailed, empirically convincing analyses of the economic and domestic functioning of any specific rural communities or households have appeared in the literature. Those works which address themselves in any way to economics are hard to obtain. In contrast contemporary studies which deal with voodoo (Metraux 1972; Deren 1970; Huxley 1966; Courlander 1960) are easily available. There has been, in short, a fascination with colorful ritual, drumming, possession and the like. The subsistence activities and domestic organization of rural Haiti had received much less detailed attention. Fieldwork was thus initiated with the firm intention not to get lured into producing one more analysis of voodoo; and the domain of ritual was specifically designated as one that would receive only passing attention.

Related to this was a general research orientation with hypotheses which anticipated a great deal of conscious economic motivation and economic rationality on the part of the peasants. It was anticipated, for example, that in discussing the ideal number of children, they would refer to the agricultural utility of older male children. This anticipation of conscious economic calculation (which was eventually found to hold for some spheres but to be a simplistic misrepresentation for others) created a tendency to dismiss religious explanations which individuals gave for their behavior as conventional conversational devices to avoid giving the "real" motives—the conscious economic ones—

17. Metraux et al. (1951); Bastien (1951). See also the very useful article of Comhaire-Sylvain (1961).
which it was assumed would eventually come out.

The basic theoretical orientation underlying these anticipations—the assumption that the conditions of subsistence will have important repercussions on other spheres of life—survived the test of fieldwork and has been given documentation in these pages. The simplistic misconceptions as to how this primacy of subsistence patterns would manifest itself directly on the phenomenological and motivational plane were quickly demolished, as villagers persisted in alluding to the importance of ritual considerations in many spheres of behavior. The intervention of the ritual complex in the regulation of access to economic resources was a major aspect of the analysis to be presented in these pages. But long before these insights emerged, ritual had intervened to make possible the establishment of those preliminary basic social bonds from which much of subsequent fieldwork was to flow. It is hard to be "objective" about the processes by which one established personal relationships; but retrospective myth-making can be held to a minimum by simply reporting a series of events which led from stark, initial social isolation to the establishment of at least general acceptance and public justification of one's presence in the village. The role of ritual will be clear.

The first occasion for contact with the community at large came a few days after my arrival in Kinantwa, when some young men began singing châte lwa ("songs to the ancestral spirits") in the lakou. Their glances in my direction indicated that they were doing it at least partially for my benefit. I took the cue and inquired about the songs. They explained what they were and offered to gather a group and sing some for me that night. I agreed. Almost a hundred villagers
showed up in the lakou that night, and several hours were spent in this activity.

Shortly thereafter the people in my lakou hinted that it would not at all be inappropriate for me to *fè yoù vodou*, that is, finance a ceremony consisting of religious drumming, singing, dancing, and spirit possession. This step was taken; and again the community assisted. This was yet a further occasion on which some contacts were established.

Shortly after this event I left the community for a brief period of time. From the beginning I had informed the neighbors of my forthcoming marriage, and explained that I had come alone only to *paré kay-la*, to prepare a decent residence before the wedding, a special preparation that was seen as highly necessary and appropriate in the light of local custom, which demanded that elaborate reparations and embellishments be carried out on their future abode by villagers who were going to take the big step of getting legally married. Furthermore the matri-local residence patterns prevalent in the Plains had led to wedding customs whereby the ceremonies themselves (outside of the actual church wedding) were almost always to be held in the *lakou* of the bride. Thus it was seen as quite natural and proper that I should be going to my future wife's *lakou* (in the neighboring Dominican Republic) for the wedding ceremony itself, even though we would both be living in Kinanbwa afterwards because of my work.

When my wife and I returned to Kinanbwa, the reception of the members of the *lakou*, and of many village neighbors, was warmer and more cordial than anything I had yet experienced in the community. Yet the growing acceptance was to be publicly articulated in a manner that
took us both somewhat by surprise. Not too long after our arrival, a frapé asō was held in our lakou, a ceremony in which an oũgā (a ritual specialist of the local ancestor cult) summoned the dead owner of our house, who was the father of the children who after some hesitation had agreed to rent the house. The purpose of the ceremony was to consult with the dead patriarch concerning his food preferences with respect to the majo mò which was being prepared in his honor. The dead patriarch's voice could be heard from behind the closed door, where the oũgā had summoned him into a govi (a clay receptacle with the shape of a small jug). After answering the questions for which he had been summoned, the deceased patriarch took the occasion to formally welcome my wife and me to his former abode. He informed us that he had been personally responsible for inspiring us to choose Kinanbwa, and he excoriated his children for their initial reluctance to rent me the house. He had brought us to ékléré lakou-a, to "bring light" to the compound, and we were to be treated as members of the lakou.

The impact of this particular ceremony was dramatic, at least for the two of us who had never been through such a rite before and who had been singled out for a welcome from beyond the grave. Previous intellectual acceptance of the "integrative function of ritual" became for the first time an emotional reality. The obvious question that

18. Literally "meal of the dead." This is a minor banquet which is an obligatory service that children "owe" to their dead parents—preferably soon after death, but at any rate at some period during the children's lives. It was the rental money from the house which was to be used in the preparation of this ceremony, and indeed a great deal of the rent had already been spent in embellishing the peristil (an elaborately constructed locale for holding rituals), which their dead father, who had been an important local oũgā, had built during his lifetime.
would have arisen had we read about such an event—"did the people suspect it was the ougâ's voice and not that of their dead father?"—seemed completely trivial at the time. There was a palpable glow of mutual acceptance which had been triggered off by this ritual, and the possibly fictive nature of the dead patriarch's presence seemed genuinely irrelevant, even to a skeptic's mind. It was a useful cognitive device for bringing about a social catharsis that was indeed genuine.

The emotional glow itself, of course, was relatively short-lived. Bickering among the siblings, and between one particular household in the lakou and ourselves, was quickly to resume. But the fact was that our presence in the lakou now had a validation that went far beyond the fact of having shelled out the rent money. A very important feature of local life had thus manifested itself; the commercial basis on which so many aspects of life in rural Haiti seem to openly rest is not the final story. There will in many important events be a supplementary rationale—-if not "more basic" then at least ancillary—sought through the rites of the ancestor cult.

The assessment of the importance of ritual in local social life does not rest merely on an intellectually clever Monday-morning reinterpretation of this one particular incident. For not only in this lakou, but in the community at large, was our gradually increasing acceptance expressed and explained in the context of ritual. The concept of our "brightening up the lakou," which was hardly the interpretation of our presence in the community that we wished to be promulgated, eventually came to take on a very specific and paradoxically accurate significance. It turned out that the vast majority of large social gatherings in the
village took place around rituals—wakes, healing ceremonies, spirit séances (rélé-lwa), pre-wedding receptions, and vodou dances. These events generally took place at night, and efforts were made (except in the rélé-lwa) to provide as much light as possible. There being no electricity in the village, people were dependent on dim kerosene lanterns, or even dimmer, and smokier, wicks soaked in gasoline. The pressure lantern which we had bought to be able to read and write at night cast an intense light which could light up a large area.

When we had settled for several weeks in the community, people began inviting us to these events and asking if they might not borrow the lantern. We accepted the invitation and invariably lent the lantern, leaving it in the hands of the owner of the house if the event was to continue after we departed. This practice continued throughout fieldwork.

Caution must be exercised in attempting to assess the genuine attitudinal impact of this gesture. But one thing is empirically certain: our willing lending of the lantern for these frequent rituals was the major issue around which subsequent comments of acceptance and solidarity tended to be made to us. The comments mention the lantern, but also mentioned our willingness to pèdi nyit-la ("lose the night") with other people in the community, especially for wakes. In short, it was through invitations to participate in their rituals that the community first approached us; and our assistance at, and contributions to, these events was the major source of early social contacts. Not only had these rituals given our presence in the lakou some legitimation that came from beyond the grave, but they were in the beginning the major context for interaction with the community at large.
Later in fieldwork, even when more intensive interaction had been created through neighbor relationships and work relationships that went beyond the conventionalized interactions of ritual contexts, the ancestor cult continued to be invoked as the rationale justifying our presence. The major kin group in the community, some of whom were undoubtedly among those who had feared loss of land or death of children if foreigners found lodging in the community, were eventually to recall that shortly before I had come to the community, there had been an elaborate ancestral ceremony for the mét bitasyé, the founding patriarch of the entire community. It was suggested that it had been his doing that brought us to the community, and it was further suggested on different occasions that, since he was reportedly the child of a white, I might actually be a distant relative of the contemporary villagers. In short solidarity was sought, and our presence in the community was eventually explained and ritually justified, by reference to long dead ancestors.

As in the case of the earlier-mentioned welcome from beyond the grave, the question of whether anyone in the community actually believed this, or whether we believed it, seemed completely immaterial at the time. The function of such statements was clearly one of affirming solidarity, and as such they manifest the central place of ritual words and actions in the social system, quite independently of the "true beliefs" of any of the participants. Ritual is among the central strategies or "methods" by which important ends are achieved. This topic has been dealt with specifically because it relates directly to the nature of the latent economic regulatory device uncovered during fieldwork. Had we perceived at the time that ritual was intervening
in the village's treatment of us, the discovery of an even profounder latent function of this ritual would not have come as such a surprise.  

Fieldworkers perhaps have a tendency to generalize from their own concrete experiences and turn them into "useful rules." Herskovits did this when he cautioned fieldworkers in Haiti to avoid any attempts to participate in an way in the ritual events being observed, under threat of ridicule (1971:326-7). His challenging of the vague concept of "participant observation" is very well taken, but his jeremiad against any sort of participation seems quite extreme in light of what we experienced in Kinanbwa. My own attempts to learn the songs and the drum rhythms, and to participate as everyone else, at least in the singing and dancing, was never ridiculed, was on the contrary positively received. There are probably several factors involved. In the first place these activities are all frequent, and are a major context for recreational enjoyment, social contact, and for some, emotional release. These rites are considered to be a bell bagay, a "beautiful thing." Secondly there were two groups in the community, numerically small, who disapproved of voodoo activities. There was some tension between them, and my participation in ritual activities tended to be seen as a solidary affirmation on my part that I was not "on the side" of those who condemned voodoo and its practitioners--that is, the converts to evangelical Protestantism, and the group of katolik fra, "pure Catholics," who avoided what they considered to be the satanic rites of the ancestor cult. I of course interacted cordially with members of both of these groups, and was occasionally the object of public proselytization, especially by the evangelicals. My refusal to reject satanic practices was not held against me personally, but against the wiles of the voodoo devotees who had managed to ensnare me into their diabolical rites. Thus a note of seriousness entered the reaction of many people to my marginal participation in these matters--but no apparent traces of the ridicule which Herskovits foretold.

Another factor underlying the community's acceptance of my interest in these rites is connected to the fact that proficiency in ritual activities is seen to be a guaranteed source of income. When I became serious about mastering the voodoo drum rhythms, some people openly commented as to how I was going to make a lot of money lot bo ("back home") doing that. It was seen as quite natural that I should participate and attempt to attain some proficiency in these matters. In short the ritual area turned out to be one of the major areas where participation to some degree was possible.

However any reverse insistence to the effect that a researcher ought to get involved with the rituals would be just as inappropriate as Herskovits' warning that they should not. Much will depend simply on the inclination of the researcher. One could easily live in a village, have nothing to do publicly with the rituals, and still do effective fieldwork in rural Haiti.
APPENDIX B

METHODOLOGY

I. INTRODUCTION

The research and analysis presented in these pages is constructed out of two epistemologically distinct types of component elements. Because one of these components enjoys a much greater degree—not of certitude—but at least of empirical credibility, than the other, it is crucial to indicate very clearly that they are in fact conceptually distinct.

There was an analytic-explanatory component which has involved not a little theoretical speculation and hunch-following; but excursions in this area were carefully tied to a much more empirically rigorous second component: a body of carefully recorded information.

The oft-flouted truism that even the information which a researcher collects is influenced by the pre-existing theoretical focus under which research was entered should not obscure the fact that research competently done will provide a corpus of data that stand and demand explanation whatever the fate of the theoretical framework in which the data were first analyzed. It is this dichotomy which endows a shelf of old ethnographies with a value and permanence not enjoyed by a shelf of abstract, theoretical treatises also of bygone years. Were it not for the odious tradition in the social sciences of forcing newer generations to analyze the more "classic" of the thought patterns of older generations, most of these latter treatises would have long since been confined to oblivion; whereas the ethnographies become, if anything, more valuable and priceless as time passes.

The unanticipated complex of land tenure and land use pat-
terns, which constitute the factual base around which the theoretical construct of evolutionary adaptation was woven in these pages, was uncovered through the application of a slightly "modernized" version of what in its basic contours and objectives was simply a conventional application of the powerful anthropological research method frequently referred to as the "community study." This research strategy has as one of its major defining features a type of extended immersion and face-to-face involvement in the ongoing daily routine of at least some representative members of the group whose lifeways are the object of research. Though the nature and degree of the immersion and involvement will vary from field worker to field worker, the vast majority of analyses produced by anthropologists have been based upon some such settling in, learning the language, and establishing social contacts; whereas those produced by members of other disciplines have, in their majority, probably not.

This is not the place to undertake a defense of the basic premises of this research strategy, nor to point out the misunderstandings, "straw men," and less-than-lucid logic which underlie at least some of the criticisms directed against it in recent decades. Both of these tasks have been done by the person with whose name this method and its defense are most frequently associated (Arensberg 1954; 1960; 1961). But brief mention can be made of some major points where confusion can enter.

The term "community study" itself may perhaps be misleading. The normal English decoding of that phrase would read "study of a community." But as the term is being used here, it means rather "a study carried out within a community, as opposed to a laboratory study,
or study within some bounded institution."¹ Thus the titling of a piece
of research as "community study" does not at all imply that the study
is organized by chapter into traditional ethnographic headings. That
is, the content of the study does not in itself classify it in this
sense; "community studies" are compatible with a broad range of
does not imply a theoretical commitment on the researcher to a
view of a community as a self-sufficient whole. This has to do with
a researcher's theory. The community study method is compatible with
a broad range of theoretical approaches. The question to ask is:
does a substantial part of the data of this research--whatever the
theory, whatever the content--come from observation of and interac-
tion with people in a broad range of the natural settings in which
their lives unfold? If the answer is yes, we are dealing with the
community study method.

Assessments and critiques of this method, as opposed to other
methods, of gathering data have abounded. Much of the discussion
that has taken place within the discipline of anthropology has revolved
around a semantic confusion. For example, both Steward (1950) and
Manners (1960), in their criticisms of the community study method
or of traditional anthropological techniques, are primarily concerned
with what they perceive to be a conceptual fallacy by those anthro-

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¹. This is a paraphrase of the now classic distinction which
Arensberg (1961) made between the community as object and the community as sample.

². There does not seem to be much difference in this use of "community study" from the term "field study" as used by Kerlinger (1964:389-91) or "participant observation" as used by others (e.g. Becker and Geer 1969).
pologists who allegedly analyze peasant communities as though they were self-contained systems. But, in the first place, this error has not been documented with any great frequency. And in the second place the criticisms concern anthropological analysis, not anthropological data-collection. Neither of the above-mentioned authors suggests that anthropologists should stop living among the people they study; they are not criticizing the method per se, but rather the analytic frameworks which they perceived anthropologists to have used. In their criticisms of the "community study," or "traditional anthropological techniques," neither of these authors makes any specific recommendations as to how anthropologists might change their actual field tactics. Such discussions are hence irrelevant to the issue of "anthropological methods" per se, by any normal decoding of that term (cf. Arensberg 1960).

But there have been more telling criticisms aimed directly at perceived defects in the techniques themselves, whereby the critic for one reason or another says that data collected by this observation and interaction with the researched in their daily lives tend to be scientifically less valid. Such criticisms come principally from scholars in other disciplines. A classic example is the assertion by the psychologist Kerlinger that, despite the strengths it has, "...the field study is a scientific weak cousin of laboratory and field experiments." (Kerlinger 1964:390.) This is merely a blunt statement of a point of view that can be found expressed in many fashions, not necessarily in anthropology, but in other social sciences. The notion tends to be that somehow the data gleaned through participant observation and interaction are less valuable scientifically, less verifiable statistically. The data are "soft," not "hard." They tend to be
"merely descriptive" instead of "analytic" or "explanatory." And it may even be suspected that participant observation is the preferred research mode of warm-hearted (and probably soft-headed) humanists, as opposed to the mercilessly cold, penetrating statistical probes of those with a more hard-headed scientific bent.

Such a construal is blatant nonsense. One of the major objectives of this dissertation, over and above the analysis of certain aspects of rural Haitian society, has been to document and demonstrate the well-nigh untapped and unequallable "hard" scientific potential of the community study method, with its reliance on immersion in a social field. The argument can be made that the "softness" of this method stems more from its newness and lack of full exploitation; as maturity approaches, a scientific strength born of more skillful techniques will imbue the traditional intuition-gleaned insights of these anthropological immersion procedures, not only with a solid substructure of incontestable statistical "hardness," but also an unprecedented ability to penetrate and expose heretofore latent patterns and processes which had escaped even the most careful ethnographic description during the discipline's adolescence—and which at any rate will remain forever invisible to research whose designers lack the insights that only immersion can bring.3

Such claims obviously stem from the unexpected patterns that were discovered during the community study in Kinanbwa. The methodological

3. If these notions are correct, we may expect that the not-too-distant future will see the intellectual vindication of those who have refused to climb on someone else's bandwagon, but who have maintained instead a public insistence on the unique potential which they knew to be latent in this most ancient of anthropological data-collecting strategies.
Implication of this experience is that the latent scientific potential which in-depth techniques have always had is contingent upon their eventually being harnessed to quantitative techniques. This generalization will become clearly specific in the light of concrete examples of how this was done in the research community, and done in a way that would have been utterly impossible to an itinerant researcher who quickly breezed into Kinanbwa for a brief survey. If the patterns found have validity, it should be clear that in-depth field workers should weed out any sentiments of fear --or scorn-- for quantitative techniques. The disdainful sneer with which the term "questionnaire research" is occasionally pronounced by anthropologists can be seen as highly inappropriate. Such techniques are not the foibles of unimaginative nit-pickers who want to document everything they say; they rather provide the researcher with completely unanticipated things that he otherwise would never have thought of saying. Fear of these techniques will be seen to be just as inappropriate--the understandable hesitance of some fieldworkers who feel they are somehow "out of their depth" when approaching the domain of statistics. On the contrary, a very convincing argument can be made to the effect that a researcher plunged into linguistic and cultural involvement within a community is in a uniquely advantageous position to use these quantitative techniques for genuinely effective research. He is able to avoid the pitfalls which so frequently sabotage the investigations of permanent office-based (or visiting hotel-based) survey researchers, pitfalls which frequently turn such research projects into expensive farces.

In light of this concern for evolving techniques, I will give
in this appendix a fairly detailed discussion of the methods that were used at different points in fieldwork, and the considerations that led to their eventual adoption and use. Many of the methodological decisions were taken with hesitation, and a few of them proved ill-founded. But on the whole the methodological complex which finally crystallized seems to have been effective enough to warrant presentation of its principal features.

The appendix will be divided into two sections. In the first section a discussion will be undertaken of variations on traditional ethnographic methods which were used in Kinanbwa, distinguishing them from the consideration, in the second section, of the various types of quantitative techniques that were simultaneously being used.

With respect to ethnographic techniques, a discussion of the decision to engage in active fieldwork, combining open note-taking with formal interviewing, will be followed by a description of the contractual arrangements which were entered into with a large number of regular informants as a response to a series of obstacles that had presented themselves in the earlier days of fieldwork. The misgivings that had been felt about these arrangements will be discussed, as well as the highly positive impact which, despite these earlier misgivings, the decision to adopt such arrangements had on the course of fieldwork and the quality of the ethnographic data.

A lengthy and detailed discussion of the quantitative techniques utilized in Kinanbwa will begin with an analysis of some major problems which such research confronts in the rural Third World. An argument will be made that village based researchers are in a better position to do such research than visiting survey takers, and detailed descriptions will be given of the content and methods of the surveys taken in Kinanbwa.
ETHNOGRAPHIC METHODS

Appendix A has analyzed in their broader context the series of events that occurred between arrival in the town of Les Bayahondes and the eventual onset of active fieldwork in Kinanbwa. The "settling in" period was a quasi-passive phase, with no clear termination point, which resulted in the modicum of integration into the community necessary for beginning a more active pursuit of new information and insights into the dynamics of local life. Interesting and moving as these processes were (in retrospect), they by no means provided most or even much of the serious insights that eventually surfaced. These latter were the product of conscious and active data collecting techniques, and the validity of the analysis rests, not on the degree of "integration" achieved into the community, but on the reliability of the subsequent research procedures employed after the modicum of preliminary acceptance had been won.

ACTIVE FIELDWORK

Though there were several broad topics which had been designated as eventual targets of specific research, the first weeks were spent in the time-honored anthropological task of trying to soak up as much information as possible about daily life in our lakou, trying to identify the major activities that engaged the energies of our neighbors, and the major concerns around which conversations revolved. ¹

¹ My then my Creole was adequately fluent. I had been studying the language, and practicing it with Haitians in New York, for over a year before beginning fieldwork. My wife had also arrived with a basic knowledge of the language. In this task, the grammar by Valdman (1970) proved useful, as had Hall's earlier descriptive grammar (1953).
The lakou where we lived was an ideal site to carry out such exploratory observations. Because of the location of our house, we were members of a lakou which, in addition to our own household, had four other households, representing some variety in terms of conjugal types, household composition, and age of children. In addition to this great social diversity, there was also a large degree of economic diversity within this lakou, ranging from the relatively well endowed households to impoverished households whose members lived in a room that had originally served as a storage room. The presence of different household types and different levels of economic well-being in terms of landholdings gave firsthand exposure to a wide variety of the life situations present in this community and throughout the Plain. Furthermore the presence of adult half-siblings within the same lakou, and of inmarrying husbands whose union to the adult females of the lakou was of the non-legal plasa type, and who consequently had no strict property rights in the lakou apart from their having procreated children there, was also typical and provided direct access to various types of interpersonal and interhousehold dynamics (both friendly and hostile) whose observation provided many important leads and insights.

Eventually, informal observation and sporadic inquiry had to give way to more formal methods. The first aspect of the change involved an expansion of contacts, and the gaining of access to other lakous in the community. But after one or two visits, informal conversation tends to run dry, and people begin to wonder just what the researcher does for a living. The occurrence of this problem in Kinanbwa brought to the fore an issue which many fieldworkers have discussed and which
probably most fieldworkers have had to confront: how formal and obvious should one's research be and, specifically, how open should one's note taking be?

Initially care was taken to restrict open note-taking to a minimum in order to avoid creating uncomfortableness in people and perhaps stopping or altering the content of the conversations or behaviors thus recorded. But the alternative--"acting naturally" in situations and waiting to write down information afterwards--proved to be a quite dissatisfactory procedure. It constantly involved what in effect was--to me, at least--uncomfortable dissimulation, as covert "interviews" were carried on under the guise of "natural" innocent chatting. It further involved the continual but subtle manipulation of conversations toward certain topics. Furthermore, this technique, despite the naturalness of behavior which it purported to sustain, in actuality proved to be comparatively superficial in the quality of the information obtained. If questions were held back and the conversations permitted to follow their natural course, topics would switch before vital information would come up. But if question after question was injected by the researcher, people soon realized they were being pumped. Uncomfortableness was felt on both sides. And at any rate the delay in writing down what was observed, casually overheard, or conversationally elicited led to a loss of rich, colorful, and potentially crucial information.

Any research technique involves problems; but the informational advantages of completely overt fieldwork, formal interviewing, and unabashed note taking were eventually felt to outweigh any disadvantages, and they were thus adopted as constant research tools. Informal
observations and "mental notes" continued to be made, but open note-taking and interviewing became gradually more frequent; and clearly the bulk of the data on which the analysis has depended was elicited in situations where people knew they were openly being asked questions or where they knew events were being observed by a researcher.

Eventually it was necessary to stop attempting to soak up and record "everything" and to begin focusing observation and question-asking. Broad content areas had been previously designated, on the basis of both theoretical concerns and specific needs of the public health program of which this research project was in part an adjunct, as topics for research. In terms of these latter concerns, high priority was given to the exploration of healing rituals and specialists, with respect not only to the details of the ceremonies, but also to the folk-theories and conceptual models which underlie these rites. Special attention was similarly given to documenting in some detail the cultural beliefs and practices associated with pregnancy, childbirth, and care of the neonate (Murray and Alvarez 1972). A dominant research concern also involved the general question of family size. This general topic was formulated into more specific questions concerning the local economic repercussions of having many as opposed to few children, or vice versa. This formulation of the broader issue was chosen because it was conducive to the gathering of detailed ethnographic information on economic and domestic patterns in rural Haiti—spheres which had been given relatively little scholarly attention in the literature. 5

5. A preliminary analysis of these latter topics can be found in Murray 1972.
The quantitative coverage given to some of these issues later in fieldwork will be discussed below. But all through fieldwork they were given detailed, descriptive ethnographic coverage as well. They were pursued not only through observation of daily life in several lakous, gardens, and market-places, but also through repeated intensive, tape-recorded interviews with some two dozen adult males and females from different selected households. Various formats were used for this interviewing. Some sessions were "dyadic," between interviewer and one interviewee. But many group interviews were also held, where the topic did not make such a procedure inappropriate. These group interviews tended to produce highly detailed data, as informants would reinforce (and occasionally contradict) each other, buttressing their statements with vivid anecdotal materials that would call forth yet more information from others. These conversations were neither interrupted nor slowed down, and new questions that arose during the interviews were jotted down and posed when a lull in the conversation occurred. In other sessions detailed genealogies and life histories were elicited.

6. This was one of the major advantages of the tape recorder, which was used during most interviews. If an individual had never seen a tape recorder, a demonstration of its use was given before the interview. Surprisingly few cases of "mike fright" were encountered throughout fieldwork. All of the interviews were subsequently transcribed, producing thousands of pages of rich verbal data. The tape recorder was also used during rituals, as was the camera. Far from encountering objections to this, as fieldwork progressed and more neighborly invitations were received to attend various rites being given by different households for their ancestral spirits, the tape recorder became expected. On one occasion when it was left behind, the person giving the ceremony asked why I had not brought it, implying that I was treating his ceremony as somehow less worthy of recording than ceremonies that I had attended in other lakous. After that I generally took the tape recorder to such events.
THE QUESTION OF REMUNERATION

These extended relationships with many villagers who permitted themselves to be interviewed repeatedly and at great length provided much important data and were in many ways crucial to successful fieldwork. Though such matters tend to be omitted or treated passingly in many anthropological studies, the specific steps taken to establish such research bonds, whether consciously done or not, constitute an important element in the methodological repertoire of the researcher. Such extended cooperation from such a wide variety of households was a boon which did not just emerge spontaneously. It was made possible only by the adoption of a system of explicit, regular recompense. The misgivings felt, and the decisions taken, with regard to this sensitive and somewhat controversial issue are worthy of at least brief discussion.

When the decision was taken early in fieldwork to be less shy about direct questioning and open note-taking, the most frequently expressed objection by some villagers was: why was no payment being made for their assistance? These requests came as no surprise. I had encountered more frequent and direct general requests for money in Haiti than in any other Caribbean setting, usually by people who had performed no service whatsoever. Little stigma appeared to be attached to making such a direct request if the asker placed himself

Such requests had, however, virtually never been encountered during fieldwork among peasants of the Dominican Republic. Though economically hard-pressed individuals there would occasionally ask for money, requests were never phrased as recompense for cooperation in an interview. Quite the opposite was true in Kinanbwa, however, dramatically illustrating that rules of fieldwork appropriate in one setting may be totally misguided in another.
in a low economic category. In fact many times the request was made in a joking tone that indicated that the petitioner fully expected a refusal. No such joking tone was present when recompense for time spent giving information was requested.

Neither financially nor philosophically did such requests present a problem. Financially the grant under which fieldwork was being carried out allowed for research expenses, of which informant remuneration would be a justifiable item. Philosophically research was ultimately viewed as a task requiring the expenditure of human time and energy. The villagers' participation was not limited to going through their normal daily routine as the researcher observed and questioned; there were times when certain villagers would be asked to drop what they were doing and to spend one or several hours of their time and energy in direct assistance to the researcher.

Despite the association of the study with a public health program, I neither entertained nor promulgated the illusion that the research was so noble in intent as to merit grateful, unremunerated assistance from its intended beneficiaries. It was a neutral, professional task; and if individuals who gave of their time and energy toward the achieving of that task asked for recompense, they were being perfectly reasonable.

Philosophical agreement with the validity of the requests was countered, however, by misgivings of a different nature. These misgivings centered on two issues: the practical worry that payment would set a precedent that would be difficult to retreat from at later stages of fieldwork; and a less clearly definable concern at the "commercialized" element that this would impart to fieldwork, a concern
which was related to the vanishing (but still occasionally flouted) mystique that "good fieldwork" is that which proceeds on the basis of neighborly rapport—"people give you information because you're one of them and they like you." Though the absurdity of this second misgiving is patent on close scrutiny, the combination of the two produced serious hesitation when payment for services was requested. I had gloomy fantasies of eventually approaching a group of neighbors relaxing and conversing in the lakou, and of being charged admission to join the group; of anthropological visitors coming to be shown around my community and of my shame at having to pay people in advance to be sure to wave to us.... Some of the hesitations against paying had an air of practical plausibility; others on close examination bordered on the absurd. But all were felt and were weighed heavily before a decision was taken which profoundly affected the overall course of much of the subsequent fieldwork.

Eventually the misgivings were cast aside and a contractual arrangement was adopted whereby individuals would be selected, approached, and asked if they would be interested in spending a few hours "working with me." They were told that selected individuals from different lakous, who agreed to fairly regular sessions, would be remunerated for their cooperation at a fixed hourly rate.

Though never explicitly formulated, clear "rules of the game" emerged which were acceptable and satisfactory to all concerned. Payment was strictly for those intensive (and increasingly frequent) sessions where the informants sat with me at a table while I asked lengthy questions, writing or tape-recording their answers; or when they dropped what they were doing to make a special trip to the fields.
or marketplaces specifically to point out or clarify some matter. At no other time—neither in relaxed conversations in their lakou, nor in the religious ceremonies, nor while they were performing normal tasks in their fields or houses—was any money ever requested or paid. When a regular working relationship was satisfactorily established, other ambiguities tended to disappear.  

EFFECTS OF REMUNERATION

The adoption of this system had dramatically positive impacts, not only on the socioemotional and interpersonal dynamics accompanying the gathering of information, but also on the breadth and quality of the information itself. Because the decision to use this method could conceivably seem less than wise to some fieldworkers, a factual description of some of its effects in the context of Kinanbwa is in order.  

It must be emphasized that the following discussion is not an advertisement for blanket use of direct cash payments by all fieldworkers. The appropriateness and effectiveness of this system in a rural Haitian community might be matched by a glaring inappropriateness and ineffectiveness in other settings, a practical assessment which must be made by each fieldworker. Nonetheless unwarranted misgivings may be felt by fieldworkers in a situation where it might

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8. It should be pointed out that some of the informants were in the middle or higher economic level in the community and were never among those who actively requested money in the early days of fieldwork. But the incontestable appropriateness in this cultural setting of properly preferred cash recompense is attested to by the general agreement to collaborate which such an offer elicited throughout fieldwork, and by the absence of a single refusal to accept such payment when tactfully offered as a matter of course.

9. For a discussion of remuneration in a slightly different context, see Coen and Murray (1975).
be a highly effective procedure to utilize some variant of this re-
muneration strategy. To these the following discussion should prove
relevant.

**Effects on the Interview.**

The most immediate noticeable effect of a regular remuneration
system was the virtual elimination of a generalized uncomfortableness
that had up until then pervaded many interviews. The uncomfortable-
ness alluded to here is not the nervousness that understandably
results from the broaching of locally sensitive of "taboo" topics;
a noticeable degree of tension—and relief at termination—was present
even during some interviews whose topics were fairly neutral.
The nature of the interview situation itself undoubtedly accounted
for part of this uncomfortableness. The informant was not only per-
mitting an imposition on his or her time, but was also being subjec-
ted to a type of detailed questioning which most had probably never
undergone before. If the villager felt uncomfortableness, the
interviewer was no less so. Though thorough questioning and the
clarification of inconsistencies or implausibilities in the informa-
tion was essential to the research, these constituted a less than
attractive imposition on the person being interviewed. In fact the
latter was doing the researcher a favor; both parties knew it.
And whereas such a favor could be asked and given once with a minimum
of tension, crucial follow-up interviews, though essential, were diffi-
cult to request.

This uncomfortableness had yet another dimension in Kinanbwa, which
is perhaps less prominent in other cultural settings but probably holds
in some other regions of Haiti as well. Favors and services tend to
be rendered to non-family members only under specific arrangements (such as exchange-labor groups) where the nature of the reciprocity is clearly understood and its occurrence is assured. This is not unusual in peasant communities; in fact it is rather common. But there is a norm in Kinanbwa whose effect must be taken into account. To let oneself somehow be induced into doing something pou gramèsi ("for a great big thank you"—i.e. for free) is generally interpreted less as a manifestation of generosity than as a sign of gullibility, is less a virtue than a weakness. The occurrence of some complaints against talking pou gramèsi indicated that the interview situation itself was subject to this construal. One offshoot of this is that even individuals who might not object to dedicating time to a researcher were potentially vulnerable to the danger of mockery which extended, repeated cooperation could elicit from other villagers.

The establishment of a system of remuneration effectively eliminated this problem, which had not only made the obtaining of interviews more difficult, but even contaminated the atmosphere of some of those that were granted. When remuneration was adopted, both parties tended to be more at ease during the interview itself, and neighbors knew that steady informants had been selected and were doing this pou kôb ("for money") and not pou gramèsi. The only complaint that was heard voiced on this matter was, not that such a practice existed in the community, but why were not more individuals given such a ti-levi ("little break"). Dread of interviews disappeared, replaced by willingness and in some cases at least outright enthusiasm. The interviews themselves proceeded in a much more relaxed fashion, and the tension that interviewer as well as
interviewee had often felt became a thing of the past.

The "contract" nature of the interview situation also eliminated many of the physical interruptions which had plagued the non-remunerated interviews earlier in fieldwork, when children and curious neighbors would make their presence felt. The noise itself was a distraction, and the content of what was being said was in many cases perhaps altered by virtue of the arrival of new "listeners." On other occasions the villager was busy and the interview had to proceed as the respondent was simultaneously occupied in some other task; or the interview would be simply terminated by the respondent before all of the content had been covered. In such cases I simply just was in no position to be firm in securing privacy and undivided attention for the interview, or insisting on completion. The interviews conducted in the remuneration framework had none of these problems.

If the interview under this latter arrangement was being conducted inside my own home, interruption from the neighbors' children was easily avoided and any adult who arrived was courteously attended to for a few moments at the door and invited back later when "my work" was finished. When the interview took place in the informants' houses, they themselves played similar roles in removing the sources of interruptions. Occasionally other adults would enter and circumstances did not permit a request for the newcomer to leave. In such cases, if the content of the interview was delicate, the topic would be changed to something broader and more neutral until the reestablishment of privacy once again permitted the original topic to be pursued. As work became regular and "normal,"
such interruptions, usually motivated by curiosity, greatly diminished in number. This control of the interview situation, usually done on the initiative of the informants themselves in their own homes, was a naturally assumed concomitant of the formalized work situation.

Quite apart from its beneficial effects on the socioemotional dynamics of the interview itself, this contractual arrangement had positive effects on the breadth and quality of the interview data themselves. In contrast to the fleetingness and chanciness of information gleaned in "normal conversations," in these remunerated interviews and visits to the fields it was possible to cover a wider range of crucial topics\(^\text{10}\) and to pursue these in the desired depth. Time was, of course, no longer a problem; and the elimination of ambiguities concerning the nature of the expected cooperation and recompense also removed the major ambivalences on both sides concerning the detail with which information could be pursued and given. General preliminary explanation had always been given as to the objective of the research and of the need to explore at least some areas that people usually discussed only with their intimates. These preliminaries, coupled with the contract nature of the interview situation itself, certainly made it easier to probe otherwise sensitive areas and—to all appearances, at least—made it substantially less painful or embarrassing to talk of them. There were questions that still resulted in slightly uncomfortable pauses; but both

\(^{10}\) There were, of course, some topics that were purposefully not broached in this fashion.
parties helped to get through these "rough spots." They were treated as natural though difficult; they were no longer treated as inappropriate invasions of privacy, and never threatened to terminate the interview abruptly. In this fashion the range of explo­rable content expanded greatly.

**Effects on other aspects of Research.**

It must be further recalled that the intensive interview, or the special visit to the gardens, was only one aspect of the field research. Though important data were gathered in such contexts, insights gleaned in more informal settings continued to be sought and in many instances provided material for later intensive questioning. The contract relationship with informants had the paradoxical effect, not of making other types of fieldwork more difficult, as had been feared, but of opening wide the doors of many houses and lakous, where working relationships had been established, and of rendering quite natural and non-disruptive visits by me to houses or gardens when ordinary work was going on. Thus participation in ordinary domestic scenes in a greater variety of lakous became possible, as well as detailed observations in gardens and market stalls where the presence of the researcher would have formerly been more intrusive. Thus the effects of this contractual arrangement were felt far beyond the confines of the particular situations where it was formally in effect.

**Misgivings Proved Unwarranted.**

If there were any disadvantages to this system, they did not become apparent. The various misgivings which preceded the decision
proved unfounded. A major fear, for example, had been that once payment was proffered for one bit of information, every subsequent insight during the remainder of fieldwork would also have to be purchased. As was pointed out, the opposite occurred. The expectation of cash remuneration automatically confined itself to certain formalized work sessions, and other interactions were construed in the idiom of friendship or neighborliness. In fact the frequent requests for money or other gifts, which had made the early days of fieldwork somewhat trying, generally came to an abrupt halt in those lakous where solid work relationships with an adult member had been established.

But to some degree the opposite danger had also been seen as a possibility, the danger that some individuals would be insulted at the offer of money. Open requests for money tended to be made by less well-off individuals. Furthermore, as became clear when labor arrangements were discussed, working for wages for other villagers, no matter what the task, is considered a demeaning manifestation of one's own poverty. Many villagers would have been insulted if another villager offered to hire them for a day in his gardens. Persons in need of such employment frequently sought it out in distant communities where their condition would not be so manifest. It was thus feared that offering money to informants would be construed as bearing the same demeaning implications.

This did not occur. The unusualness of this research situation to the villagers, and its association with the first foreigner who had lived in the community, created a flexibility of interpretation by which a special invitation to participate might be interpreted
positively, as an activity somewhat analogous to prestigious "white collar" employment in the town, for example. Though it is impossible to say in retrospect how prevalent this attitude was, it did find verbal expression. And positive steps were taken to avoid the attachment of any negative economic or social implications to agreement to "work with me." It was made clear to the two dozen or so men and women with whom we worked intensively at different points in fieldwork that their services were being utilized, as opposed to those of other villagers, because of their knowledgeability and capacity for communicating that knowledge. And though work sessions were carried on in as informal and relaxed a manner as possible, and sessions were peppered with easy-going humor, this relaxed atmosphere was intentionally embedded within a certain context of situational formality, incorporating some of the paraphernalia of research--such as a tape recorder--and the seating arrangements that would facilitate its use. This maintained a "work-ethic" air, even in the context of the easy conversational style appropriate for the elicitation of certain topics, and fully legitimized and desensitized the potentially embarrassing (for some) payment aspect by embedding the whole matter in a professional context where payment was highly appropriate.

It had also been feared, as was mentioned above, that working with informants on a direct cash basis would tend to channel relationships into a commercialized "employer-employee" mold which would bear little in common with the warm, disinterested neighborly rapport so frequently flouted in the literature as the anthropologist's main source, not only of human satisfaction, but also of penetrating insights into local life. To adopt a quasi-contractual mode of work relationship
seem to run the risk of precluding such relations from the start, or of making them extremely difficult. Indications have already been given above that this was not in fact what happened. The establishment of economic bonds served in fact to provide a basis for, rather than to hinder, the emergence of more generalized interpersonal relationships, which in turn gave rise to the mutual invitations, minor food gifts, and reciprocal visiting patterns characteristic of "classical" anthropological fieldwork. In retrospect the initial fear of injecting an economic element into informant relationships had little theoretical validity; for in the context of life in Kinabwa (and in other peasant settings) it is precisely around realistic, serious work relationships that other types of relationships tend to crystallize.

It is true, of course, that unlike most economic bonds between neighbors in the community, the researcher-informant bond had a heavy element of asymmetry. But a strongly egalitarian orientation which governs most interactions between adults in the community, as well as the above mentioned sensitivity toward potentially demeaning interpretations of working for wages, resulted in the formulation by some informants of explicit rationales as to how this type of work required skill on their part, which not everyone in the community possessed. This mutually developed and accepted definition of the informant as an articulate, knowledgeable expert was buttressed by a concomitant definition of the researcher as a perceptive, not-easily-fooled, but—in local matters—helplessly ignorant questioner whose ignorance it was the informants' specific task to overcome. This working definition of the situation was quite effective in "defusing" the potential
sensitivity of non-egalitarian aspects of the working arrangement
(such as payment and the firmness which was occasionally necessary
for the maintaining of a punctuality, concentration, and coherence in
the interviews). The economic asymmetry of the relationship was
thus deemphasized in favor of the model of a quasi-egalitarian
and collaborative search for accuracy, a task which required skill,
hard work, and some discipline on the part of all involved. The sense
of mutual achievement which was felt at different "plateaus" in
fieldwork eventually imbued certain relationships with a number of
sentiments that are more appropriately discussed under the rubric,
nor of work relationships, but of friendship.

Two other objections were heard in Haiti against the practice of
directly remunerating informants and respondents. These must be dis­
cussed briefly. The first stated, in effect, that the peasants were
already too prone to ask for money and had to be taught to cooperate
voluntarily with people who came from Port-au-Prince or from other
countries to engage in activities (among which was research) which
would ultimately benefit them. The second objection was based on the
feeling that payments would "spoil the ground" for other researchers.
The first objection, which depicts the researcher as an altruistic,
quasi-humanitarian benefactor of the lucky villagers on whom he has
bestowed his attention, scarcely needs comment.

The second objection, as stated, is simply false; ground is not
spoiled. A village which has been the object of intensive research,
but whose residents have been adequately recompensed for their coope­
ration, will in all likelihood be much more receptive to future research,
than a village which has never been exposed to this initially threatening
experience or which has been studied during a sudden inundation of questionnaire-toting urban interviewers sent out by social scientists who assume that it is the villagers' duty to donate their time to answer his questions. It is this latter type of impersonal, threatening, and frequently demeaning intrusion which generates hostility to research, not the type of extended, remunerated collaboration that was carried out in Kinanbwa.

It is true, however, that the peasants of Kinanbwa are now aware of a right to be repaid for assistance rendered to researchers; and to that degree the ground has been spoiled for any researcher who had hoped to find a village full of "naive subjects," who like so many Third World peoples can be easily talked into donating free time and information to help people write their articles or books. The people of Kinanbwa were "recalcitrant" in this sense from the very beginning, and are undoubtedly more so now.11

To sum up the preceding: in the light of certain research obstacles encountered early in fieldwork, a decision was made which was to affect dramatically the quantity and quality of certain types of ethnographic data: the decision to inject a higher degree of structured formality into fieldwork, one aspect of which was the "contracting" of several informants for extended work on the basis of specified hourly recompense. The many unanticipated benefits of this decision were briefly discussed, not the least of which was the removal of much initial artificiality and the creation of realistic, task-oriented bonds which overflowed into other types of relations, greatly enhancing fieldwork in several fashions. Caution must be

used in generalizing from this experience; it was appropriate for a specific setting. Yet it was found to be useful by one researcher, and other researchers may be inclined to at least consider its applicability to their own setting if they are encountering analogous obstacles.

**QUANTITATIVE METHODS**

Had data collecting been limited to the methods discussed above, a relatively thorough and somewhat traditional ethnography of life in Kinanbwa would have emerged, an ethnography which would have captured in some detail the major patterns of rural Haitian culture, but which would have missed crucial domains of more subtle, less visible patterning which will in the long run turn out to be an important key to understanding what occurs on the surface. A major feature of this camouflaged regularity became visible through the application of quantitative techniques, which were employed at four different periods of fieldwork. How the instruments were constructed and the data collected will be the subject of the following paragraphs.

"Quantification" can take several forms. One could capture in figures key aspects of one day in the life of one peasant, in terms of caloric intake, man-hours dedicated to different tasks, and the like. The type of quantification that is of interest here, however, is that research procedure in which the investigator singles out a number of important dimensions and attempts to gather the relevant data on a large number of carefully chosen individuals, whether they constitute an entire population, or a representative sample thereof.
A surprisingly large percentage of scholars who have analyzed some aspect of peasant Haiti present at least some such quantitative information in their writing. But the researchers who actually collected the quantitative data which they present can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Comhaire-Sylvain (1952) has published an analysis of several land tenure patterns in Marbial, using firsthand data collected by members of that project. International organizations have also carried out brief surveys on land tenure in specific regions of Haiti (Organization of American States 1962:630). And Klein (1971) has written up a preliminary analysis of demographic data which she gathered in Fond Parisien.

But outside of these studies the literature tends to rely, for quantitative estimates, on what is perhaps one of the most fictitious and unreliable body of numbers in the Western Hemisphere: the Haitian Census of 1950. The shortcomings of the census are in part due to problems inherent in the realization of survey research in the Third World. These common pitfalls simply destroy the effectiveness of the research in many cases. As was suggested earlier, steps were able to be taken from the vantage point of village-based research which effectively crossed many of the hurdles which prove to be the downfall of jiffy surveys whose designers never set eyes on the majority of the people being interviewed. As each of these pitfalls are mentioned, some concrete examples of specific solutions adopted in Kinanbwa will be given.

COMMON PITFALLS

Sociolinguistic Barriers.

The first weakness in the census—and apparently in some other survey research which has been carried out in Haiti—had its origin in sociolinguistic problems with roots reaching back to the days in which the Creole language crystallized. The majority of the population speak only Creole, a language which despite its consistent similarity to French in its lexical inventory has a syntax and certain phonological features which make it mutually unintelligible with French. Several competing orthographies have long been available for the language. But French is the national language and one frequently hears ambivalent or outright negative evaluations of Creole from educated Haitians to the effect that Creole is somehow an uneducated, grammarless patois. With this attitude so prevalent among the groups who would be entrusted with a task such as that of designing a census, it is understandable that there would be a reluctance to "debase" such a serious endeavour by producing a document in Creole. Thus the census takers descend on the Haitian countryside bearing masterfully constructed French documents which could be proudly tacked up in the Sorbonne but which are unintelligible gibberish to all except a small minority of the people being interviewed.

The practice of having each interviewer make his own translation on the spot is completely unacceptable from the point of view of response reliability. The practice of supplying the interviewers with standardized translations which they read from a separate sheet while filling in the answers in French on the French
questionnaire borders on the absurd. 13

Inflexible Prestructuring.

There is a further common weakness in much rural survey research in that the investigation is inappropriately prestructured. The researchers frequently go directly from their theoretical problem to specific questionnaire items, which they then literally translate into the language of the country where the survey will be run. Even apart from the meaningless of many of the questions to the village respondents, the researcher has precluded the possibility of re-operationalizing his theoretical concerns in terms of their concrete manifestations in local life—a task which he cannot possibly realize without at least some firsthand contact with the population to be researched.

This insistence on "face to face" contact is occasionally dismissed as an amateurish, quasi-religious initiation rite necessary for entry into the anthropological fraternity. The opposite is true. First-hand, face-to-face knowledge is a simple task-oriented prerequisite for the construction of any professionally competent research instruments. Appearances to the contrary, it is the coat-and-tie office-based researchers, not the village based fieldworker, who in historical perspective may turn out to have been the bungling amateurs.

From the beginning research in Kinanbwa was prestructured in its general contours, in that certain key topics were designated as major research objectives. Investigation was, among other things, 13. This practice was reported to me.
oriented toward exploring possible interrelationships among economic organization, domestic organization, and fertility (Murray 1972). These are topics which had received much treatment in the scientific literature in other cultural contexts, and the agrarian base of rural Haitian life was seen as providing a promising context for an extended ethnographic and quantitative exploration of these matters. But it was felt that the formulation of these broader issues into specific research questions had to be postponed until some knowledge of the organization of local life had been obtained. Ready-made instruments with specific prefabricated questions, it was felt, might simply confine and pre-channel perception. A looser, more open approach to defining problems was adopted in the beginning.

This openness resulted in the eventual incorporation of land transactions, mortuary ritual, and female absenteeism into the research question, phenomena which in Kinanbwa are central to the issues being researched, but which would never have occurred as dimensions to explore carefully had research been totally prefabricated in advance. This flexibility is one powerful benefit stemming from immersion in a cultural milieu, as opposed to pre-designed survey research; and it was utilized heavily in the elaboration of specific research questions in Kinanbwa.

**Epistemologically Weak Classificatory Schemes.**

A survey instrument can be weak because of failure to include certain locally crucial variables; but it can also go astray—and in Haiti frequently has—in its utilization of categorization schemes that are inappropriate to local reality. The most devastating example
of this occurs with depressing regularity in the crucial domain of subsistence. The designers of the national census correctly attempted to categorize the population of peasant Haiti in terms of land-tenure variables. The error came when researchers borrowed from abroad a taxonomic scheme that attempts to categorize each peasant as a landowner, sharecropper, renter, or landlord who has land which others work. This taxonomic scheme assumes either that a peasant works only one plot, or at least that all the plots are worked under the same tenure relationship. As was demonstrated in these pages this is emphatically not the case in Kinanbwa, where the average peasant crops over five separate plots, almost always under varied tenure relationships, and in a large number of cases simultaneously gives out a plot on a sharecropping basis to another peasant.

The epistemology of a fourfold classification scheme in which most individuals straddle two of the categories, and many fall into three, borders on the absurd. Yet the literature is replete with percentage figures taken from the 1950 Census, which used what was basically a variant of this type of categorization scheme.

Obviously a radically different classificatory scheme is called for in such a setting. When I had become aware of the nature of local land tenure, the solution adopted in Kinanbwa was to devise a classification scheme in which the basic unit of analysis was not the individual cultivator, but the plot, thus permitting a higher-level secondary classification of an individual on the basis of relative numbers of different types of plots with which he is connected in one fashion or another. It is this type of search for classification schemes with local epistemological validity that preceded the construction of final survey instruments in Kinanbwa.
Choice of Locally Inappropriate Lexemes.

There is a final type of error, consciously avoided in Kinanbwa, which can weaken the effectiveness even of a well conceived instrument with appropriate categories of inquiry and classification. These are simple lexical shortcomings, in which the researcher, in the formulation of his questions, uses terminology that is somewhat alien to the community being investigated. This creates ambiguities in the respondent's interpretation and may result in correspondingly ambiguous answers. Such errors are especially unfortunate, since with a modicum of preliminary work with members of the community being researched, locally used words and expressions which zero directly in on the topic can usually be found. The instruments used in Kinanbwa were constructed with the help of village assistants who ensured that the questions being posed really meant what they were intended to mean. Two very important examples of such local terminology which were incorporated into the instruments will be discussed.

In the area of mating patterns, there were several socially and terminologically distinct conjugal union types, legal marriage (mariaj) and consensual cohabitation (plasaj) accounting for most unions. But there is a scientifically relevant generic category meaning to enter into any type of conjugal union, in which a person can be designated as "ever mated" or "never mated." The problem was to find if this category existed in the local terminological scheme, and if so what linguistic terms were used to designate it. There is such a category; and, it turns out, there is a common locally used phrase which permits the formulation of unambiguous questions as to whether an individual has ever entered a conjugal union: fè arè ("to make affair").
To "make an affair" is to enter into any type of conjugal union in which there are community-structured economic responsibilities on the part of the man, and in which the woman is publicly recognized as his madam.14 This thus excludes casual sexual liaisons, or even semi-permanent liaisons in which the couple has not yet taken the steps which earn for them community recognition as man and wife. That is, there was in the Creole of Kinanbwa a generic term which roughly coincides referentially with the academic concept of "conjugal union." The identification of this concept, and its term, thus permits the formulation of specific interview questions which zero directly in on the target area. "Has the respondent ever been involved in a conjugal union?" enters the survey instrument as "Éské ou kòm fè afè déja?" "How many conjugal unions has the respondent entered, including his current union?" enters the instrument as "Kòbyè afè ou gè tā fè?" And so on.

To discuss "conjugal unions" without referring to the concept of "affair" would require cumbersome circumlocutions which will probably be ambiguous to respondents and result in the elicitation of ambiguous responses. The problem cannot be avoided by merely being fluent in Creole. Several urban Haitians with whom I discussed this matter found this term surprising—and gave a different interpretation to the term "make affair." It is a matter of discovering underlying conceptual categories which differ greatly from urban to rural areas. Failure to do this can result in ambiguous answers and vitiate the

14 She will generally not be called "Madam so and so" unless the union is of the legal marijac type. But in third person references, even placé wives are referred to as the madam of so and so.
results of the hard work necessary to design and run a survey.

An equally important lexical item emerged in the ritual sphere. Questionnaires have been seen in which respondents were going to be queried as to whether they adhered to the beliefs and practices of the folk-religion of Haiti, commonly referred to in the literature as "voodoo," or vodun. The fatal error made in these questionnaires was to assume that, because the researcher and the interviewer refer to the religion as vodun, the peasants do also. They in fact do not. It turns out that in Kinanbwa, the term vodoun has a different, quite restricted and specialized meaning. It refers to a public dance, heavily recreational in nature, which is an optional grand finale to many larger services, but at any rate somewhat tangential to the central rites of healing and ancestor sacrifices which are the central axis and focal point of rural Haitian ritual. The researcher, oblivious of the actual meaning of the word vodoun in peasant speech, tries to ascertain whether the respondent practices voodoo, by asking him, "Eske ou kòm fè vodoun?" To the peasant, this question is crystal clear. It means approximately "Have you ever financed a public ritual dance?" And of course, since most haven't, they laugh and say no. And the researcher concludes either that voodoo is on the wane in his research community, or that the secretive peasants are denying their attachment to their ancestral spirits.

What has actually happened is that the question was posed in an inappropriate fashion. It became clear that there was no noun or adjective in common speech which was used as a label for the religion. But there was a verb phrase whose semantic content corresponded roughly to the concept "practice the folk religion." This verb
phrase is sèvi lwa ("serve the spirits"); and the question "Do you serve the spirits?" elicited an immediate, unabashed yes from most respondents in Kinanbwa.

To sum up: in preparation for quantitative research in Kinanbwa, a great deal of elicitation and intensive ethnoscientific probing of folk categories and taxa preceded the design of the various survey instruments, to insure the formulation of survey questions which were both clear to the villagers from a linguistic point of view, and were taxonomically appropriate for eliciting the desired information. Much of the quantitative research that has been carried out in Haiti, including the national census, has been weakened from the outset by the utilization of poorly designed instruments. Yet there is a danger that obstacles encountered in a survey will be blamed on peasant mistrust ("they refuse to answer questions truthfully") or even, as was occasionally heard, peasant superstition ("they refuse to tell the birthdate of their children for fear of sorcery"). In actuality the major source of weakness which has weakened or devastated the value of much survey research in rural Haiti, and other Third World settings, is probably to be found in the instruments themselves. Most are originally constructed in offices by researchers who have neither the familiarity with the daily life of the researched which would permit the construction of taxonomically relevant questions, nor the familiarity with the language to insure the intelligibility of the questions. If many surveys done in villages turn out to be farces, the cause is to be found less in peasant recalcitrance than in researcher incompetence.

The incompetence lies not in any failures on the part of survey researchers with respect to the mechanics of their own craft. The
shortcoming resides rather in their frequent "skipping" of a crucial page in the blueprint for intelligent research: the instruments must be finely adapted to the local scene. In this sense the village based researcher is in general in a highly advantageous position, to design instruments that tap all local manifestations of the theoretical problem, that use locally appropriate classification schemes, and that are formulated with locally appropriate vocabulary which makes the queries crystal clear to the respondents.

To conclude, we may mention yet another source of error which can damage quantitative research. The instrument itself may be perfect, but the information given by the respondents may be inaccurate, either through error or through intentional dissimulation. The outside survey researcher is virtually powerless against this. The village-based fieldworker is, on the contrary, in a uniquely advantageous position to devise techniques which make the occurrence of errors less likely, and their detection and rectification more feasible when they occur (cf. Chen and Murray 1975). Discussion of the steps taken will be given as the content of each of the four major surveys is described.

CONTENT OF THE FOUR SURVEYS

A great deal of quantitative data was gathered in Kinanbwa in the course of four separate surveys carried out at different periods of fieldwork. Each of these surveys aimed at a broad range of information, but for purposes of discussion here, each will be given a label referring to a major content area which distinguished it from the other surveys. Discussion will focus on those aspects of the surveys
which bear most directly on the content of the analysis to be presented in these pages. Mention will be made of the methodological innovations employed in each survey.\footnote{15}

The Exploratory Survey.

The collection of quantitative data had been anticipated before fieldwork began, but the intention was to spend at least half a year immersed in the life of the community before designing instruments. Nonetheless some three months after fieldwork began, when some basic

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15. Financial support for these surveys was given as follows. The first survey (henceforth to be referred to as the "Exploratory Survey") and the second survey (the "Land Transaction Survey") were carried out entirely under the generous and flexible funding arrangements of the Overseas Population Internship Program of the Department of Population Planning at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. The third survey (henceforth to be called the "Demographic Survey") and the fourth survey (the "Agricultural Survey") involved supplementary support from other institutions, over and above the research funding, support which is here gratefully acknowledged.

The Demographic Survey, carried out several months after the Land Transaction Survey, was done with financial and professional support from the Division of Social and Administrative Sciences of the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction, at Columbia University. The director of this division, Dr. Samuel M. Wishik, sent two members of his professional staff on a brief visit to Kinabwa, visited the research community himself, financed a trip by me to consult in the division's center in New York City, covered the many expenses involved in the preparation and carrying out of the survey, and, above all, arranged for Ms. Kwan-Hwa Chen, a demographer from the Division, to be jointly responsible for the collection and analysis of the demographic data gathered in this survey, and to reside in Kinabwa itself during the survey.

The Demographic Survey was also made possible by the generosity of Dr. Ary Bordes, who generously permitted the use of the office and mimeographing facilities of the Centre d'Hygiène Familiale, over and above the logistical support which he had given the anthropological investigation throughout fieldwork.

The Agricultural Survey, which was carried out in the final months of fieldwork, was again primarily funded under the research grant from the University of Michigan. But deeply appreciated support was also received from the Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Sciences of the Organization of American States, whose Representative in Haiti, Dr. Michel Montoya Maquín, completely financed the preparation of the
insights had been gleaned into local life and fluency in the language had increased, a decision was made to collect certain basic data on every household in the community. Items were included which would provide information not only on population size, fertility, mortality, age structure, and sex ratio of the village, but also on occupation, house type, household composition, house ownership, mating patterns, outside children, migration patterns and other items, all of potential relevance to the theoretical issue of the interrelationship between the economic, domestic, and fertility variables toward whose exploration fieldwork had from the outset been oriented.16

I collected this data myself during some two months of door-to-door interviewing. Subsequent hand tabulations of the data provided much of the basis of an analysis of local fertility patterns (Murray 1972). Though systematic comparisons have yet to be carried out, informal inspection of this data in the light of subsequent surveys indicate that it provided an accurate picture of the village on most of the variables covered. There appear to be, however, some

questionnaires and provided invaluable transportation facilities for several trips to and from Kinabhwa. To all of these individuals and institutions I reiterate my deepest gratitude for the combined provision of a degree of financial, logistical, and professional support that must certainly be unusual in graduate-student field projects; and for their patience in the face of the laborious delays inevitable in the processing, analysis, and presentation of such abundant data.

Though preliminary hand tabulations were done in the field, analysis of the data was greatly facilitated by the use of the IBM 360 at the Yale Computer Center. I was able to program the data—using Data-Text and for simpler tasks Fortran—only through a grant for computer time arranged for me by Professor Sidney W. Mintz, then director of the Antilles Research Program at Yale, and through the competent guidance of Uli Locher, who spent several hours instructing me in the ABC's of Data-Text and the use of various types of equipment, thus introducing me to a sphere of endeavour which I otherwise might not have approached.

16. A preliminary report was prepared on the basis of these data (Murray 1972).
systematic discrepancies of a minor nature between this data, collected by an outsider who had recently arrived in the village, and data later collected by village interviewers, patterned discrepancies which should make for interesting comparisons.

As will be discussed below, the data from this survey were eventually superceded by data collected in subsequent surveys. But the 10 weeks of labor were not therefore spent in vain. The formulation and wording of many essential items in subsequent surveys were verbatim repetitions of the ones which trial-and-error experimentation in this survey showed to be the most effective. And of equal importance the survey highlighted the difficulties inherent in the collection of quantitative data and was directly responsible for two crucial methodological innovations which were tried out in the subsequent Land Transaction Survey, and whose success resulted in their incorporation as central methods in the Demographic Survey and the Agricultural Survey.

The Land Transaction Survey.

The Land Transaction Survey was an attempt to capture the essential features, by quantifying several key parameters, of a remarkable pattern of land purchasing and selling which, though shrouded in the tactful secrecy characteristic of many vital economic phenomena in peasant society, had nonetheless been dimly glimpsed in the first year of life in Kinanbwa. The strategy of this survey was to interview villagers of both sexes who had been involved in land transactions either as sellers or buyers, and secure information on some twenty features of each of the transactions in which they had been
Among the questions asked of each transaction were: size of plot, type of land, sex of both seller and buyer and the kin relationship, if any, between them; price of the plot; reason for the sale; source of capital for the purchase, approximate ages of the seller and buyer when the transactions occurred. Data was obtained in this survey on over 600 transactions in which villagers had been involved, and it was the tabulation of data from this survey which unexpectedly revealed the camouflaged operation of the regulatory mechanism alluded to in chapter 1.¹⁸

But some of the formidable difficulties which had been encountered in the Exploratory Survey led to experimentation. One of the major obstacles was one which has been alluded to already in a slightly different context: the problem of widespread reluctance to spend time "for free" answering questions. This was handled by remunerating respondents on a scale that, though not lavish, was generous in local terms and that adjusted for differences between respondents in terms of the number of transactions each had been involved in. Interviews that lasted one or several hours were remunerated at a substantially higher rate than those lasting only a few minutes. This strategy was adopted primarily in light of the growing success that had been encountered in remunerating informants (discussed above).

Remuneration was aimed at the problem of willingness to be interviewed; but the problem of the veracity and accuracy of the information still remains. It was not for a moment assumed that a villager's

¹⁷. The Land Transaction Survey was carried out in August-September 1972.
¹⁸. The data on this survey were consequently retrospective in nature.
acquiescence to be interviewed guaranteed the accuracy of what he would say. On the contrary, the Exploratory Survey had revealed clearly the reluctance of many villagers to answer any questions, even such relatively innocuous queries such as "where were you born?" or "how many children do you have?" To expect villagers to enter into details about their acquisition of land seemed to be asking for trouble in light of this former experience.  

Nonetheless in the matter of land ownership it became clear that secrecy was not absolute; the promulgation of some information in this matter was mandated by the very design principles of the local social ranking system. Though the details of land transactions were generally kept confidential between the transactants themselves, nonetheless there was fairly common local knowledge in the community as to who had purchased land and who had sold; rough estimates of how much land different individuals possessed; and knowledge of who had been involved in transactions with each other. Because the local ranking system is so heavily dominated by the acquisition and loss of land, there are subtle informational mechanisms and "signal systems" by which the ownership status of an individual become clearly broadcast, while still permitting discretion as to many of the details.  

19. The crucial role which secrecy plays in social life in general and in peasant communities in particular, and the processes by which this information barrier is created and maintained, are empirical questions of great theoretical and methodological consequence which merit more attention by researchers than has been given. What is a theoretical concern to the analyst of society is a very practical concern to the fieldworker. Non-trivial research involves the exposure and elucidation of phenomena which lie close to the heart of the well-being of individuals and groups. But it is frequently around precisely such central concerns that barriers of secrecy and ideological obfuscation are erected. Effective research must somehow penetrate these barriers.
The competing demands of both public status placement and economic secrecy are in fact generally balanced and met.

This fund of public knowledge is available only to the villagers involved in this local status system; outsiders will not easily be made privy. In fact a quite marked (and highly justifiable) "conspiracy of silence" will be triggered off at attempts to penetrate this wall.\textsuperscript{20}

The problem was approached by incorporating insiders into the data-collecting process, not only as informants or respondents, but as paid interviewers. When the Land Transaction Survey was designed, preparations were already in progress for a collaborative Demographic Survey (see the following section). Though the original plan had been to use Port-au-Prince interviewers in this survey, I eventually proposed that we use instead several villagers who I knew had at least some degree of literacy in Creole. With this in mind, I had contacted several potential candidates, pending a final decision on the matter. It was these individuals who collected the data for me on land transactions.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{20}. The notion of going to legal records, which in some settings would be useful, is in Kinabwa of low utility. As will be seen, the vast majority of transacted plots are not subsequently surveyed and deeded to the new owner. The only record of such transactions is the record of sale written in a local notary's office. These records contain only simple, basic information such as the location and size of the plot, the names of the transactants, and the price paid. Most of the other crucial items mentioned above simply do not appear. And even the record of the price paid is, according to many informants, invariably underestimated, since the notary's fee is a net percentage of price of the transaction. The buyer and seller will usually combine and agree on the "true price," but report a lower price to the notary, and exchange this lower quantity of money in his presence.

\textsuperscript{21}. The pros and cons of using villagers instead of anonymous outside interviewers has been discussed in Chen and Murray (1976).
The interviewers were briefly trained in the reading of the questions and the writing of the responses. The twenty variables chosen for investigation on each transaction were formulated in such a fashion that the answers could be recorded in one or two words. (It was not until later surveys that more complicated open-ended questions were attacked, using village interviewers as well.) Furthermore the very choice of village interviewers was made on the hunch that they could capitalize on their own social networks and personal relationships in contacting and interviewing respondents, thus minimizing at least to some degree the tension inherent in the interview situation itself. With this in mind no attempt was made to randomly assign respondents or village areas to each interviewer. They were permitted, rather, to cover the community in the fashion they saw fit.

In the resulting survey most of the villages who had been involved in land transacting were contacted and interviewed, and all of those villagers who were heavy land transactants were covered. The entire village would have been covered by the enthusiastic interviewers were it not for my decision to cut off the survey when data on some 600 transactions had been collected—a practical decision which, however, was regretted in retrospect. Random sampling had been rejected as an impractical procedure for reasons discussed above; but it would have been possible to cover the entire population, since the combined remuneration and village-interviewer system was producing a greater degree of willingness to cooperate than I had encountered in the frequently frustrating Exploratory Survey. Cutting off the Land Transaction Survey after 600 transactions had been collected produced a corpus of data which was neither
a true random sample nor an entire population coverage. Nonetheless
the fact that most transactants had been contacted and interviewed
produced a sample of at least 50% and perhaps as high as 75% of
the population of transactants, making the presence of detrimental bias
highly unlikely.

The fact that only a minority of the transactants were newly inter-
viewed meant that the non-random nature of the sample was less likely
to distort the results. But the results could be biased by a much
more direct and simple process: inaccuracies in the answers given by
those that were interviewed. Survey researchers might find such an
observation in slightly poor taste. For social science to roll on,
its practitioners must adhere, at least to some degree, to an un-
written gentleman’s agreement by which they will accept the infor-
mation on each others’ questionnaires as “basically accurate.”

Yet some will find this agreement more difficult to adhere to
than others. In particular, a survey researcher who in addition to
supervising his interviewers has also done some actual fieldwork
himself, and has walked, notepad in hand, up to the door of a
peasant household to attempt to elicit information on landholdings,
cannot help but entertain suspicions as to the magnitude of the
make-believe involved in that gentleman’s agreement. Survey researchers
in general never lay eyes on most (or even any) of the people whose
answers fill their questionnaires, and are thus hermetically shielded
from the possible discomfort of learning that systematic dissimulation
may have effectively reduced their meticulously filled questionnaires
to a massive, expensive pile of science-fiction. A field-
worker who has, on the other hand, lived among the researched and knows
at least a few of them well enough to recognize an outright, blatant error on one of his questionnaires has no such comforting shield.

It is neither masochism nor scientific posture which prompts this concern for the accuracy of responses in surveys, and certainly not any illusion that 100% accurate and fullproof techniques will ever be devised. This issue takes on such importance, rather, because of sobering revelations received later in fieldwork concerning horrifying (or hilarious, depending on whose "side" one is on) straight-faced "inaccuracies" which characterized much of the earlier economic information that was given to questions which went beyond a simple yes-no probing of whether the individual was a cultivator or not.

The willingness to confront openly this potentially embarrassing issue of inaccuracies in hard-earned data is also motivated by rather solid and heartening evidence that remunerated respondents being interviewed by fellow villagers did in fact give information that was satisfactorily accurate, not only in comparison to information elicited by outsiders, but by any reasonable standards which are realistic for the social sciences, and that we may consequently be dealing with an extremely promising approach for gathering such data.

The evidence, though not statistically conclusive, is rather compelling. There was an automatic cross-checking mechanism built into some of the data by virtue of the mechanics of the survey, a mechanism which could not determine the truth of a response but which could infallibly detect the presence of an error. Respondents, it will be recalled, were questioned on any transaction in which they had participated, either as buyer or seller. This meant that, by
serendipitous good fortune, information on some transactions was
gathered twice—once when the seller was interviewed, and once with
the buyer, if both happened to be living in Kinanbwa and had been
contacted for the survey. Fortunately, one of the questions that
had been asked of each respondent was the name of the other transac-
tant, thus permitting the identification of these duplicated trans-
actions. In this manner the information given by the buyer could
be compared to that given by the seller.

A complete quantitative analysis of these duplicated trans-
actions has yet to be done; but even a casual inspection was revealing.
It would be pleasant to be able to report that information was in
all cases identical for both versions of the transaction. But in
fact in not one of the duplicated transactions were the two versions
exactly the same. There appeared to be clear patterns—provocative
for future analysis—whereby the versions of buyers systematically
differed from the versions of sellers. But it is the smallness
of the differences that is heartening: the information was not
identical, but it was usually very close.

In the first place, both participants tended to report transac-
tions. There were a few cases where individual X reported transac-
ting with individual Y; but individual Y would not mention that par-
ticular transaction in his interview. But such forgetfulness or
concealment appeared clearly to be the exception. Examination of the
duplicated cases gave encouraging indications that most transactions
were in fact being elicited.

Furthermore the discrepancies, such as size of plot and price
paid, were of a minor nature, and still permitted confident placement
of the transaction within a high, medium, or low range with respect to price or size of plot. And comparing the minor discrepancies appearing in the protocols of the village interviewers with some of the incredible concoctions which I had been given by some of the respondents at other periods of fieldwork gave dramatic testimony to the accuracy-enhancing effect of using local people to participate actively in the gathering of information.

But there is yet another important evidence, perhaps even more impressive, that points in the same direction. This evidence comes actually from the Agricultural Survey, but will be mentioned here in the context of this discussion of the accuracy of the economic information. The literature has been very confused and contradictory in its presentation of the actual morphology of the typical holding (called exploitation in the French literature) to be found in rural Haiti. A major ambiguity and inconsistency concerns the degree to which a holding is contained in one or two plots, or is scattered out rather into many plots. What the village interviewers of Kinanbwa found stands in strong contrast to what outside interviewers have found, and this discrepancy, it will be argued, constitutes dramatic evidence toward an assessment of the relative accuracy of these competing research techniques.

The contradiction in the literature becomes apparent when the patterns that emerge from descriptive, ethnographic findings of what is typical are contrasted to patterns that emerge when outsiders have been sent in to elicit specific information on sensitive issues. A perusal of the ethnographic literature from different parts of Haiti suggests strongly that the typical landholding in Haiti, though
relatively small, nonetheless must be scattered out into many plots. This impression of plot dispersal, rather than plot concentration, comes from at least three features of the inheritance and land tenure system reported in the literature.

In the first place the very nature of the partible inheritance system leads to dispersal. As will be seen, in extralegal plural unions the property of the spouses, with a few statistically minor exceptions, tends to be kept separate, which means that their children will inherit separately from each parent. This produces the phenomenon whereby an individual has both dwa bo papa ("property from his father's side") and dwa bo mama ("property from his mother's side"). Thus we can expect the typical inheriting adult to inherit at least two plots of land. When it is further recalled that both sexes inherit, this means that, if the system functions at all as it is reported to function, households will on the whole have a minimum of four plots, since the spouse of the cultivator will also have inherited. These features of the local system point to the probability of a dispersed landholding system.

But there is a further dispersal-generating factor, to be found in the actual mechanics frequently employed in the division of land. If an individual has, for example, four plots and four children who will inherit them, the usual practice in Kinabwa and elsewhere (cf. Comhaire-Sylvain 1952:182) is for the four children to receive

22. Actually we could expect more in some cases, since each of the parents of an individual will also have inherited separate plots from both sides, creating the possibility that their legacy to their children will be truly dispersed and that the children will be receiving tiny plots in many different places. Moral (1961:187) also alludes to this phenomenon of separate inheritance from each parent.
one-fourth of each of the plots, rather than an entire plot in one piece. In short both the rules governing inheritance and the customary details of how it is carried out are conducive to the producing of holdings which consist of several extremely tiny plots.

But there is yet a final factor which should yet increase the degree of land dispersal. This is the practice reported all over Haiti of supplementing one's inherited land with purchased, rented, or sharecropped plots as well. As will be seen in Kinanbwa, these are not occasional strategies resorted to by a landless few, but are on the contrary major economic maneuvers which both statistically and normatively are key components of the long-range economic strategy of the ordinary peasant cultivator. And though their statistical and normative importance is not there discussed, the literature abundantly documents the existence of these land-acquisition strategies elsewhere in Haiti. (Underwood 1964:477; Moral 1961:36; Bastien 1951:41; Organization of American States 1972:630; Combes-Sylvain 1952:184; Mintz 1964:273-4; Herskovits 1971:77; Schaedel 1962:18; Simpson 1940:505.) These patterns would strongly reinforce the tendencies toward holding dispersal created in the first place by the partible inheritance system discussed above.

The overwhelming evidence which indicates that the typical Haitian peasant subsists on a holding that has many small plots may now be compared to what individual peasants have told investigators who questioned them specifically about how many plots they were cropping. Though only three studies containing relevant breakdowns have been located, their findings are coherent and revealing. Two studies found that the average peasant household was cropping fewer than two plots;
the third found slightly more than two per household. These findings can be restated. Despite impressive evidence to the contrary the peasants, when questioned by outside interviewers, report having only some two plots under cultivation. This contrasts dramatically with the data brought in by the village interviewers of Kinanbwa, which indicated that the average cultivator was cropping between five and six plots.

The meaning of this disparity, between what outsiders are told and what fellow villagers are told, should be obvious. The community of Kinanbwa is characterized by the same poverty and land scarcity as has been reported in other Haitian communities; the larger average number of plots is hardly due to wealth in Kinanbwa. Nor are the peasants of Kinanbwa any different from other peasants studied around the world, in that their dissimulation takes the form of minimizing, not exaggerating, their local wealth. We are dealing with a dramatic demonstration of the differential effectiveness of competing research techniques in eliciting accurate information in sensitive areas. This issue has merely begun to be explored. It is important, not only because it lends credibility to the data which have been presented in this village study but also because of the implications

23. It is often stated that anonymous interviewers will elicit more accurate information than interviewers known to the respondents. But to imagine that this holds in all settings for all topics would be just as ill-founded as the reverse extreme of completely denying the value of anonymity for any purpose. Neither stance is being adopted here. But there is good reason to believe that the principle of anonymity as a path to accuracy is blatantly inapplicable to survey research in the rural Third World. This issue, as well as other methodological, theoretical, and ethical issues, have been discussed at more length elsewhere (Chen and Murray 1975).
it may have for other research. The reasons for this pattern will make for interesting debate; but the information given by remu-
nerated respondents talking to fellow villagers, while not free of errors, appears to be dramatically more accurate than information more conventionally gathered by outsiders, be they foreigners or urban Haitians.

The Demographic Survey.

For all of its effectiveness and the subsequent importance of its data, the Land Transaction Survey had several procedural weaknesses that would make a professional survey-researcher wince. There were no reproduced questionnaires; the interviewers each went out with a list of the questions to be asked and wrote numbered answers on separate lined sheets. Sampling was purposefully rejected; but the logical alternative--complete coverage of the community--was not pursued fully, though most transactants were in fact interviewed. Ages of fellow transactants were elicited, but no techniques were used for enhancing the accuracy of this variable.

Many of the shortcomings of this survey were overcome in the third survey to be run in Kinantwa. The methodological advances involved a direct reversal of some of the shortcomings mentioned in the preceding paragraph. Furthermore the content of this survey was much broader than that of either of the two surveys which had preceded it. This survey, which unlike the others was collaborative and interdisciplinary in nature, provided a uniquely comprehensive demographic and ethnographic coverage of a rural community. At the same time it gave rise to a number of unanticipated issues which
demanded solution—among them the problem of ensuring that the time-
consuming nature of the endeavour did not jeopardize the pursuit of
the principal research\textsuperscript{24} and the problem of establishing an equi-
table and satisfactory allocation of access to, and credit for,
this rich data, which had been collected in an institutional
context which, though utilizing the pre-existing findings and
village activities of a single researcher, also involved the funding
and professional expertise of others. The content of the Demographic
Survey, and the arrangements adopted in response to these other
issues, is discussed at length in Appendix C.

\textbf{The Agricultural Survey.}

A question that had been kept in the forefront during the
months of fieldwork concerned the mechanisms by which the population
of rural Haiti had attempted to respond to the paradox created by
its own internal growth. The mechanisms governing the movement
of demographic rates \textit{per se} were in a position to be explored, now
that data from the Demographic Survey had been collected and prepared
for analysis. But a different question, straddling the demographic
and the ethnographic, yet remained to be answered. For a society
responds to demographic pressure not only by regulating fertility and
mortality \textit{per se}, but by adjusting its overall adaptive strategy. As
has been discussed in Chapter 1, agrarian societies have been shown to
adapt in the productive sphere, adopting more productive techniques—

\textsuperscript{24}. This problem was largely solved by subsequently including
a heavy ethnographic component in the Demographic Survey, which
ended up greatly enhancing, rather than interfering with, the
exploration of economic and domestic patterns that had been the
\textit{main target} of research in Kinanbwa. Cf. Appendix C.
investing more man-hours of labor in the agricultural process, as response to population pressure. But toward the end of fieldwork the clear impression had emerged that Haiti's response had been of a different kind; though older informants remarked that more land had been brought under cultivation as a result of there being more people around in recent years, technology had remained relatively static and production had not increased, but declined. What had appeared among the peasants of Kinanbwa was feverish movement, not in the realm of productivity, but in the "institutions of access," in the land tenure system itself. It seemed crucial to collect in the final months some definitive data on this matter.

Since the mechanics of quantitative research had now been mastered to some degree, and since there was a corps of now proficient interviewers eager for further work, one final survey was undertaken. This survey would delve heavily into agricultural matters, would be restricted to the males of the community, but would also include more of the adolescent males who had not yet established independent households, but who were working their own gardens. In this final survey some 275 adult males were interviewed at length, covering more than 95% of the villagers who were currently cropping at least one plot.

One of the weaknesses inherent in many earlier studies of Haitian land tenure has already been alluded to. Complexities within the typical holding render somewhat invalid the standard categorizations conventionally used to classify a cultivator as "owner," "renter," "sharecropper," or "landlord." The sobering realization became clearer that perhaps the only epistemologically valid approach to the
dynamics of land tenure would be one in which the target of data-and the preliminary unit of classification and analysis would be, not the individual peasant, but the individual plot. This would require the collection of data on either a random sample or the entire universe of plots cropped by the villagers, indicating for each plot not only the tenure relationship under which the plot was being cropped, but also key variables such as size, distance from the community, type and quality of land, length of time the person cropping it had been on the plot, crops grown, and other key measurable variables which stood a chance of varying significantly under different types of tenure relations, thus exposing at least some of the complex dynamics of local man/land relationships.

This task was undertaken as one aspect of the Agricultural Survey, and such data were collected, not only for each plot the respondent himself was cropping (or sharecropping), but also for each plot which he owned and was giving out to some other cultivator on a sharecropping basis. Data from over 1,200 plots were thus collected, which constituted over 95% of the plots being cropped in the village. Because random sampling would have been virtually impossible, the entire universe of Kinantwa gardens was studied.

One of the major categories of the traditional categorization scheme—the category of "owner-operator"—glossed over a critical local distinction that separated different types of owners socially, that received terminological distinction within local usage, and that showed promise of being analytically relevant as well. In an attempt to capture these locally relevant distinctions, a five-fold classification scheme was finally adopted and applied to each plot. A cultivator
could be cropping a plot because he 1) had purchased it; 2) had inherited it; 3) was sharecropping it; 4) was the husband of the owner; 5) or had rented it from its owner. This classification scheme is much more sensitive to the actual dynamics of access-acquisition than is the simple "owner-operator," "sharecropper," and "renter" classificatory scheme used in other pieces of research. This more sensitive classification scheme was in fact devised on the basis of knowledge of local land-tenure dynamics.\(^{25}\)

But it is one thing to devise a classification scheme and another to elicit the information which reliably places phenomena within that scheme. The elicitation of the information presented formidable challenges. In the first place there is no locally used lexeme or phrase which refers to "land tenure." I could simply find no way of formulating the question "Under what type of tenure are you cropping this plot?" Circumlocutions were available, but their looseness produced ambiguities in the responses. There appeared to be only one way to ensure that each plot was categorized correctly as to its tenure: to go through the entire series of alternatives for each plot. Thus as part of the elicitation procedure, the respondent was asked, in this order: "are you sharecropping this plot?" If not: "are you renting the plot?" If not: "are you working it for your wife?" If not: are you the owner?" If not: "who is the owner?" If the respondent said he was the owner, then he was asked: "Did you inherit the plot or purchase it?" The effectiveness of the

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\(^{25}\) A sixth category emerged as important as well: a plot that was currently being lent to an individual, usually by one of his parents. But the detection of these plots was made possible by other questions already built into the information that was gathered on the ownership of each plot.
classification scheme itself is attested to by the fact that virtually every plot was unambiguously assigned to one of the categories by the respondents, indicating that the scheme was both ethically valid, in that it represented an outsider's categorization scheme, and emically appropriate in that, though it did not rely solely on an explicitly formulated folk-classification of land tenure, it nonetheless did no violence to the local scheme, but produced in fact highly consistent and unambiguous categorizations on the part of respondents. 26

Once again it must be remarked that the effectiveness of any scheme will depend on the willingness of the respondents to spend the time answering the questions and to give truthful answers to those questions. Though much quantitative research assumes these, I assumed the opposite throughout my fieldwork and gave high priority to meeting these problems head on. With respect to this survey of the villagers' gardens, I used the same techniques of generous remuneration to respondents, which did in fact elicit cooperation from almost all individuals approached (and even produced offers to be interviewed by people from other communities). Furthermore a strict perusal of the interview protocols resulted in the detection of inconsistencies. As in the Land Transaction Survey, the fact that many sharecropped gardens were reported twice—once by the sharecropper and once by the owner—gave me a handle for checking consistency. I made it clear to the village interviewers that nobody

26. One of the distinctions that was made in the Census proved irrelevant in Kinanwa: that of "renter from the State." This arrangement did not exist in the research area.
in the village was obliged to be interviewed, that participation was completely voluntary, but that once a person agreed to be interviewed, I expected truthful answers. In the Demographic Survey two interviewers had been eventually dismissed from the job because of the obvious inaccuracies in many of their protocols; and I maintained this same degree of pressure for accurate information on the remaining core of four interviewers who carried out the Agricultural Survey. Toward the end I had them reinterview a sample of 10% of the respondents, and there was over 90% consistency in the number of gardens reported. The 10% inconsistency keeps one humble with respect to any illusions of absolute truth, but in the long run all we can hope for are closer approaches to complete etic accuracy and the gradual design of research techniques which keep to a minimum the intrusion of inaccuracies.

The preceding discussion has centered around the questions of landholdings and land tenure, which were a major focus of the Agricultural Survey. But another concern throughout fieldwork had been the economic value of children. In the Agricultural Survey quantitative data were collected which would document some important aspects of this question. In an earlier paper (Murray 1972) hypotheses had been forwarded to the effect that both fertility aspirations and actual fertility output would be found to be in substantial harmony with the economic patterns of local life. A more specific hypothesis stemming from this is that children--both male and female--would be essential contributors to the productive activities of local households; that the villagers' stated preferences for children would emphasize these productive inputs of theirs; and that, since
male income-generating agricultural activities can absorb and profitably utilize more additional labor than the income-generating commercial activities of female traders, the preference would be for male children. Several queries appropriate for the testing of these hypotheses were incorporated into the Agricultural Survey.27

The earlier surveys had been composed of questions that were in their vast majority factual. Except for the final section of the Demographic Survey, villagers were not asked in survey interviews about their feelings, beliefs, values, or motives. This restriction of the content of the earlier surveys was not due to any rejection of the phenomenological realm as a valid sphere of inquiry. What was in doubt was whether the survey was an effective research tool for tapping this realm. A great deal of attitudinal and motivational interviewing had been done in Kinanbwa, but always in the context of conversations or loosely structured interviews where people would talk freely and spontaneously. The survey setting, on the other hand, appeared to be an awkward context for trying to capture attitudinal and ideational phenomena. Other methods seemed more appropriate.

But this decision had merely postponed a problem that eventually had to be faced. The "inner world" of the people of Kinanbwa, though not amenable to the same research techniques as their external behavior, was still a matter of great interest. This interest stemmed not only from a desire to imbue the research with an element of human

27. The results of the survey confirmed some hunches, but other aspects of the hypothesis were dramatically disconfirmed by the emergence of preference patterns which were shaped to a much greater degree by the long-term dynamics of land acquisition rather than the short-term demands of field labor.
feeling and credibility; there was a theoretically important issue at stake as well. For one of the major contributions that a scientific study of human society can make is to document and analyze subtle linkages between the external behavior systems in which individuals must function, and the cognitive and attitudinal patterns which, though apparently "private," in effect function to rationalize and ensure active participation in these external systems. But an analysis which purports to expose the interrelationships between the behavioral and the phenomenological spheres must presumably have equivalently reliable data on both realms.

There is nothing about the phenomenological realm of attitudes and motives which makes it more amenable to generalization-by-intuition or by guessing than the behavioral realm. It is no more valid to talk about the Kinanbwa value system on the basis of haphazard conversational data, or interview data with a small number of informants, than it is to talk about fertility or land tenure patterns on the basis of impressionistic data. If the action system--including the domestic and economic components which will be discussed here--are carefully documented, the phenomenological phenomena should enjoy comparable empirical documentation, or any analysis of the interaction between the two domains will lose some of its credibility.

Several types of "attitudinal" questions were built into the Agricultural Survey. Some questions were open ended, and the interviewers were instructed to probe. Others were answerable with a simple two or three word response. And still others were to be answered by checking off one of a number of pre-structured answers (frequently a simple yes-no dichotomy). In some items the respondent
as asked to make a choice between two preferences, and then asked a further follow-up question which asked him to explain the reason that he chose a particular alternative.

It should be remarked that the open ended attitudinal questions were the hardest to construct. They often proved difficult for the interviewers to ask naturally, and they apparently were the most ambiguous to respondents. Nonetheless after extensive revision, pre-testing, and consulting with the village interviewers who were going to pose these questions, fairly effective formulations of most items were arrived at, in some cases after nine or ten versions of an item had been tried and rejected.

No attempt was made to exhaust any cognitive or attitudinal domain in these questions. The content areas of attitudinal and motivational probing were selective, chosen principally to give at least some quantitative validation of patterns which had been discovered by more intensive in-depth methods. Some areas which were probed were attitudes toward various types of labor arrangements (e.g. desirability of exchange labor as opposed to wage labor), strategies for dealing with land shortage (wage labor vs. sharecropping), the sale of land, the utility of children of both sexes, polygyny, and others. These topics were chosen because they stood a chance of being important elements in the eventual analysis of certain economic and domestic patterns, and the objective was simply to give at least some aspects of local attitudinal and motivational patterns the same quantitative documentation that was being prepared for certain economic and domestic patterns.
NON-SURVEY TECHNIQUES FOR QUANTIFICATION

It would be incorrect to equate "quantitative research" with "survey research." The latter is merely one variant of the former. For some types of phenomena, a well designed door-to-door survey (emphasis being on "well designed") is a highly effective means of quantification; but for other phenomena, it is less effective or appropriate, and quantification must take other forms. Though certain aspects of the economic and domestic organization of Kinanbwa were probed in some detail via the above-mentioned survey techniques, there were other crucial domains that were purposefully not approached in this fashion. There were several possible factors which led to a decision not to pursue a given topic on one of the surveys. The information might have been of such a nature that the respondent could not give it with any sort of accuracy; the information might have been so sensitive as to create embarrassment or offense, destroying the smooth interaction which was one of the principal advantages of using village interviewers; or the information might be of such a complicated nature that its accurate elicitation would unduly extend the length of the interview. For such phenomena, other types of quantifying probes were used.

Two important examples can be given of such information, which despite its importance to an effective analysis of economic and domestic patterns was not attacked in the survey. Crop yields were of high concern. Such information is of interest not only from the point of view of agricultural technology, but also from the point of view of domestic functioning. Because most crops were planted with a view less to their edibility than to their saleability, domestic income was
largely a function of crop yields. But this question was not put into any of the surveys for several reasons. In the first place it would have slowed down the interview greatly, if for each of the 1,200 gardens studied the respondent had been asked how much the garden produced, what percentage of the crop he marketed instead of saving for home consumption, and how much cash the marketing of the crop brought. But perhaps more seriously, this question was felt to be much more sensitive and potentially disruptive of the interview than questions on the number of gardens worked, and the tenure relationships under which each garden was worked. Prevalent beliefs in garden magic, and the quasi-religious rationale that underlay the habit of minimizing the output of one's garden meant that it was an inappropriate question to expect the village interviewers to ask of their fellow cultivators. (Not that outsiders would have had much more luck—as I painfully learned.) The inappropriateness of this question in a survey context was sensed on the basis of familiarity with certain aspects of life in the village. The task was to design questions which would effectively call upon the insider's knowledge possessed by the village interviewers, but which would not violate unspoken taboos nor prove embarrassing to any party involved or counterproductive to the successful termination of the interview.

Another topic that was not pursued in the context of surveys was the question of annual domestic income and expenditures. The same elements were involved to some degree in this decision. But here the element of cumbersomeness was the major consideration. Villagers do not have figures on their annual income at their fingertips, in the sense that a salary or wage earning employee in an
industrialized setting could give, for example, a fairly accurate estimate of his annual income with a modicum of thought. In a village setting the only way to elicit this information in a survey would be to have a knowledge of every possible source of income in the local peasant economy, and to mention each source, asking if the respondent had earned money on this in the past year and if so, how much. Because this question was not seen as crucial to any aspect of the broader hypotheses which had emerged by the end of fieldwork, this, like the question of crop yields, was never entered into a survey.

But these matters are important for any economic analysis of village life, and figures are obtainable through other methods. There are in effect at least four other ways of obtaining quantitative information that were employed (some much more than others) at different periods in fieldwork. These may be briefly listed in decreasing order of the empirical rigor which they involve.

The availability of scales and tape measures made possible the direct measurement of certain phenomena, and these methods were employed, albeit to a minimal degree, for some phenomena. Some produce was actually weighed to assess the accuracy of the villagers' calculation of the weights of different produce contained in different volume measures commonly utilized. Furthermore some plots were measured to assess the degree of correspondence between informants' reports of their size and their actual size. Direct observation of market transactions, in which urban customers purchased from the female traders of Kinanbwa in Port-au-Prince, were made over extended periods by my wife, providing information on the scope of typical trans-
actions and the speed at which stock was sold and replenished.

But the conditions under which these direct measurements were made was limited. And there are certain types of information—such as income and expenditure patterns—for which observation will be virtually impossible and the investigator will have to elicit verbal data from informants. (The survey, including national censuses, is a research tool of this latter type; it is a form of conversation, and the data elicited are verbal.)

A very promising type of verbal data can be elicited if households and individuals are contacted over an extended period of time, and ongoing information is elicited. Assuming that cooperation from households has been obtained, one can gather daily or weekly accounts of expenditures, activities, movements, and the like. This method was also used to some degree, though not as heavily as the methods described below.

A method which might be called a "retrospective case study" was used extensively. Certain aspects of the cropping cycle which could not be quantified via the survey method were captured in this fashion. In sessions with close informants, questions were posed as to specific plots that had been cropped in the recent past. By asking specific questions about the size of the plot, the amount of seed (or vegetative cutting) that was necessary to plant it, the number of days allocated to each task, the number of fellow villagers called upon to assist, the amount of crop harvested, and the disposition of the harvested crop, some reliable quantitative insights into local agriculture and marketing were obtained. This retrospective data seems broadly reliable, judging from the consistency between informants.
In reality local cultivation involves much cash orientation over and above its subsistence function, and cultivators are thus aware of the general quantitative parameters of their inputs and outputs. Once the cooperation of the cultivators has been obtained, they can provide much accurate information in this fashion.

There is yet another method of quantification which was used throughout fieldwork. This method has the highest danger of inaccuracies and contamination with "ideal" instead of actual figures. But used properly it can also elicit much useful quantitative information. In the retrospective case study mentioned above, the investigator questions informants about specific events in their past history. But informants can also be asked to generalize as to what they think is typical. For some domains this would produce questionable data—e.g. "how many people live in the typical community in this region?" (In fact informants were even inaccurate about the population of their own community, estimates varying from a few hundred to several thousand, but most being far wide of the figure 1,200 which turned out to be the actual population of the community.) Nonetheless there are types of information in which the generalizations of villagers can be taken into account, above all if they are already "experienced" informants who have been "caught" a few times in inaccuracies and are aware of the researcher's interest in exactitude. This type of research tool might be called the "informant generalization."

The domain of crop yields provides again an illustrative case where such an approach might be appropriate. If one wants to know exactly how much rice is produced per hectare locally, the actual
weighing of yields from selected representative plots would be called for. But though such high exactitude is admirable, most social science hypotheses and theories can be perfectly well tested by data which contain a slightly larger margin of error, and it could be questioned whether the tremendous effort involved in weighing yields from a respectable sample of plots is not excessive in terms of the advantages which accrue to the overall research from such high accuracy, in comparison to roughly accurate data gleaned from simpler methods. Dogmatism in this matter can be avoided by a recognition that the issue depends largely on the specific hypotheses which the researcher eventually wants to test. But unless the researcher has some fairly specific hypotheses whose testing hinges on the resolution of exactly how much rice (or other crop) is produced locally on a hectare of land, a rough estimate will probably do. And in a setting where measures are commonly used and calculations made, this rough estimate can be gleaned by asking knowledgeable villagers.

In Kinanbwa informants were asked to bracket what would be excellent, normal, and poor yields for given quantities of different types of land. This setting of three different levels reduced somewhat the danger of eliciting purely ideal "good old days" yields. It is of course necessary to cross-check the estimates of many informants; but the same is true of any other method, including the actual weighing of produce. Any generalization that was based on data from only one plot or one household would be weak, no matter what the exactitude of the measurement carried out. It was found that the creation of three possible levels, and the specification of different conditions,
such as different types of land, was a useful way of producing fairly consistent quantitative estimates of different phenomena.

A major drawback, alluded to above, is that a particular informant might think in terms of the "good old days," when land of course produced the way it was supposed to. But this type of exaggeration disappears when the informant has been interviewed several times. And it vanishes with astonishing rapidity if the information is being elicited in a group interview with three or four cultivators, who will generally call to task any generalization that smacks of absurdity. For attitudinal questions group interviews may bias the results toward the socially acceptable and hence possibly lead to inaccuracies. But for factual questions under normal circumstances, the group interview was found to be productive of highly credible generalizations. Such a strategy was thus widely used in Kinanbwa for eliciting quantitative estimates of phenomena that were important but not amenable to easy investigation through the survey method.

To sum up the preceding, the objective of the above paragraphs was to describe briefly a series of quantification techniques used in Kinanbwa which did not involve the use of the survey methods that were applied for gathering data on other topics; to explain why these alternative techniques were used; and to justify them on the basis of their ability, when circumspectly used, to produce data of sufficient accuracy for many purposes. But the discussion was not meant to be an advocacy of "margins of errors" as generally preferable to exact information. The discussion was rather governed by a best-of-all-worlds image of research in which an investigator 1) has a clear theoretical stance and a concomitant notion of what types of information are most
crucial for addressing themselves to that theory; 2) is aware of and proficient in a wide gamut of differentially effective techniques; 3) arrives at a methodological selection which reflects the theoretical stance, choosing rigorous, time consuming methods for exactitude in data critical to the main hypotheses and less demanding methods for spheres where exactitude would be less important for the main thrust of the research; and 4) specifies in any case what the methods were.

To sum up and conclude this discussion, the preceding pages have discussed on some detail the procedures employed during fieldwork in Kinanbwa. Discussion began with a consideration of the major ethnographic techniques, paying special attention to the ticklish question of eliciting and maintaining informant cooperation over extended periods of time through a system of regular remuneration. Discussion then turned to the methods used in the collection of a large body of quantitative data, and of the various solutions adopted to the problems which arise in such research in rural Third World settings. Despite heavy use of quantification, research in Kinanbwa was a variant of the traditional community study method, in that it adhered to the premise that only intensive, long term field immersion in the life of a specific human group would generate the type of behind-the-scenes, nuts-and-bolts human insights which would provide most of the direction for subsequent data gathering and analysis. The adoption of quantitative techniques was done within this basic framework. Had this dual policy not been adhered to—had research been purely descriptive or purely quantitative—it is unlikely that the latent resource control patterns discussed in these pages would ever have surfaced.
THE DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY

The Demographic Survey involved supplementary funding from the International Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction at Columbia University and was carried out in collaboration with Ms. Kwan-Hwa Chen, a demographer from the Division of Social and Administrative Sciences within that Institute. In response to the paper written after the Exploratory Survey (Murray 1972), Dr. Samuel M. Wishik arranged for Ms. Chen and Dr. Susan Scrimshaw to make a brief visit to Kinanbwa. During this visit the problems which had been encountered with respect to the accuracy of fertility, mortality, and age data were discussed. It was further pointed out that the collection of certain additional demographic data in Kinanbwa would be highly useful for certain types of analyses which were of interest to the Institute. Though basic demographic and sociological data, including age, occupation, education, marital status, and religion, had already been elicited for most adults in Kinanbwa during the Exploratory Survey, the possibility was discussed of re-eliciting this data as well as additional demographic data in a professionally run survey using interviewers, questionnaires, and a number of aging techniques that one member of the Division for Social and Administrative Sciences had already used in another Haitian community (Klein 1972).

The marginality of some of these topics to the ongoing research in Kinanbwa, as well as Ms. Chen's particular interest in exploring the use of baptismal records (which were available in Les Bayahondes) as a source of accurate aging, led to the suggestion that she and I
might collaborate on such a survey in Kinanbwa. A collaborative survey aimed strictly at focused demographic matters would not constitute a duplication of the research already in progress; and Ms. Chen's presence in Kinanbwa to participate in actual data collection would permit regular fieldwork to continue at least to some degree during the survey itself. Furthermore the data, though demographic in nature, would provide some quantitative data that would be of utility to the broader research being conducted as well. A proposal for such a survey was written up and subsequently approved.

During a brief visit to New York arranged for me by Dr. Wishik, a questionnaire was jointly designed by Ms. Chen and myself incorporating the major questions which had been asked already on the Exploratory Survey as well as the additional questions necessary for eliciting the detailed age, fertility, and mortality data that would provide the basis for a focused demographic analysis to be jointly authored by Ms. Chen and myself.

As a preliminary step, my task was to return to Haiti with this questionnaire, translate it into locally effective Creole, and test it out on a few respondents. On completion of this Ms. Chen would join us in Kinanbwa during the actual collection of the data.

While the instrument was being translated and pre-tested, however, a number of problems were encountered which turned this originally intended brief task into a frustrating, full-time activity which brought to a halt other aspects of fieldwork. Of particular difficulty was the construction of truly effective attitudinal questions concerning ideal family size and contraception. A method had to be devised
to circumvent the expressions of submission to God's will which are the conventional responses to this type of questioning in Haiti and which mask the clear preference patterns which had been found to exist in the course of ethnographic fieldwork (Murray 1972:36-42). The construction of an effective survey instrument was proving to be much more difficult and time-consuming than had been anticipated.

But despite the unanticipated drain on time which the pretesting of this instrument occasioned, the experience gleaned in constructing items and in experimenting with different phrasings of questions and in formatting the interview schedule itself made me aware of the tremendous possibilities these methods would have for capturing other patterns as well, and of the inestimable value which quantitative data on general ethnographic patterns would have to my own research. With this in mind, I designed some 150 ethnographic questions.

But the inclusion of these items into the questionnaire was done in a tentative fashion, pending approval from Ms. Chen and a clarification from Dr. Wishik of certain issues to which their inclusion would give rise. For if these items were incorporated, the survey would in effect go drastically beyond the focused content area on which the invitation had first been extended to, and accepted by, the Institute to have one of their researchers briefly join us in Kinanbwa. These additional items would, in the first place, lengthen every interview and thus increase the cost of the survey to that institution. Furthermore the content of the survey would now no longer be tangential to, but would cut to the very heart of, the research into economic and domestic organization which I had been doing for a year in Kinanbwa. The throwing into one basket of all the hard earned research eggs gathered during this year of laborious village field-
work was a serious, decisive step which should be taken only when the conditions of subsequent access to the contents of that basket were clear beyond doubt. The nature of the special funding, and the presence of interdisciplinary collaboration, would subject the data collected in this survey to special institutional control and, possibly, to a concomitant expectation that it should appear solely or principally through the vehicle of joint or plural authorship. Though such institutional restrictions and expectations were eminently appropriate for the originally planned demographic content, they seemed professionally and intellectually inapplicable to the ethnographic items conceived and designed during a mosquito-infested year of solitary fieldwork in Kinabwa.

But whereas the conditions of funding remain recorded in the records, mosquito bites and their evidence quickly vanish. It was feared that eventually all of the quantitative data, including the hard-earned ethnographic insights into economic and domestic patterns, would--by virtue of the presence of collaboration--fall subject to uniform patterns of institutional control and plural access consistent with the funding arrangements under which the data had been collected. If this were the case, it was not desirable to gather data on such matters in the context of a joint survey.

The fear of unwittingly and unintentionally forfeiting personal control over the fruits of extended fieldwork, though a highly delicate topic, was broached in correspondence with Dr. Wishik, who had manifested a constant concern for, and expertise in, the accurate and equitable attribution of professional credit, a con-
cern that was born of lengthy experience in collaborative research. A clarification of the future "rules of the game" with respect to access to the data was requested, and a memorandum was prepared for Dr. Wishik and Ms. Chen specifying the precise items which I had added and which should potentially be cut. If their additional cost was prohibitive to the Institute, or my future access to them was in any way unclear, the ethnographic items should be eliminated, to be pursued by me independently at a later date, and the survey should be restricted to the much briefer and more focused instrument designed by Ms. Chen and myself.

The problem was resolved when the Institute generously approved the instrument in its longer, more expensive form, and graciously refrained from tacking any explicit restrictions on my future access to the envisioned ethnographic treasure house that would be provided by the added items. The result was an expanded survey instrument, unusual in its scope, designed to elicit not only the detailed and accurate data required for demographic purposes, but also a comprehensively broad range of ethnographic patterns such as cropping patterns, land tenure, purchase and sale of plots of land, livestock, house types, exchange labor, residence patterns, details of religious involvement, migration patterns, kin dispersal, bilingualism, sickness, recreation, and other topics--questions which in effect embedded knowledge, insights, and hypotheses that had been gleaned during a year of anthropological fieldwork in rural Haiti.
Ms. Chen then came to Haiti and was a neighbor in our lakou during the weeks in which the survey was run. A division of labor was instituted, involving the unremittingly full-time activity during 16 hour work days, of Ms. Chen, my wife (who was temporarily employed by the DSAS during the survey) and myself. A discussion of the methodological complex used in this survey has already been published (Chen and Murray 1976) and Ms. Chen has begun subjecting the age, fertility, and union data to statistical scrutiny and has uncovered several provocative patterns which suggest that local fertility regulation may be achieved, not by late onset of union or by economically motivated female absenteeism, as had been impressionistically hypothesized, but rather by complex patterns of withdrawal from unions and by the concomitant loss of reproductive time which this withdrawal entails. But age-related patterns of union involvement have also been tentatively linked to age-related patterns of land acquisition which have been documented in these pages, providing the exciting promise of potential causal insights into certain demographic processes and illustrating the power of collaborative research which incorporates methods and queries transcending the conventional boundaries of any one discipline. These findings will be further explored and presented in forthcoming papers. Pending the completion of these reports, an agreement has been reached concerning interim use of the data of the joint survey.

The bulk of the analysis presented in these pages rests on economic and attitudinal data which was gleaned in the other surveys. But tabulations of the major ethnographic items subsequently included in the joint survey have also been presented here, as well as
those key variables relevant to the basic sociological identification of individuals (e.g. age, religion, education, marital status). Though these items had been first collected in the Exploratory Survey, the obsolescence of this latter data in light of the subsequent surveys has made unnecessary their transference to IBM cards, and for these variables the data from our joint survey has been used instead.
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